INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00198768
ENVELOPE
CDSN = CPS140   MCN = 94364/25925  TOR = 943641929
RTTZYUW RUEKCS8137 3641927-8665—RUEANSS.
ZNY-69555
HEADER
R 301927Z DEC 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADM/OCIA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLMBAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSSA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSCC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAM/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEHCC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIJA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMGRA/CPO GARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUDHSRC/CDRUSASOC WASHINGTON DC//DI//
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 301550Z DEC 94
TO RUEKCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO
RUEHNU/USDAO MANAGUA NU
RUEHSN/USDAO SAN SALVADOR
RHLBAAL/USCINCSC Quarry Heights PM//SCJ2//
BT
CONTROLS
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02
SECRET NOFORN

SERIAL: (U) IIR

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ***********/
BODY
COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT).

SUBJ: IIR          EZLN STRENGTH (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED
SECRET NOFORN.
SUMMARY: (S//NF) MX MILITARY ESTIMATES EZLN ARMED STRENGTH AT 5,000 COMBATANTS, WITH FIVE TO TEN SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR EACH ARMED COMBATANT. GT ARMY PREPARES CONTINGENCIES IN CASE OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN MX ARMY AND EZLN.

TEXT: 1. (S//NF) THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CHIAPAS, MEXICO, HAD INFORMED THE GT ARMY THEY ESTIMATED CURRENT EZLN (ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY) STRENGTH AT APPROXIMATELY 5,000 ARMED COMBATANTS. THESE COMBATANTS ARE WELL ARMED WITH MOSTLY AK-47'S OR M-16'S, NOT THE POOR WEAPONRY SEEN WHEN THE EZLN FIRST APPEARED IN JANUARY 1994. FURTHER ESTIMATED THAT FOR EVERY ONE ARMED ZAPATISTA COMBATANT, THERE WERE FROM FIVE TO TEN ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL FORMING THE EZLN SUPPORT NETWORK IN CHIAPAS.

2. (S//NF) BECAUSE OF THE CEASEFIRE DECLARED IN JANUARY 1994, THE MX ARMY HAD IN EFFECT Ceded A LARGE AREA TO THE FULL CONTROL OF THE EZLN. THE EZLN HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THIS SITUATION TO BECOME BETTER ORGANIZED AND ARMED. LIKewise, THERE ARE MANY UNIMPEDED ACCESS AREAS INTO EZLN CONTROLLED TERRITORY THAT FACILITATE WEAPONS SMUGGLING TO THE EZLN. MOST LIKELY, WEAPONS WERE SMUGGLED THROUGH NORTHERN BELIZE AND THE NORTHERN PETEN DEPARTMENT OF GUATEMALA, DESCRIBED AS "WIDE OPEN" FOR SUCH SMUGGLING, INTO MX TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY THE EZLN.

THE FSLN WHEN THEY OVERTHREW THE SOMOZA REGIME IN 1979, PROVIDING A LINK BETWEEN THE FSLN AND THE EZLN. Efraín ((Bamaca)) Velasquez, the ORPA (Poor People's Army) leader, had also served as one of the "internationalists" with the FSLN in 1979.

4. (S/N) As a result of the problems in Chiapas, cooperation has increased significantly between the MX and GT armies. 

   Even with 5,000 armed combatants, the EZLN is not a military threat to the MX army. The problem is much more political than military. For example, the GT army had faced a similar sized insurgent force from the URNG in 1980 and 1981, and was able to defeat them and isolate them in reduced numbers to a few small areas of the country. However, it had been a bloody struggle with high political costs for the GOG. MX faces a similar dilemma—they can defeat the EZLN, but the combat would be bloody with high political costs.

5. (S/N) In the meantime, the GT army is preparing contingency plans in case open hostilities resume between the MX army and the EZLN, whether it is initiated by either side. For the moment, those GT units on the border have been placed on an increased state of alert. GT units have detected no EZLN presence along the MX-GT border during December, however. 

   If any armed EZLN forces do cross into GT, they will be combatted by the GT army. If hostilities do resume in Chiapas, the GT army also expects a large flow of MX refugees into GT, and much of the planning is concerned with how to deal with such a situation.

COMMENTS: 1. (S/N)