

On 14 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

COL [REDACTED] MP, CFLCC – PMO, **Interviewer**
LTC [REDACTED], 705th MP Battalion, **Interviewer**
LTC [REDACTED], JA, CFLCC – SJA, **Interviewer**
LTC [REDACTED] 800th MP Brigade, **Respondent**

The interview is summarized as follows:

My name is [REDACTED]. I'm a Lieutenant Colonel with the 800th Military Police Brigade stationed at Uniondale, Long Island. I am the Executive Officer, and I also act as the Civil Affairs Officer for the 800th MP Brigade.

In October 2002, I was the Chief Observer Controller for the 800th. I knew the unit was going to be deployed, so I asked COL [REDACTED], he was the Deputy Brigade Commander, if he had any positions open, and he said the Civil Affairs position was open. By December 15, 2002, I was transferred from the 2nd Signal, to the 800th MP Brigade. January 15, 2003 we were activated, and by January 29, 2003 I was here, and I've been here since.

After the war started, late March, we crossed the lines and went into Camp Bucca. I was there until the end of July. I was asked by General Hill, to come back and be the Executive Officer. I stayed here for approximately 3 weeks, as the Executive Officer, because we were losing COL [REDACTED]. He had 24 months on ground. We lost the Executive Officer for the same reason, and we lost several other officers, as well. So, the units forward, with the Deputy coming out, were down to a Major, so I asked BG Karpinski if it was okay to come forward, because she would probably somebody there to help her.

During that interim, LTC [REDACTED] changed command, and she came in, as the Rear Executive Officer. I had the forward position, as well as Civil Affairs. So, we had no Deputy Commander, and we were missing a few other officers, as well.

BG Hill I never had much to do with, other than when I returned, here. He's very closed mouth. BG Karpinski is very intelligent. I always got the feeling she was thinking a week ahead of me. She seemed to have a good handle on what was going on. I learned a lot off of her. I plan to stay with the unit I leave in October. I'll be reaching age 60, by

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that time. I have mandatory retirement, then. Getting back to command leadership, BG Karpinski had regular meetings to clarify what she expected. She has no problem expressing her opinion, as to the way things should be accomplished. I'm very comfortable with her.

In my opinion, her primary interests were in the care, custody, and control of all the detainees. It was specified in her CCIR, her Rules of Engagement, which were pretty much made up by the S3 and LTC [REDACTED] the SJA. She was interested in our own troops, our own safety. I always got that same continuous opinion.

She was always on the move, going to Baghdad Central, going down to various jails. I tried to stay close, whereas she would take trips to Mosul, and Bucca. She would take care of that.

The soldiers involved in the Bucca incident were charged, and brought back to Arifjan. I was in the dark, until BG Diamond called me in the office, and wanted to know what was going on. When BG Karpinski took over, she asked that I keep track of the people for suicide, for contact with each other, and that I put them in meaningful jobs. CSM [REDACTED] took care of that, and I would check with him. When he left, I asked MSG [REDACTED] because he lived in the same barracks as some of them.

CSM [REDACTED] was very boisterous, physical, opinionated, and there was a point when I had to have a talk with him, as well. It encompassed what was perceived as sexual harassment. This was sometime back in July. BG Karpinski wanted me to keep a very close eye on him, but not to impede his position. CSM [REDACTED] informed me that he had seen some things that were inappropriate. I told CSM [REDACTED] that I think it would be a good idea for him to stick close to me. He didn't do that. I let the General know. There was an incident that was perceived as sexual harassment, whereas he touched a female on the shoulders, or something of that nature. I don't know if he said anything. That kicked off an investigation. As a result, he's been sent to the states.

BG Karpinski felt, in my opinion, that LTC [REDACTED] needed to relax a little bit. He was uptight, so she took him out for a couple of weeks. He got other jobs to do to assist us, and she put him back in place. I want to say that was October or November. In the interim it was pretty much MAJ [REDACTED] that ran the show.

Before the war started, I got the Free Iraqi Fighters, and held classes for the units. They could ask them any question they want, regarding the traditions, cultures, and what to expect from Iraqi soldiers. That was under BG Hill. When BG Karpinski took over, she emphasized training on the Rules of Engagement. The S3 emphasized that.

