

E5

Current Class: SECRET
Current Handling: EXDIS
Document Number: 1984STATE079782

Channel: n/a

PAGE 01 STATE 079782
ORIGIN SS-25

RELEASED IN FULL

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:FJRICCIARDONE
APPROVED BY P: LSEAGLEBURGER
NEA: JAPLACKE
P: RRAPHEL
S/SA FAIRBANKS (SUBS)
S/S-O:RDAVIS
S/SMCKINLEY

-----342065 180158Z /60

O P 180139Z MAR 84
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY
AIT TAIPEI FM AIT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 079782 DECAPTIONED

STADIS////////////////////////////////////
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, IZ
SUBJECT: KITTANI CALL ON UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

REF: AMMAN 2536 (NOTAL)

- 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. ACTION REQUESTED PARA 7.

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 079782

3. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY DROPPED IN ON U/S
EAGLEBURGER'S ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH ISMET KITTANI MARCH
15 TO REINFORCE THE MAIN MESSAGE OF THE U.S. SIDE: OUR
CONDEMNATION OF IRAQI CW USE WAS MADE AS PART OF STRONG
U.S. COMMITMENT TO LONG STANDING POLICY, AND NOT AS A

Current Class: SECRET

Current Class: SECRET
 Current Handling: EXDIS
 Document Number: 1984STATE079782

Page: 2

Channel: n/a

PRO-IRANIAN/ANTI-IRAQI GESTURE. OUR DESIRES AND OUR ACTIONS TO PREVENT AN IRANIAN VICTORY AND TO CONTINUE THE PROGRESS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS REMAIN UNDIMINISHED. EAGLEBURGER ELABORATED ON THESE POINTS IN A LARGER DISCUSSION INCLUDING EX-MINISTER OF CULTURE AND INFORMATION HASHIMI, IRAQI CHIEF HAMDOUN, AMB. FAIRBANKS, NEA DAS PLACKE, AND S/P RODMAN. FAIRBANKS DISCUSSED EFFORTS TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF ARMS TO IRAN.

EAGLEBURGER EMPHASIZED CONTINUED STRONG USG SUPPORT FOR IRAQ-JORDAN PIPELINE PROJECT, PROMISING THE USG'S BEST EFFORTS TO SECURE EXIM ASSISTANCE WHEN THIS QUESTION COMES TO EXIM FOR DECISION. HASHIMI NOTED THAT THE GULF COULD "BLOW UP IN YOUR FACE" AT ANY TIME. KITTANI REPORTED ON HIS TALKS ON THE HILL, MENTIONING THE TERRORISM ISSUE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING THE TRANSFER OF OUR EMBASSY TO JERUSALEM. HE URGED THE U.S. TO PAY CAREFUL ATTENTION TO KING HUSSEIN'S STATEMENT OF DISSATISFACTION WITH U.S. POLICY, AND TO AVOID CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT SYRIA HAD WON SOME KIND OF VICTORY OVER THE U.S. IN LEBANON. KITTANI ALSO WAS ASKED TO CONVEY THE VICE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO IRAQI DEPRIMIN TARIQ AZIZ TO VISIT THE VP IN WASHINGTON AT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME. END SUMMARY.

4. CHEMICAL WEAPONS: EAGLEBURGER BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY TAKING KITTANI ASIDE TO EMPHASIZE THE CENTRAL MESSAGE HE WANTED HIM TO TAKE BACK: OUR POLICY OF FIRM OPPOSITION
 SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 079782

TO THE PROHIBITED USE OF CW WHEREVER IT OCCURS NECESSITATED OUR MARCH 5 STATEMENT CONDEMNING IRAQ'S USE OF CW. THE STATEMENT WAS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FUEL FOR KHOMEINI'S PROPAGANDA WAR, NOR TO IMPLY A SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN AND IRAQ. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO HELP PREVENT AN IRANIAN VICTORY, AND EARNESTLY WISHES TO CONTINUE THE PROGRESS IN ITS RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. THE SECRETARY THEN ENTERED AND REITERATED THESE POINTS. KITTANI NOTED THAT THE MARCH 5 STATEMENT REGRETTABLY HAD PLAYED INTO KHOMEINI'S "MEDIA BLITZ," AND THANKED THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY FOR THE CLARIFICATION OF THE U.S. POSITION.

