Washington, D.C. - July 8, 2004 - "You should tell
[Suharto] that we understand the problems they face in West Irian,"
national security adviser Henry Kissinger wrote President Nixon
on the eve of Nixon's July 1969 visit to Indonesia. On the 35th
anniversary of West Papua's so-called "Act of Free Choice"
and Indonesia's first direct presidential elections, the National
Security Archive posted recently declassified
documents on U.S. policy deliberations leading to Indonesia's
controversial 1969 annexation of the territory. The documents detail
United States support for Indonesia's heavy-handed takeover of West
Papua despite overwhelming Papuan opposition and United Nations
requirements for genuine self-determination.
Background
When Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands in
1949, the Dutch government retained control over the territory of
West New Guinea. From 1949 until 1961 the Indonesian government
sought to "recover" West New Guinea (later known as West
Irian or West Papua), arguing that the territory, a part of the
former Netherlands East Indies, rightfully belonged with Indonesia.
In late 1961, after repeated and unsuccessful attempts to secure
its goals through the United Nations, Indonesia's President Sukarno
declared a military mobilization and threatened to invade West New
Guinea and annex it by force. The Kennedy administration, fearing
that U.S. opposition to Indonesian demands might push the country
toward Communism, sponsored talks between the Netherlands and Indonesia
in the spring of 1962. Negotiations took place under the shadow
of ongoing Indonesian military incursions into West New Guinea and
the threat of an Indonesian invasion.
The U.S.-sponsored talks led to the August 1962 New York Agreement,
which awarded Indonesia control of West New Guinea (which it promptly
renamed West Irian) after a brief transitional period overseen by
the UN. (Note 1) The agreement
obligated Jakarta to conduct an election on self-determination with
UN assistance no later than 1969. Once in control, however, Indonesia
quickly moved to repress political dissent by groups demanding outright
independence for the territory.
U.S. officials understood at the outset that Indonesia would never
allow West Irian to become independent and that it was unlikely
to ever allow a meaningful act of self-determination to take place.
The Johnson and Nixon administrations were equally reluctant to
challenge Indonesian control over West Irian, especially after the
conservative anti-Communist regime of General Suharto took over
in 1966 following an abortive coup attempt which led to the slaughter
of an estimated 500,000 alleged Communists. Suharto quickly moved
to liberalize the Indonesian economy and open it to the West, passing
a new foreign investment law in late 1967. The first company to
take advantage of the law was the American mining company Freeport
Sulphur, which gained concessions to vast tracts of land in West
Irian containing gold and copper reserves. (Note
2)
Over six weeks from July to August 1969, U.N. officials conducted
the so-called "Act of Free Choice." Under the articles
of the New York Agreement (Article 18) all adult Papuans had the
right to participate in an act of self-determination to be carried
out in accordance with international practice. Instead, Indonesian
authorities selected 1022 West Papuans to vote publicly and unanimously
in favor of integration with Indonesia.
Despite significant evidence that Indonesia had failed to meet
its international obligations, in November 1969 the United Nations
"took note" of the "Act of Free Choice" and
its results, thereby lending support of the world body to Indonesia's
annexation.
Thirty-five years later, as Indonesia holds its first-ever direct
Presidential elections, the international community has come to
question the validity of Jakarta's takeover of West Papua and the
ongoing human rights abuses there. In March, 88 members of the Irish
Parliament urged United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to
review the United Nations' role in the 1969 Act of Free Choice,
joining South African Archibishop Desmond Tutu and scores of non-governmental
organizations and European Parliamentarians. On June 28, 2004, nineteen
U.S. Senators sent a letter to Annan urging the appointment of a
Special Representative to Indonesia to monitor the human rights
situation in West Papua and the territory of Aceh.
The
Documents
The Archive's postings include a confidential
February 1968 cable from U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia
Marshall Green. Following a conversation with Indonesian Foreign
Minister Adam Malik about the situation in West Irian, Green concluded
that conditions in the territory are "far from satisfactory
and deteriorating." A subsequent
cable reported that Indonesia is "belatedly and
almost desperately seeking to develop support among the peoples
of West Irian" for the "Act of Free Choice."
A consular
trip to West Irian in early 1968 observed that "the
Indonesian government directs its main efforts" in the territory
to "maintaining existing political facilities and suppressing
political dissent." Because of neglect, corruption and repression
at the hands of Indonesian authorities, Western observers agreed
almost unanimously that "Indonesia could not win an open election"
and that the vast majority of West Irian's inhabitants favored independence.
