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From Director of Central Intelligence
to Director of National Intelligence

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 144

Edited by Jeffrey T. Richelson

Posted - December 17, 2004

Updated - August 12, 2005 - New Documents on the Intelligence Czar

President Bush with with Ambassador John Negroponte, on the day he was nominated to become the first Director of National Intelligence. (White House photo)

Washington, D.C.: Today, the National Security Archive posts an updated collection of reports, studies, commentaries, and other material concerning the issue of exactly how much authority should be vested with the nation's chief intelligence officer. The Archive's previous posting in December 2004 provided historical context for the congressional and public debate over intelligence reform proposals that included establishing an intelligence czar.

In February 2005 President Bush nominated John D. Negroponte, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, to become the first Director of National Intelligence (DNI) -- a position established when the president signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 on December 17, 2004. Since then, Negroponte's authority over the Intelligence Community has taken a number of concrete forms -- including the assumption of responsibility for producing the President's Daily Brief, the plan to replace the CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) with a Non-Proliferation Center reporting to the DNI, and the establishment of new safeguards to ensure that National Intelligence Estimates are based on credible information. [1]

The creation of the position of DNI ended the 57-year reign of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as the nation's chief intelligence officer. Throughout those 57 years, similar reorganization proposals were debated inside and outside the the intelligence community - a debate which elaborated on the pros and cons of such a change.

The DNI is now the president's primary intelligence adviser, replacing the DCI in that role, and has greater authority over budgetary and personnel decisions across the entire 15-member U.S. intelligence community than that which was possessed by the DCI.

Ever since the Central Intelligence Agency was established in July 1947 there has been controversy and conflict over the role of the DCI in managing agencies other than the CIA - both because existing intelligence agencies and their departments sought to protect their bureaucratic turf and because it was feared that increased authority for the DCI could result in a reduction in the responsiveness of military organizations to the requirements of the military.

Notable milestones over the years have included DCI Walter Bedell Smith's successful fight to establish that the Intelligence Advisory Committee, consisting of the chiefs of the national intelligence agencies, existed to provide him advice rather than serve as a board of directors. Allen Dulles (1953-1961) fought and won a number of battles to prevent the Defense Department from gaining control of key institutions and programs for the collection and analysis of intelligence. His successor, John McCone, became embroiled in the bitter battles between the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology and the leadership of the National Reconnaissance Office over control of satellite programs - at one point submitting a memorandum that would have abolished the NRO.

During his tenure as DCI, Richard Helms complained that while he was ostensibly responsible for the activities of the entire intelligence community, he only controlled 15% of its resources, with almost all the remaining 85% in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. More recently, prior to his resignation, George Tenet reportedly told members of the Senate oversight committee that "he does not really consider himself to be DCI."

Over the years, presidents have issued directives, beginning with a 1962 letter from John Kennedy to John McCone, that expressed their desire that the DCI should coordinate the activities of the entire community. In 1971, Richard Nixon issued a memorandum which also called on the DCI to serve as community manager. In 1977, Jimmy Carter took a significant step by assigning the DCI responsibility for approving the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget - which meant approving not only the CIA budget, but also those of the National Reconnaissance Program (and thus the NRO), the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (and thus the NSA), and Navy Special Activities (and thus the budget for the submarine reconnaissance program). He stopped short, however, of assigning the DCI responsibility for supervising the day-to-day operations of those activities and organizations, with that responsibility remaining with the Secretary of Defense.

Some of the actions taken by presidents to enhance the DCI's authority followed one or more of the multitude of studies undertaken to examine the workings of the intelligence community. Investigations into intelligence community performance have been conducted since at least 1949 - by private citizens or government officials appointed by the DCI, by interagency groups, by the Office of Management and Budget, by internal CIA panels, by Congressional committees, and by other entities. Often the options considered have included ones far more radical than the administration has been willing to adopt. Among the more radical proposals has been the creation of an intelligence czar - a Director of National Intelligence who would replace the DCI as the president's primary intelligence adviser and would be responsible for the entire intelligence community's activities.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the Congressional Joint Inquiry and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States examined the issue of intelligence organization and recommended the creation of a Director of National Intelligence. The proposal was eventually supported by the Bush administration, but opposition from the Pentagon and then the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee blocked passage of legislation creating a DNI. With the compromise reached on December 6, the road was cleared of obstacles to establish a Director of National Intelligence.

