



Authority IND 979518  
 By EB NARA Date 12/19

8

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

VV XRA100  
 PP RUEHC  
 DE RUEHST 1454/1 3352315  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
 P 011815Z DEC 69  
 FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2184  
 BT

187Q

DEC 1, 7:12 PM 1969

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 6 HELSINKI 1454

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, CHAIRMAN JCS, DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AND ACTING DIRECTOR ACDA (MAY WISH TO PASS TO ATTORNEY GENERAL), FROM SMITH

SALTO 58

SUBJECT: THINKPIECE RE PRESENT POSITION OF PRELIMINARY SALT

THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUS IN MANNER ABOUT SALT BUT IT IS TOO EARLY FOR USEFUL ESTIMATES OF THEIR INITIAL NEGOTIATION POSITION OR OF THE NATURE OF THE MIX OF THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CONSENSUAL PURPOSES.

BOTH SIDES ARE SAYING MUCH THE SAME THING IN GENERALITIES ABOUT MUTUAL DETERRENCE, WHAT DRIVES THE ARMS COMPETITION, THE DENSE ARM PROBLEM. WE THINK WE ARE BEING MORE SPECIFIC BUT IN RELATIVE TERMS THE PREVIOUSLY SILENT AND ENIGMATIC BEAR PROBABLY IS SOMEWHAT PROUD OF THE AMOUNT OF ARM IDEAS IT HAS OFFICIALLY GIVEN US FOR THE FIRST TIME. IT ACKNOWLEDGES A FURTHER DEBT IN THE COIN OF SPECIFICITY AND SPEAKS IN A STRATEGIC IDIOM WORTHY OF THE BEST AMERICAN THEORETICIANS.

WE HAD A BLIND SPOT IN NOT SEEING THAT "NO TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS" WAS A NATURAL SOVIET MOVE. WHAT ELSE HAVE WE OVERLOOKED?

THE "GRAY MATTER" AND QUALITY OF MY ASSOCIATE PRINCIPAL DELEGATES IS WELL DEMONSTRATED IN THE ATTACHED MEMORANDA. I SUGGEST THEY ARE WELL WORTH YOUR CAREFUL READING.

NOTE: MEMOS WRITTEN BEFORE GARTHOFF/KISHILOV CONVERSATION REPORTED SEPTEL.

MR. NITZE'S MEMO

SECRET

~~SW~~  
 AH  
 VL NIS.

Authority 1110 979518  
 By LEB NARA Date 2/9

SECRET

-2- HELSINKI 1454, SECTION 1 OF 6, DEC 1, 1969

AFTER THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS THERE APPEARS TO BE A CONSIDERABLE OVERLAP BETWEEN US VIEWS AND STATED SOVIET VIEWS ON CERTAIN BASIC CONCEPTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HARD BARGAINING IS CERTAINLY AHEAD ON THE MORE CONCRETE ISSUES THAT MUST BE RESOLVED IN MOVING TO AGREEMENT.

FIRST OF ALL, THERE IS APPARENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIETS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE. THEY HAVE SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN US WOULD BE SUICIDE AND THEY HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY INTEND TO MAINTAIN A DETERRENT AGAINST US AND RECOGNIZE THAT WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN ONE AGAINST THEM. SECONDLY, THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ACTION-REACTION NATURE OF THE ARMS COMPETITION AND OF THE INTER-COMPETITION BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN DRIVING THIS STABILITY THERE APPEARS TO BE ROUGH AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE POINTED OUT THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE SYSTEMS OTHER THAN LAND-BASED MISSILES AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THIS REDUCES THE INCENTIVE TO PREEMPT EVEN IF LAND-BASED MISSILES WERE TO BECOME VULNERABLE. THEY HAVE AGREED THAT DENSE ABM DEPLOYMENTS MAY BE DESTABILIZING AND MAY GIVE THE SIDE HAVING THEM AN INCENTIVE TO STRIKE FIRST.

ON ISSUES OF PROCEDURE THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT CAUSED SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES. THEY CONSIDER ONE IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF THESE TALKS IS TO DRAW UP A WORK PROGRAM FOR LATER TALKS. THEY ARE INTERESTED IN ISSUING A JOINT COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING THESE TALKS WHICH WOULD CONTAIN MORE THAN AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TIME AND PLACE OF LATER TALKS. THERE WILL NATURALLY BE SOME NEGOTIATION ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE COMMUNIQUE; WE ARE PLANNING TO DRAW ON SECRETARY ROGERS' SPEECH OF NOVEMBER 13 FOR SUBSTANCE.

