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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

TARGET COORDINATION AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS (U)

References: a. J.C.S. 1620/257-4720 (5 Jan 50)
b. J.C.S. 2056/131
c. J.C.S. 2056/134
d. J.C.S. 2056/137

1. Pursuant to agreement at the meeting on 1 December 1959, Enclosure "A" hereto, containing the views of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army;* the Chief of Naval Operations;** the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force;*** and the Commandant of the Marine Corps,**** on the questions posed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/134, is circulated for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Op60B/1s, serial 000 362P60, subject: "Target Coordination and Associated Problems", dated 30 September 1959, is appended, as Enclosure "B" hereto, at the request** of the Chief of Naval Operations.

H. L. HILLYARD,
J. O. COBB,
Joint Secretariat.

- * CSAM-401-59, dated 15 December 1959; on file in Joint Secretariat.
- ** Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations, Op-604E/br, serial 000467P60, dated 20 December 1959; on file in Joint Secretariat.
- *** CSAFM-565-59, dated 15 December 1959; on file in Joint Secretariat.
- **** Memorandum by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, A03B(6)-dw/0003A34859, dated 17 December 1959, subject: "Target Coordination and Associated Problems (U)"; on file in Joint Secretariat.

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1. Strategic Targeting Policy

2. QUESTION What should be our policy for development of a national strategic target system?

ANSWER

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

A national strategic target system should be developed.

b. QUESTION What categories of targets should be included in the national strategic target system?

ANSWER

Chief of Naval Operations

A national strategic target system should be developed.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

A national strategic target system should be developed.

Commandant of the Marine Corps

A national strategic target system should be developed.

(NOTE: To facilitate examination, it is assumed that the following definition of "A Strategic Target System" based upon the Chairman's memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, will be acceptable for use during the consideration of these questions:

questions:

"A Strategic Target System comprises the following elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc strengths:

- "(1) Critical components of
"(2)
"(3)
"(4)

It is further assumed that, for the purpose of considering these questions, this assumption would provide adequate definition, by implication, of the term "strategic" as used otherwise, i.e., "strategic delivery systems," "strategic force," etc.)

The categories of targets to be included would, for the purpose of this paper, be those contained in the note above, however, the specific numbers and types to be included should be determined after considering the results of the current HNSC studies.

(NOTE: To facilitate examination, it is assumed that the following definition of "A Strategic Target System," based upon the Chairman's memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, will be acceptable for use during the consideration of these questions:

questions:

"A Strategic Target System comprises the following elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc strengths:

- "(1) Critical components of
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It is further assumed that, for the purpose of considering these questions, this assumption would provide adequate definition, by implication, of the term "strategic" as used otherwise, i.e., "strategic delivery systems," "strategic force," etc.)

The categories of targets to be included would, for the purpose of this paper, be those contained in the note above, however, the specific numbers and types to be included should be determined after considering the results of the current HNSC studies.

The national strategic target system should include the following elements of the following categories of targets which comprise the Sino-Soviet Bloc and capability to wage war.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(NOTE: To facilitate examination, it is assumed that the following definition of "A Strategic Target System," based upon the Chairman's memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, will be acceptable for use during the consideration of these questions:

these questions:

"A Strategic Target System comprises the following elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc strengths:

- "(1)
"(2)
"(3) War-sustaining resources.
"(4)

It is further assumed that, for the purpose of considering these questions, this assumption would provide adequate definition, by implication, of the term "strategic" as used otherwise, i.e., "strategic delivery systems," "strategic force," etc.)

The categories of targets to be included would, for the purpose of this paper, be those contained in the note above, however, the specific numbers and types to be included should be determined after considering the results of the current HNSC studies.

NOTE: In arriving at these views, consideration was given to GSAM-542-59, dated 1 December 1959, in which the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force suggested consideration be given to substituting, as an agreed answer, an Air Force proposed answer to question 1b of the Chairman's Report, in lieu of the unanimously agreed answer to that question advanced by the Committee. The answer to question 1b was arrived at by the Ad Hoc Committee as an initial and basic step in this consideration of the Chairman's 13 questions. Further, the agreed answer incorporates a definition of "A Strategic Target System" which is based directly on and taken essentially verbatim from the Chairman's memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, which is the basic source of the 13 questions under consideration. It is in the view of the Chief of Staff of Naval Operations that for purposes of consideration of the Chairman's 13 questions, that the answer to question 1b should stand as it was unanimously agreed to by the Ad Hoc Committee.

