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B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)



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	ACDA-12	SSN-01	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	SSA-02
	SPD-02	/095 W					

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P 281024Z MAR 85  
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8407  
INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 0892

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IZ, JO, EG  
SUBJECT: VIEWS OF THE JORDANIAN AND EGYPTIAN AMBASSADORS ON  
IRAQ: THE WAR, THE PEACE PROCESS, AND INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: [REDACTED]

BELIEVE THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF MUBARAK'S VISIT TO IRAQ WAS ALMOST TOTALLY SYMBOLIC. THEY AGREE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS QUITE MOVED BY THE GESTURE. BOTH CREDIT IRAQ WITH HAVING PLAYED A VERY POSITIVE BEHIND THE SCENES ROLE IN ENCOURAGING THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INTERVENTION WITH MUBARAK CONTRIBUTED TO MUBARAK'S DECISION NOT TO LEAVE THE PLO TO ITS OWN DEVICES. BOTH MEN SHARE THE BELIEF THAT IRAQ'S CURRENT PRAGMATISM AND MODERATION REFLECT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CONVICTIONS AND REPRESENT A LONG-TERM SHIFT IN IRAQ'S POLICIES THAT WILL OUTLAST THE WAR. NEITHER SEES AN IRAQI-SYRIAN RECONCILIATION IN THE CARDS. BOTH MEN SUGGESTED THAT IRAQ WOULD HAVE EMBRACED MODERATE POSITIONS MORE QUICKLY AND

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WITH GREATER ENTHUSIASM IF THE LEADERSHIP WAS NOT CONCERNED WITH LOOKING WEAK WHILE THE WAR CONTINUED. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING A MARCH 26 MEETING WITH CHARGE, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CONFIRMED THAT THE REAL IMPORTANCE OF LAST WEEK'S VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO BAGHDAD WAS THAT IT OCCURRED AT ALL. HE CLAIMED THAT RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND IRAQ HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED, BUT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD BEEN MOVED BY THE GESTURE OF SUPPORT. HE FURTHER INDICATED THAT IRAQ, ALTHOUGH INITIALLY UNHAPPY ABOUT THE SILENCE OF THE GULF STATES DURING THE BATTLE IN THE MARSHES, WAS NOW VERY PLEASED WITH THE "UNPRECEDENTED" STATEMENT OF SUPPORT THE GCC HAD GIVEN IRAQ. THE IRAQIS, HESAI, FELT THAT THE IRANIANS COULD NOT HELP BUT NOTE THAT THEIR EFFORTS TO NEUTRALIZE BULF SUPPORT FOR IRAQ HAD FAILED ABJECTLY. WHENEVER THE IRANIANS LAUNCH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE, HE OBSERVED, THE GULF STATES QUICKLY LOSE THEIR COMPLACENCY ABOUT THE WAR AND RECALL THAT THE ONLY THING THAT STANDS BETWEEN THEM AND DISASTER IS IRAQ.

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4. IN DISCUSSING ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE, [REDACTED] SAID HE DID NOT EXPECT IRAQ TO GO PUBLIC WITH ITS SUPPORT FOR A HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT NOR DID HE EXPECT THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD PUSH PLO LEADERS SUCH AS THE RECENT VISITING SALAH KHALAF (ABU IYAD) TO TAKE A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE WITH JORDAN. HE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RECALL THAT IRAQ HAD COME A LONG WAY BUT THAT BAATHIST PRINCIPLES STILL PFEVAILED AND THAT IRAQ DID NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE TAKING MEASURES CONTRARY TO ITS FORMER POLICIES OUT OF WEAKNESS. (AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION [REDACTED] EXPRESSED SEVERE DISAPPOINTMENT WITH WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS A LACK OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT IN VIEW OF THE CONSIDERABLE RISKS THEY WERE TAKING. HIS CRITICISMS AND CHARGE'S

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REBUTTALS WERE ALONG THE FAMILIAR LINES OF SUCH CONVERSATIONS. CHARGE JOIKED THAT DURING THE MARCH 25 MEETING HELD BETWEEN SECRETARY SHULTZ AND TARIQ AZIZ, EACH MAY HAVE URGED THE OTHER TO BE MORE SUPPORTIVE OF THE KING'S INITIATIVE.)

5. [REDACTED] CONFIRMED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD TOLD MUBARAK AND HUSSEIN THAT IRAN HAD R-17 MISSILES AND ASKED CHARGE IF HE KNEW WHAT THAT MEANT. CHARGE REPLIED THAT THESE WERE

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SCUD-B MISSILES. [REDACTED] ALSO AFFIRMED THAT THEY HAD BEEN TOLD BY SADDAM THAT SIX SUCH MISSILES HAD BEEN ACQUIRED FROM LIBYA. HOWEVER, IN STATING THIS, KABARATI MENTIONED IN PASSING THE POSSIBILITY THAT NORTH KOREA WAS A SUPPLIER BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