5. ARMS TO IRAN: THE SECRETARY TOOK HIS LEAVE AS KITTANI AND EAGLEBURGER RETURNED TO THE LARGER GROUP. CONTINUING THE DISCUSSION OF U.S. EFFORTS TO PREVENT AN

Current Class: SECRET

Page: 2

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: SECRET
Current Handling: EXDIS
Document Number: 1984STATE079782

Page: 3

Channel: n/a

IRANIAN VICTORY, EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD APPOINTED AMB. FAIRBANKS TO COORDINATE EFFORTS TO CRIMP THE FLOW OF ARMS TO IRAN. HOWEVER, AS WE WILL STATE TO THE PRESS IF ASKED, THERE IS NO NEW "SPECIAL UNIT" WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT DEDICATED TO THIS TASK. FAIRBANKS STRESSED THAT WE COULD NOT HOPE TO STOP ALL WESTERN ARMS FROM REACHING IRAN BECAUSE THE SOURCES ARE DIVERSE, WIDESPREAD, AND OFTEN BEYOND THE REACH OF COOPERATING GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF BASIC AMMUNITION AND EQUIPMENT. NONETHELESS, WE HAVE ACHIEVED SOME SUCCESS, AND ARE FOCUSING ON KEY ITEMS OF SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT THAT ARE EASIER TO TRACE AND IMPORTANT TO IRAN'S WAR EFFORT. AT A MINIMUM, WE ARE CONFIDENT OF HAVING TIGHTENED UP ON DIVERSION OF U.S. CONTROLLED ARMS. DAS PLACKE NOTED THE ADDITIONAL PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING EXPORTS OF DUAL USE EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS THE THOUSANDS OF U.S. MADE OUTBOARD MOTORS IRAN PURCHASED FOR THE SMALL BOATS BEING USED IN THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE. PLACKE DESCRIBED THREE CATEGORIES OF RESPONSES FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS WE HAD APPROACHED: (1) OFFICIAL ASSURANCES

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 079782

REGARDING HALTING SALES, BACKED BY EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS SUCCEEDING IN ENFORCING SUCH ASSURANCES; (2) OFFICIAL ASSURANCES, WITH EVIDENCE OF LEAKAGE OF PRIVATE ARMS SALES; (3) OFFICIAL ASSURANCES, WITH EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT KEEPING ITS ASSURANCES.

6. SOUTH KOREA, TAIWAN, GREECE, SPAIN: HASHIMI SAID IRAQ BELIEVES SOUTH KOREA IS AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF IRANIAN ARMS. KITTANI MENTIONED TAIWAN AS ANOTHER SOURCE. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT WHILE NORTH KOREA REMAINS IRAN'S MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIER, ELEMENTS OF THE ROK APPARENTLY ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH THE POLICY DECISION, AS EXPRESSED BY THE ROK MFA, TO PROHIBIT MILITARY SALES TO IRAN. HE HAD PERSONALLY RAISED THIS WITH FM LEE BUM SUK SHORTLY BEFORE HIS ASSASSINATION, AND HAD RENEWED HIS PERSONAL INTERVENTION WITH LEE'S SUCCESSOR LEE WON KYUNG. FAIRBANKS NOTED THAT WE HAD FOUND THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS ALSO HAVE THE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL COORDINATION AMONG MFA, DEFENSE, AND EXPORTING AGENCIES. KITTANI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS MAY BE THE CASE IN SPAIN AND GREECE, FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH OF WHOM HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND HAD RECEIVED IRAQI DEMARCHES ON THIS ISSUE.

