Washington, D.C.:
Today, the National Security Archive posts an updated collection
of reports, studies, commentaries, and other material concerning
the issue of exactly how much authority should be vested with
the nation's chief intelligence officer. The Archive's previous
posting in December 2004 provided historical context for the congressional
and public debate over intelligence reform proposals that included
establishing an intelligence czar.
In February 2005 President Bush nominated John D.
Negroponte, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, to become the first Director
of National Intelligence (DNI) -- a position established when
the president signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention
Act of 2004 on December 17, 2004. Since then, Negroponte's authority
over the Intelligence Community has taken a number of concrete
forms -- including the assumption of responsibility for producing
the President's Daily Brief, the plan to replace the CIA's Weapons
Intelligence, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC)
with a Non-Proliferation Center reporting to the DNI, and the
establishment of new safeguards to ensure that National Intelligence
Estimates are based on credible information. [1]
The creation of the position of DNI ended the 57-year
reign of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as the nation's
chief intelligence officer. Throughout those 57 years, similar
reorganization proposals were debated inside and outside the the
intelligence community - a debate which elaborated on the pros
and cons of such a change.
The DNI is now the president's primary intelligence
adviser, replacing the DCI in that role, and has greater authority
over budgetary and personnel decisions across the entire 15-member
U.S. intelligence community than that which was possessed by the
DCI.
Ever since the Central Intelligence Agency was established
in July 1947 there has been controversy and conflict over the
role of the DCI in managing agencies other than the CIA - both
because existing intelligence agencies and their departments sought
to protect their bureaucratic turf and because it was feared that
increased authority for the DCI could result in a reduction in
the responsiveness of military organizations to the requirements
of the military.
Notable milestones over the years have included DCI Walter Bedell
Smith's successful fight to establish that the Intelligence Advisory
Committee, consisting of the chiefs of the national intelligence
agencies, existed to provide him advice rather than serve as a
board of directors. Allen Dulles (1953-1961) fought and won a
number of battles to prevent the Defense Department from gaining
control of key institutions and programs for the collection and
analysis of intelligence. His successor, John McCone, became embroiled
in the bitter battles between the CIA's Directorate of Science
and Technology and the leadership of the National Reconnaissance
Office over control of satellite programs - at one point submitting
a memorandum that would have abolished the NRO.
During his tenure as DCI, Richard Helms complained that while
he was ostensibly responsible for the activities of the entire
intelligence community, he only controlled 15% of its resources,
with almost all the remaining 85% in the hands of the Secretary
of Defense. More recently, prior to his resignation, George Tenet
reportedly told members of the Senate oversight committee that
"he does not really consider himself to be DCI."
Over the years, presidents have issued directives, beginning
with a 1962 letter from John Kennedy to John McCone, that expressed
their desire that the DCI should coordinate the activities of
the entire community. In 1971, Richard Nixon issued a memorandum
which also called on the DCI to serve as community manager. In
1977, Jimmy Carter took a significant step by assigning the DCI
responsibility for approving the National Foreign Intelligence
Program budget - which meant approving not only the CIA budget,
but also those of the National Reconnaissance Program (and thus
the NRO), the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (and thus the NSA),
and Navy Special Activities (and thus the budget for the submarine
reconnaissance program). He stopped short, however, of assigning
the DCI responsibility for supervising the day-to-day operations
of those activities and organizations, with that responsibility
remaining with the Secretary of Defense.
Some of the actions taken by presidents to enhance the DCI's
authority followed one or more of the multitude of studies undertaken
to examine the workings of the intelligence community. Investigations
into intelligence community performance have been conducted since
at least 1949 - by private citizens or government officials appointed
by the DCI, by interagency groups, by the Office of Management
and Budget, by internal CIA panels, by Congressional committees,
and by other entities. Often the options considered have included
ones far more radical than the administration has been willing
to adopt. Among the more radical proposals has been the creation
of an intelligence czar - a Director of National Intelligence
who would replace the DCI as the president's primary intelligence
adviser and would be responsible for the entire intelligence community's
activities.
