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By AT NARA Date 10-11-97

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

1/21/70

Mr. Okun:

I would like the attached
memorandum back after the
Secretary has seen it.

Thanks.

SWeiss

S/S-S

Returned from
Secretary's Office
RL Brown
S/S

[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]

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By AT NARA Date 10-14-97

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 21, 1970

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
(With Attachment)

TO The Secretary
SUBJECT: Defense Views on SALT

I think you may find the attached note which I did for Elliot Richardson of some interest. It records the views of Paul Nitze and Gardner Tucker on various aspects of SALT. Tucker, who has been Johnny Foster's Deputy and has recently been appointed Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, has been the principal adviser, along with Paul Nitze, on Dave Packard's and Secretary Laird's interests in SALT.

S. Weiss
S. Weiss

Attachment
As stated.

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(With Attachment)

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January 15, 1970

ELR:

SALT: Luncheon Discussion with Paul Nitze
and Gardner Tucker

Of the various discussions that I have had in recent weeks, on where we go from here on SALT, today's luncheon talk with Nitze and Tucker was in certain respects the most interesting and provocative. As a result, I have recorded it in some detail. Since they were speaking candidly, and since it is clear that there are many differences still within the Pentagon, we should treat their views with considerable discretion.

1. Simple vs. Complex Agreement. As Nitze and Tucker see this, the issue is not solely whether we should seek a simple as contrasted to a complex agreement, or even whether we should have one basic position, or go into the discussion with several options. As they see it the issue is how we determine what it is that represents our minimum and maximum requirements. Both are agreed on the central concept that there cannot and should not be a "single US position" in that there will have to be a constant interaction between what we and the Soviets propose. Nitze said that the Russians told him categorically that this was the way they were going to prepare for the Vienna talks, that is, they would play it like chess moves in that each of their positions would be in considerable measure predicated upon positions we took and on our responses to their positions. (Query: Does this mean we should hire Bobby Fisher as a Consultant?) Paul describes his approach to the problem as follows: We should in our preparations identify a "band" of possible arrangements within which an agreement would adequately satisfy US security needs. Paul would probably prefer starting with the maximum desired US position (i.e., at the top of the "band"), negotiating downward depending upon Soviet reactions. He would argue that this is the only way to determine what is the maximum position we can negotiate which is in our interest. Gardner Tucker would

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agree with the need to define the "band" within which US interests lie, but he might be more inclined to start at the other end, that is to say start at the lower end of the "band" on the assumption that this would be more likely to be negotiable with the Soviets. He would, however, use this as a base for exploring other more inclusive concepts to see whether the Soviets and we could agree that a more inclusive concept was in our mutual interest. In either event, the need to define the parameters of the "band" is obviously an essential element. One important implication was that an agreement which fell near the bottom of the band and thus did not have much bearing on the strategic equation would require careful scrutiny in terms of its political implications. For example, we would wish to assure ourselves than an agreement which did not have much direct strategic significance not lend itself to the creation of a false aura of increased US-Soviet detente. This might in the broader political arena, outside of SALT, create difficult problems for us.

2. MIRV. Both are clearly opposed to seeking a MIRV ban. Their reasons are severalfold:

a. Assuming both sides agreed that a ban on further testing, as contrasted to deployment, was all that was feasible within acceptable inspection arrangements, the US would be free to deploy its present MIRV. DOD would recommend we do so. If we did, this would presumably be intolerable to the Soviets who could not be certain that its kill capability was limited to soft targets. The proposed agreement would collapse on those grounds.

b. Agreement on a ban on testing cannot give us the verification assurance required. This is a familiar story, the essence of which being that the Soviets could pursue an extensive MIRV development and production program short of testing, then test, breaking the ban. By doing so they would shorten the lead time and could have a hard target MIRV before we could take compensating measures. I asked how realistic a concern this really was, even though I was prepared to accept that the point was certainly not without merit. I argued that in the first place our own experience

