



20 July 1994

In reply refer to:
I-94/16596

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

SUBJECT: DoD Support for Humanitarian Efforts in Rwanda (U)

(U) Last night, prior to my NightLine taping, we met to discuss DoD support to ameliorating the horrendous conditions in Rwanda. Dick Clarke and Doug Bennett joined Walt Slocombe, Admiral Owens and an array of OSD and Joint Staff representatives in the meeting. Let me offer you a synopsis.

(C) During the next 24-48 hours we plan to move on several fronts. First, USCINCEUR will deploy a survey team to Goma in Zaire. The team, to include experts in logistics, health and sanitation, engineering and transportation, will have two functions: to assess possible DoD assistance and to start helping UN and French authorities in areas of our expertise such as flight scheduling, airfield throughput operations, onward movement of supplies, security, communications support, and health services. Second, we will dispatch another team to France to facilitate coordination with their MFA and MOD. Third, we will offer to augment the UNHCR with a logistic planning cell in Geneva.

(C) After our deployed experts feed us back some analysis, we are willing to consider further steps. Here is a list of some possible responses:

- Deploy runway repair team
- Provide night capability at Goma airfield
- Deploy an airlift control element
- Provide excess medical supplies
- Deploy preventative medicine elements
- Provide water distribution equipment, bladders, ROWPUs
- Provide trucks
- Provide rations

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- Deploy Special Forces Teams or a Group
- Deploy PSYOP unit(s)
- Provide civil affairs personnel to assist in the UN relief operation
- Provide additional airlift

(U) Funding: Approximately \$8M of the \$15M DoD humanitarian assistance funds identified for transportation support remain. State is passing \$19M to the UN which may be helpful as we work in concert with UNHCR; perhaps State and other agencies can offer other similar contributions. Beyond that we see two possibilities. The first is a Presidential drawdown under section 506a2, but that isn't cash and would mean pulling goods and services out of serving Army units, with possible impact on readiness. We would also be willing to pursue an emergency DoD reprogramming.

(Ø) As we begin to immerse ourselves more deeply, two factors are critical. First, we will be playing a supportive role to the UN and the French, nothing more. Second, while we work to save lives in Zaire, the international community must find a way to convince Rwandan refugees to return home as soon as possible.

(Ø) Currently, Hutu refugees prefer the uncertainties of Goma to what they see as almost certain death at the hands of avenging Tutsis. Security in Rwanda is key to bringing the refugees back. UNAMIR forces in Rwanda must provide this security; working in tandem with UNHCR, they must become a "magnet" to draw Hutus home as U.S. forces helped draw Kurds back to northern Iraq. As I told Ted Koppel last night, our model is not Somalia but Provide Comfort.

(Ø) Your staff is working with State and USUN to try to reconfigure UNAMIR from a heavy mostly African force to a light force with a substantial component of First World militaries with the logistical skills to assist in refugee repatriation and humanitarian assistance inside of Rwanda. Walt alerted Bob Hunter yesterday that we and the UN may be calling on our NATO allies in this regard. At the same time, we must continue to facilitate political reconciliation through international and bilateral channels. State is working this and of course we stand by to help.

cc: Strobe Talbott
General Shalikashvili

