Since it was first created in 1960, the Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SIOP)--the U.S. plan for nuclear war--has been one
of the most secret and sensitive issues in U.S. national security
policy. The essence of the first SIOP was a massive nuclear strike
on military and urban-industrial targets in the Soviet Union, China,
and their allies. To make such an attack possible, U.S. war planners
developed a complex organizational scheme involving the interaction
of targeting, weapons delivery systems and their flight paths, nuclear
detonations over targets, measurements of devastation, and defensive
measures, among other elements, and successive SIOPs would become
even more complex. Much of this information remains highly secret
and may never be declassified; it is even possible that no civilian
official has actually seen the SIOP (which one author suggests amounts
to a stack of computer print-outs). To ensure tight secrecy, when
the first SIOP was created, its architects established a special information
category--Extremely Sensitive Information (ESI)--to ensure that only
those with a need-to-know would have access to the documents. (Note
1)
The SIOP's tremendous importance-its implementation would mean the
death of millions---has made it a subject of acute interest among
historians and social scientists, and, to be sure, the subject of
many FOIA requests. To shed as much light as possible on how the United
States would have waged war in the nuclear age, the National Security
Archive has made many declassification requests on U.S. nuclear war
planning, especially the early history of the SIOP. High security
walls around the SIOP have made this a difficult task but significant
information has nevertheless been declassified. To show how the SIOP
came to be created and to show some of its basic features, as well
as the problem of presidential control over nuclear planning, the
Archive publishes on the Web for the first time documents recently
released under appeal by the Defense Department as well as vintage
material that was declassified and later reclassified in the early
1980s. This material makes it understandable why presidents, even
those with deep knowledge of military affairs, have had difficulty
grappling with nuclear war plans. When President Dwight D. Eisenhower,
who tried to bring the war plans under control, received his first
report on the SIOP 62 (for fiscal year 1962), he commented that it
"frighten[ed] the devil out of me." Among the disclosures
in these documents:
- The SIOP included retaliatory and preemptive options; preemption
could occur if U.S. authorities had strategic warning of a Soviet
attack;
- A full nuclear SIOP strike launched on a preemptive basis would
have delivered over 3200 nuclear weapons to 1060 targets in the
Soviet Union, China, and allied countries in Asia and Europe;
- A full nuclear strike by SIOP forces on high alert, launched in
retaliation to a Soviet strike, would have delivered 1706 nuclear
weapons against a total of 725 targets in the Soviet Union, China,
and allied states;
- Targets would have included nuclear weapons, government and military
control centers, and at least 130 cities in the Soviet Union, China,
and allies;
- Alarmed White House scientists, Army and Navy leaders were concerned
that the SIOP would deliver too many nuclear weapons to Soviet and
Chinese territory and that the weapons that missed targets "will
kill a lot of Russians and Chinese" and that fallout from the
weapons "can be a hazard to ourselves as well as our enemy";
- According to the damage expectancy criteria of SIOP-62, it would
take three 80 kiloton weapons to destroy a city like Nagasaki--which
the U.S. had actually bombed with a 22 kiloton weapon;
- The Marine Corp commandant was concerned that the SIOP provides
for the "attack of a single list of Sino-Soviet countries"
and makes no "distinction" between Communist countries
that were at war with the United States and those that were not;
- The Defense Department has overclassified and inconsistently released
information about the SIOP.
In the late 1960, the Department of Defense leadership, with President
Dwight D. Eisenhower's support, approved the Single Integrated Operational
Plan-62 (for fiscal year 1962) agreeing that it should go into effect
on 1 April 1961. SIOP-62 was the U.S. government's first comprehensive
nuclear war plan; the first attempt to synchronize the nuclear forces
of the U.S .Air Force, Navy, and Army so that they could be used in
a massive attack on the Soviet Union, China, and their communist allies.
The SIOP-62 plan for a combined attack by strategic bombers, Polaris
submarine-launched missiles, and Atlas ICBMs, among other delivery
vehicles was, according to historian David Rosenberg, a "technical
triumph in the history of war planning." At the same time, however,
it was also "an American Schlieffen Plan, an ultimate strategy
for war winning … with an even less tenable basis in political
and military realities than the German plan, infamous for its inflexibility,
executed in 1914." (Note 2)
For many years, the SIOP's very existence was a closely guarded secret.
So far as this writer knows, the first reference in the print media
was by Seymour Hersh, in a 9 December 1973 New York Times
article entitled "The President and the Plumbers." There
Hersh reported on White House fears that Daniel Ellsberg had revealed
"the most closely held nuclear targeting secrets of the United
States, which were contained in a highly classified document known
as the Single Integrated Operation Plans, or S.I.O.P." (Note
2a) A few years later, however, information on the SIOP and its
early history became part of the public record. In June 1975, a Congressionally-mandated
Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of
Foreign Policy--the "Murphy Commission" headed by career
ambassador Robert Murphy--published its final report. Included was
a multi-volume series of supporting studies including one by former
RAND Corporation president Henry S. Rowen on "Formulating Strategic
Doctrine." Drawing on years of government experience and consulting,
Rowen provided a relatively detailed account of post-World War II
nuclear planning. Besides a useful overview of changes in nuclear
doctrine from the 1940s to the 1970s, Rowen's report included interesting
and important details on the role of the Joint Strategic Target Planning
Staff, the production of the SIOP, and nuclear targeting issues. In
light of the recently announced "Schlesinger Doctrine,"
Rowen gave special attention to the problem of developing workable
"limited" alternatives to the massive attack options embodied
in the first SIOP. (Note 2b)
In the wake of Rowen's seminal study, the mass media began to look
more closely at U.S. nuclear war plans. On 10 May 1976, Aviation
Week and Space Technology published a special report on "SAC
[Strategic Air Command] in Transition", which included significant
detail on the SIOP as it stood in 1976, when the Command was starting
to move away from the concept of a "massive nuclear belch"
toward concepts of strategic flexible response. On 5 September 1977,
US News & World Report published an article by Orr Kelly,
'If the U.S. Comes Under Nuclear Assault", which also included
more details on the SIOP. The Washington Post did not mention
the SIOP until the next decade, when Thomas Powers published an article,
"What's Worse Than the MX," in the 31 May 1985 issue of
the Washington Post's "Outlook" section.
By the time that Power's article had appeared, the SIOP had become,
if temporarily, a subject that scholars could research. In 1981, the
Reagan Presidency had begun but Jimmy Carter's executive order on
information security policy and declassification remained in effect.
Under provisions for systematic review of documents that were over
20 years old, during the summer of 1981, the Navy's historical reviewers
opened up files on the SIOP in former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Arleigh Burke's papers at the U.S. Navy Operational Archives. Burke
had played a key role presiding over the creation of SIOP-62 so his
documents included important data on the nature and scope of the attack
plans as well as the internal Pentagon controversies over the plan.
Two assiduous researchers quickly seized the opportunity and poured
through the files. One was David A. Rosenberg, then a Ph.D. candidate
in history at the University of Chicago; the other was Fred Kaplan,
a Ph.D. candidate in political science at MIT who had worked as defense
adviser to the late Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis). Owing to the Operational
Archives' inordinately tight restrictions on copying documents, Kaplan
and Rosenberg had to rely on their note taking abilities.
Within a few years, Rosenberg and Kaplan had published outstanding
contributions to U.S. nuclear history. In the spring of 1983, International
Security, an influential scholarly journal in the security studies
field, published David Rosenberg's seminal article, "The Origins
of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960."
(Note 3) Drawing on wide-ranging research in government
archives, including the Burke files, Rosenberg provided the first
detailed account of the complex interaction between presidential policy,
military strategy, and operational planning. At the heart of Rosenberg's
account is the growing power and independence of the Strategic Air
Command, which gave the Air Force a decisive advantage in bureaucratic
conflict over nuclear weapons strategy and planning. Thus, while the
other military services had serious doubts about Air Force strategy
and Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke offered an alterative
strategy, they could not restrain their more powerful rival from developing
war plans premised on massive attacks on long lists of targets. A
key element in Rosenberg's narrative was intelligence estimating which
encouraged the Air Force demands for weapons to strike a growing list
of targets. Rosenberg shows that President Dwight D. Eisenhower shared
the Army's and Navy's concerns about war plans based on unconstrained
nuclear attacks but, in the end, he was unable to alter the course
of events.
