

On 15 February 2004, CPT [REDACTED] returned for a follow-up interview.

The following persons were present:

COL [REDACTED] MP, CFLCC – PMO, **Interviewer**  
CPT [REDACTED], CFLCC – SJA, **Interviewer**  
SFC [REDACTED], US Army MP School, **Interviewer**  
CPT [REDACTED], 20th MP Battalion – S3, **Respondent**

The interview is summarized as follows:

I'm the Battle Captain for the S3, at the 320th Military Police Battalion. I'm also the Force Protection Officer.

I wasn't assigned to BCF until October 22nd '03. I tallied up the number, and I believe there have been seven or eight escapes. I know of two separate incidents, one at Camp Ganci, where, I believe, six escaped. Another involved the hard site, where one or two escaped. We prepare a SITREP that we forward to Brigade. These are maintained on our computer. They are in a folder titled, "Escapes."

After the mass escapes at Camp Ganci, we increased the roving patrols and stationary positions, and we put up additional fencing. As far as the hard site, they used the metal bed, and used the legs of the metal bed, to pry open the concrete bars, and create a very small hole. I think he was cut or injured in the process of escaping. As a countermeasure, we have started tacking the beds down, either to the wall or to the floor. It's been a constant battle with the ICOs to man their posts, and to do what they're supposed to do. The CPA hasn't been too supportive in that area. They've kind of dumped that mission on the 372<sup>nd</sup>, there.

The 372<sup>nd</sup> was delegated authority over the hard site, and they were the primary contact for all issues related to the hard site, and work with CPA. I know that most of the S3's focus was on Camp Ganci, leaving Vigilant and the hard site to the 372<sup>nd</sup>.

On a rotating schedule, we have a dog on compound duty. They're always available for call out, when they're actively engaged in patrol duties. During an escape, the IRF and the QRF are mobilized. When the IRF is activated, the K-9 unit comes with them. Under the direction of the NCOIC of the compound, they go to the area the suspect is believed to have escaped from. Then, they start their process of tracking, and piecing together the route of escape. We haven't had any escapees caught with the K-9s. We had an attempted escape within the last two weeks, where our soldiers, through situational awareness, nabbed a guy hiding between the conexes.

I tried to manage the Dog Program. I kind of created a job for myself. The Commander never directly told me to take charge of any one area. So, I just kind of took the bull by the horns. The S3 went on leave, and the S3 Sergeant Major went on leave, so there I

was, a by default guy. The Dog Program seemed an implied task for the S3. I found out that I didn't have the authority to do that, so I deferred it to the [REDACTED]

I'm concerned about the narcotics dogs. I know that [REDACTED] was aggravated that he couldn't get narcotics kits. He was concerned that his dog could possibly have to go back to school, if he didn't maintain his accreditation. I don't believe that they got the necessary kits. I believe they would have shared that with the 3, if they did.

The presence of a dog is a psychological deterrent for escape; not knowing whether or not they're going to get bit, when they take off running. It's a force multiplier.

MAJ [REDACTED] was charged with the responsibilities of managing the Dog Team. He's a Staff Sergeant. It was expressed to all handlers that he was the NCOIC, and all matters should go through him.

The Army dogs were originally scheduled for departure 4 February. Apparently, that was delayed. I don't know what for. I don't know if they're going to be replaced or not. I never saw any orders on them. The Navy dogs, I don't know what their termination date is.

I know that the [REDACTED] was not a team player. That issue was brought up to SGM [REDACTED]. Based on his insubordination, I told [REDACTED] in front of SGM [REDACTED] that he should be facing charges under the UCMJ. The Commander was unaware of this. I brought it up to MAJ [REDACTED] because he's my supervisor. I was a little aggravated with the SGM, because he'd look you in the eyes, and tell you, "I got it under control. I agree with you, Sir," and turn around and tell the subordinate just the opposite.