As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the Congressional
Joint Inquiry and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States examined the issue of intelligence organization
and recommended the creation of a Director of National Intelligence.
The proposal was eventually supported by the Bush administration,
but opposition from the Pentagon and then the chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee blocked passage of legislation
creating a DNI. With the compromise reached on December 6, the
road was cleared of obstacles to establish a Director of National
Intelligence.
The memoranda, directives, letters, and studies below provide
documentation of the road that began with attempts to enhance
the DCI's authority and has ended with the creation of a DNI.
Documents
Note: Many of the following documents are in PDF
format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
New
Document 1: John McCone,
Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Discussion with Mr. Clark
Clifford at luncheon - 14 July 1964, July 14, 1964. Secret Eyes
Only
Source:
FOIA Request
This memo, written by Director of Central Intelligence John McCone,
about his discussion with presidential political advisor and future
Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, covers a variety of topics,
including the responsibilities of McCone's position. Clifford,
according to the memo, had proposed, in 1961, to separate the
DCI's responsibilities from those of the head of the CIA. The
memo reports on the reaction of then DCI Allen Dulles as well
as the reaction of McCone.
Document
2: Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms
to Clark Clifford, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, September 20, 1966 w/att: Discussion of Adequacy
of DCI Authority to Coordinate the U.S. Intelligence Effort
Source:
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1964-1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign
Policy; United Nations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 2004), Document 253, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32677.htm
This letter notes that the activities of the U.S. intelligence
community are directed by two individuals - the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. Helms writes that "the
precise delimitations of authority and responsibility" between
the DCI and Secretary of Defense "remains vague and ill-defined
although practical working relationships are satisfactory."
The attachment notes the authority given to the DCI, via letters
from presidents Kennedy and Johnson. It also notes the different
requirements of different government departments for finished
intelligence, as well as the relevance of intelligence collected
by individual departments to national intelligence. As a result,
"it follows that all of the activities of the components
of the Government which serve national intelligence purposes can
never by totally subordinated to the direction, control and management
of a single central authority." The attachment suggests the
need to examine the mechanisms by which the DCI provides guidance
and coordination "to ensure that they provide an adequate
basis for the assertion of his influence."
New
Document 3: Report
to the DCI on the Organization of CIA and the Intelligence Community,
January 20, 1969. Top Secret
Source:
CIA CREST Collection, NARA II
The first six parts of this study examine the existing legal
arrangements for coordination of U.S. foreign intelligence activities,
the organization and management of the CIA, proposals for organizational
change in the CIA, and the organization of the intelligence community
at the time.
The seventh and last section reviews proposal for organizational
change in the community. The proposals concern Defense Department
management of intelligence resources, the DCI's community management
staff, enforcement of intelligence guidance, intelligence support
of tactical vs. national consumers, early warning, coordination
of espionage and counterintelligence operations, research and
analysis by outside technology contractors, and managerial improvements
in the National Reconnaissance Office.
Document
4: James Schlesinger, A Review of the Intelligence Community,
March 10, 1971, Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This study was prepared by future CIA director and Defense secretary
James Schlesinger while he was a staff member of the Office of
Management and Budget and preceded decisions made by President
Richard Nixon on intelligence community organization. The report
begins by reporting two "disturbing phenomena" - a significant
increase in the size and cost of intelligence activities and an
"apparent inability to achieve a commensurate impact in the
scope and overall quality of the intelligence product."
It goes on to elaborate on problems (including the increasing
fragmentation and decreasing disorganization of intelligence functions,
unproductive duplication in collection, and unplanned growth)
and examines a variety of organizational alternatives - including
creation of Director of National Intelligence with responsibility
for running the CIA, a Director of Central Intelligence with augmented
authority, and a coordinator of national intelligence.
Document
5: Comments on "A Review of the Intelligence Community,"
no date
Source:
CIA CREST Collection, NARA II
This short review of Schelsinger's study, apparently prepared
by either by the National Security Council staff or the CIA, observes
that if the president wishes the DCI to coordinate the intelligence
community's resources he could issue a directive to the DCI and
Secretary of Defense. At a minimum, the directive would have to
give the DCI authority to coordinate programs, prepare budgets,
and conduct a final review before submission to the president.