The memoranda, directives, letters, and studies below provide documentation of the road that began with attempts to enhance the DCI's authority and has ended with the creation of a DNI.

Note: Many of the following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

New Document 1: John McCone, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Discussion with Mr. Clark Clifford at luncheon - 14 July 1964, July 14, 1964. Secret Eyes Only
Source: FOIA Request

This memo, written by Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, about his discussion with presidential political advisor and future Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, covers a variety of topics, including the responsibilities of McCone's position. Clifford, according to the memo, had proposed, in 1961, to separate the DCI's responsibilities from those of the head of the CIA. The memo reports on the reaction of then DCI Allen Dulles as well as the reaction of McCone.

Document 2: Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms to Clark Clifford, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, September 20, 1966 w/att: Discussion of Adequacy of DCI Authority to Coordinate the U.S. Intelligence Effort

Source: Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), Document 253, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxiii/32677.htm

This letter notes that the activities of the U.S. intelligence community are directed by two individuals - the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. Helms writes that "the precise delimitations of authority and responsibility" between the DCI and Secretary of Defense "remains vague and ill-defined although practical working relationships are satisfactory."

The attachment notes the authority given to the DCI, via letters from presidents Kennedy and Johnson. It also notes the different requirements of different government departments for finished intelligence, as well as the relevance of intelligence collected by individual departments to national intelligence. As a result, "it follows that all of the activities of the components of the Government which serve national intelligence purposes can never by totally subordinated to the direction, control and management of a single central authority." The attachment suggests the need to examine the mechanisms by which the DCI provides guidance and coordination "to ensure that they provide an adequate basis for the assertion of his influence."

New Document 3: Report to the DCI on the Organization of CIA and the Intelligence Community, January 20, 1969. Top Secret
Source: CIA CREST Collection, NARA II

The first six parts of this study examine the existing legal arrangements for coordination of U.S. foreign intelligence activities, the organization and management of the CIA, proposals for organizational change in the CIA, and the organization of the intelligence community at the time.

The seventh and last section reviews proposal for organizational change in the community. The proposals concern Defense Department management of intelligence resources, the DCI's community management staff, enforcement of intelligence guidance, intelligence support of tactical vs. national consumers, early warning, coordination of espionage and counterintelligence operations, research and analysis by outside technology contractors, and managerial improvements in the National Reconnaissance Office.

Document 4: James Schlesinger, A Review of the Intelligence Community, March 10, 1971, Top Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request

This study was prepared by future CIA director and Defense secretary James Schlesinger while he was a staff member of the Office of Management and Budget and preceded decisions made by President Richard Nixon on intelligence community organization. The report begins by reporting two "disturbing phenomena" - a significant increase in the size and cost of intelligence activities and an "apparent inability to achieve a commensurate impact in the scope and overall quality of the intelligence product."

It goes on to elaborate on problems (including the increasing fragmentation and decreasing disorganization of intelligence functions, unproductive duplication in collection, and unplanned growth) and examines a variety of organizational alternatives - including creation of Director of National Intelligence with responsibility for running the CIA, a Director of Central Intelligence with augmented authority, and a coordinator of national intelligence.

Document 5: Comments on "A Review of the Intelligence Community," no date
Source: CIA CREST Collection, NARA II

This short review of Schelsinger's study, apparently prepared by either by the National Security Council staff or the CIA, observes that if the president wishes the DCI to coordinate the intelligence community's resources he could issue a directive to the DCI and Secretary of Defense. At a minimum, the directive would have to give the DCI authority to coordinate programs, prepare budgets, and conduct a final review before submission to the president.

Document 6: Richard Nixon, Memorandum, Subject: Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community, November 5, 1971, Top Secret Codeword
Source: CIA CREST Collection, NARA II

This memorandum, issued by President Richard Nixon subsequent to the Schlesinger report (Document 2) and the following discussions contained a number of initiatives intended to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community - including creation of a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, reconstitution of the U.S. Intelligence Board, establishment of a National Cryptologic Command under the director of the National Security Agency, and the creation of the Defense Mapping Service.

A significant part of the memorandum focused on expanding the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. Nixon directed the DCI "to assume leadership of the community in planning, reviewing, coordinating, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities …" The memorandum did not, however, provide the DCI with additional responsibility for implementation in the form of day-to-day management responsibility for collection agencies - NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office - operating within the Department of Defense.