It was pretty apparent the day to day operations were ran by MAJ [REDACTED]. The primary focus was on Camp Ganci, and I'll say that again, the primary focus was on Camp Ganci. I think that the resources were so tapped, that everyone was at their wit's end. I know that policies and SOPs were slow in coming forth. There was so much going on, that it was difficult to put it on paper, immediately.

The primary issue was soldiers, the number of soldiers on the ground. An I/R Battalion comes with x number of MPs. Seventy-seven, I think, is on the MTOE. Those MPs are divided between four compounds. You have your guard companies that are attached to do external security. Problem is, we have about 35 MPs in the Battalion proper. We couldn't run four compounds with a thousand each. Now, you divide that up, and you have your manning requirements for eight compounds, with towers and so forth. So, we have double the workload, with half the MPs we're supposed to have. It's mind-boggling why a battalion, with a compliment of four or five companies was tasked with that mission. We have a generic briefing. When VIPs come through, we pop it in and show them, but I don't think this was emphasized to most of our visitors.

I don't know when a Vet last looked at these dogs. I know there's a Vet at BIAB. I don't know what type of food the dogs eat. I'm not aware of the kennel requirements. I don't know how often the dogs are trained. I've deferred the training to the handlers.

Ideally, the dog handlers should report to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] should to the S3. I hate to admit it, but they've gone pretty much unsupervised from a management point of view. As long as they showed up, and did what they were supposed to do. I wanted to avoid SGT [REDACTED]. I didn't want to compromise my position, by having a verbal confrontation with an NCO, without any support on the disciplinary side.

The K-9 Program needs a Kennel Supervisor and an integrated team. We need to mimic what the Air Force has done with their facilities. And, they need the next tier NCO to supervise the standard. I think the FOB Commander should have overall control of the K-9 Program.

I think we need to replace SGT [REDACTED] and bring in someone who has a spirit of cooperation. I think [REDACTED] is more than capable, with the support of a good team. If we had somebody in there to put their foot down, we'll be in good shape.

The interview complete, CPT [REDACTED] was dismissed.

On 12 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Ghraib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

COL [REDACTED], MP, CFLCC – PMO, **Interviewer**  
LTC [REDACTED], JA, CFLCC – SJA, **Interviewer**  
LTC [REDACTED], 705<sup>th</sup> MP Battalion, **Interviewer**  
CPT [REDACTED], 530<sup>th</sup> MP Battalion, **Interviewee**  
SSG [REDACTED], 27D30, CFLCC – SJA, **Recorder**

The interview is summarized as follows:

My name is [REDACTED]. My social security number is [REDACTED]. My rank is Captain. My unit is the 530<sup>th</sup> MP Battalion out of Omaha, Nebraska. I am currently assisting to the 320<sup>th</sup> Military Police Battalion, at Abu Ghraib BCCF. I am Reserve. I was told to report to the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade. Then, I was directed to the 320<sup>th</sup> MP Battalion to help with force protection.

My duties consisted of focusing on force protection issues; it took up the bulk of my duty day. The remaining time I assisted and integrated with operations. My OER support form reads assistant S-3/Force Protection Officer for the Battalion. I work for MAJ [REDACTED] he is my immediate supervisor.

From my experience we generate policies in the S-3 section dictating operating procedures, we take input from subordinates to help define, and improve policies and procedures. We have a TAC SOP that governs procedures of camp operations.

We disseminate policies in couple of different ways. We have two daily meetings, a 0900 staff briefing and a 1600 force protection meeting, additionally we would notify individual unit commanders as they were affected by set policies.

I am familiar the Geneva Hague Convention. I know it is posted but I don't know if it's posted throughout the facility. I believe it is posted in the TOC, but it probably should put out in different areas. We received training when the ICRC came down. I think it was about thirty days ago for Battalion Staff. I know that during the last visit, there was a discussion of the articles. When there is training we try to maintain a sign-in roster, but I'm probably not the expert on that.

