TELCON
Phil Habib/HAK
4/11/75 - 9:07 a.m.

K: Phil, in this maneuvering that's going on in the Department.
In the Defense Department. I've just had a call from Schlesinger
and he claims that in his judgment fix-winged can do it. Now,
I'm sticking behind you. I just want to find out -- Dean believes
it cannot.

H: Dean's: specific words to me were if you want to save lives,
we'll do it with helicopters. If not -- it is dangerous -- we can't
get to the airport. The airport is under fire. They lost another
airplane there last night. They had a few people killed yesterday
they're only 2 miles from the airport. Phil if you want to save
lives, do it this way. I said John, you've got the hand on the
throttle. You do it your way. Now he did get some airplanes
in last night. Yesterday with supplies and getthem out but it's
not the same thing as assembling 100's of people, taking them
to the airport across town, putting them on the airplanes and
taking off. Dean believes this is the safest, cleanest way.

K: I'm backing you ... look the sob just wants to be able to say two
things. That he was pushing evacuation if anything goes wrong
it's our fault. I'm behind you.

H: You know, I kept saying to them yesterday.

K: Phil, you stick to your cause. You've been a hero in this. I'm
proud of you and I'm behind you. I just ....

H: I think sometimes you get angry at me though. You know.

K: Well, I sometimes get angry at you because I don't like Arabs but
you know, it's a racial feeling, it has nothing to do with your
competence.

H: We semis have to get along you know.

K: I didn't think yesterday I needed a lecture in front of everybody.

H: Sorry about doing it in front of everyone. But know what happened
is that I felt we lost a little bit of time by.

K: It was a screw up but I spent all my day with the President. I wasn't
in an overly....

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H: I didn't know what was happening to even respond to you. You asked me questions that I can't answer because I don't know.

K: It was a screw up.

H: Did you get my little note this morning as to what went on through the night on that thing.

K: Yes, but we couldn't get in touch with him.

H: Well, we finally did and he in a way raised the ante. But I've told Dean...

K: What does he want now?

H: He's talking now... it's not enough for them to call him back, he's got to get the bonzes (?) and the populous, the peasants, and the army all have to call for his return so that he can come back. Otherwise the Khmer Rouge -- he'd have to come back with the Khmer Rouge. I -- that's indirect. That's what his man is saying. The door is open. The Cambodians know about it and I've told Dean to go ahead with Eaglepull. Not to hold up.

K: You know, if we had a sane Secretary of Defense I'd hold up on Eaglepull.

H: I think very frankly that we can't. It's too dangerous now. They're very very close in. And the final thing is that if the Cambodians still want to do what we've opened the door for them to do with Sianouk. They can do it without our presence now. Because we've passed all the messages that we need to pass.

K: Okay. It's not a proud day but we did the best we could.