THE SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN TO MAKE A CASE FOR INCLUDING IN OUR DISCUSSIONS A CONSIDERATION OF WEAPONS WHICH, BECAUSE OF THEIR LOCATION, CAN BE USED AGAINST EITHER HOMELAND. ACCORDING TO THEIR INITIAL STATEMENTS THESE SORTS OF WEAPONS, E.G. THOSE CARRIED BY AIRCRAFT BASED IN EUROPE OR ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED STRATEGIC. ACCORDING TO THE SAME PRINCIPLE, SOVIET IR/MRBMS TARGETS AGAINST EUROPE WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED STRATEGIC SINCE THEY DO NOT THREATEN THE CONTINENTAL US. WE HAVE ARGUED AGAINST THIS DEFINITION OF "STRATEGIC". WE HAVE POINTED OUT THE THREAT TO OUR ALLIES POSED BY THE IR/MRBMS, THE PROBLEM OF IR/MRBMS BEING CONVERTED TO ICBMS, AND THE DELAY AND COMPLICATIONS WHICH WILL BE CAUSED BY DEALING WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THESE AND THE FOLLOWING SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. WE HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT THE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

IND 979518

By

EB

NARA Date

1/9

**SECRET**

-3- HELSINKI 1454, SECTION 1 OF 6, DEC 1, 1969

DELAY WHICH COULD BE CAUSED BY CONSIDERING IN THESE TALKS TRANSFERS OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES. ON THIS LATTER POINT THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO DELAY DISCUSSIONS.

THE SOVIETS MAY ATTEMPT TO USE THE ABOVE ISSUES OF IR/MRBMS, TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND TRANSFERS TO THIRD COUNTRIES AS BARGAINING POINTS OR THEY MAY ATTEMPT TO USE THEM AT A LATER TIME TO CAUSE FRICTION BETWEEN US AND OUR NATO ALLIES. THEY MAY ALSO ATTEMPT THE LATTER BY STATING THAT IT IS THEIR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET UNION SHOULD DEAL WITH POLITICO-MILITARY MATTERS,

SMITH

BT

**SECRET**



DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority 1ND 979518  
 By CB NARA Date 4/9

Depart State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

VV XRB506  
 PP RUEHC  
 DE RUEHST 1454/2 3352315  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
 P 011815Z DEC 69  
 FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2185  
 BT

1900

DEC 1, 7:23 PM 1969

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 6 HELSINKI 1454

NODIS

SALTO 58

RATHER THAN MERELY WITH STRATEGIC MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE AGREEMENT OR ITS REVISION OR EXPANSION.

THE MOST SERIOUS POTENTIAL DIFFICULTY IS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE LAYING A FOUNDATION FOR A PLAUSIBLE AGREEMENT TO CURB THE ARMS RACE IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH APPROVED US POSITIONS, BUT THE LOGIC OF WHICH WILL BE DIFFICULT POLITICALLY TO RESIST. THE MAIN POINTS WOULD BE A ZERO OR VERY LOW ABM LEVEL AND A BAN ON MIRV TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT, COUPLED WITH LOOSE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. THEY HAVE LAID A FOUNDATION FOR SUCH A POSSIBILITY BY SUGGESTING A HALT AND EVEN REVERSAL IN ABM DEVELOPMENT. THEY MAY WELL SUGGEST THAT A SIMPLE FLIGHT EST BAN IS ADEQUATE TO ASSURE AGAINST ABM AND MIRV DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT AND EXPAND ON THEIR ARGUMENTS FOR RESTRICTING VERIFICATION TO NATIONAL MEANS. THEY MAY ALSO SUGGEST THAT THE THIRD COUNTRY THREAT CAN BEST BE MET BY POLITICO-STRATEGIC CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE TWO OF US. THEIR NEXT POINT MAY BE THAT WITH A ZERO OR VERY LOW LIMITS ON ABMS, MEANS OF PENETRATION BECOME UNIMPORTANT AND MRVS AND MIRVS CAN THEREFORE BE BANNED WITH NO SIGNIFICANT RISKS.