There was a constant need for replacements, which we never got. There was a constant need for interpreters, which we never got. Before the war started, we put in a request for 250 interpreters. We didn't have interpreters assigned until May, and that was at Camp Bucca. There was a constant need for attention on the supply side. I felt the Supply Officer did a pretty good job on it. It was very tough to deal with.

The main concern out of the S1 was the MDRS System, and accountability. That was another concern of the General; correct reporting, and accuracy on that. The awards and stuff? I think you got a problem there, in the respect that we lost three people out of the S1. One had to go REFRAD, back to the United States. He was very seriously ill. That was a First Lieutenant, excellent worker, 16 hours a day. Things started to slow down, but I think they did the best that they could. Now, up at Brigade you had MAJ [REDACTED]. He never had much help up there. He kind of depended on people back here, to cover that bridge.

BG Karpinski was Rater and Senior Rater, according to the rules. I was worried about that, because I felt she was inundated with OERs and stuff. I think she had 89 OERs, an exorbitant amount. So, I went to the S1, and asked, "How come?" He said, "They have to be rated by a General Officer." He showed to me in the book. I don't know what we can do to change that. If there was a way to do it, I assume the S1 would find that way. MAJ [REDACTED] is coming on the 15th, at 9 o'clock in the morning. He can answer that question for you.

We have a tactical SOP. It's probably going to be massively updated, after we get back. You try to update them, as you go along, but sometimes you're not able to do that. I think the SOP that we have is 2002.

Our mission is I/R, Internment/Resettlement. I am somewhat familiar with the Brigade's METL. I know that the Geneva Convention is constantly talked about. It's constantly being looked at, for a variety of reasons, for instance, cigarettes. An Iraqi without a cigarette, you got a problem. So, we were giving cigarettes to them, which was not required by the Geneva Convention, but that was a part of their comfort and welfare.

At the Brigade level it was constantly looked at, to decide what we could do better. The battalions sent up RFIs, and we answer their RFIs, all of them. The General goes down there, and answers their questions. I call down there on a regular basis. I would ask them, "Is there something I can get you? What is your biggest problem?"

The CCIR are the Commander's Critical Information Requirements. In general, it would be the care, custody, and control of internees, the immediate status reporting of persons that are injured, U.S. personnel, what affects her position, as far as attacks, and SIRs. A heart attack, an injury, anything that happens to the normal welfare of a prisoner is reported immediately through an SIR.

I'd be guessing, but I want to say there were 3 maybe 4 detainee deaths, including Bucca, that were the result of a soldier's action, that I can recall.

I was in the TOC, when MG [REDACTED] team came through last fall. The General took that over, along with the S3, and whoever else she needed to accommodate that mission. I understand that they were very pleased, at what they had to say. I believe the S3 has that report, because I've heard the S3, MAJ [REDACTED], refer to comments that were made by

MG [REDACTED] people. I don't recall a briefing chart, which specifically addressed the recommendations from MG [REDACTED] report.

I wish I had the answer. Is it getting people in everyday, training them every single day, and beating them to death with the same information? As far as escapees, and deaths, and abuse, what is acceptable? Actually, none is acceptable. As far as killing somebody, I don't think anyone here really wants to pull that trigger. I know I don't, and I can't evaluate the person who did, unless I was there, and I saw exactly what went on. As far as abuse goes, it's absolutely unacceptable. When I heard what went on at Camp Bucca, I was appalled. It's not acceptable, and we've got to show that. If you can prove a point with somebody guilty of doing what those people did, you'll put the fear into everyone else, even if they got that little idea in the back of their head. And what I just heard happened at Baghdad Central... I'm appalled. I can't believe that our people... I mean I have to, because it did occur. They have enough evidence to support that. What can we do to stop it? We need a constant check and balance system. I'm not allowed in the MI area. If I want to go over, and I say, "Hey, I'm LTC [REDACTED] I'm the XO," I don't have free access, to check on my guards, or to just take a look. There has to be a supervisory presence. There has to be a fear, of what will happen to you, if you commit those offenses against people.