On file in Joint Secretariat
Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/131
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ANSWER What agency should apply our strategic targeting policy, develop the national strategic target system, and keep it up-to-date?

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

(NOTE This question is considered based upon the interpretation as follows "What agency should apply our strategic targeting policy in developing the national strategic target system and in keeping it up-to-date?")

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the support of any agency, or agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which may be required

Chief of Naval Operations

(NOTE This question is considered based upon the interpretation as follows "What agency should apply our strategic targeting policy in developing the national strategic target system and in keeping it up-to-date?")

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the support of any agency, or agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which may be required.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

As the commander functionally responsible under the Joint Chief of Staff for conduct of the strategic offensive on a world wide basis, CINCSAC is uniquely qualified and equipped to develop and maintain the national strategic target list. Since the designation as a specialized command under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Strategic Air Command has, as a matter of necessity, compiled and collected data from targeting references and other sources which, for all practical purposes, constitute the basis for a national strategic target list.

Air Force war planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is promulgated in the form of strategic guidance through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. That plan is a mission type directive embodying guidance to commanders on all aspects of atomic employment, including targeting policy, weapon programming, damage criteria and constraints. Within the parameters of this guidance, each commander develops plans designed to accomplish the missions and tasks assigned to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a prerequisite to such plans, each commander develops a target list which will permit accomplishment of his specific missions and tasks. Based upon priorities of tasks within his mission, force availability and operational considerations, each commander then selects targets from his total list which he programs for attack in the Atomic Annex to his war plan.

Just as authority for development of a theater target list upon which to base theater war plans with atomic attack programs is essential to the theater commander for accomplishment of his mission, the authority for development of a national strategic target list as a basis for his war plan is essential to the commander functionally responsible to the Joint

Commandant of the Marine Corps

(NOTE This question is considered based upon the interpretation as follows "What agency should apply our strategic targeting policy in developing the national strategic target system and in keeping it up-to-date?")

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the support of any agency, or agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which may be required.

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4. QUESTION: What agency should review the national strategic target system for consistency with policy and approve it as a basis for further analysis?
ANSWER:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

2. Integrated Operational Plans

a. QUESTION: Do we need a single integrated operational plan for attack of the national strategic target system?
b. QUESTION: If we do need a single integrated operational plan for strategic attack, what agency should develop this plan? What agencies should review it and approve it?

ANSWER:

The first question is not susceptible to a categorical yes or no answer, since the answer would depend on whether or not there is a single commander charged with the operational responsibility of executing the attack on the entire national strategic target system, as well as on the interpretation given to the phrase "a single integrated operational plan." For the reasons stated in my answer to question 3g, I do not believe a single operational commander should be charged with the responsibility of executing this mission.

A single operational command authority is implicit in a single operational plan. With this interpretation it is therefore considered neither necessary nor desirable to have a single

Definition of such a target list is a product of careful relating of intelligence and operational knowledge and experience, evaluated on the basis of mission and task assignments as well as other conceptual guidance provided in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. In keeping with these considerations, it is appropriate that command be assigned responsibility for development of the National Strategic Target List on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for review and approval by them, and without prejudice as to the forces to be employed to accomplish attacks against these targets.

The first question is not susceptible to a categorical yes or no answer, since the answer would depend on whether or not there is a single commander charged with the operational responsibility of executing the attack on the entire national strategic target system, as well as on the interpretation given to the phrase "a single integrated operational plan." For the reasons stated in the Navy answer to question 3g, I do not believe a single operational commander should be charged with the responsibility of executing this mission. A single operational command authority is implicit in a single operational plan. With this interpretation it is therefore considered

Yes, we need a single integrated operational plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff currently produce a single strategic plan which constitutes the basis for the preparation of implementing operational plans by the commanders of the unified and specified commands, as appropriate to their assigned tasks. A single operational plan, implementing the single strategic plan, is required specifically to direct attack of the targets included on the national strategic target list because:

2. Successful attack of these targets is of crucial importance in general war and demands positive control of planning and assured unity in execution.