There were no policies governing the use of dogs in 1A and 1B to my knowledge. I took it upon myself to develop an SOP to deal with the joint resources focusing on three areas: ECP operations, IRF operations, and Compound operations. I didn't get into the specific hard site limited use of dogs. We attempted to concentrate on Camp Yancey, Camp Vigil, IRF, and then the ECP was my primary focus. Our primary threat against the facilities were IED's, knowing the dogs capabilities and their presence as a psychological and physical deterrent at the gate, that's were we tried to focus our efforts.

I can't specific for the specific Tiers, but in general the dogs were used in the hard site. I remember vaguely about a dog bite incident, I remember Kimbrough reporting to me that his dog snipped at someone but nothing serious. The S-3 didn't change any policies regarding that incident. I didn't here about the [REDACTED] incident, but I believe what [REDACTED] reported was the same incident with [REDACTED]

SSG [REDACTED] did bring up to me that the use of dogs at the hard site was not a good idea. After he found out that he would be leaving soon he dropped off a list of items with suggestions. I had not had on a chance to review the list, before your arrival here.

The Battalion Commander would make the decision on dog use or policy changes. The direct responsibility would fall on the S-3. MA1 [REDACTED] handled the day-to-day operations. We published a work schedule and gave guidance, and did not micro manage the program. We gave MA1 [REDACTED] the flexibility as an NCO to run the dog program.

I don't have the list of suggestions I had submitted a copy. The SOP clearly states the NCOIC will handle administrative issues, personnel actions, and handling the teams. I do not know if military working dogs are used in other Battalions.

No dog handler representative would attend the daily force protection meeting or daily staff call. A representative would attend in the beginning and then they stopped because the information would not pertain to them.

There was a published ROE at BCCF, even though there was a lot if confusion about that ROE because there were revisions and so forth. For compound operations in general, word was passed during shift change briefings. Dog Handlers were issued a copy of the ROE, and that I know for fact.

The navy dogs were bomb explosive patrol dogs, and the army's dogs were narcotic patrol dogs. The intent was to integrate both teams so there would be one NCOIC, with the original work schedule it was possible, but with all the changes that took place and without the help of a SGM the integration never took place. There was a little friction between the army and the navy dogs. I took a personal interest in this but I was shut down. As an outsider, I am not part of the unit so my input did not weigh much.

If your efforts are undermined by an E-9, it's difficult to get them across. The SGM used lines of friendship, rather than the command lines of influence to affect things in the unit. I gave the prison personnel an SOP and a schedule, and told them how I wanted things done. They moaned and complained to the SGM to the point that they got to do what they wanted. This was the S-3 operation SGM. SGM [REDACTED] she has been removed.

I found out yesterday that I got a baby boy.

I tried to do this the best way, the right way, which I knew how. I presented an SOP and a work schedule to the Battalion Commander. The Battalion Commander signed off on the integration of both teams. There was a meeting held after that, that dictated otherwise, and at that point is when I realized where I fit in at in the hierarchy. I was rendered helpless.

The Battalion Commander, the Battalion S-3, SGM [REDACTED], SSG [REDACTED] and basically all the dog handlers, had a meeting to determine that would not follow my proposed work schedule. When you task individuals to do things a certain way and that changes, you lose your authority. The changes included that the army specifically work the compound, which had me dumfounded. It works broken down to where all the dogs would work all the areas, but it never came to light. I made the work schedule and SOP based on input from the dog handlers.

There were not any specific guidelines on when a dog entered a facility on who had OPCON (Operational Control). It is my understanding when a dog handler is patrolling, and then the dog handler is called for a specific task, that is the dog handler's lane. The use or deployment of the dog is up to the dog handler; it is his duty to know the limitations and parameters in which they may operate. They were familiar with their specific policies regarding use of their dog.

I would speculate that a handler could lose control of his dog by being in cramped spaces, too many people around, distance person should stay from dog, noise, and I could see lots of ways that leash could have been extended.

I can't even imagine why the acts in the allegations occurred; I'm just dumfounded.