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6. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S QUERY [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT BASED ON EVERYTHING HE HAD SEEN AND HEARD DURING HIS TIME N BAGHDAD, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT SO LONG AS SADDAM WAS RULING THE COUNTRY, IRAQ WOULD CONTINUE ON ITS PRESENT PRAGMATIC COURSE. HE BELIEVED THIS WOULD BE TRUE EVEN AFTER THE WAR ENDED. IN HIS OPINION THERE WAS NO FORE-SEEABLE POSSIBILITY OF IRAQI- SYRIAN RECONCILIATION. IRAQ WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS ON A STATE-TO-STATE BASIS, BUT SYRIA'S INSISTENCE ON STARTING WITH UNIFICATION OF THE TWO WINGS OF THE PARTY ONLY DEMONSTRATED ITS LACK OF INTEREST IN ANY SUCH IMPROVEMENT.

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7. IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION ON MARH 27 WITH [REDACTED] [REDACTED] CHARGE COVERED MUCH THE SAME GROUND.

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[REDACTED] AFTER MUBARAK DEPARTED SADDAM HUSSEIN SEEMED ALMOST EUPHORIC.

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8. [REDACTED] HE COULD NOT HELP BUT BELIEVE THIS GESTURE WOULD FURTHER ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO RE-ESTABLISH FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. HE CONFIRMED PREVIOUS REPORTS THAT THE TALKS HAD LARGELY INVOLVED SADDAM

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P 281024Z MAR 85  
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8408  
INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BAGHDAD 0892

HUSSEIN'S RECOUNTING OF THE BATTLES WHICH HAD JUST BEEN FOUGHT N THE MARSHES AND A REVIEW OF ARAB SUPPORT FOR IRAQ'S WAR EFFORT. SADDAM BITTERLY CRITICIZED ASSAD AND QADHAFI AND PREDICTED THAT THEY WOULD SOON PASS FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE. [REDACTED] THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED ABOUT GULF ARAB SUPPORT FOR IRAQ AS OF THE TIME OF THE VISIT. HE SAID T WAS HIS FEELING THAT THE PRO-IRAQI GCC RESOLUTION ISSUED THE DAY FOLLOWING THE MUBARAK-HUSSEIN VISIT IN LARGE MEASURE WAS INFLUENCED BYTHE VISIT ITSELF AND IRAQ WAS NOW PLEASED.

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4. IN QUERYING [REDACTED] ABOUT ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS CHARGE CHARACTERIZED IRAQ'S POSITION AS ONE OF "QUIET SUPPORT". [REDACTED] DISAGREED, SAYING IT WAS ONE OF "ACTIVE SUPPORT". IRAQ, HE SAID, WAS PLAYING A MUCH MORE POSITIVE ROLE THAN WAS REALIZED. HE CITED SEVERAL EXAMPLES TO SUPPORT HIS CONTENTION. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] FURTHER CLAIMED THAT IRAQ EARLIER HAD PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENCOURAGING ARAFAT TO BE FORTHCOMING IN HIS TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAID THAT THE IRAQIS WERE SURPRISINGLY MODERATE. ONLY HALF JOKINGLY, HE SAID AT TIMES HE FOUND HIMSELF FEELING THAT THE IRAQI LEADERS WITH WHOM HE SPOKE WERE MORE DOVISH THAN HE. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN BELIEVED THAT HE ARABS HAD TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN NOW WHAT WAS POSSIBLE. CHARGE SAID IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT IRAQ ARGUED THERE WAS NO REASON FOR IT TO DEAL WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 242 AND 338 SINCE IT DID NOT HAVE A COMMON BORDER WITH ISRAEL.

[REDACTED] AGREED BUT SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD IRAQI OFFICIALS SPEAK POSITIVELY OF BOTH RESOLUTIONS.

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9. [REDACTED] ALSO TOOK THE POSITION THAT IRAQ'S PRAGMATIC POLICIES WOULD OUTLIVE THE WAR. IN FACT, HE ASSERTED, IRAQ WOULD HAVE MOVED MORE QUICKLY TO EMBRACE MODERATE ARAB POSITIONS HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE WAR WITH IRAN. THE IRAQIS, HE OBSERVED, WERE VERY CONCERNED NOT TO APPEAR TO BE ACTING OUT OF WEAKNESS AND THIS HAD SOMETIMES CAUSED THEM TO HOLD BACK. HE DID NOT SEE ANY PROSPECTS FOR A SYRIAN-IRAQI RAPPROCHEMENT BUT BLAMED THIS ON SYRIA RATHER THAN IRAQ.

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10. COMMENT: BOTH [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] AMONG THE BEST OBSERVERS OF THE LOCAL SCENE. WE ARE STRUCK BY [REDACTED] CONFIDENTIAL

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[REDACTED] COMMENTS CONCERNING IRAQ'S ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH TEND TO GIVE THE IRAQIS MUCH MORE CREDIT THAN THEY WOULD GIVE THEMSELVES. WE SUSPECT AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S TRUE ROLE LIES SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THESE TWO MEN.

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[REDACTED] KATTOUF

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