THEY MAY FURTHER HAVE IN MIND GOING ON TO SAY THAT BECAUSE OF THE LINK BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENTS, THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A MUTUAL HALT TO FURTHER CONSTRUCTION OF OFFENSIVE MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS IF THE ABOVE CONDITIONS ARE MET. THEY HAVE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN THAT ABMS DEPLOYED TO DEFEND OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND OTHER TARGETS A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE APART MAY CAUSE UNCERTAINTY BECAUSE SUCH A THIN SYSTEM COULD EVOLVE INTO ONE FACILITATING A FIRST STRIKE. IF DENSE TERRITORIAL ABM SYSTEMS ARE DEPLOYED THEY HAVE INDICATED THAT "THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF OFFENSIVE" SYSTEMS WOULD THEN BE APPROPRIATE FOR CONSIDERATION.

SECRET

-2- HELSINKI 1454, SECTION 2 OF 6, DEC 1, 1969

THIS MAY INDICATE THAT THEY WILL USE ANY US INSISTANCE ON A NATIONWIDE ABM DEPLOYMENT BY THE US -- WHETHER ITS RATIONALE BE BOMBER PROTECTION, ICBM PROTECTION, OR PROTECTION FROM CHINESE ATTACK -- AS AN EXCUSE TO LABEL US AS THE SIDE WHICH IS PREVENTING AN EFFECTIVE HALT IN THE BUILD-UP OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THIS TYPE OF SOVIET POSITION COULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH UNLESS WE HAVE LAID A FOUNDATION OURSELVES FOR (A) LIMITING AND REDUCING OFFENSIVE LAUNCHERS WHILE PERMITTING MIRVS AND A NATION-WIDE ABMMEEYENSE, AS IS DONE BY OPTION VII, OR (B) GUIDING A MIRV TEST BAN IN A DIRECTION MORE FAVORABLE TO US, AS IS DONE IN OPTION VI. IF ON THE OTHER HAND WE WILL EVENTUALLY FIND IT WISE TO ACCEPT AN OPTION IV OR OPTION V TYPE OF AGREEMENT COUPLED WITH A LOW ABM LEVEL, THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGES IN RAISING THE MORATORIUM ISSUE NOW RATHER THAN POSTPONING IT.

FINALLY, BY PRESENTING SEVERAL GENERAL CONCEPTS, THE SOVIETS HAVE RAISED POINTS WHICH COULD BE REFERED TO AT A LATER TIME IN A PROPAGANDA ATTACK AGAINST US IF WE COME TO A DISAGREEMENT, TEMPORARY OR FINAL, ON SUBSTANCE. SOME OF THESE POINTS HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY STATED, OTHERS HAVE BEEN IMPLIED. HESE GENERAL POINTS ARE FAMILIAR. AMONG THEM ARE: THAT THE SOVIET PEOPLE ARE CONVINCED OF THE SUPERIORITY OF THEIR SOCIAL SYSTEM, BUT UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE OTHER NATIONS CAN CHOOSE THER SYSTEMS; THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN THE INITIATORS OR DRIVING FORCE FOR DISARMAMENT AND THAT IT WAS OUR DESIRE TO RESTRICT THE DISCUSSIONS TO THE LESS RADICAL TOPIC OF LIMITATIONS; THAT THE INTEREST OF THE WORLD IN OUR TALKS INDICATED THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD ARE ON THE SIDE OF DISARMAMENT; THAT DISARMAMENT CAN PERMIT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO BE USED TO AID THE POORER NATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE; AND THAT THE US INTEREST IN THIRD COUNTRIES, GERMANY AND NATO IN PARTICULAR, CAUSES US TO TAKE ONE-SIDED POSITIONS WHICH VIOLATE AN OBJECTIVE GEOGRAPHICAL CONCEPT OF SECURITY.

AMB. THOMPSON'S MEMO

DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR PRELIMINARY TALKS TO DATE INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS SERIOUSLY WISH TO WORK TOWARD AN AGREEMENT. THEY HAVE TAKEN SOME POSITIONS WITH WHICH WE COULD NOT AGREE PARTICULARLY BECUASE OF THEIR EFFECT UPON OUR ALLIES ALTHOUGH AT LEAST SOME OF THESE MAY HAVE BEEN ADVANCED MERELY FOR LATER BARGAINING PURPOSES. MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAVE INFORMALLY MADE CLEAR THAT THEY DO NOT WISH TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE CONTEMPTIOUS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AT THIS PRELIMINARY MEETING. THEY HAVE ALSO INFORMALLY INDICATED THAT THE MAIN TALKS SHOULD PROBABLY NOT BEGIN BEFORE THE END OF

SECRET