Current Class: SECRET

Page: 3

UNCLASSIFIED

7. AQABA PIPELINE/EXIM: EAGLEBURGER STATED THAT WE WILL NOT TRY TO HIDE FROM IRAQ THE FACT THAT WITHIN EXIM THERE IS A PESSIMISTIC VIEW, BASED ONLY ON ECONOMIC CONCERNS, OF THE WISDOM OF LOANS TO IRAQ. EAGLEBURGER SAID HE HAS SPOKEN WITH EXIM CHAIRMAN DRAPER, WHO UNDERSTANDS THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN EXIM FINANCING PROJECTS AS POSSIBLE IN IRAQ. EAGLEBURGER ASSURED THE IRAQIS THAT DESPITE THE NEGATIVE POSITION OF EXIM'S BOARD, THE DEPARTMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION CAN EXERCISE SOME INFLUENCE ON SPECIFIC

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 079782

CASES. HE PROMISED THAT THE DEPARTMENT AND ADMINISTRATION WILL MAKE THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO SECURE EXIM ASSISTANCE FOR THE AQABA PIPELINE, SHOULD THE U.S. FIRMS INVOLVED APPLY FOR SUCH FINANCING, AND SAID WE ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT WE CAN GET EXIM TO DEAL IMAGINATIVELY WITH IRAQ. EAGLEBURGER EXPLAINED THAT BECAUSE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF BECHTEL IN THE AQABA PIPELINE, THE SECRETARY IS KEEPING COMPLETELY ISOLATED FROM THE ISSUE. IRAQ SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THIS DOES NOT IMPLY A LACK OF HIGH LEVEL USG INTEREST. KITTANI NOTED IRAQ'S

UNDERSTANDING OF THIS POINT, AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR USG SUPPORT FOR THE PIPELINE PROJECT. AMMAN ACTION REQUESTED: YOU MAY DRAW ON FOREGOING AS APPROPRIATE TO MAKE CLEAR SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR THE IRAQ-AQABA PIPELINE PROJECT (REFTEL).

8. GULF WAR: HASHIMI STATED THE GULF "COULD BLOW UP IN YOUR FACE" AT ANY TIME. KITTANI QUICKLY STATED IRAQ'S HOPE THAT IT WOULD BLOW UP "NOT IN THE U.S.' FACE, BUT IN KHOMEINI'S," AND THANKED EAGLEBURGER FOR THE UNDERSTANDING HE HAD SHOWN FOR IRAQ'S SITUATION IN THEIR MEETING LAST SEPTEMBER. EAGLEBURGER REITERATED THAT THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THAT IRAQ IS AT WAR AND WILL NATURALLY PUT ITS OWN INTERESTS FIRST, BUT URGED IRAQ TO MAKE VERY CAREFUL CALCULATIONS OF THE POSSIBLY MONSTROUS CONSEQUENCES OF ITS ACTIONS IN THE AREA. HASHIMI STATED THAT IRAQ HAS A RIGHT TO CUT OFF IRAN'S OIL EXPORTS IF IT DOES NOT ALLOW IRAQ TO ENJOY THIS RIGHT. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO BE "RIGHT" AND STILL DO SOMETHING THAT WOULD WORK AGAINST EVERYONE'S INTERESTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WERE MANY IN VIENNA IN 1914 WHO WERE CONVINCED OF A RIGHT TO REDRESS FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHDUKE FERDINAND. AS IN EUROPE IN 1914, THE GULF IS THE INTERSECTION OF VITAL INTERESTS TO MANY PARTIES

Current Class: SECRET

Page: 4

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: SECRET
Current Handling: EXDIS
Document Number: 1984STATE079782

Page: 5

Channel: n/a

BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE DISPUTE.
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 079782

9. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY: KITTANI REPORTED ON HIS MEETINGS THE PREVIOUS DAY WITH SENATORS BAKER AND BOSCHUITZ (JOINTLY, FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF), AND CONGRESSMAN HAMILTON. KITTANI NOTED STRONG CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENTS ON THE CW ISSUE, AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR BOSCHWITZ' APOLOGY FOR OTHERS' EFFORTS TO RE-IMPOSE ANTI-TERRORISM CONTROLS ON EXPORTS TO IRAQ AND PROMISE TO DO HIS BEST TO MODIFY SUCH LEGISLATION. KITTANI EMPHASIZED THAT TRANSFER OF THE U.S. EMBASSY TO JERUSALEM WOULD CAUSE SEVERE PROBLEMS FOR THE U.S.' FRIENDS IN THE REGION. NOTING THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY WELL AWARE OF THE DOMESTIC COMPLEXITIES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, HE STATED THAT EVEN HE IS SOMETIMES "FLABBERGASTED BY ITS VICISSITUDES." THERE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY TO INFLUENCE US FOREIGN POLICY IS TO TAKE US HOSTAGES OR KILL US MARINES. AS SOON AS THE U.S. HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED FROM IRAN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. FORGOT ABOUT THE THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS POSED BY KHOMEINI. KITTANI SAID THAT THE U.S.' INABILITY TO PURSUE A STEADY FOREIGN POLICY COURSE, UNDETERRED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING CASUALTIES, IS AFFECTING THE U.S. POSITION IN THE GULF. EAGLEBURGER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT OUR REVULSION AT ACCEPTING CASUALTIES IS A PROBLEM IN PROTECTING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS.