New Document 7: William Colby, Letter to Robert D. Murphy, November 7, 1973 w/att: Statement by the Director of Central Intelligence, Classification Unknown
Source: CIA CREST Collection, NARA II

In the attachment to his letter Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby provides Robert Murphy, chairman of a commission examining foreign policy organization, his analysis of the "state of the intelligence community. with respect to about a dozen topics. Among the subjects Colby addresses are the DCI's authority, evaluation of community performance, reports and estimates, and oversight and accountability.

New Document 8: An Historical Review of Studies of the Intelligence Community for the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, December 1974. Top Secret
Source: CIA CREST Collection, NARA II

This review reports on the conclusions of about a dozen studies on intelligence organization and management that had appeared since 1960. It provides summaries of each individual study effort, but also examines eight issues, summarizing the views of each review with regard to the issue in question. The issues are the direction of the intelligence community, intra-community relationships, resource planning and management, requirements, collection, production, consumer feedback, and clandestine services and covert action.

New Document 9: Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Report, June 1975, Chapter 7: The Organization of Intelligence, Unclassified
Source: U.S. Government Printing Office

Part of the chapter provides the readers with an unclassified thumbnail sketch of the major U.S. intelligence agencies. It subsequently identifies steps the commission believes would provide for more effective oversight and leadership of the intelligence community. The report cautions against separating the jobs of chief intelligence adviser to the president and director of the CIA, observing that "to function as the President's intelligence adviser, it is essential that the DCI have immediate access to an control over CIA facilities necessary to assemble, evaluate, and reach conclusions about intelligence in all functional fields, including political, economic, military and scientific subjects." The commission also suggests strengthening the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). In addition, the report addresses measures that could be taken to improve the relevance and quality of intelligence - including establishment of a staff to support the National Intelligence Officers - a staff which was subsequently established - and giving increased attention to human sources.

Document 10: CIA Study Group, American Intelligence: A Framework for the Future, October 13, 1975, Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request

This study, directed by CIA Executive Director James Taylor examined then current organization and management problems facing the intelligence community as well as possible future organizational arrangements.

The group recommended replacing the Director of Central Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency with a Director General of Intelligence, who would become a member of the NSC, and a Foreign Intelligence Agency. The DGI would have a staff to perform substantive, coordination resource management, and evaluation functions - with the National Intelligence Officers and the Intelligence Community Staff becoming subordinate to the DGI. The new FIA would consist primarily of the operations, science and technology, and intelligence directorates of the CIA.

Document 11: Jimmy Carter, Presidential Review Memorandum 11, Subject: Intelligence Structure and Mission, February 22, 1977, Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request

As part of his administration's review of national security issues, President Carter ordered a review of the intelligence community's mission and structure. The focus of the ensuing review is specified in this presidential review memorandum, and includes an examination of the responsibilities and powers of the DCI in his role as principal foreign intelligence advisor to the president.

Document 12: Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Views on the Future Management of the Intelligence Community, April 22, 1977, Secret
Source: CIA CREST Collection, NARA II

This paper was prepared as part of the PRM-11 review process. The authors identified three alternatives -- reducing the responsibilities of the DCI as a way of acknowledging the DCI's inability to effectively management national collection activities operating within the Defense Department, increasing the DCI's authority over the intelligence community budget or some significant part of it, or giving the DCI line management authority over major parts - specifically NSA and NRO -- of the intelligence community. The paper recommended the third of the three options, which would give the DCI authority not only to set budgets but to supervise the daily activities of NSA, NRO and other national activities, such as the underwater reconnaissance program.

Document 13: National Security Council, Report on Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-11: Intelligence Structure and Mission, 1977, Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request

This report is the result of the interagency review initiated by PRM-11, and consists of four parts: an examination of the objectives and principles for U.S. foreign intelligence, identification of problem areas, structural options, and possible solutions in other areas - ranging from producer/consumer relations to counterintelligence.

The report's examination of structural options covers a wide variety of possibilities from increasing the DCI's authority to creation of a Director of Foreign Intelligence to increasing the Secretary of Defense's authority to a radical restructuring of the intelligence community.

Document 14: Jimmy Carter, Presidential Directive/NSC-17, Subject: The Reorganization of the Intelligence Community, August 4, 1977, Official Use Only
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request

This directive was the end result of the PRM-11 process. While the directive did not adopt the solution proposed in the CIA's April 22, 1977 paper of giving the DCI line authority over the NSA and NRO it did increase his budgetary authority. It specified that the DCI would have "full and exclusive authority for approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget prior to its presentation to the President …" (The NFIP budget includes the budgets for the National Reconnaissance Program and NSA as well as for the CIA).