Also in 1983, Simon and Shuster published Fred Kaplan's highly praised
book, The Wizards of Armageddon (since reissued in Stanford
University Press's "Nuclear Age" series). Like Rosenberg,
Kaplan was interested in the nuts and bolts of nuclear war planning,
but the focus of his research and writing was the theorists of nuclear
strategy and their difficult relationship with the military establishment.
The heart of his book was the role of RAND Corporation strategic intellectuals,
including Bernard Brodie, William Kaufmann, and Arnold Wohlstetter,
who sought to deploy their ideas to impose "rational order"
on U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Drawing on an amazingly wide range
of interviews as well as extensive primary source research, Kaplan
illuminated the impact of ideas on military policy but also expanded
knowledge of the history of the SIOP and the interservice controversies
over nuclear targeting.
Significantly, the window of opportunity that enabled Kaplan and
Rosenberg to write about the origins of the SIOP closed before their
publications appeared. Not long after they were opened in 1981, the
Navy reclassified the Burke files altogether; in 1982, the Reagan
administration imposed a tighter classification/declassification policy
that would slow down the declassification of classified historical
documents. It was not until 1996 that the Naval Operational Archives
reopened some of the Burke files that Rosenberg and Kaplan had seen
and which Rosenberg cited in his footnotes. Since then the files were
closed once more awaiting further processing of the entire CNO Burke
collection. Luckily, researchers at the National Security Archive
were able to copy the most important documents for publication in
the Archive's collection, U.S.
Nuclear History: Nuclear Arms and Politics in the Missile Age, 1955-1968
making these documents more widely available to the interested public.
Another major breakthrough in knowledge of SIOP-62 was the declassification
and publication of most of the text of a SIOP briefing to President
Kennedy by JCS Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer in September 1961. Stanford
University professor Scott Sagan successfully pushed for declassification
of this document, which he published, with valuable commentary, in
International Security in 1987. (Note 4)
The declassified briefing provides useful detail on the lead-up to
SIOP-62, operational concepts, targeting sequence, SIOP forces, launch
times, and the plan's alleged "flexibility." After the strong
criticism of the plan from Army, Navy, and Marine Corps leaders who
saw the SIOP as too inflexible, the briefing included a justification
of the plan. According to Lemnitzer, the "current SIOP effectively
integrates in a well-planned and coordinated attack the forces committed"
and "is well designed to meet the [NSTAP] objectives."
To expand knowledge of the SIOP's early history, but also to supplement
and amplify the contributions of Rosenberg, Kaplan, and Sagan, the
Archive's nuclear weapons documentation project filed a number of
Freedom of Information requests with the National Archives and the
Defense Department. During the 1990s, when it was still possible to
file a Freedom of Information Act request with the National Archives
and expect to see it processed in a reasonable period of time, a number
of documents from a key JCS file on the creation of the SIOP---3205
(17 August 1959)--became available, but with excisions at significant
and trivial points. For example, as will be noted on the marking on
a number of documents in this collection, the declassification reviewers
consistently excised references to the "Sino-Soviet Bloc"
as the focal point of strategic targeting (for example, see
document 10 below), as if it were a deep secret that China and
the Soviet Union were targeted nations during the Cold War. Moreover,
the reviewers withheld data which had been released in the past--for
example, the assurance of delivery factor of 75 percent that the weapons
necessary to destroy a given target would arrive at each bomb-release
line (BRL). Also withheld were damage expectancy probabilities--that
is, the probability that weapons would cause severe damage to a given
target. A variety of other important, details were also withheld,
for example, whether the SIOP included retaliatory and preemptive
attack options, or significantly, the general types of targets that
would be attacked.
When these documents were released in 1996, the National Security
Archive quickly filed a FOIA appeal for the withheld portions. Earlier
this year, eight years later, the Defense Department responded to
the appeal by releasing more details. Details that should have been
released before, the Sino-Soviet bloc, the 75 percent assurance factor,
and references to preemption, were duly declassified. Some information
on the damage expectancies was partly declassified but not enough
to make sense of the issue. Moreover, the reviewers withheld even
the most general information on target categories. As these are general
policy documents, they do not mention specific targets, but rather
the type of targets which would absorb nuclear strikes. Although the
documents released from the Burke papers confirm that urban-industrial
areas, nuclear weapons installations, and air defenses were targeted,
the Defense Department's reviewers refuse to release this most obvious
forty-year old information. There may be some uneasiness with acknowledging
plans for nuclear strikes against urban-industrial targets and some
at the Pentagon may believe that declassifying the fact that nuclear
weapons were a prime target is giving something important away.
The Pentagon's declassification policy on nuclear weapons strategy
has been inconsistent. Four years ago, when it released, on appeal,
a less excised version of the History of the Joint Strategic Target
Planning Staff: Background and Preparation of SIOP-62, it declassified
information that it presently treats as classified. On the one hand,
the Pentagon recently withheld some of the details of the NSTAP target
objectives (see document 10 below); on the other hand, only a few
years ago, it released the same information in the JSTPS history:
"Specific objectives of [the NSTAP] were to destroy or neutralize
Sino-Soviet strategic strike forces and major military and government
control centers, and to strike urban-industrial centers to achieve
the level of destruction indicated in study 2009." These conflicting
policies on the release of information on the NSTAP is evidence of
the subjectivity of declassification review and perhaps also of a
Pentagon decision against releasing any information on SIOP targeting
policy in spite of previous declassifications actions.
While newly and less recently released documents on SIOP-62 tell
us much about the nature of the SIOP-62 and the forces that pushed
it forward, much important information about the first SIOP remains
classified. Some details, such as the targets on the NSTL, may never
be declassified, at least not for many years. So far, no documents
are presently available that detail the gross explosive yield or the
fatality estimates associated with the SIOP-62 strikes. Based on their
access to the Burke files, Kaplan and Rosenberg found that the megatonnnage
for the alert force was 2164 or slightly lower (2100). According to
Kaplan, a strike by the total SIOP force would produce an explosive
yield of 7,847 megatons. 175 million Russians and Chinese would be
killed by the alert force, while a strike by the committed force would
kill an estimated 285 million with 40 million more injured. (Note
5) As suggested by a recent study, casualty estimates produced
by the JSTPS need to be treated cautiously because target planners
saw blast damage as the foremost destructive effect of nuclear weapons
thereby seriously underestimating the destruction that mass-fires
would cause. (Note 6)
SIOP-62 was the first of the succession of SIOPs. The Kennedy administration,
looking for "flexible response" and more options for the
president, pressed the military to make the SIOP less rigid. The Joint
Chiefs were willing to introduce target withholds and create options
to strike military targets only (counterforce), but they were reluctant
to change the fundamental character of the plan. The next revision,
SIOP-63, included some of those changes, but it posited such huge
attack options that one insider later characterized as "five
choices for massive retaliation." While the SIOP would go through
more changes, the overall structure of attack options did not change
in fundamental ways until the late 1970s, after the Nixon and Carter
administrations had pressed for limited nuclear options that gave
the president an alternative to catastrophically massive attacks.
Nevertheless, even after attack options became more "flexible"
and precise, they involved massive destruction. As studies by the
Natural Resources Defense Council have shown, "Even the most
precise counterforce attacks on Russian nuclear forces unavoidably
causes widespread civilian deaths due to the fallout generated by
numerous ground bursts." (Note 7) Moreover,
the SIOP always included a preemptive option even though policymakers
understood the dangers associated with preemptive attacks--the warning
of the enemy attack being preempted might be inaccurate and preemptive
attack on another nuclear power could not prevent tremendous destruction
to the United States. While some argued that limited use of nuclear
weapons might make nuclear war controllable and stave off a global
catastrophe, fortunately such theories have never been tested. (Note
8)
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document
1: Memorandum, "Discussion at the 387th Meeting of the National
Security Council, Thursday, November 20, 1958," November 20,
1958, Top Secret
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Ann
Whitman File, NSC Series, box 10, 387th Meeting of the National Security
Council; published with excisions in U.S. State Department, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1958-60, Volume III (Washington, D.C.
: Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 147-152
Early in his administration, President Eisenhower established a
special subcommittee of the National Security Council, the Net Evaluation
Subcommittee (NESC), whose mission was to develop estimates of the
net effect of a nuclear war on the U.S., the Soviet Union, and their
allies. Each year, the NESC would look at a different scenario and
see how a nuclear war played out in terms of civilian fatalities,
destruction of economic resources, and damage to military capabilities.
The NESC would provide Eisenhower and the NSC a full briefing on
their conclusions. Although some analysts have treated the NESC
as a war-planning agency, its mission was largely analytical. (Note
9) In November 1958, the Subcommittee briefed the NSC on its
study of a war caused by a Soviet strategic surprise attack in 1961
to which the U.S. responded with a retaliatory attack designed to
paralyze the Soviet Union. The huge attack on Soviet military and
urban-industrial targets posited by the study--one weapon on every
Soviet city over 25,000--evidently appalled Eisenhower, who believed
that there "was obviously a limit -- a human limit---to the
devastation which human beings could endure." Instead of "100
per cent pulverization," he wanted those targets identified
whose destruction "would most economically paralyze the Soviet
nation." Toward that end, in the fall of 1959, Eisenhower ordered
another study: to evaluate the impact on deterrence of "alternative
retaliatory efforts" directed at two different Soviet target
systems: 1) military targets, or 2) an "optimum mix" of
urban-industrial and military targets. Eisenhower would request
this under NSC action 2009 and it would be conducted by a secret
NESC working group. (Note 10)
Document
2: J.C.S. 2056/131, Notes by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 20 August 1959, enclosing memorandum from JCS Chairman Nathan
Twining to Secretary of Defense, "Target Coordination and Associated
Problems," 17 August 1959, Top Secret
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218,
Records of the Joint Chief of Staff, Decimal Files 1959, 3205 (17
Aug 59)
While the NESC prepared the NSC 2009 study, top military leaders
worried about endemic problems with U.S. nuclear targeting. With
the huge expansion of the nuclear stockpile in the late 1950s and
the wider dispersal of nuclear weapons and delivery systems among
the services, the unified and specified commanders were playing
a greater and greater role in nuclear planning. Thus, unified commanders--that
is, the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) of regional, or theater, commands,
such as European or Pacific, that included units from all three
services--had control of nuclear bombs and missiles, as did, of
course, SAC, the first specified command. The proliferation of nuclear
weapons inevitably produced duplication of targets. Coordination
conferences and special committee failed to solve this problem,
much less resolve inter-service conflicts over the weight of a nuclear
attack. (Note 11) To get discussion going, JCS
Chairman General Nathan Twining, the former Air Force Chief of Staff,
sent his colleagues a think piece calling for greater centralization
of nuclear war planning; he specifically mentioned the need for
a "single integrated operational plan" and a "national
strategic target list." By carefully assigning targets, Twining
wanted to see "atomic operations … pre-planned for automatic
execution to the maximum extent possible and with minimum reliance
on post-H-hour communications." Taking issue with arguments
for a minimum deterrent, Twining supported a large strategic force
that mirrored the Soviet "Principle of Mass"; a "heavy"
strategic force was necessary to destroy "the critical components
of Soviet long-range nuclear delivery capability." He believed
that the "necessity of prevailing in general war is of such
vital importance that any error in judgment should be on the safe
side."
Besides strategic nuclear targets, Twining recommended other target
categories: "governmental and military control centers,"
"war-sustaining resources" (war-related industry), and
"population centers." Attacking civilians as such contravened
the laws of war, but by positing a wide array of military, industrial,
government, and urban targets, Twining was following the Air Force
tradition of searching for the "Achilles heel" whose destruction
would cause a society to break down and capitulate. (Note
12) Twining addressed other issues--Army/Navy versus Air Force
on how much destruction was necessary, the role of naval forces
in attack plans, and organizational responsibility for developing
the single integrated operational plan. Because the Strategic Air
Command operated the "major portion of forces responsible for
the strategic mission", its commander-in-chief (CINCSAC) "should
be charged with the responsibility for developing such a plan."
Document
3A: A: JCS 2056/143, Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 5 October 1959, enclosing Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 22
December 1959
Document 3B: attached memorandum
from Chief of Naval Operations, 30 September 1959 attached, Top Secret,
Excised Copy With More Details Released on Appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records
of the Joint Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59)
After Twining issued his 17 August memorandum, he distributed to
the Joint Chiefs a list of questions on targeting. While the Air
Force Chief of Staff solidly supported Twining's call for reform,
the other service chiefs rejected his concept of greater centralization
of nuclear war planning under the direction of CINCSAC. All agreed
with the Chairman's concept of a strategic target system (excised
from this version), but the Army, Navy, and Marines plainly saw
the concept of a single integrated operational plan as a challenge
to organizational prerogatives. For them, the concept of a SIOP
implied a "single integrated operational command authority";
rejecting that, they wanted the Joint Chiefs to develop strategic
targeting plans. On the question of a Unified Strategic Command,
the Air Force believed that one was necessary once the Navy's Polaris
missile was ready for military operations, but the other services
objected because they believed that it would downgrade the authority
of the Joint Chiefs and the CINCs. The answers showed more diversity
of opinion over the role of aircraft carriers, for example, whether
they should have responsibility for H-hour coverage of targets.
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke's extended commentary
on Twining's memorandum is heavily excised (and it is necessary
to compare the two to make sense of Burke's paper). Nevertheless,
the discussion in section 3 suggests that he had some doubts about
Twining's polarization of counterforce and population center targets.
In the event of a U.S. preemptive attack, Burke probably believed
that non-nuclear target categories--possibly command and control,
war-related industry, and urban centers--had to be "destroyed
too." In the event of a Soviet surprise attack, Burke rejected
going after "empty bases and missile sites", probably
suggesting instead command-and-control and urban-industrial targets.
Writing before the U.S. had reconnaissance satellites, Burke believed
that preemptive strikes would be difficult to carry out because
of the problem of finding Soviet missiles. Under those circumstances,
a "preemptive attack would not eliminate the threat of unacceptable
damage to the United States."
Disagreeing with Twining's emphasis on a "single pre-conceived
plan," Burke argued that "we would forfeit the flexibility
that is inherent in the decentralized execution of strike plans
by several unified commanders." Nevertheless, he reluctantly
accepted the idea of a SIOP if the JCS had final approval and if
all the unified and specified commanders were involved and participated
in its execution. While acknowledging the possibility of insufficiently
powerful strikes, Burke wanted to find out "how much is enough"
in order to avoid gross overestimates of the "the effort required."
Document
4: JCS Chairman Twining to Director, Joint Staff, "Appraisal
of Relative Merits, from the Point of View of Effective Deterrence,
of Alternative Retaliatory Efforts," 19 February 1960, enclosing
Memorandum to the President, same title, 12 February 1960, with National
Security Council memo, same title, 17 February 1960
Source: National Archives, RG 218, JCS Chairman Nathan
Twining Papers, 381 Net Evaluation
By the fall of 1959, the NESC had completed its study of nuclear
targeting, "Appraisal of the Relative Merits from the Point
of View of Effective Deterrence, of Alternative Retaliatory Efforts."
So far no copy has surfaced and it remains in question if the document
still exists. After reviewing three different target systems--urban-industrial
only, military only, and an "optimum mix" of urban-industrial
and military targets, including nuclear forces---the NESC concluded
that only a strategy that focused on the "optimum mix"
targets would enable the United States to "prevail" in
a nuclear war. According to White House science adviser George Kistiakowsky's
account of the report, "To prevail in the sense defined by
this study, it would be necessary to kill over one-third of the
population of the USSR (and about 100 million Chinese), in effect
totally destroying about 100 cities, since none of them would receive
less than a megaton and some several 20-megaton weapons." (Note
14)
On 12 February 1960, Eisenhower presided over a restricted meeting
of the National Security Council to consider the NESC study. Before
the meeting, Joint Chiefs of Chairman Nathan Twining sent the President
a memorandum endorsing the NESC's "optimum mix" target
system and recommending that Eisenhower agree to refer the study
to the Joint Chiefs as the basis for planning. Some of the Chiefs
expressed reservations about the study, for example, General Lemnitzer
noted that the problem of "locating and destroying enemy ICBM
sites" was a problem that had to be solved and Admiral Burke
and Twining were plainly in disagreement over the deterrent value
of "forces required only for attack of the urban-industrial
system." No minutes were taken of the meeting and, so far,
the only account that has surfaced so far appears in Kistiakowsky's
diary. Kistiakowsky privately believed that the "overkill"
proposed for the attack on the optimum-mix targets was "appalling"
and during the meeting Eisenhower showed great concern with this
problem (as he had in November 1958). Burke also "fairly strongly
objected to overkill." Nevertheless, Eisenhower signed off
on Chairman Twining's recommendations.
