


# FM 3-19.1 (FM 19-1)

## Military Police Operations



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ANNEX 92

Change 1

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## **Military Police Operations**

1. Change FM 3-19.1, 22 March 2001 as follows:

Remove Old Pages

1-7 and 1-8

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Insert New Pages

1-7 through 1-19

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2. A bar ( I ) marks new or changed material.


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# Military Police Operations

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\*This publication supersedes FM 19-1, 23 May 1988.

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## Preface

The Military Police (MP) Corps supports the commander across the full spectrum of military operations. This manual is the foundation for all MP doctrine as it relates to this support. It communicates to all levels of leadership and staffs how the MP provide a flexible and lethal force capable of operating across this full spectrum. As the keystone manual, it identifies what the MP train on and how their forces are organized and equipped in support of all Army echelons. Additionally, this manual provides guidance that can be used by United States (US) Army service schools, students, sister services, and federal agencies.

This manual is based on the purpose, organization, responsibilities, and goals of the US Army as set forth in Field Manuals (FMs) 100-1 and 3-0, as well as corps, division, and brigade manuals. Additionally, this manual is fully compatible with current joint, multinational, and interagency doctrine.

Appendix A contains a metric conversion chart.

The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 directly to Commandant, US Army Military Police School (USAMPS), ATTN: ATSJ-MP-TD, 401 Engineer Loop, Suite 2060, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8926.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

*The MP Corps has a strong history evolving over the past five decades. We, as a corps, continue to transform our organizations and doctrine as we have in the past to support the Army in the active defense of the 1970s, the AirLand battle of the 1980s, and now the force-projection doctrine of the 1990s. Our five MP functions clearly articulate the diverse role the MP play across the full spectrum of military operations. We cannot bask in our successes, nor reflect or celebrate. Our charter is to continue our legacy of stellar performance and strive to perfect it.*

*BG Donald J. Ryder*

When the Army developed the Active Defense strategy in 1976, the US was facing the Cold War scenario of central Europe. Military strategy and doctrine were related to a single, focused threat that revolved around the countries in the Warsaw Pact. We were an outnumbered and technically inferior force facing an armor-dominated European battlefield. The MP Corps supported the Active Defense strategy by tailoring its forces to meet the threat. In 1982, when the AirLand Battle strategy was developed, US forces were still outnumbered, but were no longer technically inferior. Still threat-based and focused on a central European conflict, the AirLand Battle strategy used a relatively fixed framework suited to the echeloned attack of soviet-style forces. It delineated and clarified the levels of war; emphasized closed, concerted operations of airpower and ground forces; balanced the offense and the defense; and highlighted the synchronization of close, deep, and rear operations. MP doctrine kept pace with the Army's AirLand Battle strategy by supporting the battlefield commander through four basic missions—battlefield circulation and control, area security (AS), enemy prisoner of war (EPW), and law and order (L&O).

#### OVERVIEW

1-1. In October 1983, MP capabilities in the AirLand Battle strategy were tested during operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. The MP performed missions that ranged from assisting the infantry in building-clearance operations to assisting Caribbean peacekeeping forces in restoring L&O. These actions secured the MP's place in the combat-support (CS) role, demonstrating the professional knowledge and flexibility necessary for rapid transition from combat to CS to peacetime missions. The changing battlefield conditions of operation Urgent Fury set the stage for the demand of MP units today.

1-2. Evolving simultaneously with the changing definition of the modern battlefield, MP performance in Operations Hawkeye, Just Cause, and Desert Shield/Storm galvanized their ability to perform at any point along the operational continuum. With the publication of FM 100-5 in 1993, the Army adopted the doctrine of full-dimensional operations, relying on the art of battle command to apply those principles and to shift the focus from AirLand Battle to force-projection doctrine. This new doctrine was based on recent combat experience in a multipolar world with new technological advances. Already trained and expected to perform in this new strategy, MP support was already in place and fully operational. The MP continued to perform their basic battlefield missions and to refine their capabilities while supporting the battlefield commander as he deployed to contingency operations throughout the world.

1-3. In 1996, the MP Corps went through a doctrinal review process to determine if it was properly articulating its multiple performance capabilities in support of US forces deployed worldwide (see Appendix B). The review process identified the need to restructure and expand the EPW mission to include handling US military prisoners and all dislocated civilians. This new emphasis transformed the EPW mission into the internment and resettlement (I/R) function. The review process also identified the need to shift from missions to functions. In the past, the four battlefield missions adequately described MP capabilities in a mature theater against a predictable, echeloned threat. However, that landscape is no longer valid. Accordingly, the four MP battlefield missions have become the following five MP functions:

- Maneuver and mobility support (MMS).
- AS.
- L&O.
- I/R.
- Police intelligence operations (PIO).

1-4. These new MP functions are shaped by the following factors:

- The application of stability and support operations where the integration of joint, multinational, and interagency capabilities are common occurrence.
- The lack of traditional linear battlefields, requiring theater commanders in chief (CINCs) to request forces that meet a specific function to accomplish operational requirements.
- The impact of asymmetric threats (such as drug traffickers and terrorist factions) and the effects of man-made and natural disasters.
- The impact of advances in information and communication technologies and specifically in understanding the increased vulnerabilities presented by these technologies.

1-5. Articulating MP capabilities along functional lines benefits the MP and the Army echelon commander as well as the combatant commander. Since there is a multinational, interagency, and sister-service overlap of security services, the importance of including MP leaders and staffs early in the operational planning process cannot be overemphasized. This means before units are designated, unit boundaries are drawn, and unit missions are assigned. Early involvement ensures the proper development of common



security responsibilities, communication and connectivity, liaisons, processes, and the rules of interaction between all forces. The ultimate goal should be the optimal, phased employment of MP forces in support of a commander's operational plan. MP functions not only reflect and capture current capabilities, they define the MP Corps in the twenty-first century.

1-6. As the Army reshapes and focuses its resources on transformation, Force XXI, and other redesign efforts, the MP Corps stands proud and ready to support this progress and reiterate its commitment to assist, protect, and defend.

### OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

1-7. The operational framework consists of the arrangement of friendly forces and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other, the enemy, or the situation (see Figure 1-1). The operational framework for Army forces (ARFOR) rests within the combatant commander's theater organization. Each combatant commander has an assigned geographical area of responsibility (AOR), also called a theater, within which he has the authority to plan and conduct operations. Within the theater, joint-force commanders at all levels may establish subordinate operational areas such as areas of operation (AOs), joint-operations areas (JOAs) and joint rear areas




Figure 1-1. Operational Framework