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By
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Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

To foresee the probable evolution of a situation as intricate as the present one in Germany calls for more than mere familiarity with the problem. No amount of expertise on Germany would allow one to predict whether a German settlement is probable or possible at this time. I shall not try to act as a prophet, but instead propose to explore with you certain elements of the problem that may throw light on the issues involved in dealing with it wisely.

I should think that we could agree that there are three principal elements. The first is the situation in Germany itself. This situation has had a long and involved history. It has a certain dynamic of its own. Senator Mansfield in his recent speech before the Senate based his argument on the proposition that German unity is inevitable. He said that "the key question has never been: Will Germany be unified? The question has long been: When and how will Germany be unified?". He implied that the history of the German situation and the dynamics of that situation leaves no possibility for Soviet actions or influence, or for our actions or influence, to halt the process of unification. It is by no means obvious or certain that Senator Mansfield is correct in this judgment. It is therefore necessary to give close consideration to two other elements.

The second element is the question of what the Soviet Union wants to do and can do with respect to Germany and how

it is apt to react to various types of actions we on the Western side might take.

The third element is what we and our allies can do, should do, and are apt to do.

After we have explored these three elements it may be possible to step back and make some kind of a guess as to the prospects for a German settlement.

Let us now go back for a few minutes to the German situation and the dynamics of its history.

At the end of the war there was wide disagreement in the United States, and in the West generally, as to what our attitude toward the German question should be. Many felt that it would be possible in the postwar world to continue the wartime collaboration between the Western allies and Russia. They felt that the main danger to be guarded against was the possibility of some renewed attempt on the part of Germany to establish hegemony on the continent of Europe. Secretary Morgenthau was the most extreme exponent of this point of view, but there were many not so extreme who shared this general thesis. The other group felt that a continuation of wartime collaboration with the Russians would not be possible after the defeat of the German threat - the common danger which alone had made that collaboration possible. They also felt that Germany had been so thoroughly defeated in both its attempts at a German hegemony through force that Germany no longer presented a problem comparable to that of the rising power of the Soviet Union. It was their view that if the rising power of the Soviet Union and its communist associates

was to be balanced, Germany and Japan would have to be brought back promptly into the community of nations as sovereign and independent powers. At the end of the war this second group was, however, in the minority and the main thrust of Western policy was therefore directed to an attempt to continue the wartime collaboration with Russia into the postwar world.

The Soviet Union, however, had quite a different view of the German situation. The history of the Soviet party in Russia and its attitudes toward foreign relations in general have been deeply molded by their historic experiences with the German question. These go back to the early days of Lenin's seizure of power. He and many of his associates thought that the Russian revolution was of minor importance to the communist movement in comparison to the German communist revolution which they anticipated would shortly follow. Their initial experience with foreign relations was with the negotiation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Their first collaboration with a non-communist country was with Germany. With General Seckt they developed secret arrangements for the manufacture of armaments and the training of military cadres by Germany in Russia in circumvention of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Their first diplomatic relations were with Germany. These led to the Rapallo agreement. In 1939 they negotiated the Hitler-Stalin Pact which led to World War II. In 1941 they felt the full force of German military power in Hitler's attack. As a result of these experiences, the communist leadership has consistently given full weight, and perhaps excess weight, to the importance of the German problem.

At the end of the war Mr. Stalin was clear as to the path he proposed to follow. His program could not be acceptable to the Western powers. Continued collaboration by the Western world would therefore have to be entirely one sided and could not be expected long to continue. Therefore it was important for Russia vigorously to nail down whatever it held in Germany. As a result Germany became divided with Berlin a tenuous enclave within the Soviet sector.

By the spring of 1947 all but the most blind could see what the Russians were up to and that the policy of attempting to continue into the postwar world the wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union was bankrupt. But what new policy could be followed? The only one that was practicable was to merge the U.S., British and French zones, to permit and encourage the creation of the Bonn government, and to restore that part of Germany, not under Russian occupation, to freedom, to sovereignty and to responsible collaboration with its Western neighbors. The German economy was restored by the Marshall Plan. German relations with France improved.