Document
5: Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff, for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, on Target Coordination and Associated Problems, JCS 2056/149,
26 April 1960, Top Secret, Excised copy with more details released
on appeal
Source:
National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chief of
Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59)
Some of the differences among the Joint Chiefs, for example, over
the requirements of deterrence, were difficult to resolve. Nonetheless,
Eisenhower had given his marching orders and the next step was to
prepare "policy guidance at the national level" for the
preparation of the NSTL. This would set target priorities and criteria
for causing "over-all damage to the Sino-Soviet bloc war potential."
In late April 1960, the Joint Staff presented the JCS with a "National
Strategic Targeting Policy", later renamed "National Strategic
Targeting and Attack Policy" (NSTAP), based on the optimum-mix
concept. While this document is excised at important points, it
is possible to read behind the excisions. The first excision would
read something like an "optimum mix of [strategic strike, major
military and government control, and urban-industrial centers."
The next excision is probably a more specific rendition of the optimum-mix
concept. The three priority target categories excised from page
1359 are undoubtedly: 1) Sino-Soviet strategic nuclear forces and
nuclear weapons storage sites, 2) Sino-Soviet government-military
controls, and 3) Sino-Soviet urban-industrial centers.
The excisions from the damage criteria section on page 130 are
very possibly in the same order as the target priorities on the
previous page. Thus, the attack on nuclear threat targets was supposed
to have a "ninety percent probability of severe damage"
while attacks on military and governmental control centers were
to obtain a "ninety percent probability of moderate damage."
Attacks on urban-industrial targets were to have a "ninety
percent probability of destruction of 50 percent of industrial floor
space." Such high damage criteria were a major source of the
"overkill" that worried Kistiakowsky and Eisenhower; several
nuclear weapons would be assigned to same "designated ground
zero" (DGZ) to assure a ninety percent change of "severe"
or "moderate" damage.
Document
6: Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas White to Secretary of Defense Thomas
Gates, 10 June 1960, enclosing "Strategic Targeting Authority"
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Reading Room,
Thomas D. White Papers, box 29, Top Secret General 1960
The Air Force was determined to play a central role in strategic
targeting and planning and Chief of Staff Thomas White brought a
plan to the Secretary of Defense that would codify such a role.
Acknowledging that the Air Force's concept of a unified strategic
command, with control over the Navy's Polaris submarines, was unlikely
to win top-level support, White supported a "lesser solution"
to the target coordination problem by designating CINCSAC the "Strategic
Targeting Authority." With "jurisdiction over strategic
targeting, strike timing, and force application," the new authority
would produce an NSTL and a SIOP. The Joint Chiefs would review
and approve both documents. Defining the NSTL as a "list of
specific vital enemy targets," the top priority targets was
consistent with the optimum-mix concept: "nuclear delivery
capability," "governmental and military control centers,"
and "war sustaining resources, including urban industrial areas."
Document
7: Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from JCS Chairman Nathan
Twining, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems,"
29 June 1960, JCSM-273-60, with Enclosures A, "Policy,"
B, "Selection of Targets," and C, "Planning and Coordination,"
Top Secret, Excised copy with more details released on appeal
Source: National Archives, RG 218, JCS Chairman Nathan Twining Papers,
381 Net Evaluation
While the proposal for an NSTAP was under considerations, the services
began to thrash out important organizational problems: who would
prepare the NSTL and who would prepare the SIOP itself. For the
first task, preparation of the NSTL, the services saw three alternatives:
the JCS/Joint Staff, SAC, or a Unified Strategic Command. For the
second task, "to translate the attack of the targets of the
NSTL into an effective national effort", the alternatives were
essentially the same: the JCS, SAC as an "agent" of the
JCS, a Unified Strategic Command, or by the Unified and Specified
Command. While these papers only presented the alternatives, the
splits over alternative wording showed that the services were leaning
in different directions. For example, on pages 8 and 20, it is apparent
that the Army/Marines/Navy disagreed with the Air Force over whether
the Joint Chiefs had the capability to prepare the NSTL or the SIOP.
Especially important for the Air Force was that the agency with
responsibility over the target list "must have immediately
available electronic computing machines of considerable capacity."
For preparing a SIOP, the Air Force, consistent with White's proposal,
wanted to designate CINCSAC "Strategic Targeting Authority"
arguing that the CINC had the "capability to carry out effectively
this type of planning and strategic targeting function." Presumably
SAC had the requisite computer capability. The other services, however,
envisioned a less elevated coordinating role for CINCSAC, with only
limited responsibility for preparing the war plan.
Document
8: Memorandum for General Twining et al from Rear Admiral F. J. Blouin,
Joint Secretary, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems,"
SM-679-60, 15 July 1960, Top Secret, Excised copy with more details
released on appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59)
After several meetings in early July it became apparent that the
JCS remained completely split over the organization and direction
of strategic nuclear planning. The spread sheets produced by the
Joint Secretariat illustrate the disagreements. Thus, under the
"Objectives and Concepts" category, the Army and Navy
were content to see key target systems destroyed or neutralized
and supported the idea of prevailing in war, but the Air Force had
a more thoroughgoing concept drawing upon older thinking about the
utility of bombing to destroy a society's morale; it sought to "destroy
the Sino-Soviet bloc's will and ability to wage war." While
the Air Force had specific concepts of strike priorities--apparently
putting strategic nuclear targets at the top of the list--the other
services rejected the idea of priority targets, with the Army holding
that all on the target list were "important." The Navy
probably rejected putting giving strategic targets top priority
because of the problem of striking empty silos. Significantly, the
services significantly diverged on the issue of restraints over
nuclear weapons use. To limit or even avoid "overkill,"
both the Army and the Navy supported constraints on surface bursts
of nuclear weapons. Both services worried about the lethal impact
of downwind fallout, with the Army explicitly concerned about limiting
exposure of "friendly forces and people" to radioactive
fallout. By contrast, the Air Force saw no need for additional constraints.
On organizational responsibilities and methods of organizing attack
plans, differences remained profound. Both the Navy and the Marine
Corps wanted responsibility for the NSTL and operational plans lodged
with the JCS, which would work out attack plans with the CINCs.
The Air Force agreed that the JCS should have overall responsibility
for targeting policy, but wanted the CINCSAC to have the authority
to develop the NSTL and the SIOP. The Army's position leaned toward
the Air Force in that it supported designating CINCSAC as the "National
Strategic Target Planning Agent," but with less authority than
the Air Force envisioned.
Document
9: Admiral Burke's Conversation with Secretary [of Navy] Franke 12
Aug 60
Source: U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Arleigh Burke Papers, SIOP/NSTL
Briefing Folder
By early August, Secretary of Defense Gates had met with the JCS
numerous times to form a consensus on strategic nuclear planning
but he was not able to overcome the wide gulf between the services,
especially the Air Force and the Navy. While Gates rejected Air
Forces ideas for a unified command, he sought Eisenhower's endorsement
of the proposals for an NSTL and SIOP to be prepared by a Director
of Strategic Target Planning. Apparently, Gates saw SAC's vaunted
computer capabilities as a significant reason for lodging strategic
planning at Offutt Air Force Base. Strongly dissenting, Burke wanted
Eisenhower to hear him out. During a two hour meeting on 11 August,
Burke made his plea for JCS "direct control" over nuclear
planning; otherwise it would be would be very difficult for the
Chiefs to review target lists and operational plans if another agency
created them. Burke further objected to the imposition of SAC methods
on the unified commands. Eisenhower was sympathetic to some of Burke's
concerns but he wanted to "test" the new approach. Troubled
by the "schism over the method of conducting the first two
hours or so of war", Eisenhower insisted that the war plan
be on a "completely integrated basis" with the strikes
"firmly laid on." "The initial strike must be simultaneous."