It also specified continuation of the DCI's tasking authority in peacetime - which had been exercised through DCI committees such as the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX).

Document 15: Memorandum, Director, PHOTINT Tasking Office to Acting Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking, Subject: Defense Reconnaissance Support Program (DRSP), September 18, 1980
Source: CIA CREST Collection, NARA II

This memo is a response to the creation of the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program and the Defense Support Project Office by the Secretary of the Air Force, as a means of improving the ability to the military to obtain intelligence from NRO space systems. The creation of the DSRP and DSPO is viewed by the author, however, as an action that would weaken the authority of the DCI over the national reconnaissance program.

Document 16: Ronald Reagan, Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, December 4, 1981, Unclassified
Source: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1981, pp. 1128-1139

This executive order, which is still in effect, except for provisions altered by President George W. Bush's order of August 2004, specifies, inter alia, the responsibilities and authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence. As did President Carter's presidential directive and subsequent executive order, it gave the DCI responsibility to "develop, with the advice of the program managers and departments and agencies concerned, the consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, and present it to the President and Congress …"

Document 17: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Explanatory Statement: Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992, 1992, Unclassified
Source: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

In 1992, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees both proposed similar significant changes in the organization of the U.S. intelligence community. This document provides the the Senate Select Committee's rationale for the proposed changes - which included the creation of a Director of National Intelligence with enhanced budgetary authority, transformation of the CIA into agency whose sole responsibility was human intelligence collection and covert action, and creation of a National Imagery Agency.

Document 18: Robert M. Gates, Director of Central Intelligence, Statement on Change in CIA and the Intelligence Community, April 1, 1992, Unclassified
Source: Central Intelligence Agency

With proposals for radical reorganization being considered by both the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees, DCI Robert Gates testified before a joint hearing in April 1992. Much of Gates' statement concerned issues other than organization - including intelligence analysis, openness, politicization, and communications with policy makers. The organizational changes he reported were much less sweeping than those proposed by the oversight committees. They included replacement of the Intelligence Community Staff by DCI Community Management Staff, restructuring of the National Intelligence Council, creation of a National Human Intelligence Tasking Center within the CIA to manage HUMINT collection, and establishment of a Central Imagery Office, reporting to both the DCI and Secretary of Defense. The CIO, Gates reported, would seek to improve the coordination of the use of national and tactical reconnaissance systems, and work on problems of standards and interoperability - which had proved to be a significant problem during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Document 19: Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Recommendations, December 10, 2002, Unclassified
Source: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html

The mid-1990s saw two major examinations of U.S. intelligence organization. One was conducted by a commission chaired by former Defense secretary Harold Brown, which included members from Congress as well as executive branch appointees. The second was conducted by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Neither produced drastic changes in the organization of the U.S. Intelligence Community, although the House report suggested a radical restructuring.

Predictably, the attacks of 9-11 resulted in several investigations, including a joint Congressional inquiry. A number of the recommendations produced by Joint Inquiry concerned the organization and operation of the U.S. intelligence community, including creation of the post of Director of National Intelligence, "who shall be the President's principal advisor on intelligence and shall have the full range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entire U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole."

Specifically, the DNI should be able to establish and enforce priorities for intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination and also have the authority to review, approve, modify and oversee the execution of intelligence agency budgets. The DNI recommended by the Joint Inquiry would also be able to move personnel between elements of the Intelligence Community.

Document 20: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report, July 2004, Section 13.2, Unclassified
Source: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911

About eighteen months after the Joint Inquiry issued its report and recommendations, the commission appointed by President George W. Bush and Congress completed its report. One chapter focused on alternative ways of organizing the government's national security activities, including intelligence. The first of its recommendations concerning intelligence called for replacement of the position of Director of Central Intelligence by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas of responsibility. One was overseeing the national intelligence centers (on WMD proliferation, international crime and narcotics, China/East Asia, Middle East, and Russia/Eurasia) that the commission suggested should be established. The second responsibility would be to "manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it."

The National Intelligence Director's powers should include, according to the commission, the authority to reprogram funds among national intelligence agencies, and the right to approve and submit the nominations for the head of a variety of intelligence agencies and components - including the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.