During this entire period, German reunification did not appear to be a practicable short term objective. It was clear that the Russians had no intention whatever of withdrawing from their zone on any terms. German reunification was a long term objective deeply held by the German people. It was vigorously supported by the West. Some of those on the Western side believed that no real security for Europe could be achieved until German reunification was accomplished. Others, who feared the strength of a reunified Germany, saw no prospect of its being

accomplished and therefore no danger in supporting it as an objective.

The first serious consideration of German reunification, as a program rather than merely as an objective, took place after the lifting of the Berlin blockade in May 1949. As a condition to lifting the blockade, we had agreed with the Russians to convene a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris to discuss "matters arising out of the situation in Berlin and matters affecting Germany as a whole".

George Kennan, who was then Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, was in charge of the planning work in preparation for the upcoming meeting. I was among those who worked with him at that time. We were uncertain as to what it was the Russians wanted to accomplish at the meeting or what they would propose. One possibility was that they might consider, or possibly propose, the withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany and the reunification of Germany. We developed two alternative proposals for consideration by the Western delegation. One was called Plan A and contemplated the phased withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany, the reunification of Germany under free elections and the limitation of German rearmament under four power control. Plan B contemplated no commitment to withdraw Western forces from Germany. It endeavored to go as far as might be practicable within that limitation toward German reunification, the limitation of unilateral controls by the individual occupying powers in their respective zones and the substitution therefore of four power control operating by majority vote, -- except for certain basic limitations

on German rearmament which could be changed only by unanimous agreement among the occupying powers.

It was finally decided to base the Western negotiating position on Plan B and not on Plan A. This was done because few people believed the Russians would in fact agree to any plan requiring the withdrawal of their forces from the Eastern zone. The negotiations completely confirmed this view. General Chuikov, the Soviet High Commissioner of the Eastern Zone, said one day at lunch "anyone who suggests the withdrawal of our forces from Germany is mad. These people hate us". It proved impossible during the negotiations to make any progress at all toward a mitigation of the unilateral control by the Soviet Union of the Eastern zone, toward German reunification or toward the improvement of the situation in Berlin. During that portion of the negotiations devoted to Berlin, the Russians insisted on a continuing veto power of even the most minor details of the administration of the city. Their plan would have given them a permanent veto power over the appointment of janitors in the Berlin Art Museum.

From 1949 up to last year, discussion about German reunification remained pretty well frozen. There was much talk about the objective of reunification through free elections, but no program was envisaged by which this could be brought about. In the meantime the economic and political strengthening of the Federal Republic went ahead apace. It became a member of NATO and the decision was finally made to urge Germany to make its fair contribution in military forces to the common defense.

Last spring George Kennan reopened the discussion on the Western side in his Rieth lectures over the British Broadcasting System. In effect he urged the reconsideration of the basic ideas behind Plan A as opposed to Plan B. His proposals received wide support from the British Labor Party and from the SPD in Germany. They received little support in the United States. Even those of us who had worked on Plan A with Mr. Kennan and agreed with it at

the time subject only to the reservation that there seemed little prospect that the Russians would agree to it - were doubtful that it would be helpful in today's quite different situation. In 1949 the United States still had a monopoly in the atomic field; Germany was not a member of NATO; and a German military contribution was not considered essential to Europe's security. These factors have since changed and withdrawal of Germany from NATO and the withdrawal of United States forces from Germany would today leave Europe in a most insecure position.

Let us leave here our brief review of the historical development of the current situation and turn to the second element that we proposed to explore - the question of what it is the Soviet Union wants to do and intends to do with respect to Germany.

Last November Mr. Krushchev sent us a note dealing with Berlin. In January he sent us a draft of a proposed peace treaty with Germany. What do these documents indicate as to Soviet intentions?

The note on Berlin says that the Soviet Union regards the agreements concerning Berlin arising out of the termination of hostilities as being void. The governmental arrangements set up in Berlin as a result of the agreements and the presence in Berlin of French, British and American troops are illegal and detrimental to Russian interests. He proposes that these troops be withdrawn, that the three Western sectors be made a self-governing free city with international guarantees of its independence and of its access to and from Germany. The Russians have said that while

they are prepared to discuss how and when the withdrawal of Western forces will take place, they will not discuss whether it shall take place. Furthermore, they say a solution of the Berlin question must be found in a plan which provides for the demilitarization of Germany, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany, and the withdrawal of both East and West Germany from the Warsaw and NATO alliances.