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would suggest that extensive testing would be required to gain assurance of accuracy and reliability sufficient to permit adoption of the MIRV for operational purposes. Such testing would not normally seem to be a short lead time requirement. Beyond that, I argued that it was not entirely easy to see the political scenario that the Soviets would follow once they adopted this course of action. Leaving aside the unlikely possibility of a preemptive strike, the political pressures which the strategic advantage might permit them to bring to bear would be relatively short-lived. We would unquestionably respond by taking offsetting measures, and, indeed, given our superior technology, production base and wealth, the end result for the Soviets might be much to their disadvantage. Further, I assume that we would be taking maximum hedges of our own and thus once we learned that the ban had been violated we could respond fairly rapidly with offsetting military actions.

Neither were much persuaded by my arguments. Nitze said he would rate the possibility of the Soviets achieving success, in a technical sense, if they chose to follow this course of action at about 50-50 with whatever technical limitations that would evidence themselves once testing was begun, correctable in a period of time measured from zero to six months. Tucker's answer was simple: granted that the arguments raised against the Soviets developing and producing MIRV covertly had merit, he would not be willing to risk US security on the hope those arguments were valid.

3. ABM. On this there apparently is a difference between the two. Nitze is attracted to the idea of further exploration of what the Soviets have in mind, including examining the possibility that they would agree to a zero level deployment. He admitted that he thought Soviet agreement to a zero level deployment was unlikely. He thinks that the Soviets would not be willing to destroy Dog House and Hen House radars and that their comments in Helsinki indicated it was launchers rather ^{than} radars that concerned the Soviets. I said I was surprised at this interpretation since I had the impression that the Soviets were concerned about the prospect of our deploying a relatively large number of geographically dispersed radars which could then rapidly be filled in with launchers thereby denegrating the Soviet assured destruction capability. He said this was his initial reading also, but

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as they probed the Soviet Delegation in Helsinki it was clear that they were not about to agree to place radars under control. In any event, Nitze would see how far we could go in getting a zero or minimum ABM deployment since I gather he felt that the alternative i.e., of the Soviets deploying something analagous to Safeguard, would represent a significant threat to our being able to penetrate Soviet defenses.

Tucker takes a different tack: a zero or even very low level of ABM could probably not provide the damage denial which we seek against China. While he would be prepared to concede that China is a somewhat secondary consideration as compared to the threat from the USSR, he argues that it is not an insignificant concern. He also argues that we probably can maintain a damage denial capability against China for the indefinite future through upgrading our defensive technology as the Chinese gain more sophistication in their offensive technology. With regard to the Soviet Union, he is willing to leave open the question of how our land-based offensive forces are made survivable. If the Soviets demonstrate a willingness to agree to major restrictions within SALT which removes the growing danger to our land-based forces, he would be willing to scale back ABM accordingly. However, he does not share Nitze's concern that a Soviet ABM system analagous to Safeguard would endanger our ability to penetrate, as long as we have MIRVs. At the same time such an ABM would provide the Minuteman defense required. Though he did not explicitly say so, I gathered that he left open the possibility of assuring Minuteman survivability through other means (for example, mobility). Moreover, he doubtless harbors continuing reservations concerning how certain we could be that the Soviets did not have a significant ABM capability, even with an agreement, given their existing radar net plus the potentiality for upgrading SAMs.

In the foregoing general connection, I asked two questions: First, had Defense as yet explicitly defined the minimum area defense required against China. The answer was "no" although they tended to confirm what I had previously suspected, namely that such a system will require a fairly significant number of radars, probably not less than the 12

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contained within Safeguard II. The major variable will be the number of launchers. In this latter connection, the interesting point was raised as to the possibility of making the number of launchers agreed to by the US and the USSR a function of the number of Chinese ICBMs. That is to say both sides might agree to start out with a given number of launchers, subject to review pursuant to observation of developing Chinese ICBM capabilities.