10. JORDAN: KITTANI URGED THE U.S. TO GIVE CAREFUL ATTENTION TO KING HUSSEIN'S STATEMENTS OF MISGIVINGS OVER U.S. POLICIES; THE KING IS VERY WISE AND THOUGHTFUL AND IS ONE OF OUR BEST AND OLDEST FRIENDS WHO TRIES VERY HARD TO MAINTAIN THE FRIENDSHIP. KITTANI HOPED THE KING'S NEW YORK TIMES INTERVIEW OF MARCH 15 WOULD NOT SET BACK U.S.-JORDANIAN RELATIONS. EAGLEBURGER REPLIED THAT WE

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 079782

VALUE OUR RELATIONS WITH JORDAN AND PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE KING'S ADVICE; WE WORK EQUALLY HARD AT MAINTAINING OUR FRIENDSHIP. HOWEVER, SOMETIMES THE KING IS WRONG, AND WE HAVE TOLD HIM SO. WE WOULD PREFER TO DISCUSS OUR PROBLEMS IN PRIVATE, NOT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES. THE KING'S LATEST STATEMENTS HAVE MADE A DIFFICULT JOB IN THE CONGRESS ONLY MUCH WORSE. NONETHELESS, THE STRAINED

Current Class: SECRET

Page: 5

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Class: SECRET
Current Handling: EXDIS
Document Number: 1984STATE079782

Page: 6

Channel: n/a

ATMOSPHERE WILL PASS QUICKLY AND WILL HAVE NO IMPACT ON OUR FIRM FRIENDSHIP FOR JORDAN AND COMMITMENT TO ITS SOVREIGNTY AND SECURITY.

11. SYRIA: KITTANI SAID THE U.S. MEDIA ARE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPPORTING THE PERCEPTION THAT SYRIA HAD ACHIEVED SOME KIND OF VICTORY IN LEBANON; HE URGED THAT THE USG NOT SUPPORT SUCH AN UNFOUNDED PERCEPTION. IN IRAQ'S VIEW, SYRIA WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE ITS OWN SERIOUS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS AT HOME AND IN LEBANON, WHERE IT CAN ACHIEVE NOTHING CONSTRUCTIVE. AS ELSEWHERE IN ARAB AFFAIRS, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO IRAQ, SYRIA CAN ONLY HAVE SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE AS A SPOILER. THE RECENT ARAB LEAGUE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN BAGHDAD IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF SYRIA'S ISOLATION: THE ARABS' UNEXPECTEDLY STRONG CONDEMNATION OF IRAN WAS AN IMPLICIT CONDEMNATION OF SYRIA AS WELL. EAGLEBURGER AGREED THAT ASSAD HAS HIS OWN PROBLEMS IN LEBANON AND AT HOME, AND WE GENERALLY SHARE THE IRAQI ASSESSMENT.

12. BILATERAL RELATIONS/VP INVITATION: EAGLEBURGER CLOSED THE MEETING BY REITERATING U.S. DESIRE TO SEE RELATIONS CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AT THE PACE IRAQ FINDS APPROPRIATE. AFTER THE MEETING, EAGLEBURGER ASKED KITTANI TO CONVEY TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ THE VICE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION FOR A WASHINGTON VISIT AT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME LATER THIS YEAR. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THE HEAVY TRAVEL BURDEN OF THE VP IN THE LATER

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 079782

WEEKS OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AS A FACTOR IN WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATE. SHULTZ

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Current Class: SECRET

Page: 6

UNCLASSIFIED