Sometimes the discussion was testy; when there was some possibility
of putting the planning on a trial basis, Twining argued that if
that happened the "Navy would sabotage it." Eisenhower
dismissed such charges and said he wanted to think about the "trial
run" concept. (Note 15)
The day after President Eisenhower made his decision to support
Gates and Twining in going ahead with the SIOP and the JSTSP, Burke
met with Secretary of the Navy William B. Franke. Recounting the
meeting with Eisenhower, Burke went over his misgivings about SAC's
role in strategic planning and Gate's acquiescence in the Air Force
agenda. Nevertheless, Burke was determined to give the new system
a try and send experienced Naval officers to work in the new strategic
target planning staff. "We want to make this thing work as
well as we possibly can." Burke remained bitter, however, worried
that the Air Force was trying to take over all nuclear forces; "smart
and ruthless" Air Force leaders were using "exactly the
same techniques as the Communists" to win power struggles at
the Pentagon. "As a matter of fact [the Air Force's textbooks],
originally about ten years ago, were built on the textbooks of the
Communists, how to control these things." (Note
16)
Document
10: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Target
Coordination and Associated Problems, 22 August 1960, JCS 2056/165,
Top Secret, Excised copy with more details released on appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59) Sec. 6
After Eisenhower made his decision, the Joint Chiefs fell into
line and made a series of decisions that pushed the SIOP forward.
As this document shows, they reached agreement on a final version
of the NSTAP, thus setting objectives for targeting, damage and
assurance criteria, and assigning responsibility for creating the
NSTL and SIOP and final review of the effort. Unlike an earlier
draft (see document 4), the NSTAP did not identify priorities for
targeting no doubt on the grounds that such a critically important
issue was best left to those who prepared the SIOP. Like the earlier
draft, however, the NSTAP established broad damage criteria In addition,
the NSTAP prescribed a 75 per cent assurance of delivery at each
bomb release line (BRL) of the weapons required to realize the specified
levels of damage.
The directive assigned the Director of the of Strategic Target
Planning to create a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS),
which would consist of personnel from all of the armed services
and would have responsibility for developing and maintaining the
NSTL and SIOP. The JCS would have responsibility for the NSTAP as
well as the power to review and approve the NSTL and SIOP. To ensure
that the JCS would be in a position to monitor the new planning
arrangements, they established a "permanent … liaison
group" at the JSTPS headquarters. When the Chiefs approved
the NSTAP they also designated CINCSAC Thomas Power as the Director
of Strategic Target Planning.
Document
11: Note from Rear Admiral Paul Blackburn, Assistant to Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy, to Admiral Russell, 12 October
1960, with List of Questions and Comments Attached, Top Secret
Source: U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Arleigh Burke Papers, SIOP/NSTL
Briefing Folder
While the JSTPS was establishing itself and preparing the NSTL
and SIOP Navy insiders were closely monitoring the developments.
Admiral Paul Blackburn, on Arleigh Burke's staff, prepared a list
of questions whose answers would shed light on the adequacy of the
methods used by the JSTPS. It is likely that the questions were
prepared for a Joint Staff briefing that same day by members of
the JCS liaison group that was attached to the JSTPS. In the questions
Blackburn raised a number of problems, including damage criteria
(whether they were too severe), plans for destroying Soviet missiles,
data processing procedures, the "cumulative" impact of
nuclear attacks (for example, fires exacerbated by destruction of
water supply pumping stations), and the effect of fall-out on hostile
and friendly populations). The questions also provide important
details, for example, filling in the blanks on the damage requirements
of the NSTAP. How they were answered on 12 October remains obscure
but during the weeks that followed the Navy would find answers.
Document
12: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Analysis
of Initial NSTL and SIOP, JCS 2056/184, 18 October 1960, Top Secret,
Excised copy with more details released on appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59) Sec. 7
This document highlights in detail the mechanisms set up by the
Joint Chiefs, the Joint Staff, and the JSTPS to ensure that the
NSTL and the SIOP conformed to JCS guidance. The Joint Chiefs and
the Secretary of Defense, along with the CINCs, would only have
a brief window, late November-early December--to review the plans
themselves, but before the final review the Joint Staff set up a
series of briefings by the JCS liaison group to the JSTPS, requested
the JSTPS's director to provide detailed information on the plans,
and established a Joint Staff working group to analyze and review
the NSTL and SIOP. Among the problems to be reviewed was the target
assignments of weapons systems and whether the weapons and delivery
systems assigned to the plan would achieve the "levels of damage
necessary for meeting" NSTAP damage criteria.
Document
13: Memo from Rear Admiral Paul Blackburn to Chief of Naval Operations,
"SAC use of computers in targeting, information on," 26
October 1960
Source: U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Arleigh Burke Papers, SIOP/NSTL
Briefing Folder
Although SAC had argued that its capacious advanced computer capabilities
gave its headquarters a distinct advantage over the Joint Staff
in preparing the NSTL and SIOP, the Navy concluded that SAC had
greatly exaggerated its capabilities. An investigation instigated
by Admiral Blackburn concluded that "computers are used by
SAC for less than 5% of the targeting function." Besides showing
how SAC had to rely on its staff to manipulate data manually, this
useful document provides a step-by-step account of how the new JSTPS
constructed the NSTL and SIOP from establishing target priorities
to planning "flights" (bomber and missile strikes). The
discussion of how the Planning Staff established and targeted DGZs
discloses significant planning assumptions about the weight of the
attack. The employment of nuclear weapons with an average explosive
yield of 3.8 megatons--about 253 15 kiloton Hiroshima weapons) was
among the "fixed factors" entered into the SAC computer
systems. Moreover, JSTPS planners assumed "all surface bursts"
which would produce large quantities of radioactive fallout.
Document
14: Cable from General Berton E. Spivy, Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison
Group, Offutt Air Force Base, to JCS, 29 October 1960, Top Secret
Source: U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Arleigh Burke Papers, SIOP/NSTL
Briefing Folder
In this progress report, the JCS's liaison to the JSTPS reviewed
how the Planning Staff developed its methodology for estimating
damage expectancy against a given DGZ, the problem of gauging the
survivability of U.S. bases under conditions of nuclear attack,
and the status of target plans for the "alert force" (those
bombers and missiles that are in a high-state of readiness for attack),
the relationship of SACEUR's forces to the plan, and procedures
for execution of the SIOP. The discussion of the alert force is
especially significant because it shows that it consisted of 880
delivery vehicles with 1459 weapons (several for each bomber aircraft)
slated to strike 654 targets. Delivery vehicles would have a 74.5
percent assurance of reaching targets. Most of the 654 targets were
military (bomber bases, headquarters, nuclear depots, air defenses),
although striking missile bases was then out of the question because
the United States was then in the dark about where the Soviets were
deploying their ICBMs, much less how many they had.
Developing agreed procedures for SIOP execution had to include
an understanding on "base time" for launching nuclear
forces. Typically military planners had an H-hour concept (H for
hour) for designating the moment when military operations would
commence. Perhaps believing that there would be some difficulty
in starting operations in an emergency, SAC proposed separating
"E-hour" (E for SIOP execution) and "RCS" (radio
command system?) H-Hour with a 15 minute planning factor. The Joint
Staff, however, argued that the plan should collapse E-hour with
H-hour by stipulating only one "reference hour." SAC finally
accepted that argument as long as the 15 minutes planning factor
was assumed.