The first question is not susceptible to a categorical yes or no answer, since the answer would depend on whether or not there is a single commander charged with the operational responsibility of executing the attack on the entire national strategic target system, as well as on the interpretation given to the phrase "a single integrated operational plan." For the reasons stated in my answer to question 3g, I do not believe a single operational commander should be charged with the responsibility of executing this mission.

A single operational command authority is implicit in a single operational plan. With this interpretation it is therefore considered neither necessary nor desirable to have a single integrated operational plan. However, improvements

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Chief of Staff, U S Army

Since the USSR has the capability to launch a nuclear attack against us without warning at any time of their choosing, our nuclear retaliatory forces should be composed of weapons systems which have a reasonable assurance of surviving a surprise Soviet attack, rapidly launching their own attack, penetrating Soviet defenses and delivering their nuclear warheads accurately. For this reason, only all-weather capable delivery means should be assigned to pre-planned attacks against targets, on the approved national strategic target list, which must be developed in the immediate reaction to the hostile attack. Other nuclear capable delivery forces should be employed primarily in backup, re-strike or follow-up attacks as required and feasible in light of their capabilities and their other missions.

Chief of Naval Operations

Since the USSR at all times has the option of launching a nuclear attack against us without warning, it is desirable that the retaliatory weapon systems of the United States possess these characteristics:

(a) Invulnerability to such enemy attack, (b) A capability to penetrate the enemy defense system, (c) Speed of reaction, (d) An all-weather capability, (e) Remote patterns. No force should be categorically disqualified from any mission because it does not possess to the optimum degree, one or more of these desirable characteristics. It would be inappropriate for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to circumscribe the prerogatives of the commanders in the field by imposing tactical limitations to the extent of saying "no" to this question. Conditions within the areas of the various commanders vary as to forces available, geographic weather, targets etc. The commanders should be permitted freedom of action in the tactical employment of their forces to carry out their assigned mission.

In substance, this is a question of tactical detail that we can depend upon the operational commanders for a proper decision that will apply to their respective areas of operations.

Chief of Staff, U S Air Force

No. Inability to pre-determine the conditions under which U.S. offensive forces may have to be employed necessitates that they be capable constantly of immediate offensive action regardless of time or weather. Employment of forces having less than all-weather capability may be appropriate in a backup, support or subsequent phase role if circumstances permit, but not for assured coverage of priority preplanned strategic targets 24 hours every day.

Commandant of the Marine Corps

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In substance, this is a question of tactical detail that we can depend upon the operational commanders for a proper decision that will apply to their respective areas of operations.

2.d QUESTION Should our aircraft carrier forces be relieved of responsibility for 24-hour coverage of targets on the national strategic target list?

ANSWER

Unless the capabilities of carriers permit their remaining on station and launching an immediate strike in any weather 24 hours a day, carrier aircraft should not have responsibility for 24-hour coverage of targets on the national strategic target list.

No. The commanders of unified commands are assigned missions to be accomplished throughout the full spectrum of war -- cold, limited and general. They are assigned a variety of forces to accomplish these missions. In order to effect maximum

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economy of force, and to face the enemy with a diversity of threats, the commanders of unified commands should be permitted maximum freedom of action in the use of their forces, they should not only be permitted, but encouraged to exploit the multiple characteristics (possessed in varying degrees) of their forces. Unless these multiple characteristics are exploited, the force level of single purpose forces would have to be increased to cover this omission.

The theaters of three commanders' unified commands (CINCPAC, CINCLANT and CINCPAC) contain large ocean areas from which Soviet general war targets can be hit by carrier based aircraft. In two of the ocean areas, the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific, we keep carrier task forces deployed. In view of their effectiveness in conditions short of general war, they would be so deployed even if they possessed no general war nuclear delivery capability. But they do have such a capability that has progressively increased over the years. Their normal operational areas are within range of enemy targets, and are frequently between the bases of our land based bombers and enemy targets.

Carrier task forces provide the nation with a potent dispersed and alert force of nuclear capable bombers operating from movable airfields within the prospective theaters of operations. These are valuable characteristics that will become increasingly important in the missile age.

In the interest of economy of force and military effectiveness, we should exploit the full potential of carrier striking power by pre-planned strikes against targets on the national strategic target list. If this requires revision of current operating procedures the revisions should be made.

