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J.C.S. 2056/204

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19 January 1961

Pages 1887 - 1891, incl.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED GUIDANCE (U)

- References:
- a. J.C.S. 2056/165
  - b. J.C.S. 2056/191
  - c. J.C.S. 2056/194 - 3205 (17 Aug 59)  
Sec 8

The enclosed memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, CSAM 19-61, dated 17 January 1961, is referred hereby to the J-3 for consideration in connection with the review of the NSTL and SIOP-62 which will be directed toward possible changes in developing the next NSTL/SIOP, as indicated in paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/194.

F. J. BLOUIN,  
M. J. INGELIDO,  
Joint Secretariat.

3205 (17 Aug 59)  
Sec 8

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E N C L O S U R E

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED GUIDANCE (U)

CSAM 19-61

17 January 1961

1. Action\* by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in approving NSTL/SIOP 62 provides that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders concerned, and the Director, Strategic Target Planning shall recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff areas to be investigated for possible change in developing NSTL/SIOP-63.

2. Pursuant to that action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I consider the following areas to require further investigation:

a. Basic Policy Guidance:

(1) Determination of the essential general war task for strategic nuclear delivery forces. The basic objective of the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy is to establish an essential national task to be accomplished under the several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated. SIOP-62 reflects an initial strike capability of the forces made available. The task against which this capability has been applied remains to be defined; i.e., no task is stated except that which committed forces can accomplish.

(2) Specific objectives. Preliminary damage assessment reveals that although the general levels [REDACTED] prescribed in the NSTAP have been attained, the [REDACTED] targets selected do not provide for full neutralization

\* See Decision On J.C.S. 2056/194

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of any resource system. Yet it is evident that within the over-all level of damage there is marked redundancy of damage in terms of the end effect on the economic and control system. The selection of more precise objectives should more effectively neutralize the war-making and political potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc at the same or a lesser level of effort.

(3) Damage criteria. The over-all level of damage and population casualties appear to exceed that which is required even though no account is taken of thermal or radiation effects. Damage criteria specified in NSTAP deal only with severe damage. Yet lesser but significant damage may in many cases contribute equally to attainment of the over-all objective.

(4) Assurance at BRL. NSTAP prescribes [75% assurance of delivery at each bomb release line] of the necessary weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to targets on the NSTL. SIOP-62 provides a variable scale of assurance averaging [over ██████████]. The assurance method, compounding the probability associated with individual weapons carriers assigned to a target to attain an assurance that the target is struck, produces an expectancy that a large proportion of targets will be struck with multiple weapons. It is not clear that coupling delivery assurance and damage probability for individual targets is the optimum method by which a realistic and reasonable level of assured damage may be prescribed. Consideration also is needed of the feasibility

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and desirability of providing the higher levels of assurance which may be necessary through the use of alternate target assignment and reporting or post-strike reconnaissance procedures to guide commitment of follow-on forces.

(5) Initiative/Retaliation. NSTAP\* requires the SIOP\*\* to be prepared in consideration of the several ways in which hostilities may be initiated. Yet except for missiles there is no provision for alteration of the target system or target priority between the circumstances of pre-emption and retaliation. Target priorities, particularly for the alert force which may be the only force launched, appear to be optimum for neither circumstance.

b. Constraints. The SIOP conforms to the prescribed constraints criteria. However, the methodology employed for computation of expected dose of residual radiation from fallout does not consider seasonal wind variations and multiple weapon probability. Further, it has not yet been possible to consider additive effects due to employment of weapons outside the SIOP. The range of probability of adverse effects on other concurrent military operations due to fallout from SIOP and other weapons has not been considered. Both the method for computation of expected dose and the tolerance levels for the several monitoring points require close review.

c. Organization of the JSTPS. The current organization of the JSTPS reflects the necessity which existed in September 1960 to rely on the experience of SAC headquarters personnel

\* Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2056/165  
\*\* J.C.S. 2056/191

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and the existing organization of Headquarters, SAC for preparation of the initial NSTL/SIOP in the limited time available. This necessity no longer exists. The permanent organization of the JSTPS should be that best calculated to fulfill the requirements of the JCS and to this end should provide for equitable representation among the services, particularly at the policy level.

d. Relation of SIOP to Other Planning Documents. Although the SIOP is a significant component of the JCS guidance for commanders, it fails to bear a logical relationship to other primary planning documents, notably JSCP, in the planning cycle. The due date of May 1962 for SIOP-63 provides insufficient time for commanders to incorporate it into their plans prepared in support of JSCP-63. Neither does the May date provide sufficient time for SIOP preparation subsequent to provision of over-all strategic guidance in SIOP-63.

3. I recommend:

a. That the foregoing comments be forwarded to the Director, Joint Staff for consideration in the development of the plan of action with respect to the NSTAP.

b. That the Director, Joint Staff prepare, for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a time-phased program for actions in support of NSTL/SIOP-63.

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