Document
15: CNO Cable to CINCLANTFLT (Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet),
CINCPACFLT (Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet), CINCUSNAVEUR (Commander-in-Chief
U.S. Naval Forces Europe), 20 November 1960
Source: U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Arleigh Burke Papers, SIOP/NSTL
Briefing Folder
As the Army and Navy learned more about the NSTL and SIOP they
began to articulate their reservations. In mid-November senior Army
officers prepared a position paper which Admiral Burke transmitted
to top commanders noting that the Army's thinking "coincides
closely with our positions." Among the Army's concerns was
the lack of constraints on surface bursts creating an "excessive
and intolerable radioactive hazard," the "indiscriminate"
and "wasteful" attacks on urban-industrial complexes,
"arbitrary" point values for targets, high levels of assurance
of delivery, and over-emphasis on "non-productive military
targets." The Army was also skeptical of the lack of clear
retaliatory or preemptive options. Weapons would hit the same targets
whether used for retaliation or preemptive ("initiative");
thus, when used for retaliation the SIOP had a strong counterforce
element, even though it may have been doubtful that the target,
a bomber base, for example, had anything left worth striking.
Document
16: CNO Cable to CINCLANTFLT (Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet),
CINCPACFLT (Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet), CINCUSNAVEUR (Commander-in-Chief
U.S. Naval Forces Europe), 22 November 1960
Source: U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Arleigh Burke Papers, SIOP/NSTL
Briefing Folder
Burke would soon comment on the Army paper but in the meantime
he shared his thinking with top commanders. Recognizing that Air
Force critics could not derail the inexorable NSTL/SIOP process
he suggested that the most feasible approach was to treat the plan
as a "good first effort" but that many areas, such as
damage criteria, the point system, and constraints, and JCS guidance
itself needed rethinking. Still concerned about the efforts, spear-headed
by the Air Force, to exclude "carrier non-all-weather attacks"
from the war plan, Burke believed that they could play a useful
role in striking "flexible TOTs [time-over-targets], that is,
non-time urgent targets. Like the Army's leaders, he believed that
assurance criteria were "excessive", for example, 97 percent
for 202 DGZs (presumably mostly nuclear targets). (Note
17) To obtain 97 percent, SAC and other nuclear forces would
strike targets with multiple high-level nuclear weapons. Another
concern was the size of the minimum NSTL. Based on ONI (Office of
National Intelligence) estimates, Burke believed that it was too
large. As it stood, the list comprised 750 DGZs, which included
nuclear delivery forces, government and military headquarters, and
urban-industrial targets. (Note 18) As before
Burke remained concerned about the lack of constraints, the failure
to take into account fire and radiation effects, and the decision
to treat missed strikes as zeros in the "box score of damage
achieved" (even though "misses will kill a lot of Russians
and Chinese"), among other problems.
Document
17: CNO Cable to CINCLANTFLT (Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet),
CINCPACFLT (Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet), CINCUSNAVEUR (Commander-in-Chief
U.S. Naval Forces Europe), 24 November 1960
Source: U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Arleigh Burke Papers, SIOP/NSTL
Briefing Folder
In this message, Burke developed a few areas where he disagreed
with the Army. For example, Burke dissented from the Army's interest
in extending the SIOP beyond the "initial strike" so it
included follow-on attacks. According to Burke, this would be impractical
because "there is going to be a lot of confusion after initial
strikes and control of subsequent operations must rest in Unified
Commanders and local commanders." Burke felt even more strongly
than the Army about the SIOP's preemptive features. For a variety
of reasons, Burke argued, "Preemptive, preventative, or initiative
strikes will not prevent serious damage on the United States."
One of the problems that Burke cited--Washington's lack of knowledge
of the location of Soviet ICBM silos--would be solved within a year,
but his arguments about the uncertainties and dangers of preemptive
attacks would become familiar ones.
Document
18: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Review
of the Initial NSTL and SIOP, JCS 2056/194, 9 December 1960, Top Secret,
Excised copy with more details released on appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59) Sec. 8
On 1 December 1960, Secretary of Defense Gates, the Joint Chiefs
and the CINCs traveled to Offutt Air Force base to get briefings
on, and review, the NSTL and the SIOP. So far, there are no primary
sources available on these discussions, but Kaplan has a fascinating
interview-based account of top-level SIOP briefings that same month
which may about this episode. (Note 19) As this
document shows, a week later the Chiefs met and decided that the
NSTL and SIOP were "satisfactory for the integration of the
initial national strategic attack" and should be used for "the
preparation of detailed implementing plans and procedures."
SIOP-62 would go into effect on 1 April 1961. Looking ahead, the
Chiefs called for a review of the war plan to determine areas where
changes might be in order.
The two appendices "A" and "B" to the document
provide some interesting material on the procedures used to produce
and assess SIOP-62. "Joint teams" working at the JSTPS
developed "chronological sequence[s]" showing when weapons
would arrive at targets; a key element in the plan was the "roll
back" principle designed to destroy air defenses in order to
establish "corridors" for the "following sorties."
In light of the high assurance requirements, to raise the odds that
a weapon would arrive at a given BRL, targeters would assign several
of the same type of missile or bomb to the same target (cross-targeting).
Appendix "B" summarized a Defense Atomic Support Agency
(DASA) study estimating the use of the alert force to cause "severe
damage" to industrial complexes. Comparing the damage by one
high yield and one low-yield weapon to a given facility, the DASA
study concluded that the alert force was "meeting but not excessively
meeting the damage level specified in the guidance." This was
a controversial subject, however, and Army and Navy leaders remained
troubled by high levels of damage. As they no doubt noted, the SIOP
often assigned several weapons, not just one, to the same target.
Document
19: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Review
of the NSTL/SIOP-62 and Related Policy Guidance, JCS 2056/197, 30
December 1960, Top Secret, Excised copy with more details released
on appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59) Sec. 8
During the weeks after the Chiefs approved the SIOP some of the
service chiefs and the CINCs sent in comments, some of them skeptical.
Not surprisingly, Admiral Burke sent in the first such assessment.
His arguments will be familiar by now, as they express reservations
about the damage criteria, which are "based on blast damage
only" not taking into account "thermal and radiation effects."
Thus, the new policy "results in damage levels and population
casualties beyond those which appear to be required." He also
saw problems in the interpretation of assurance for arrival of weapons
at the BRL, resulting in "extremely high levels of assurance"
and the unrealistic estimates of radiation doses. Plainly worried
about the fallout effects on friendly countries and U.S. forces,
Burke asked for an analysis of "world-wide contamination, to
include effect of Soviet weapons employment."
Document
20: Cable from CINCPAC to JCS, "Report of Preliminary Review
of SIOP-62," 18 January 1961, Top Secret, Excised copy with more
details released on appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59) Sec. 9
With this cable CINCPAC Harry Felt informed the Joint Chiefs that
his recent review of SIOP-62 confirmed "doubts in my mind."
Like White House science adviser George Kistiakowsky (see
document 23 below), Felt was concerned that JCS damage criteria
were excessive and would produce damage far beyond what a relatively
small nuclear weapon did to Hiroshima in 1945. This comparison "revealed
the extremes to which we have gone in our plans in the past 15 years."
The United States could reach its objectives (presumably to prevail
over the adversary) while obtaining far less destruction. Like Burke,
Felt believed that damage criteria were unrealistic in that they
only considered blast effects but did not take "heat, fire,
and radiation" into account. Also like Burke, Felt worried
about the fallout hazards to friendly forces and nations: "When
we consider that worldwide about 1450 weapons are programmed by
alert forces and about 3400 weapons by all the committed forces,
we realize that our weapons can be a hazard to ourselves as well
as our enemy."
Document
21: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Review
of the NSTL/SIOP-62 and Related Guidance, JCS 2056/204, 19 January
1961, Top Secret, Excised copy with more details released on appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59) Sec. 9
On 17 January Army Chief of Staff General George Decker presented
the Joint Chiefs with his assessment of SIOP-62. Like some of his
colleagues he believed that the damage criteria were excessive and
that the constraints criteria were unrealistic. Like Arleigh Burke,
Decker saw the SIOP as problematic because it was a "capabilities
plan" that simply threw available nuclear weapons at the Sino-Soviet
bloc. (Note 20) As Decker put it, "SIOP-62
reflects an initial strike capability of the forces made available."
What Decker thought was needed was a SIOP that was more firmly based
in objective; he suggested that the "selection of more precise
objectives should more effectively neutralize the war-making and
political potential of the … Bloc at the same or lesser degree
of effort." Also like Burke, Decker worried about SAC domination
of the JSTPS and called for a more "equitable representation
among the services" on the planning staff.