To my knowledge, I'm not authorized access to the hard site. We were upset. I caught a hold of something in the aftermath of this happening. We heard from the battalions that the MIs were escorting people in the nude. What are they doing in the nude to begin with? That's not humanitarian, unless they were on fire, or they had to take a shower, or something. That's not the way we treat people. I was a police officer for 35 years. I never even thought of doing something like that to people, and I've heard about abuse of prisoners, even as far as a policeman goes. I detest that, and I appall it. Our unit said, "Hey! You guys gonna do that stuff, we're gonna pull out our MPs, if that's the way you're going to treat people." And there have been some questions about how they're questioned. Now, would that have happened in our custody? I don't know. I would venture to say no.

To my knowledge, if I wanted access to Tiers 1A and B, I would need an escort. If I had a suspension, I want to go directly to the suspension. During unannounced checks, you discover many things.

I'm not aware of any training instituted, after the Bucca incident.

The panel stopped the interview, to consider LTC [REDACTED]' statements.

Finished with their discussion, COL [REDACTED] gave LTC [REDACTED] questions, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate form of identification to facilitate filing and
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION <i>Camp Doha</i>	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) <i>2004 Feb 14</i>	3. TIME <i>1230</i>	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRSTNAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS <i>O-5 / Reserve</i>	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS <i>800 MP Bde, Camp Profjin, Kuwait</i>			

9. *Hilm* [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I do not recall the exact dates, Lt [REDACTED] & Lt [REDACTED] gave incorrect information during a brief to MG [REDACTED] @ Baghdad Central facility. BC Karpinski related to me that she told Lt [REDACTED] (15 MP Bn Ch) to stand in as commander of the 320th MP Bn while Lt [REDACTED] has a break for a week or few days. BC Karpinski felt I agreed that Lt [REDACTED] was overwhelmed with being the center/focal point for BC & Major & 320th Bn Commander. No orders I aware of that were written. Lt [REDACTED] returned as col 8-10 days later & in my opinion, refreshed.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF <i>2</i> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

[REDACTED]

TAKEN AT

Camp Vaha

DATED

14 Feb 04

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

nothing follows [REDACTED]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED] Person Making Statement

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law administer oaths, 14 day of Feb, 2004 at Camp Vaha Kuwait

[REDACTED]
NECC-SJA, CAMP DHA KUWAIT
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
Article 1366 (4) UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[REDACTED]

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On 15 February 2004, LTC Gary Maddocks, 800th MP Brigade, returned for a follow-up interview.

The following persons were present:

MG Antonio Taguba, **Interviewer**
LTC [REDACTED] **Member**
LTC [REDACTED], **Respondent**
MSG [REDACTED] **is, Recorder**

The interview is summarized as follows:

MG Taguba read the investigation purpose and reminded the respondent that the interview was being taped.

I was a civil affairs officer when I first come to the Brigade and that was in December 2002. 2003 I was activated January 15th and I arrived here in country January 29th and I was a civil affairs officer. I went to Camp Bucca the end of March, and I came back sometime in July whereas General Hill had asked me to be his executive officer because the executive officer had to leave because of 24 months of active duty. Shortly after that, we lost a deputy brigade commander along with a couple of other officers that were coming up on 24 months duty here. From that point we changed command, General Karpinski, and the deputy was coming out of Camp Victory, Baghdad, and I suggested that I go forward as opposed to staying behind at Camp Arifjan. So, General Karpinski said she would think about it and about a week later, she agreed that I should go forward.

At the time, I was the XO. We also had another XO, LTC [REDACTED]. She was in the rear at Arifjan and I took the forward position. LTC [REDACTED] never gave me any detailed guidance related to my job, but what she would do would let me know what she wanted me to do. There was no deputy commander at the time, and still none.

General Karpinski went to CJTF-7 to get a colonel, but was refused and she had to hunt through the ones she had to find one that would volunteer and was a promotable LTC. That was LTC [REDACTED]. He came in around October and left first part of December.

My responsibilities as XO were to first find out what the general wanted me to do and I would work whatever from day to day: civil affairs, SITREPs, intelligence reports, communicating with the various battalions to assess their needs.

The staff needed very little supervision. We had staff call every day, whether the general was there or not. We stated our needs and problems and adjusted them from there. I ran the staff call if the general wasn't there.

My S-3 was the strongest staff element. I don't feel as though I have a weakest. I think the 1 is a very knowledgeable person.