We have done a few changes in the way we conduct operations; we have posted information about the treatment of detainees, we've done training on treatment of prisoners, and we have done a rotation of random third party independent officers to conduct walkthroughs at random hours of the night. The MP's are disgraced and embarrassed on what happened.

The Brigade Commander is Brigadier General Karpinski. She visited the facilities three times to my knowledge. She is located here at Camp Victory. It is difficult for me to say why she hadn't visited more; I didn't know her workload or demands of her position entailed. If I were the Brigade Commander I would on a rather frequent basis. I can't speak on the number of visits by SGM [REDACTED], there was one gentleman that replaced

someone I think his name was [REDACTED] I saw him on at least two occasion, we had discussed the release program and some other issues that impacted operations.

It is very apparent that we were not resourced to do the mission that we were given. We had inadequate facilities, inadequate resources, and manpower. We were running force protection/perimeter security for one square mile. We had to man towers, do QRF, while repeatedly receiving RPG and mortar fire. It was an unacceptable environment for our soldiers to be in. I don't know how the soldiers in the command did it working 12 hours on 12 hours off everyday in this type of environment.

I don't think the Brigade had the proper support either, but I know that the concerns were voice daily to Brigade. I recall pissing contest to get an MI Battalion to fill one tower on our perimeter initially, but we have made a lot of progress since then with limited resources. We had accomplish a lot on our lower level, we had an R&U captain that was handling the development of an entire base, the personnel had to do a lot more than they were expected to do.

The Battalion mission is to conduct IR operations. There was so much the Battalion was responsible for, while maintaining a reasonable force protection posture. The Battalion's main effort was to survive day-to-day operations, and I don't mean that to exaggerate. It was a struggle just to get through the day with the movement of prisoners, escort missions, all with maintaining the security at the prison.

You can deploy the best personnel, but occasionally you get a bad apple. Whatever motivated those soldiers to do types of things that I have heard about, I don't know if there is anything you can do as a commander to prevent that from happening, other than until after the fact. We needed policies that established a clear line between MI and MP duties and responsibilities. I don't think we knew enough about what MI does. I think there were some assumptions made about the latitude that MI had. I don't know how much questioning I would have done if I were an MP, if MI said that they needed a prisoner it wasn't a problem because that was MI's lane. A briefing from MI on what their parameters were would have helped a lot.

My observation is that the S-3 drove operations, because the Battalion Commander was to busy with getting gravel, getting resources, and pleading to Brigade.

The 530<sup>th</sup> MP Battalion is an IR Battalion. My role there was the HHC Commander. I was relieved of my command and sent to Camp Arifjan. The basis was unfounded.

I would say a total of 7 or 8 escapes for the BCCF. We actually had to deploy the IRF and other resources on the one big day in question, where we ended up having to kill three or four detainees.

My civilian job back home is a special agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). That is what scares me about this other stuff, he's a police officer and

any UCMJ action directly impacts my Top Secret clearance. In e-mail he threatened something to that affect, and I've had it up to here.

The 372<sup>nd</sup> Military Police Company was tasked with the management of the hard site. It was commanded by CPT Reese, the majority of the responsibility was delegated to CPT Brinson. He has since refraded. Most of the responsibility of the hard site was delegated down. It was mostly from commander-to commander.

The best way to describe me is as a Battle Captain; I ended up handling most of the briefings.

I knew the certification on the narcotic dogs were an issue because the dogs have to be certified with the different narcotics, and we also needed certification kits that we did not have. The navy dogs were good to go, because they teamed with EOD, and the Air Force also had kits available for navy dogs

The S-4 is MAJ [REDACTED].

LTC [REDACTED] is an intelligent leader. He is very perceptive, and in tune with issues and problems. He was always seen working, trying to make himself present during visits, very involved. I never got involved on what he was working on. A fair man, not very articulate, but beyond that he gave a lot if insight and wisdom on what needed to be done.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave CPT [REDACTED] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.