Document
22: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Review
of JCS NSTL and SIOP-62, JCS 2056/206, 26 January 1961, Top Secret,
Excised copy with more details released on appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59) Sec. 9
The Atlantic Command chimed in next, with a six page critique from
acting CINCLANT Vice-Admiral Fitzhugh Lee. Using the "committed
force" for a nuclear strike, Lee argued, produced destructive
results that exceeded the specific objectives specified in the NSTAP.
To correct that problem he recommended that the Chiefs "establish
the Essential National Task which must be accomplished should …
deterrence against general war fail." Like Burke and Decker,
Lee critically assessed damage criteria, assurance delivery, constraints
policy and questioned SAC's predominant role at the JSTPS. He also
questioned the JSTPS's point system used for target worth (excised
here, but military targets were "alfa" targets, while
urban-industrial targets were "bravo" targets; see document
12). Lee doubted whether the plan made effective use of the nascent
missile force; recognizing that Polaris missiles were not accurate
enough to destroy "hard point" military targets, Lee believed
that they could "be very effectively used in their intended
role of deterrent/retaliation" by targeting urban-industrial
centers. Point 11 on "flexibility" suggests that circumstances
could emerge where it was prudent to stop the attack in whole or
in part or withholdings attacks on certain targets. While the target
categories that he thought could be withheld are excised, Lee's
thinking anticipated later decisions to establish SIOP withholds
for Moscow, Beijing, China, and Eastern European countries. As will
be seen, the Marine Corps member of Joint Chiefs shared Lee's concern
about withholding targets (see document 24). Arguments in favor
of flexibility would, over the years, have an impact on the SIOP,
but in the short-term, the JSTPS would tenaciously argue that "the
plan is designed for execution as a whole and the exclusion of attack
of any category … of targets would, in varying degrees, reduce
the effectiveness of the plan." (Note 21)
Document
23: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Strategic
Target Planning, JCS 2056/208, 27 January 1961, Top Secret, Excised
copy with more details released on appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59) Sec. 9
In November 1960, before Secretary of Defense Gates and the Joint
Chiefs had approved SIOP-62, White House science adviser George
B. Kistiakowsky, with two assistants, George Rathgens, from his
staff, and Herbert Scoville, jr., then director of CIA's Office
of Scientific Intelligence, went to SAC headquarters to receive
briefings on, and study, the SIOP. General Power and the JSTPS cooperated
with Kistiakowsky only because Eisenhower had signed a letter that
gave his adviser "about as much authority as that of the secretary
of defense." (Note 22) After he returned
to Washington Kistiakowsky prepared a report whose main points dovetailed
with the comments from the Army, Navy, CINCLANCT, and CINCPAC. While
Kistiakowsky acknowledged that the SIOP was the "best that
could be expected under the circumstances" and "should
be put into effect," he believed that the procedures then used
by the JSTPS made it worth questioning whether the damage criteria
"result in overkill and …created unjustified additional
`force requirements.'" Given that the same target list was
used for preemptive or retaliatory attacks, he suggested that it
was excessive to assign 5 weapons to counterforce targets in a retaliatory
strike (perhaps on the grounds that they might be striking empty
airfields). Kistiakowsky also raised doubts about using blast effect
as the only criterion of damage and used the devastation of Hiroshima
to argue that the JSTPS had used unrealistic criteria in estimating
the lethal effects of nuclear weapons. Indeed, he saw the destruction
caused by a preemptive strike by the alert force as "so extensive"
that he questioned whether it is necessary to include follow-on
force in the preemptive attack.
Tab "B" provides a detailed, but heavily excised, account
of how the SIOP was prepared. Some of the information may be found
in document 12.
Kistiakowsly briefed Eisenhower on his conclusions toward the end
of November. Later, the president confided to his naval aide that
the large numbers of targets, the superfluous targeting, and the
huge overkill "[frightened] the devil out of me." As David
Rosenberg explained in his path-breaking article, Eisenhower realized
that the "SIOP might not be a rational instrument for controlling
nuclear planning, but rather an engine generating escalating force
requirements." Now believing that the SIOP was far more destructive
than was necessary to deter an attack, Eisenhower wanted limits:
to "get this thing right down to the deterrence." (Note
23) But it was too late for him to change course. Nevertheless,
at close of his administration, Eisenhower sent a copy of Kistiakowsky's
report to Secretary Gates who, on 20 January, just as he was vacating
his office, passed it on to the Joint Chiefs and JSTPS for their
comments. The next administration would have to deal with the problem
of the SIOP, if it could.
Document
24A: Cable from Vice Admiral Parker, Naval Reserve Training Command,
Offutt Air Force Base, to CNO, 6 February 1961
Source: U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Arleigh
Burke Papers. NSTL/SIOP Messages, Exclusives & Personals
Document 24B: Memorandum for
the Record, "Secretary McNamara's Visit to the JSTPS, 4 February
1961," 6 February 1961
Source: FOIA Release to National Security Archive
While the records of the Gates-JCS-JSTPS conference from December
1961 have yet to surface, two accounts of the first visit by Gates'
successor, Robert S. McNamara, to Offutt Air Force Base, a JSTPS
memo and a Navy cable, have been declassified. (Note
24) The cable from the Navy's chief representative to the JSTPS,
Vice Admiral Edward N. Parker, is particularly informative. Recognizing
McNamara's background on probabilities, Parker was impressed by
his "penetrating" questions on damage probabilities, assurance,
and the effectiveness of force structure but he also found the new
Secretary to be "weak in his knowledge of weapons effects."
McNamara's response to the briefing showed that he was strongly
interested in replacing bombers with missiles, believed that it
was necessary for a larger proportion of the SIOP force to be on
alert, found the damage criteria problematic, and was especially
concerned over the high level of expected damage to China, the Soviet
Union, and the satellite countries. Recognizing that if four weapons
were targeted on a DGZ to ensure that at least one weapon reached
the target (but not taking into account the DBL--damage before launch--factor),
McNamara realized that several weapons were likely to strike Soviet
territory. That, he believed, could cause "fantastic"
levels of fallout. Earlier, McNamara had asked, if using the JSTPS's
damage criteria, how many weapons would be assigned to a Hiroshima
or Nagasaki-type target? The answer was three 80 kiloton weapons,
although Director of Defense Research and Engineering Herbert York,
then a holdover from the Eisenhower administration, suggested another
answer: weapons totaling one megaton.
McNamara also learned about the implications of damage criteria
for weapons requirements. As Herbert York explained, if 90 percent
probability of severe damage was changed to 70 percent, force requirements
would be cut in half, but if the goal was 99 percent, the force
would be doubled. The JSTPS account sheds light on the target list:
the NSTL then included 151 urban-industrial targets of which the
alert force would target 130. (Note 25)
Document
25: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Review
of the NSTL/SIOP-62 and Related Policy Guidance, JCS 2056/220, 11
February 1961, Top Secret, Excised copy with more details released
on appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59) Sec. 9
Fred Kaplan's account of the Pentagon's initial review of the SIOP
includes an especially memorable episode. During the briefings,
Marine Corps commandant David Shoup (the service with the most marginal
nuclear responsibilities) saw a chart that showed that the initial
attack would kill tens of millions of Chinese. At the closing meeting,
General Shoup asked General Power what would happen if Beijing was
not fighting; was there an option to leave Chinese targets out of
the attack plan? Power was reported to have said that he hoped no
one would think of that "because it would really screw up the
plan"--that is, the plan was supposed to be executed as a whole.
Apparently Shoup then observed that "any plan that kills millions
of Chinese when it isn't even their war is not a good plan. This
is not the American way." (Note 26)
As this document shows, Shoup put his concerns on paper arguing
that the SIOP was inconsistent with National Security Council paper
5904/1, which Eisenhower had approved in … 1959. Curiously,
the reviewers of this document excised the quotation from this NSC
paper, even though the Archive's appeal letter showed that it had
been fully declassified and published in the State Department's
Foreign Relations series. The uncensored quotation reads:
The United States should utilize all requisite force against
selected targets in the USSR--and as necessary in Communist China,
European Bloc and non-European bloc countries--to attain the above
objectives. Military targets in Bloc countries other than the
USSR and Communist China will be attacked as necessary. (Note
27)
Taking issue with the SIOP because it did not follow the limited
flexibility inhering in NSC 5904/1, Shoup argued that it made no
"distinction" between the USSR, China, and other bloc
countries and, instead, "dictates that the NSTL/SIOP provide
for the attack of a single list of Sino-Soviet countries."