Document
6: Richard Nixon, Memorandum, Subject: Organization and Management
of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community, November 5, 1971,
Top Secret Codeword
Source:
CIA CREST Collection, NARA II
This memorandum, issued by President Richard Nixon subsequent
to the Schlesinger report (Document 2) and
the following discussions contained a number of initiatives intended
to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community
- including creation of a National Security Council Intelligence
Committee, reconstitution of the U.S. Intelligence Board, establishment
of a National Cryptologic Command under the director of the National
Security Agency, and the creation of the Defense Mapping Service.
A significant part of the memorandum focused on expanding the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. Nixon directed
the DCI "to assume leadership of the community in planning,
reviewing, coordinating, and evaluating all intelligence programs
and activities …" The memorandum did not, however,
provide the DCI with additional responsibility for implementation
in the form of day-to-day management responsibility for collection
agencies - NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office - operating
within the Department of Defense.
New
Document 7: William
Colby, Letter to Robert D. Murphy, November 7, 1973 w/att: Statement
by the Director of Central Intelligence, Classification Unknown
Source:
CIA CREST Collection, NARA II
In the attachment to his letter Director of Central Intelligence
William E. Colby provides Robert Murphy, chairman of a commission
examining foreign policy organization, his analysis of the "state
of the intelligence community. with respect to about a dozen topics.
Among the subjects Colby addresses are the DCI's authority, evaluation
of community performance, reports and estimates, and oversight
and accountability.
New
Document
8: An Historical Review of Studies of the Intelligence Community
for the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the
Conduct of Foreign Policy, December 1974. Top Secret
Source: CIA CREST Collection, NARA II
This review reports on the conclusions of about a dozen studies
on intelligence organization and management that had appeared
since 1960. It provides summaries of each individual study effort,
but also examines eight issues, summarizing the views of each
review with regard to the issue in question. The issues are the
direction of the intelligence community, intra-community relationships,
resource planning and management, requirements, collection, production,
consumer feedback, and clandestine services and covert action.
New
Document 9: Commission
on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign
Policy, Report, June 1975, Chapter 7: The Organization of Intelligence,
Unclassified
Source: U.S. Government Printing Office
Part of the chapter provides the readers with an unclassified
thumbnail sketch of the major U.S. intelligence agencies. It subsequently
identifies steps the commission believes would provide for more
effective oversight and leadership of the intelligence community.
The report cautions against separating the jobs of chief intelligence
adviser to the president and director of the CIA, observing that
"to function as the President's intelligence adviser, it
is essential that the DCI have immediate access to an control
over CIA facilities necessary to assemble, evaluate, and reach
conclusions about intelligence in all functional fields, including
political, economic, military and scientific subjects." The
commission also suggests strengthening the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). In addition, the report addresses
measures that could be taken to improve the relevance and quality
of intelligence - including establishment of a staff to support
the National Intelligence Officers - a staff which was subsequently
established - and giving increased attention to human sources.
Document
10: CIA Study Group, American Intelligence: A Framework for
the Future, October 13, 1975, Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This study, directed by CIA Executive Director James Taylor examined
then current organization and management problems facing the intelligence
community as well as possible future organizational arrangements.
The group recommended replacing the Director of Central Intelligence
and Central Intelligence Agency with a Director General of Intelligence,
who would become a member of the NSC, and a Foreign Intelligence
Agency. The DGI would have a staff to perform substantive, coordination
resource management, and evaluation functions - with the National
Intelligence Officers and the Intelligence Community Staff becoming
subordinate to the DGI. The new FIA would consist primarily of
the operations, science and technology, and intelligence directorates
of the CIA.