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The nuclear attack mission of aircraft carrier forces should be stated as "In general war, attack carrier forces should be responsible for attack of those targets allocated to them in the emergency plan of the commanders of the unified or specified command to whom they are assigned, with emphasis, within their capabilities, on their anti-submarine warfare role. They should constitute a reserve striking force to execute restrike and follow-on nuclear strikes against strategic targets as feasible and as required."

Not applicable in view of answer to 2 d above

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Not applicable in view of the answer to 2 d above

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1. QUESTION Is there an immediate need for the establishment of a Unified Strategic Command?

2. QUESTION If the answer to the above question is negative, is a Unified Strategic Command viewed as desirable for the more distant future?

3. QUESTION If a Unified Strategic Command is not established in the proximate future, is there a requirement for the integration of operational plans for the employment of POLARIS submarines with CINCSAC's operational plans?

4. QUESTION If so, how should this be accomplished?

ANSWER

For the reasons stated in the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army view in WSK-171-59^a there is no immediate need for the establishment of a Unified Strategic Command. As also stated in that memorandum, the ultimate command structure should be determined after POLARIS has been tried and proven.

POLARIS submarines initially assigned to commanders of unified and specified commands exercising operational command of major naval forces can be readily employed in accordance with the concepts for coordination presented in the answers to questions 2 d and 3 d, and 4 d and 5 d.

1. There is no immediate need for the establishment of a Unified Strategic Command and the desirability of such a command for the more distant future is not foreseen. Such assignment of the full responsibility for the attack of the entire national strategic target system to a single commander, is subject to the following overriding objections:

- a. It would, in effect, establish a single superior commander over all other commanders of unified commands.
- b. It would therefore interfere with the carrying out of the other primary responsibilities of the commanders of unified commands.
- c. It would subjugate the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the strategic direction of the war.
- d. It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would

There will be a need for a Unified Strategic Command which is operationally capable and functioning by the time that the first POLARIS-equipped vessel is available for operational deployment. Accordingly, preliminary steps leading to activation of such a command should be taken at an early date.

- a. If the Unified Strategic Command is not established in the proximate future, there remains a requirement for integration of operational efforts. A single operational plan for attack of strategic targets would seem to be the essential basis for such integration in any case.
- b. It would, in effect, establish a single superior commander over all other commanders of unified commands.
- c. It would, therefore, interfere with the carrying out of the other primary responsibilities of the commanders of unified commands.
- d. It would subjugate the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the strategic direction of the war.
- e. It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would follow a massive nuclear attack.

1. There is no immediate need for the establishment of a Unified Strategic Command, nor is there any indication that such a command will be desirable in the more distant future. The assigning of full responsibility for the attack of the entire national strategic target system to a single commander, is subject to the following overriding objections:

- a. It would, in effect, establish a single superior commander over all other commanders of unified commands.
- b. It would, therefore, interfere with the carrying out of the other primary responsibilities of the commanders of unified commands.
- c. It would subjugate the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the strategic direction of the war.
- d. It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would follow a massive nuclear attack.

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2. The POLARIS submarine weapons system will be one of several weapon systems assigned to the commanders of unified and specified commands. There will be a requirement for coordination of the operational plans for POLARIS as for other systems. Such coordination, to be effective, does not require integration of operational plans into a single operational plan. The answer to questions 2 a and b above set forth the reasons why integration of operational plans is neither necessary nor desirable. The measures which should be taken to improve present coordination of planning are:

a. There is a need for a clear delineation of the areas in which commanders have primary responsibility for coordination of planning for the attack of the strategic target system. Otherwise, the present unsatisfactory coordination will continue to exist with the consequent necessity for what amounts to detailed operational planning at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. A single "strategic" as opposed to "operational" plan should be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This plan, which in effect would be a mission type directive, should make more specific the targeting and damage criteria guidance now contained in the Atomic Annex to JCS and add the national strategic target list, and the assignment of geographic areas to the commanders of unified and specified commands within which they will be responsible for the coordination of both planning and the execution of the attack on the national strategic target list. This JCS plan should be furnished annually as an annex to the JCSOP at least six months prior to its effective date.

with CINCSAG's operational plan is not a matter for consideration in isolation. I do not believe a single operational commander should be charged with the responsibility of executing the attack on the national strategic target system. I consider that coordination of the plans of the commanders of unified and specified commands for the employment of all weapons will be greatly improved through implementation of the Marine Corps proposal in reply to question 3 a.