Q. Which one, [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] was in the NDRS down at Bucca. She was not the S-1, but assisted with the S-1 when we first got to Camp Bucca. MAJ [REDACTED] was at Arifjan.

I would describe the command climate at the brigade as having good continuity. I've been in other equal brigades and I've never seen fighting amongst each other like I have in other brigades. No vindictiveness, some disagreements, but there was very little supervision needed.

I had very little knowledge as the Brigade XO on cases of detainee abuses, maltreatment, U.S. Army officer misconducts, U.S. Army enlisted misconducts of that nature. It was mostly dealt directly with the Commanding General, General Karpinski. The S-1 would have some knowledge of it, I never saw any CID report or anything of that nature. Anything I got was secondhand information.

Those reports would be discussed from day to day with the staff as we could.

Q. What was a day like for the brigade staff?

Usually by 0630 first thing I would do was check the SITREPs, intelligence, any problems that the units might have had, look for any SIRs. We usually knew about SIRs when they were coming in because they were serious and part of the CCIR. I'd go to the S-3 and he would brief his people on all the missions that were happening for that day and in the future and look up some past ones that never got completed. From there I'd contact the units or make staff visits. Try to make as much of the presence of the brigade as you can. The General may be gone to Bucca, Ashraf, Mosul, Tasarat, Rusafah, or even BCF. I'd try to stay close to the base of operations if she was away. I may go to BCF or downtown Baghdad.

I knew LTC [REDACTED] since he came into theater. I never had very much contact with him until I was the XO. I would talk with him at BCF and talk to others to see if they would have any other problems. I worked as a go-between with TITAN and tried to make sure that the interpreters were taken care of as well. I don't know Jerry through and through.

I never heard him brief, so I don't know his verbiage. He participated well and is easy to get along with. I felt as though he need, as well as the officers needed a rest because when you talk to them, they look right through you.

I was aware that he was directed to take time off in October. There was a time I understand from General Karpinski that she had asked him to come in and work with the brigade. This was because he was briefing MG [REDACTED] on something and I understand the brief was not correct.

He also had two weeks leave and he was also trying to put together something that was bigger than his battalion, the entire facility. Now the colonel for the 205th took over as the Mayor Cell. That was just too much for one man to do and run his own battalion as well. I felt as though he was overwhelmed and he seemed to perk up after about five or six days and he went back to the battalion about ten days later. During the interim, LTC ██████████ was in the area and if his assistance was required, MAJ ██████████ the S-3, would go to him. MAJ ██████████ was very knowledgeable, intelligent man.

Do I think that's odd that if you need a rest for somebody else to take your place just for 8-10 days? No. The chain of command was ██████████. His XO was competent man who could run the job. Colonel ██████████ was in constant contact with his XO. I think he was there in the event they needed a colonel or lieutenant colonel or somebody to talk with to resolve anything.

General Karpinski told me that it was a temporary thing, that he needed a rest. We never discussed that perhaps LTC ██████████ should be replaced. Subsequently he took emergency leave

We made up Rules of Engagement several times between the S-3 and the SJA. They put them up in cards in two or three different intervals. The latest one was a little green card with the Rules of Engagement on it that included the respect of prisoners as well. There were several things that was done with Rules of Engagement, to my knowledge they were passed down to the battalions and handed out. In fact I have one on me that I carry around.

I have never worked in I&R missions before this. The only experience I had was I was in the second simulation group out of Rhode Island and I was the chief observer/trainer during 2002 and I asked if they had any positions open and they said just civil affairs.

Most of the FRAGOs I've read, they would send them to me to see if we had anything to add or delete. As far as Field Manuals, we used 100-5 as a reference. We also used the prisoner's handbook for the brigade. We'd use an ARTEP to see what we're designed to do. 19-60 was the other one.

The Geneva Convention is emphasized before we come here, during ARTEPs, during simulation exercise, also at civil affairs I had brought in some FIF "Free Iraqi Fighters" and we go the battalions together at the fire station in Arifjan and we had a one-on-one with the Iraqis and our people as to what to expect, what are their traditions, that was a part of the training. And there was subsequent training as well.