Document
11: Jimmy Carter, Presidential Review Memorandum 11, Subject:
Intelligence Structure and Mission, February 22, 1977, Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
As part of his administration's review of national security issues,
President Carter ordered a review of the intelligence community's
mission and structure. The focus of the ensuing review is specified
in this presidential review memorandum, and includes an examination
of the responsibilities and powers of the DCI in his role as principal
foreign intelligence advisor to the president.
Document
12: Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Views on the Future Management
of the Intelligence Community, April 22, 1977, Secret
Source:
CIA CREST Collection, NARA II
This paper was prepared as part of the PRM-11 review process.
The authors identified three alternatives -- reducing the responsibilities
of the DCI as a way of acknowledging the DCI's inability to effectively
management national collection activities operating within the
Defense Department, increasing the DCI's authority over the intelligence
community budget or some significant part of it, or giving the
DCI line management authority over major parts - specifically
NSA and NRO -- of the intelligence community. The paper recommended
the third of the three options, which would give the DCI authority
not only to set budgets but to supervise the daily activities
of NSA, NRO and other national activities, such as the underwater
reconnaissance program.
Document
13: National Security Council, Report on Presidential Review
Memorandum/NSC-11: Intelligence Structure and Mission, 1977,
Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This report is the result of the interagency review initiated
by PRM-11, and consists of four parts: an examination of the objectives
and principles for U.S. foreign intelligence, identification of
problem areas, structural options, and possible solutions in other
areas - ranging from producer/consumer relations to counterintelligence.
The report's examination of structural options covers a wide
variety of possibilities from increasing the DCI's authority to
creation of a Director of Foreign Intelligence to increasing the
Secretary of Defense's authority to a radical restructuring of
the intelligence community.
Document
14: Jimmy Carter, Presidential Directive/NSC-17, Subject: The
Reorganization of the Intelligence Community, August 4, 1977,
Official Use Only
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This directive was the end result of the PRM-11 process. While
the directive did not adopt the solution proposed in the CIA's
April 22, 1977 paper of giving the DCI line authority over the
NSA and NRO it did increase his budgetary authority. It specified
that the DCI would have "full and exclusive authority for
approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget
prior to its presentation to the President …" (The
NFIP budget includes the budgets for the National Reconnaissance
Program and NSA as well as for the CIA).
It also specified continuation of the DCI's tasking authority
in peacetime - which had been exercised through DCI committees
such as the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
(COMIREX).
Document
15: Memorandum, Director, PHOTINT Tasking Office to Acting Deputy
to the DCI for Collection Tasking, Subject: Defense Reconnaissance
Support Program (DRSP), September 18, 1980
Source:
CIA CREST Collection, NARA II
This memo is a response to the creation of the Defense Reconnaissance
Support Program and the Defense Support Project Office by the
Secretary of the Air Force, as a means of improving the ability
to the military to obtain intelligence from NRO space systems.
The creation of the DSRP and DSPO is viewed by the author, however,
as an action that would weaken the authority of the DCI over the
national reconnaissance program.
Document
16: Ronald Reagan, Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence
Activities, December 4, 1981, Unclassified
Source:
Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records
Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States, Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1981, pp. 1128-1139
This executive order, which is still in effect, except for provisions
altered by President George W. Bush's order of August 2004, specifies,
inter alia, the responsibilities and authorities of the Director
of Central Intelligence. As did President Carter's presidential
directive and subsequent executive order, it gave the DCI responsibility
to "develop, with the advice of the program managers and
departments and agencies concerned, the consolidated National
Foreign Intelligence Program budget, and present it to the President
and Congress …"
Document
17: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Explanatory Statement:
Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992, 1992, Unclassified
Source:
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
In 1992, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees both proposed
similar significant changes in the organization of the U.S. intelligence
community. This document provides the the Senate Select Committee's
rationale for the proposed changes - which included the creation
of a Director of National Intelligence with enhanced budgetary
authority, transformation of the CIA into agency whose sole responsibility
was human intelligence collection and covert action, and creation
of a National Imagery Agency.