The Western allies are given six months to think this proposal over and to discuss it, with the Russians, or to negotiate a German peace treaty with a group of 28 nations chosen by the Russians. At the end of that time, if no progress has been made the Russians will move their troops out of Berlin and turn over the control of all traffic, including military traffic between Berlin and West Germany, to the East Germans with whom everyone must deal in the future. Finally, a warning is given that any violation of the frontiers of East Germany will be regarded as aggression against all the Warsaw Pact countries, of which the Soviet Union is one, and will result in appropriate retaliation.

The draft treaty does not provide for German reunification. It contemplates a continuation both of the German Federal Republic and of the German Democratic Republic, at least until they mutually agree between themselves on some form of confederation. It provides for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from both parts of Germany, and the withdrawal of East Germany and West Germany from the Warsaw and NATO alliances. It places limitations upon German military forces and it

places far-reaching prohibitions against political parties, political action and propaganda in any way hostile to the USSR and its associates. In reading the draft treaty, one gets the impression that the USSR may not seriously intend that this treaty be a basis for agreement with the West. As indicated in Krushchev's speech at Tula last Wednesday, it may be designed to form the basis of a treaty of peace by the Communist world with East Germany alone.

From these documents and from the innumerable speeches, articles and statements which issue from the Soviet side of the Iron Curtain we can try to decipher what it is the Russians wish and intend to accomplish. They wish to get United States forces out of Berlin, out of Germany, and, if possible, out of Europe. They wish to get West Germany out of NATO and neutralize its power. They offer very little in return. They offer only the withdrawal of Russian forces from East Germany under conditions designed to make free political life in West Germany virtually impossible and designed to minimize the risk that the East German regime would be overthrown once Russian forces are removed. If we don't negotiate an agreement with them on approximately these terms, they then intend to give the East Germans all the trappings of a sovereign and independent state, to negotiate an independent treaty of peace with them and let them eliminate what they call "the cancer of West Berlin" either by gentle means or by more forceful means.

We all know pretty well what we want. We want a reunified Germany, reunified in a way that permits a normal, responsible and not an imposed, political development for the country as a whole. We want Germany to collaborate in the free world's economic and political life and to contribute to the common defense against aggression. We want the freedom of the Berliners and their access to the rest of the world to be maintained and secured. We want our legitimate rights to be respected. We do not want to be pushed around and hectorred by an ugly little man brandishing the threat of attack with nuclear rockets on every third day.

The question, however, is not so much what we want, or who wants it more than the next man; the important question is what we can and should do about it.

We can lump the various things we can do under two headings. One heading can be summarized by the phrase "standing firm"; the other by the word "negotiations".

Obviously standing firm and negotiating are not two opposed things. You can only negotiate successfully if you are prepared to stand firm. You can only command the political support in the Western world necessary to stand firm, if your negotiating position is reasonably clear and understandable.

Let us first look at the various ways in which we can stand firm.

We can be firm in our declarations and united with our allies in the various speeches, notes and statements of policy we make.

This is important. It takes a lot of careful work. It requires a high degree of thought and clarity about what it is we can and should do in action rather than just in statement.

We can refuse to remove our forces from Berlin. We have about eight thousand troops in Berlin; the British and French have smaller numbers. They have large stockpiles of supplies, are shooting no ammunition and can stay indefinitely even if blockaded.

We can institute an airlift. Even if the East Germans attempt to jam our radars enough could be got through to support our forces in Berlin. An airlift, however, could not sustain the economy of Berlin which is now the largest industrial city of Germany. Whether an airlift could long sustain the population even from starvation, let alone sustain its economy, is doubtful. We must also reckon with the possibility that the East Germans, backed by the Russians, may shoot down our transport planes.

If the East Germans refuse to permit either our military convoys or the normal civilian traffic to move freely to and from the West, we can shove aside the East German guards and make them let our convoys go through or themselves initiate shooting to prevent it. I have a hard time, however, visualizing the shoving and pushing that might go on while we attempt to remove roadblocks and repair bridges and force on them the onus of firing the first shot.

