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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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Exclusive for Adms Felt, Dennison, and Smith from Burke.

Following are my comments on parts of my 201933Z not previously covered
my 221845Z. While in general agreement with most Army positions, divergencies in
certain areas exist.

1. Northern Bases. Army position was addressed by CINCAL in Policy Committee Meeting No. 5. Agree with Army philosophy but present missile reliability, available geodesy, and lack of detailed intelligence appears to preclude attacks this area beyond level programmed in this SIOP for manned bombers.

2. Interdiction. Interdiction targets, of course, should be struck but interdiction targets should not be in NSTL or SIOP. Destruction of interdiction targets is job of Unified Commanders.

3. Timing. I do not agree with Army position. SIOP should be restricted only to initial strikes. There is going to be a lot of confusion after initial strikes and control of subsequent operations must rest in Unified Commanders and local commanders. They must exercise their initiative and use forces which

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they have available whose capabilities will be known only to them after strikes on our forces. Conflicts would be settled by FRES.

4. Initiative vs retaliatory. Annex I of proposed SIOF discusses missile forces programmed for either initiative or retaliatory sorties. Appears planning has been geared toward initiative plan despite guidance, and agree with Army analysis of SIOF on this point. We will need provide more detailed guidance for next SIOF.

Pre-emptive, preventative or initiative strikes will not prevent serious damage on United States because first, we do not know where their land-based missile sites are and never will know all of them. And, second, we will not be able to destroy all enemy seagoing ^{MISSILE FORCES} simultaneously before they get off their ^{can} ~~ships~~ ^{MISSILES} ~~ships~~. In addition, manned aircraft are of no use in a pre-emptive war. If we ^{were to} try to coordinate missiles and bombers so that the strikes arrive on target at the same time such tremendous universal effort by United States would be known by Russia several hours before bombers could arrive and ^{RUSSIA} would launch their strikes against us. If we use missiles first, the landing of first missile would cause all bombers and missiles in Russia to be launched and our bombers arriving hours later would be bombing empty sites and empty airfields. It is surprising that Air Force is sponsoring a pre-emptive strike because a pre-emptive strike means an all ballistic missile strike and sounds the death knell of bombers.

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