Document
18: Robert M. Gates, Director of Central Intelligence, Statement
on Change in CIA and the Intelligence Community, April 1, 1992,
Unclassified
Source:
Central Intelligence Agency
With proposals for radical reorganization being considered by
both the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees, DCI
Robert Gates testified before a joint hearing in April 1992. Much
of Gates' statement concerned issues other than organization -
including intelligence analysis, openness, politicization, and
communications with policy makers. The organizational changes
he reported were much less sweeping than those proposed by the
oversight committees. They included replacement of the Intelligence
Community Staff by DCI Community Management Staff, restructuring
of the National Intelligence Council, creation of a National Human
Intelligence Tasking Center within the CIA to manage HUMINT collection,
and establishment of a Central Imagery Office, reporting to both
the DCI and Secretary of Defense. The CIO, Gates reported, would
seek to improve the coordination of the use of national and tactical
reconnaissance systems, and work on problems of standards and
interoperability - which had proved to be a significant problem
during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
Document
19: Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before
and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Recommendations,
December 10, 2002, Unclassified
Source:
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html
The mid-1990s saw two major examinations of U.S. intelligence
organization. One was conducted by a commission chaired by former
Defense secretary Harold Brown, which included members from Congress
as well as executive branch appointees. The second was conducted
by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Neither
produced drastic changes in the organization of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, although the House report suggested a radical restructuring.
Predictably, the attacks of 9-11 resulted in several investigations,
including a joint Congressional inquiry. A number of the recommendations
produced by Joint Inquiry concerned the organization and operation
of the U.S. intelligence community, including creation of the
post of Director of National Intelligence, "who shall be
the President's principal advisor on intelligence and shall have
the full range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities
needed to make the entire U.S. Intelligence Community operate
as a coherent whole."
Specifically, the DNI should be able to establish and enforce
priorities for intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination
and also have the authority to review, approve, modify and oversee
the execution of intelligence agency budgets. The DNI recommended
by the Joint Inquiry would also be able to move personnel between
elements of the Intelligence Community.
Document
20: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Final Report, July 2004, Section 13.2, Unclassified
Source:
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911
About eighteen months after the Joint Inquiry issued its report
and recommendations, the commission appointed by President George
W. Bush and Congress completed its report. One chapter focused
on alternative ways of organizing the government's national security
activities, including intelligence. The first of its recommendations
concerning intelligence called for replacement of the position
of Director of Central Intelligence by a National Intelligence
Director with two main areas of responsibility. One was overseeing
the national intelligence centers (on WMD proliferation, international
crime and narcotics, China/East Asia, Middle East, and Russia/Eurasia)
that the commission suggested should be established. The second
responsibility would be to "manage the national intelligence
program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it."
The National Intelligence Director's powers should include,
according to the commission, the authority to reprogram funds
among national intelligence agencies, and the right to approve
and submit the nominations for the head of a variety of intelligence
agencies and components - including the Defense Intelligence Agency,
National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.
Document
21: The White House, National Intelligence Director Press
Briefing, August 2, 2004, Unclassified
Source:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040802-6.html
Within weeks after the 9/11 Commission issued its report, President
Bush announced that he was asking Congress to establish the post
of National Intelligence Director, who would serve as the president's
primary intelligence advisor and would "oversee and coordinate"
the government foreign and domestic intelligence activities.
That same day, presidential press secretary Scott McClellan hosted
a press briefing, attended by national security adviser Condoleeza
Rice and chief of staff Andrew Card, to elaborate on the specifics
of the president's plan for a national intelligence director.
Answers to reporters questions indicated that the authority of
the DNI, as originally envisioned by the administration, was not
as extensive as that proposed by the Joint Inquiry or the 9/11
Commission. Card stated that "we expect that the National
Intelligence Director would have significant input into the development
of a budget." (emphasis added). He also said that "with
regard to personnel, we feel very strongly that the National Intelligence
Director should play a role - a coordinating role - in
the selection of people who are going to serve in our intelligence
community."