While Shoup conceded that the SIOP's execution procedures included
language on withholding strikes, he believed that it was not effective
enough and called for "greater flexibility" and "precise
provisions" for "routine withholding of strikes."
The reviewers removed the target categories but presumably Shoup
was referring to China as well as European and non-European Bloc
countries.
Documents
26A and 26B:
Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force for the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on Strategic Target Planning, JCS 2056/230, 17 March 1961,
Top Secret, Excised copy with more details released on appeal
Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 3205 (17 Aug 59) Sec. 9
After some delay, the Air Force Chief of Staff issued an initial
response to Kistiakowsky's report; General White's memo, however,
avoided taking on the major criticisms and took issue with he called
a "misleading" reference to the 2009 study. White's memorandum
is heavily excised but, according to a Joint Staff memo prepared
a few days later, the main point was a disagreement with the "statistical
comparison of SIOP-62 and Study 2009" made in Tab "B"
of document 22. Seeing this a "minor" error "that
is not likely to disturb the SECDEF," the Joint Staff recommended
that action on White's paper be deferred until the JSTPS had commented
on the entire Kistiakowsky report. Those comments, completed in
June 1961, remain to be declassified.
Document
27: JCLSG, Offutt AFB cable 292318Z to JCS, 28 April 1961
Source: U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Arleigh Burke Papers. Messages,
file # 2, NSTL/SIOP Messages Other Than Exclusives & Personals,
Period 1 Jan
Only a few weeks after SIOP-62 went into effect (on 1 April 1961),
the JSTPS began a more or less constant effort at updating the plan
so as to take into account the availability of new weapons and changes
in alert postures, among other considerations. For example, as this
document shows, the crystallization of plans to put 50 percent of
SAC bombers on ground alert meant the enlargement of the alert force
and the need to reconfigure the DGZs assigned to the bombers.
The most important part of this document, however, is that the
disclosure of SIOP-62's aggregate DGZs and weapons. The alert force
would use 1706 weapons against a total of 725 DGZs in the Soviet
Union, China, and allied states. Of those DGZs, 41 were defense
targets (air defense units, radars, and warning systems). As noted
earlier, document 23B shows that of the aggregate alert force targets,
130 were in urban-industrial areas. The number of delivery vehicles
(bombers and a few missiles) would have been at least 880, but probably
somewhat more (for 880 see document 13). The committed force would
use 3240 weapons against a total of 1060 DGZs. Of those targets,
25 were pure defense while about 151 were urban-industrial. According
to David Rosenberg's study, the DGZs included some 2600 separate
installations from a target data base of 4100.
Document
28: History & Research Division, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command,
History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: Background and
Preparation of SIOP-62, n.d., Top Secret, Excised copy with more details
released on appeal
Source: Freedom of Information Act request and appeal
Not long after the completion of SIOP-62, SAC headquarters produced
an official history. While rather short, on the whole it is balanced,
giving a judicious view of the controversies that preceded the high-level
decisions to create the JSTPS and synchronize target planning through
a SIOP-mechanism. Unfortunately, despite an appeal, which took seven
years to process, the Defense Department withheld significant portions
from the concluding, and most important section, "Preparation
of SIOP-62." Significantly, the Defense Department reviewers
did release a summary of the NSTAP's prime target objectives, thus
allowing readers to fill in the blanks in document 9. Interestingly,
the reviewers also released the aggregate number of targets--4,000--
in the National Strategic Data Base (NSTDB). In addition, a footnote
on page 21 includes what is probably a description of the size of
the alert force. No doubt much more information, possibly the entire
text, could have been released from this history without harm to
national security. A new declassification request, recently filed
by the Archive, may elicit additional information.
Notes
1. For "extremely sensitive information," see Joint Staff
cable 986357 to Director, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, 25
November 1960, Record Group 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3205 (17 August
1959), Section 7. For the difficulty that even properly cleared civilian
officials have had in getting access to the SIOP, see Peter Feaver,
Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in
the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992),
59-60.
2. David A. Rosenberg, "Nuclear War Planning," Michael
Howard et al., ed., The Laws of War: Contraints on Warfare in
the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p.
175.
2a. Thanks to Charles Bright, George Washington University, for pointing
out this reference.
2b. Henry S. Rowen, “Formulating Strategic Doctrine,”
Appendices, Commission on the Organization of the Government for
the Conduct of Foreign Policy, June 1975, Volume 4 (Washington,
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 218-234.
3. Rosenberg's article was subsequently reprinted in Steven Miller,
ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984). Subsequent citations are to this publication.
4. Scott Sagan, "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President
Kennedy," International Security 12, no. 1 (Summer 1987).
5. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," p. 116; Fred
M. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 19…), p. 269.
6. Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and
Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Cornell University Press, 2004).
See also the National Security Archive electronic briefing book on
fire and nuclear weapons effects, "'It is Certain There Will
Be Many Firestorms": New Evidence on the Origins of Overkill,"
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB108/index.htm>.
7. See Natural Resources Defense Council, The U.S. Nuclear War
Plan: A Time for Change, at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/warplan/execsum.asp>
8. For background on some of the developments during the late 1970s,
see U.S. Strategic Air Command, "Current US Strategic Targeting
Doctrine," prepared by Colonels Kearl and Locke, 3 December 1979,
Top Secret, excised copy, published in National Security Archive Electronic
Briefing Book, "Launch on Warning," at <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB43/doc20.pdf>.
For useful articles on the SIOP and its permutations during the 1960s
and 70s, see Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic
Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). The
most detailed account of the Nixon administration's search for flexibility
remains Terry Terriff's, The Nixon Administration and the Making
of U.S. Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1995).
9. By the late 1950s, the studies repeated the same grim conclusions;
according to a CIA official who opined that the results were always
the same and the work was becoming routinized. See General Nathan
Twining to Allen Dulles, " Presentation of the 1959 Net Evaluation
Subcommittee Report," 29 October, with CIA memorandum attached,
CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives.
10. See Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," pp. 164-166,
for details on the NSC 2009 study.
11. For more on target coordination efforts, see
document 28.
12. See Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare
: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing,
1914-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
13. H-hour is the specific hour in which combat operations are slated
to begin.
14. George B. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House:
The Private Diary of President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for
Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1976), pp. 253-254.
15. For the White House's account of the meeting, with Burke's statement,
see Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 11 August
1960, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1958-1960, III (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1997), pp. 442-451
16. See Kaplan, Wizards, at pp. 264-266, for more on Burke's
concerns.
17. The list of 202 was later narrowed down to 7 but 215 other targets
would require 95 percent assurance. See Kaplan, Wizards,
at p. 268.
18. Besides the minimum list, the NSTL included "additional
targets considered to be of major importance, those defense targets
which must be destroyed in order for attacking forces to reach their
targets, plus those targets which theater commanders must destroy
in order to protect their own forces." See see Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke to Flag and General Officers, "National
Strategic Target List and Single Integrated Operational Plan,"
Special Edition Flag Officers Dope, 4 December 1960, at <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB108/fire-6.pdf>
19. Kaplan, Wizards, pp. 269-270.
20. Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," p. 117.
21. Sagan, "SIOP-62," p. 51.
22. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, p. 60.
23. Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," p. 118. Unfortunately,
by the time that some of the Burke records were temporarily available
in 1997, the record of the telephone conversation between Burke and
Eisenhower's naval aide, who cited Eisenhower's concerns, had had
gone astray at the Navy archives.
24. For Herbert York's brief account of the McNamara SIOP briefing
and a more extended account of an earlier briefing, see Making
Weapons, Talking Peace (New York: Basic Books, 1987), at 184-186
and 204.
25. For Kaplan's account of the McNamara briefing, see Wizards,
pp. 270-272.
26. Kaplan, Wizards, p. 270.
27. NSC 5904/1, Note by the Executive Secretary to the National
Security Council on U.S. Policy in the Event of War, 17 March 1959,
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1958-1960, III (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office,
1996), pp. 207-210.