We can start an armored column on its way to Berlin with instructions to shoot if it is blocked or shot at. We can back that column up with various increments of additional non-nuclear

force.

We can back up our non-nuclear forces with tactical nuclear weapons. And finally, we can back up our tactical nuclear forces with the full power of our strategic forces.

We can also do a number of things away from the immediate area of Berlin, which can bear importantly on the Berlin situation.

We can reinforce our forces in Europe. We can increase their state of alert and readiness. We can go to various levels of increased mobilization at home.

We can counter a blockade of Berlin with a blockade of East Germany, of the USSR, or the entire Soviet bloc.

At the moment of crisis -- if a blockade has been initiated and we have determined to send an armored convoy on its way -- we can put our Strategic Air Forces on full alert and evacuate our cities, both to indicate the full measure of our determination and to be in the best possible position to survive the likely consequences if the Russians choose to challenge that determination.

Now I have merely been cataloguing the various things it is conceivable that we could do under the heading of standing firm. What it may be wise to do -- what we should do -- what informed public opinion both here and among the peoples of Europe will go along with -- what will commend itself to the conscience of the world -- may be something quite different.

A few general considerations can be advanced on the relationship between these possible actions and what it is wise to do.

In the first place, there is a definite relationship between the nature of the provocation and the course of action which is appropriate and wise. If the provocation is, and appears to the world as being, merely technical, or legalistic, we would hardly be justified in adopting forceful and highly dangerous courses of action. If the provocation is an actual and not merely a technical obstruction to Western military traffic moving to Berlin, more serious measures would be justified. If the provocation is an actual blockade of the civilian population of West Berlin, a far more serious situation would have been created, and far more serious counter-measures would be appropriate. This is so not merely because of the differing support which our actions would receive from public opinion under these differing circumstances. It is also because of the greater credibility to the Russians that a show of determination on our part will be backed up, if necessary, by still stronger measures, if that determination is challenged. The greater the provocation the more credible it becomes to the Russians that we may well follow up forceful measures even with desperate measures. It would seem to me to be most unwise to start to push a convoy through from Helmstedt to Berlin if the provocation has been merely technical, or is restricted to military traffic. We would have much greater public support and a much greater chance of getting through unchallenged by the Russians if we reserve that action for the situation that would exist if it had become clear that the freedom of the two and one-half million

citizens of West Berlin was being jeopardized by an effective blockade directed against them.

The second point is that, if it is at all possible, we should avoid being the first to shoot. The onus of initiating the crisis about Berlin is already the responsibility of the Soviet Union. Let us not fuzz up that responsibility by incurring ourselves the onus of having initiated the shooting -- if it must come to that.

The third point is that the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons, tactical or strategic, is, in my opinion, to be avoided at all cost. If the stakes involved in the Berlin situation, immense as they are, have not justified a higher degree of preparedness in the past, a willingness to make greater sacrifices and to pay higher taxes, and are not interpreted, even now that the Russians have made their intentions reasonably clear, as warranting such action, I can hardly see how they can justify the initiation of a nuclear war.

Let us now turn from the business of standing firm to the business of negotiation.

This part of the problem can be broken down into three interrelated aspects. What can be negotiated about German reunification? What can be negotiated about the mutual withdrawal, thinning out, or limitation of forces in central Europe? What can and should be negotiated about Berlin?

As pointed out earlier, the Soviet draft peace treaty for Germany really says nothing about German reunification. The only position the Russians have taken on reunification is that East and West Germans should sit down together and see what they can work out between themselves. What this amounts to is a way for the Russians to avoid their agreement to work out the problem with the British, the French, and ourselves. There is no

very good way to make them work it out with us.

Let us look at the ideas Mr. Ulbricht has expressed on reunification. He proposes an all-German Council of 100 members selected equally by the parliaments of East and West Germany and an executive organ, called the Praesidium of the Council, whose powers are vague. The Council would appoint Commissions to deal with limits on armaments, financial settlements, foreign trade and cultural matters. The Council would have no power to give directives to the two German states which would remain sovereign. A separate organ under the Council would be asked to draft a constitution and develop preparations for all-German elections.

