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AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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PRO-EX

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 13062 00 OF 03 111153Z
ACTION EUR-00

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PARIS 13062 00 OF 03 111153Z

8817 AF9610

THE BASIS OF FRENCH THINKING ON RWANDA

INFO AS-01 EPS-02 AFRA-01 EXED-01 DASD-01 ZF-01 DEO-01 CG-01
BY-01 UG-01 TZ-01 AFP-01 RW-01 /014 A3 SDB

INFO LOG-00 AF-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OAS-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 EB-00 HA-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 10-16
L-00 ADS-00 NSAF-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01
PH-00 PRS-01 P-01 SCT-03 SNP-00 SP-00 SF-00
SS-00 STR-01 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 RPE-01 PHB-00
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0 111153Z MAY 94
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4609
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
USMISSION GENEVA
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WINDHOEK AND BRUSSELS FOR A/S MOOSE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RV, FR
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH THE FRENCH ON RWANDA: SHARED

OBJECTIVES, DIFFERENT LOGIC

REF: PARIS 12973 AND PREVIOUS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN PREPARATION FOR THE MAY 13 TALKS ON
CENTRAL AFRICA IN BRUSSELS, WE WOULD LIKE TO PULL
TOGETHER IN ONE MESSAGE THE CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF OUR
REPORTING AND ANALYSIS ON FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN THE
RWANDA CRISIS. THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND GOF THINKING
HAS BEEN A SEARCH FOR EQUILIBRIUM IN AN INHERENTLY
UNSTABLE REGION WHERE FRENCH INFLUENCE AND INTERESTS
ARE AT STAKE. IN THE GOF VIEW, THE RPF DRIVE FOR POWER
SINCE 1990 IS AT THE HEART OF THE CRISIS.

PERSONAL TIES

3. FRANCE HAD A LONG AND TANGLED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
HABYARIMANA GOVERNMENT. HABYARIMANA REPORTEDLY
SUPPORTED PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE
AT LA BAULE, INCLUDING IN DIFFICULT CLOSED-DOOR
SESSIONS, THUS PROMPTING A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE TWO MEN.

5. FRANCES'S OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE SINCE THE START OF
THE 1990 RPF ATTACKS IN 1990 HAS BEEN TO STABILIZE THE
REGION. THE GOF MILITARY INTERVENTION TO IN 1992-93
WAS NOT INTENDED ENSURE A CONTINUED HUTU SUPREMACY
BUT RATHER TO TO SHORE-UP A WEAKENED HABYARIMANA
LONG-ENOUGH TO PERMIT HIM TO NEGOTIATE A POWER-SHARING
AGREEMENT WITH THE RPF.

ARUSHA

ARUSHA ACCORDS, THE GOF CONSIDERED AN AGREEMENT
ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY FOR RWANDA'S AND REGIONAL STABILITY
BUT ALSO AS A BASIS FOR EXTRICATING GOF FORCES.

RIVALRIES

8. THE COMMON WISDOM CONCERNING A FRANCO-BELGIAN
RIVALRY FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THE FORMER BELGIAN
COLONIES SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A MAJOR ELEMENT IN
FRENCH THINKING CONCERNING RWANDA. FROM A GOF
PERSPECTIVE, THE RIVALRY QUESTION HAS LONG SINCE BEEN
RESOLVED IN PARIS' FAVOR, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE
GREATER AID RESOURCES THE GOF BRINGS TO THE TABLE.

SINCE FRENCH ECONOMIC INTERESTS ARE SLIGHT AND UNLIKELY
TO GROW SIGNIFICANTLY, THERE IS NO ECONOMIC RIVALRY
EITHER.

Date: 1/28/94
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MR Cases Only:
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IN PART
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FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

PP
B1, 1.5 (w)
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Dept of State, RPS/RFS, Margaret R. Grafield, Dir.
() Classify as () Extend as () Downgrade to
Date 3/7/02 Declassify on 05/14/29 Reason 25X4

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Mandatory Review
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PAGE 02 OF 02 PARIS 13062 00 OF 03 111153Z

8817 AF9610

PARIS 13062 00 OF 03 111153Z

8817 AF9610

COME UNDER INTERNATIONAL "ATTACK", IT COULD OVERTURN
PROGRESS MADE ON REESTABLISHING STABILITY.

15. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

HARRIMAN

B1

B1

WHAT DO THE FRENCH WANT -- AND WHAT WILL THEY DO?

B1

12. IN THE ABSENCE OF A MEDIA CAMPAIGN OR PARLIAMENTARY
PRODDING, THERE IS LITTLE PRESSURE ON THE GOF TO ACT,
~~EXCEPT TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.~~ OVERALL
FRENCH OBJECTIVES IN RWANDA ARE, IN FACT, CLOSE TO
OURS: STOP THE MASSACRES; ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE; CONVENE
A REGIONAL CONFERENCE THAT WILL PERMIT HUMANITARIAN AID
TO BEGIN. EXPRESSING LOATHING FOR THE MASSACRES.

B1

13. THE FRENCH SUPPORT, IN PRINCIPLE, A NEW UN FORCE
IN RWANDA BUT DO NOT AGREE WITH THE UNSYG'S IDEA OF AN

INTERPOSITION FORCE UNTIL THERE IS AN EFFECTIVE
CEASE-FIRE. IN THE ABSENCE OF A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT,
THE GOF IS OPEN TO ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF CARRYING OUT
EMERGENCY AID IN RWANDA. AT A MINIMUM, THEY WOULD
INSIST ON AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE HUMANITARIAN MEASURES.

14. THE GOF WOULD SUPPORT A UN ARMS EMBARGO SINCE
OFFICIAL AID HAS STOPPED. THE REAL IMPACT FOR FRANCE
WOULD BE SLIGHT

B1

THE GOF WILL SUPPORT A UMHRC
SPECIAL SESSION ON RWANDA BUT MOVE CAUTIOUSLY. THE
FRENCH WILL LIKELY INSIST THAT THE FOCUS OF
INVESTIGATIONS BE ON "INDIVIDUALS" IN ORDER TO SPARE
HUTU ORGANIZATIONS AND GOV INSTITUTIONS FROM A CLOSE
SCRUTINY. IN FRENCH THINKING, SHOULD HUTU INSTITUTIONS

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