Procedures at the level of the commanders of the unified and specified commands should provide for development of operational strike plans concurrently and in the closest of coordination with respect to areas as well as other operations in the areas in which targets of the strategic target systems are located.

2. 1 QUESTION Does the joint chiefs of staff organization need policy control of an agency capable of operational analysis and war gaming of operational plans?

ANSWER

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

QUESTION If no, what agency should perform this function for the joint chiefs of staff?

ANSWER

The joint chiefs of staff need a joint operational analysis capability responsive to their requirements in order to fulfill their responsibilities as the senior operational command echelon in the military establishment. Either DASA or a new joint Agency could perform this function for the joint chiefs of staff.

The joint chiefs of staff need a joint operational analysis capability responsive to their requirements in order to fulfill their responsibilities as the senior operational command echelon in the military establishment. Either DASA or a new joint Agency could perform this function for the joint chiefs of staff.

The joint chiefs of staff should exercise direction and policy control of operational analyses and war gaming by furnishing terms of reference, including applicable assumptions, for each analysis or game. To assist the joint chiefs of staff and insure continuity of their control in these functions, a new position should be established on the joint staff, as a Special Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff. This officer of general or flag rank would be immediately responsible to the Director of the Joint Staff, and in addition to being charged with the conduct of war gaming, would also be designated as the Executive Director of the R&D Damage Assessment Center.

The new Special Assistant should be advised and assisted in monitoring the conduct of war games and damage assessment studies by a Joint Steering Committee, drawn from the joint staff and the Services.

For technical execution of war gaming, operational analyses and damage assessment studies, it would be neither necessary nor economical to divert DASA's attention to this function, which is completely foreign to its primary responsibility to provide technical, training, testing and stockpile management coordination in support of the atomic weapons field.

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A Joint Analysis Group composed of

detachments representing existing Service capabilities in the field of war gaming and damage assessment should be established. In view of the desirability of early achievement of a DOD damage assessment capability, this group could begin operation immediately, and would function within existing facilities until such time as it became possible to move into the ATCC.

The games and operational analyses, as planning tools, are the direct responsibility of the Joint Staff with personnel from J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and the Services participating. The organization proposed above allows for immediate and effective participation by personnel from those organizations, under close and continued policy direction and control by the Joint Chiefs of Staff without the highly undesirable division of responsibility which would result from an attempt to separate war gaming from its inherent and associated function of damage assessment.

3. Operational Control of Atomic Strike Forces.

2. QUESTION: As a general policy, should unified commanders having an area responsibility be responsible for H-hour attack of targets on the national strategic target list?

ANSWER:

Commanders of unified commands having an area responsibility should be responsible for pre-planned attacks of targets on the national strategic target list as feasible in light of their capabilities and other missions.

There is a need for a clear delineation of the areas in which commanders have primary responsibility for coordination of planning for the attack of the strategic target system. Otherwise, the present unsatisfactory coordination will continue

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Generally speaking, no, because the

forces assigned to the commanders of unified commands having an area responsibility are provided for the primary mission of accomplishing their objectives as opposed to accomplishing destruction of strategic targets on the national strategic target list. Recognizing, however, that certain targets constituting a direct threat to the theater may be included on the national strategic target list, available theater forces capable of providing

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Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
to exist with the consequent necessity for what amounts to detailed operational planning at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Assignment of areas of primary responsibility to the commanders of unified and specified commands would not preclude the striking of strategic targets by one commander in the area of another commander, rather, it would involve assigning primary responsibility for operational coordination of the strike forces entering each area. Areas of coordination responsibility should be based on such factors as the availability and capability of the forces assigned to the commanders of the unified and specified commands, assigned missions, security of their forces, and the characteristics of the area. The assigning of full responsibility for the attack of the entire national strategic target system to a single commander, is subject to the following overriding objections:

It would, in effect, establish a single superior commander over all other commanders of unified commands.

It would therefore interfere with the carrying out of the other primary responsibilities of the commanders of unified commands.

It would subordinate the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the strategic direction of the war.