To accept this would be to recognize the division of Germany into two separate states, and get in return only worthless debating machinery with no powers whatsoever. Reunification may not require immediate free elections but it requires something better than Ulbricht has proposed.

I am inclined to agree with Senator Mansfield that talks between East and West Germans do not need to involve recognition. I would like to see what such talks would come up with. The basic question is how we can give a Central German government any real powers, powers that are not subject to veto by the East Germans, and still have the arrangement acceptable to the East German regime. The dominance of West Germany in numbers and economic strength, but above all, in political strength, is such that the Ulbricht regime could not long survive even the most elementary non-vetoable powers given to a central government. I should think that the most elemental power would be the guarantee of, and the power to enforce, the right of habeas corpus. If such a power were given to the central government, the people in East Germany would be assured that they could not be arbitrarily held in jail. Ulbricht's

control over East Germany would, then, tend to melt whether or not there were free elections. My point is that all kinds of guarantees could be given the East German regime that the central government would not interfere in its local affairs other than to protect people from crass injustice and there still would be every prospect that Ulbricht's rule, and what the communist euphemistically call "the benefits of democratic progress" would be undermined.

I, therefore, see little prospect for agreement on any true reunification unless the other benefits to the USSR of the settlement as a whole are so great as to make it reasonable for them to take the chance and make Ulbricht take the chance that the Ulbricht regime in East Germany would not long survive.

This brings us then to the other benefits that might be offered the Russians in terms of the mutual withdrawal, thinning out or limitation of forces in central Europe.

I happen to think that tactical nuclear weapons add little to our true security or to that of Europe. It is hard to imagine circumstances in which tactical nuclear weapons could be usefully employed in Europe unless backed up by the use of the full power of our strategic nuclear forces. I believe the Russians take a serious view of the possibility that the West Germans might eventually be armed with nuclear weapons. It is, therefore, conceivable that some variation of the Rapacki plan, coupled with an agreement on Germany and Berlin acceptable to us, might form a basis for a German settlement.

The rub, however, is that any plan that involved true German reunification, or even a major risk to the Communists that true reunification would flow from

it, must also provide for the mutual withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany, and the withdrawal of Germany from NATO, if it is to be negotiable with the Russians under today's circumstances. I don't think this is a price which the West, and particularly the West Germans, are prepared to pay for a German settlement. Some think we should. Under today's circumstances I don't think they are right. In any case I do not think we will pay such a price. Therefore, it seems to me that a German settlement involving German reunification has very small prospect of being negotiated at this time.

What is more likely is that the Russians will go forward with their plan to make the German Democratic Republic as sovereign and as permanent as they can. To do this they must attempt to eliminate what they call the cancer of West Berlin. What possibilities there are of negotiating a settlement of the Berlin issue apart from an over-all German settlement Mrs. Dulles has already discussed. I would only like to say that I would not exclude the possibility of bringing the U. N. into the picture, not merely as a forum before which to bring our complaints about Soviet behavior, but also to share the responsibility, through U. N. forces and observers, that the West Berliners remain free.

In conclusion, I should like to make one final point. I see little prospect of weaving through the next twelve months without war and without the surrender of Berlin, unless we combine firmness with great discretion. Basic and irreconcilable positions have been taken by both sides. The prestige of both sides is involved. I am sure that the Soviet Union wants a nuclear war no more than

we do. The stakes involved are immenso. The process of action and reaction to be expected over the next year will test the resolution of both sides. It will be comparable to the process of peeling off the successive layers of two onions. At the center of each onion is a kernel of self-knowledge that no stake, even the German stake, is worth a nuclear war. Each side will try to peel off successive layers of the other side's onion of resolution, while trying to prevent the layers being peeled off its own. This is a dangerous game. A misplay can start a chain reaction difficult or impossible to get back under control. I believe, for instance, that the Russians are quite likely to meet an armed convoy with tanks of their own. If our planes are fired on, I think we will fire back. Great care must be used to avoid a misplay. I believe it can be done. It will take the greatest patience and fortitude. God wish us luck.