Document
22: Statement by Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, August 17, 2004, Unclassified
Source:
http://www.senate.gov
Objections and concern about the creation of a position of Director
of National Intelligence came from a variety of sources, including
the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly
JCS chairman Richard Myers. In his testimony, the secretary of
defense notes one of the key concerns, the authority for the day-to-day
management of the NSA, NGA, and NRO outside of the Department
of Defense: "we wouldn't want to place new barriers or filters
between the military Combatant Commanders and those agencies when
they perform as combat support agencies. It would be a major step
to separate these key agencies from the military Combatant Commanders,
which are the major users of such capabilities."
Document
23a: George W. Bush, Executive Order, Strengthened Management
of the Intelligence Community, August 27, 2004, Unclassified
Source:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040827-6.html
Document
23b: White House, Fact Sheet: President Issues New Orders
to Reform Intelligence, August 27, 2004, Unclassified
Source:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040827-13.html
As an interim measure, until legislation to establish a Director
of National Intelligence could be negotiated, passed, and signed,
President Bush issued an executive order, amending Ronald Reagan's
Executive Order 12333, in order to augment the authority of the
DCI. Its provisions call for the DCI not only to "develop,
determine and present" with the advice of the heads of intelligence
community agencies the annual National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget, but to "report to the President on the effectiveness
of implementation of the NFIP by organizations in the Intelligence
Community" and requires that the DCI be provided with "programmatic,
execution, and other appropriate information."
Document
24: The White House, Fact Sheet: Leading the Way on Reforming
and Strengthening Our Intelligence Services, September 8,
2004, Unclassified
Source:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040908-5.html
On September 8, 2004 President Bush met with Congressional leaders
to brief them on his administration's proposal for legislation
in response to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. This
fact sheet specifies the proposed structure of the office of the
National Intelligence Director, the director's general powers,
the director's budget authority, the personnel authorities of
the director, and the director's responsibilities for managing
the intelligence community.
Document
25: Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Intelligence Reform,
September 13, 2004, Unclassified
Source:
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/36112pf.htm
In his remarks to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee,
Powell strongly supported the president's proposal for a National
Intelligence Director. He also tried to give the committee insight
into his intelligence needs as Secretary of State - needs which
some have pointed to as being threatened by the creation of an
intelligence czar. Those requirements identified by Powell include
global coverage, "expert judgments on what is likely to happen,
not just an extrapolation of worst case scenarios," as well
as tailored intelligence support responsive to his needs.
New
Document 26: United
States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Summary of Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, December 6, 2004.
Unclassified
Source: Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
The entire Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act of 2004 is
several hundred pages in length.
The key provisions of the bill with regard to intelligence reform
are summarized in the section on "Authorities of the DNI."
That section reports on the enhanced powers of the DNI (in contrast
to those of the DCI) with regard to 'budget build', budget execution,
transfer and reprogramming of funds, transfer of personnel, tasking
and analysis, and appointments of the heads of other fourteen
organizations that formally constitute the "U.S. Intelligence
Community."
New
Document
27: President Signs Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act, December 17, 2004. Unclassified
Source:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/20041217-1.html
This document consists of President Bush's remarks just prior
to signing the intelligence reform bill. In it he states that
"A key lesson of September the 11th, 2001 is that America's
intelligence agencies must work together as a single, unified,
enterprise." He goes on to explain that "The Director
[of National Intelligence] will lead a unified intelligence community
and will serve as the principle advisor to the President on intelligence
matters."
New
Document
28: President Holds News Conference (Excerpt), February 18, 2005.
Unclassified
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050217-2.html
It would take a month after President Bush signed the intelligence
reform act before he could present to the public his nominees
for DNI and Deputy DNI. Some of those initially approached, including
former DCI Robert Gates, apparently turned down the job. In a
February 17, 2005 news conference, the president announced that
he was nominating Ambassador John Negroponte for the position
of DNI and the Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the director of the
National Security Agency, as his deputy. This excerpt from the
news conference transcript contains the president's remarks on
his nominee as well as Negroponte's brief statement.
Note
1. Douglas Jehl, "Top Spy's No. 2 Tells of Changes To Avoid
Error," New York Times, July 29, 2005, pp. A1, A12.