In July of 1968 the UN-appointed Ambassador Fernando Ortiz Sanz
arrived in Jakarta as the Secretary General's Special Representative
for assisting Indonesia with the West Irian plebiscite, as called
for by the 1962 New York Agreement.
A confidential
cable from the U.S. Embassy to the State Department
outlined the stakes in the upcoming "Act of Free Choice."
While cautioning that the U.S. government "should not become
directly involved in this issue," Ambassador Green worried
that Ortiz Sanz or other UN members might "hold out for free
and direct elections" in West Irian, frustrating Indonesia's
intention to retain the territory at all costs. Consequently, U.S.
and other Western officials worried
about the need to meet with Ortiz Sanz to "make
him aware of political realities." In a confidential
October 1968 Airgram the U.S. Embassy reported with
relief that Ortiz now "concedes that it would be inconceivable
from the point of view of the interest of the U.N., as well as the
GOI, that a result other than the continuance of West Irian within
Indonesian sovereignty should emerge."
The Indonesian government firmly rejected the possibility of a
one-person, one-vote plebiscite in West Irian, insisting instead
on a series of local 'consultations' with just over 1,000 hand selected
tribal leaders (out of an estimated population of 800,000), conducted
in July 1969 with between 6,000-10,000 Indonesian troops spread
throughout the territory. As the U.S. Embassy put it in a July
1969 telegram:
The Act of Free Choice (AFC) in West Irian is unfolding like
a Greek tragedy, the conclusion preordained. The main protagonist,
the GOI, cannot and will not permit any resolution other than
the continued inclusion of West Irian in Indonesia. Dissident
activity is likely to increase but the Indonesian armed forces
will be able to contain and, if necessary, suppress it.
Ambassador Frank Galbraith noted
on July 9, 1969 that past abuses had stimulated intense
anti-Indonesian and pro-independence sentiment at all levels of
Irian society, suggesting that "possibly 85 to 90%" of
the population "are in sympathy with the Free Papua cause."
Moreover, Galbraith observed, recent Indonesian military operations,
which resulted in the deaths of hundreds, possibly thousands of
civilians, "had stimulated fears and rumours of intended genocide
among the Irianese."
President Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger visited
Jakarta in July 1969 while the "Act of Free Choice" was
underway. Improving relations with Indonesia's authoritarian regime
was clearly uppermost in the mind of Kissinger, who characterized
Suharto as a "moderate military man … committed to progress
and reform." In Nixon's secret briefing papers (Document
9 and Document
10) for the visit Kissinger flatly told the President
"you should not raise this issue" of West Irian and argued
"we should avoid any U.S. identification with that act."
The White House generally held to this position throughout the period
preceding and following the "Act of Free Choice."
Although they recognized the deep flaws in the Act and in Indonesia's
intentions, U.S. officials were not interested in creating any problems
for a Suharto regime they saw as nonaligned but pro-Washington.
While the U.S. was unwilling to actively intervene on Indonesia's
behalf (an action they thought unnecessary and counterproductive)
at the UN to insure quick General Assembly acceptance of Indonesia's
formal takeover of West Papua, the U.S. quietly signaled that it
was uninterested in a lengthy debate over an issue it viewed as
a foregone conclusion and marginal to U.S. interests. In a secret
briefing memo for a meeting with Indonesia's Ambassador
to the United States Soedjakmoto, a State Department official expressed
confidence that international criticism of the "Act of Free
Choice" would quickly fade, allowing the Nixon Administration
to move forward with its plans for forging closer military and economic
ties with the authoritarian regime in Jakarta.
Documents
NOTE:
The
documents featured below were selected for inclusion in this Electronic
Briefing Book. Click here to download the complete
set of documents on this issue (PDF - 7.6 MB).
Document
1
February 29, 1968
Subject: West Irian
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
The U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green reports on a
conversation with Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik on West
Irian. Malik suggests the possibility of reducing the more than
10,000 Indonesian troops serving in Irian. He also hints Indonesia
will insist on indirect means for ascertaining the wishes of the
inhabitants of the territory in 1969, perhaps relying on tribal
leaders who can be induced with "favors for them and their
tribes." Green expresses concern about the "deteriorating"
situation.
Document
2
May 2, 1968
Subject: West Irian
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green, reports on a conversation
with Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik in which Malik outlines
some of the measures Jakarta is undertaking in an attempt to build
support among the people of West Irian for merger with Indonesia.