It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would follow a massive nuclear attack.

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Chief of Naval Operations
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It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would follow a massive nuclear attack.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
acceptable all-weather assurance of effectiveness against such targets on a pre-planned basis, may be assigned to attack them. This assignment would be reflected in both the strategic operational plan and in the appropriate theater operational plan.

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It would, in effect, establish a single superior commander over all other commanders of unified commands.

It would therefore interfere with the carrying out of the other primary responsibilities of the commanders of unified commands.

It would subordinate the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the strategic direction of the war.

It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would follow a massive nuclear attack.

Commandant of the Marine Corps
to exist with the consequent necessity for what amounts to detailed operational planning at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Assignment of areas of primary responsibility to the commanders of unified and specified commands would not preclude the striking of strategic targets by one commander in the area of another commander, rather, it would involve assigning primary responsibility for operational coordination of the strike forces entering each area. Areas of coordination responsibility should be based on such factors as the availability and capability of the forces assigned to the commanders of the unified and specified commands, assigned missions, security of their forces, and the characteristics of the area. The assigning of full responsibility for the attack of the entire national strategic target system to a single commander, is subject to the following overriding objections:

It would, in effect, establish a single superior commander over all other commanders of unified commands.

It would therefore interfere with the carrying out of the other primary responsibilities of the commanders of unified commands.

It would subordinate the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the strategic direction of the war.

It would not provide for the necessary flexibility in weapon systems employment inherent in decentralized control to meet the exigencies of the fluid and unpredictable situation which would follow a massive nuclear attack.

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ANSWER

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Yes

Chief of Naval Operations

Yes

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Yes

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Yes

5. QUESTION Should any additional measures be taken to improve the coordination of forces operating under the operational control of the various commanders?

ANSWER

There are additional measures which should be taken to improve the coordination of forces involved in the attack of the strategic target systems.

(1) A single "strategic" as opposed to "operational" plan should be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This plan, which in effect would be a mission type directive, should make more specific the targeting and damage criteria guidance now contained in the Atomic Annex to JSCP and add the national strategic target list, and the assignment of geographic areas to the commanders of unified and specified commands within which they will be responsible for the coordination of both planning and the execution of the attack on the national strategic target list. This JCS plan should be furnished annually as an annex to the JSCP at least six months prior to its effective date.

Procedures at the level of the commanders of the unified and specified commands should provide for development of operational strike plans concurrently and in the closest of coordination with respect to atomic as well as other operations in the areas in which targets of the strategic target systems are located.

There are additional measures which should be taken to improve the coordination of forces involved in the attack of the strategic target systems.

A single "strategic" as opposed to "operational" plan should be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This plan, which in effect would be a mission type directive, should make more specific the targeting and damage criteria guidance now contained in the Atomic Annex to JSCP and add the national strategic target list, and the assignment of geographic areas to the commanders of unified and specified commands within which they will be responsible for the coordination of both planning and the execution of the attack on the national strategic target list. This JCS plan should be furnished annually as an annex to the JSCP at least six months prior to its effective date.

Procedures at the level of the commanders of the unified and specified commands should provide for development of operational strike plans concurrently and in the closest of coordination with respect to atomic as well as other operations in the areas in which targets of the strategic target systems are located.

There are measures in addition to those discussed above which would improve coordination between commands. Since a number of such measures are already being addressed in other joint and inter-command actions, and since the measures discussed in the responses to the foregoing questions are already of priority importance, it is not deemed advisable to further enlarge the scope or detail of the present actions.

There are additional measures which should be taken to improve the coordination of forces involved in the attack of the strategic target systems.

A single "strategic" as opposed to "operational" plan should be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This plan, which in effect would be a mission type directive, should make more specific the targeting and damage criteria guidance now contained in the Atomic Annex to JSCP and add the national strategic target list, and the assignment of geographic areas to the commanders of unified and specified commands within which they will be responsible for the coordination of both planning and the execution of the attack on the national strategic target list. This JCS plan should be furnished annually as an annex to the JSCP at least six months prior to its effective date.

Procedures at the level of the commanders of the unified and specified commands should provide for development of operational strike plans concurrently and in the closest of coordination with respect to atomic as well as other operations in the areas in which targets of the strategic target systems are located.

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