During Gold Sword we posted the Geneva Convention and the provisions in general in both Arabic and English. That's true, none of that ever happened during the actual mission requirement here. It would ultimately be the battalion commander and me to oversee it. It was my failure on a staff visit, general, operations, battalion commander and those that were supposed to post it.

I do think if the troops understood the basic tenants of the Geneva Convention that none of these incidents would have happened. I further believe that if it was posted in Arabic for the detainees, posted in English for the guards, trained incessantly, emphasized increasingly in addition to the Rules of Engagement it could have prevented the abuses.

I am familiar with SGM [REDACTED] and the circumstances of his departure from command. SGM [REDACTED] was replaced as the interim. We talked constantly about things about the brigade. We live together, eat together, and work together. Any problems that I'm aware of I'm sure he's aware of. He's never kept out of the loop. He is closer than any other CSM on this base.

I would characterize the battalions as over-utilized. The 320th, the 744th didn't have much of a mission in Talil until now at the HVD. The 324th had a tough mission in Ashraf. The 530th relieved them. The 530th was at Camp Bucca with the 724th. I got a good taste of what it is like to be out in the desert that many days under that kind of temperature and I think they did exceptionally well for the time they were there and the means to secure the EPWs and detainees. I think they all just did the best they could. June last year they were thinking about going home and the officers urged them not to think about it because there was a pending mission that has never been done before; the mission of replacing Iraq and the prison system. We were always short staffed, working double shifts, extreme temperatures. I think they did the best they could.

They submitted requests for personnel for replacements and we never got any from the 377th. LTC [REDACTED] controlled those requests. My responsibility as the XO was to see that it was fulfilled. That was also done through LTC [REDACTED] Arifjan.

I never interfaced with Major General Wodjakowski at all. The only thing I had was the SUA briefs, the Separate Updates. And I also took the security detainee board as well.

I have some knowledge of what happened in Tier 1A, but it is all second hand or third hand. I was first informed around the beginning of January 2004. Colonel [REDACTED] came to myself and Colonel [REDACTED] and he indicated that someone had come to him indicating that there was abuse of prisoners that took place in 1A and B, which is MI territory. So I asked what the abuse was and he said someone took pictures and nude prisoners, a nude female. I asked what was going on and he said he couldn't see it, but that some MPs, maybe some of our people, were present. I suggested he tell this directly to the General, so we called her and she already knew about it.

Well, there was the 320th MPs there, but that was not an access for me or anybody else unannounced. That had been discussed prior to that. We were told by Maj [REDACTED] from the 320th, that we could not go there. MI controlled, not MP controlled. MPs were for the prisoners.

The Tier was controlled by the 372nd MP Company under the supervision of the 320th. When the detainees are taken out you have the MI interrogators who have access to tell the MP that they need to see a specific detainee, and they are signed out and escorted by

the MP to the interrogation booth and then back again. So, MPs had guard and access of that and they had control of the detainees feeding and housing. That's what I mean by control. What I meant to say is, that because you were told that you had no unscheduled access to that I made a comment that there were other people within that battalion, that company who took liberties of accessing that particular facility unauthorized.

The events leading to the riot on the 24th of November at Abu Ghraib, Camp Ganci. I read an SIR on it and that's all I had on it. I never went to the facility, but I believe the general went there.

The recommendations I would you make regarding the incident that happened at Tier 1A, would be as far as going into Tier 1A and 1B, a clear understanding of unannounced supervision with all. Like you said, the posting of the Geneva Convention, that would have probably had a bearing on it for someone to be looking constantly at it.

I came here only because I wanted to. I will retire at age 60 in October. I came here because I believe in what the President says and I believe in our way of life and that we can probably make a difference over here. I'm ashamed and appalled that things like that happen. Some of the things I take a look at is things that have to do with our MPs, like scores for coming in, MOS training, unit training, training prior to the war, Rules of Engagement, changing and constant emphasis, command posted emphasis, special posters about reporting abuse, ongoing battalion training, command and staff visits. There are all these things that are taking place and yet these things happen: simulated exercise, the soldier's code, cards for Rules of Engagement, general orders, briefings by SOG. And we taught our people, yet a few shame us. I've put in 16-20 hours per day along with others and I'm very disturbed that all of this happened. It doesn't hurt or help me, but I'd like to leave with a good taste in my mouth. I'm sorry it happened.