Document
3
May 10, 1968
Subject: Consular Trip to West Irian
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Airgram
In January, 1968 Embassy Political Consul Thomas Reynders visits
West Irian for one month. Reynders observes the relatively low
level of economic development in the territory since Indonesia
assumed control in 1962, noting that "The Indonesian government's
presence in West Irian is expressed primarily in the form of the
Army." Reynders concludes, as have nearly all Western observers,
that "Indonesia will not accept Independence for West Irian
and will not permit a plebiscite that would reach such an outcome"
and notes the "antipathy or outright hatred believed to be
harbored toward Indonesia and Indonesians by West Irians in the
relatively developed and sophisticated areas."
Document
4
August 20, 1968
Subject: The Stakes in West Irian's "Act of Free Choice"
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
US Ambassador Marshall Green suggests "Act of Free Choice"
in West Irian "May well be the most important political issue
in Indonesia during the coming year." Notes Indonesian "dilemma"
in seeking "to devise some meaningful way to conduct ascertainment
which will not involve real risks of loss of West Irian."
Green reminds the State Department, in urging a hands-off approach
by the U.S., that "we are dealing here essentially with stone
age, illiterate tribal groups" and that "free elections
among groups such as this would be more of a farce than any rigged
mechanism Indonesia could devise."
Document
5
August 4, 1968
Subject: "Act of Free Choice" in West Irian
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
Marshall Green writes to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific G. McMurtry Godley expressing concern
over the views of U.N. Special Representative for West Irian Ortiz
Sanz. Green recommends that "in view of high stakes …
we should do anything we can indirectly to make him aware of political
realities" regarding Indonesian intentions toward West Irian.
Document
6
October 4, 1968
Subject: West Irian
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Airgram
Embassy Political Consul Jack Lydman describes the results of
Ortiz Sanz's recent orientation visit to West Irian and asserts
that Sanz is now "attempting to devise a formula for an "act
of free choice" in West Irian which will result in an affirmation
of Indonesian sovereignty" yet "stand the test of international
opinion."
Document
7
June 9, 1969
Subject: Assessment of Irian situation
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
On the eve of the "Act of Free Choice," the U.S. embassy
offers a highly critical appraisal of Indonesia's determination
to insure West Irian's integration, concluding that from Jakarta's
standpoint "separation is unthinkable." After detailing
Indonesian efforts to repress "increasingly desperate"
supporters of independence for West Irian, Embassy concludes with
concern for "future Indonesian relations with Irianese,"
many of whom display a "festering antagonism and distrust
of Indonesians."
Document
8
June 9, 1969
Subject: West Irian: The Nature of the Opposition
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Airgram
Galbraith offers a detailed assessment of the views of various
Irian groups opposed to integration with Indonesia and advocating
independence, including the Free Papua Movement (OPM). He observes
that "opposition to the GOI stems from economic deprivation
over the years, military repression and capriciousness, and maladministration,"
and suggests that anti-Indonesian groups will be unable to alter
the final outcome of the "Act of Free Choice."
Documents
9
and 10
June 10 and July 18, 1969
Subject: Djakarta Visit: Your Meetings with President Suharto
Henry Kissinger, Memorandum for the President
National security adviser Henry Kissinger briefs President Nixon
on his visit to Indonesia and likely conversations with Indonesian
President Suharto. Kissinger argues that there is no U.S. interest
in getting involved in the issue of West Irian and that it is
certain its people will choose integration with Indonesia. In
Nixon's talking points, Kissinger urges that the President refrain
from raising the issue except to note U.S. sympathy with Indonesia's
concerns.
Document
11
August 25, 1969
Subject: Call by Indonesian Ambassador Soedjakmoto
U.S. State Department, Secret Memorandum
Paul Gardner briefs Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green
on his visit with Indonesian Ambassador to the U.S. Soedjakmoto,
who is expected to ask for help from the U.S. in "preparing
smooth U.N. handling" of the "Act of Free Choice"
in the General Assembly.
Notes
1. For an excellent overview of the events leading
up to the New York Agreement, see Jones, Matthew. Conflict and
Confrontation in Southeast Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United
States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge:
Cambridge Press, 2002): 31-62; C.L.M. Penders. The West New
Guinea Debacle: Dutch Colonization and Indonesia, 1945-1962
(Hawaii, 2002); John Saltford. The United Nations and the Indonesian
Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969 (Routledge, 2003).
2. Denise Leith. The Politics of Power: Freeport in Suharto's
Indonesia (Hawaii, 2003).
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