The second question dealt with what analysis had been done of theoretical Soviet requirements for an area defense against China and the UK and France. Apparently Defense has done some work on this matter with CIA. They have analyzed the current disposition of Soviet SA-2, SA-3 and SA-5 air defenses. By derivation, they have been able to come up with an implied priority which the Soviets place on defending various parts of the country. This has indicated a pattern which ranges from defense of such population centers as Moscow and Leningrad (these turned out to be priorities 1 and 2) to the defense of various military installations (for example, Sverodvinsk where the Soviets test their SLBMs) to defense of major oil refineries, power grids, etc. Extrapolating this into an area ABM defense would suggest: (a) that very large areas of the Soviet Union would have to be covered, (b) that major industrial and military sites would be protected, but (c) that considerable gaps would be permitted to exist, including fairly large areas of population. The study also suggested that for protection against China some "16 radar faces" would be required. A further conclusion was that the Soviets could probably not achieve a total damage denial against an attack from China. For a light defense against the US an additional "20 radar faces" would be required. (No separate calculation has as yet been made as to what was additionally required against France and the UK.) Neither Paul nor Gardner knew specifically how many major radars and missile launchers the "36 radar faces" equated to.

4. Mobile Missiles. Both agreed on the question of how a mobile missile ban should be handled: We cannot agree to separate limits on mobile ICBMs and mobile IRBMs, since the distinction between the two is not verifiable. Therefore, any mobile ballistic missile must be counted

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against the total number of ICBMs to be agreed upon by the US and the USSR. (If the Soviets choose to utilize some portion of this in an MRBM mode this would be of course their business.) Thus, the Soviet allegation that we were inconsistent in arguing for a ban on mobile IRBMs but permitting mobile ICBMs (within whatever total limit was to be agreed to on ICBMs) was not all that illogical. Thus, while we could agree to both mobile ICBM and IR/MRBM - so long as all mobiles counted against the ICBM total limit - whether such a position would be acceptable to our allies would require further consideration.

5. Fixed MR/IRBMs. Their view on this matter can be summarized as follows: We clearly cannot afford to exclude MR/IRBMs from any limitation whatsoever since to do so would open a loophole which could invalidate a limit on ICBMs. Especially given recent evidence of Soviet emplacement of ICBMs in MRBM complexes, the foregoing would be true. Beyond this they are concerned that the targetting of the MR/IRBMs already present a problem for us. It would be an increasing problem if they were to proliferate. Our ability to guarantee timely and effective destruction of IR/MRBMs targetted against Europe has deteriorated, just as our ability to guarantee destruction of Soviet ICBMs targetted against the US has deteriorated. Indeed, as a result, our assured destruction capability has been reduced. This occurs because we have been required to allocate more and more of our ICBMs against the increased number of Soviet counterforce targets, thereby reducing the number of weapons which we can target counter-value.

6. SLCMs. Nitze and Tucker shared an interesting perspective on the question of whether it was or was not in the US interest to include these weapons within a limitation. So long as a freedom to mix was part of the package they argued that it was not in our interest to include SLCMs in an agreement. To do so would mean that the Soviets would have a much larger base within which they could modernize their forces. (As a matter of fact it was noted that the same logic applied to US bombers, that is to say the Soviets would be better off if US strategic bombers were not included in a limitation, so long as that limitation provided freedom of mix. Since we have significantly more bombers than the

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Soviets, a freedom of mix would give us a bigger base for force modernization.) Of course the foregoing assumes that a freedom to mix agreement would be drawn in such a way as to permit substitution of SLBMs for SLCMs or ICBMs for bombers. This need not necessarily be the case.

7. Other Points. We did not have time to cover other points in any detail. Tucker indicated that Defense was doing quite a bit of work independent of the Verification Working Group outline which Kissinger recently promulgated. While I assume that much of the DOD work will eventually find its way into the Verification Working Group considerations, some might not. He has promised to clue me in in greater detail when we next get together.


S. Weiss

cc: J - Mr. Johnson

Clearance: S/PC - Mr. Cargo