Document 21: The White House, National Intelligence Director Press Briefing, August 2, 2004, Unclassified
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040802-6.html

Within weeks after the 9/11 Commission issued its report, President Bush announced that he was asking Congress to establish the post of National Intelligence Director, who would serve as the president's primary intelligence advisor and would "oversee and coordinate" the government foreign and domestic intelligence activities.

That same day, presidential press secretary Scott McClellan hosted a press briefing, attended by national security adviser Condoleeza Rice and chief of staff Andrew Card, to elaborate on the specifics of the president's plan for a national intelligence director. Answers to reporters questions indicated that the authority of the DNI, as originally envisioned by the administration, was not as extensive as that proposed by the Joint Inquiry or the 9/11 Commission. Card stated that "we expect that the National Intelligence Director would have significant input into the development of a budget." (emphasis added). He also said that "with regard to personnel, we feel very strongly that the National Intelligence Director should play a role - a coordinating role - in the selection of people who are going to serve in our intelligence community."

Document 22: Statement by Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, August 17, 2004, Unclassified
Source: http://www.senate.gov

Objections and concern about the creation of a position of Director of National Intelligence came from a variety of sources, including the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly JCS chairman Richard Myers. In his testimony, the secretary of defense notes one of the key concerns, the authority for the day-to-day management of the NSA, NGA, and NRO outside of the Department of Defense: "we wouldn't want to place new barriers or filters between the military Combatant Commanders and those agencies when they perform as combat support agencies. It would be a major step to separate these key agencies from the military Combatant Commanders, which are the major users of such capabilities."

Document 23a: George W. Bush, Executive Order, Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community, August 27, 2004, Unclassified
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040827-6.html

Document 23b: White House, Fact Sheet: President Issues New Orders to Reform Intelligence, August 27, 2004, Unclassified
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040827-13.html

As an interim measure, until legislation to establish a Director of National Intelligence could be negotiated, passed, and signed, President Bush issued an executive order, amending Ronald Reagan's Executive Order 12333, in order to augment the authority of the DCI. Its provisions call for the DCI not only to "develop, determine and present" with the advice of the heads of intelligence community agencies the annual National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, but to "report to the President on the effectiveness of implementation of the NFIP by organizations in the Intelligence Community" and requires that the DCI be provided with "programmatic, execution, and other appropriate information."

Document 24: The White House, Fact Sheet: Leading the Way on Reforming and Strengthening Our Intelligence Services, September 8, 2004, Unclassified
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040908-5.html

On September 8, 2004 President Bush met with Congressional leaders to brief them on his administration's proposal for legislation in response to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. This fact sheet specifies the proposed structure of the office of the National Intelligence Director, the director's general powers, the director's budget authority, the personnel authorities of the director, and the director's responsibilities for managing the intelligence community.

Document 25: Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Intelligence Reform, September 13, 2004, Unclassified
Source: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/36112pf.htm

In his remarks to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Powell strongly supported the president's proposal for a National Intelligence Director. He also tried to give the committee insight into his intelligence needs as Secretary of State - needs which some have pointed to as being threatened by the creation of an intelligence czar. Those requirements identified by Powell include global coverage, "expert judgments on what is likely to happen, not just an extrapolation of worst case scenarios," as well as tailored intelligence support responsive to his needs.

New Document 26: United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Summary of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, December 6, 2004. Unclassified
Source: Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

The entire Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act of 2004 is several hundred pages in length.
The key provisions of the bill with regard to intelligence reform are summarized in the section on "Authorities of the DNI." That section reports on the enhanced powers of the DNI (in contrast to those of the DCI) with regard to 'budget build', budget execution, transfer and reprogramming of funds, transfer of personnel, tasking and analysis, and appointments of the heads of other fourteen organizations that formally constitute the "U.S. Intelligence Community."

New Document 27: President Signs Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, December 17, 2004. Unclassified
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/20041217-1.html

This document consists of President Bush's remarks just prior to signing the intelligence reform bill. In it he states that "A key lesson of September the 11th, 2001 is that America's intelligence agencies must work together as a single, unified, enterprise." He goes on to explain that "The Director [of National Intelligence] will lead a unified intelligence community and will serve as the principle advisor to the President on intelligence matters."

New Document 28: President Holds News Conference (Excerpt), February 18, 2005. Unclassified
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050217-2.html

It would take a month after President Bush signed the intelligence reform act before he could present to the public his nominees for DNI and Deputy DNI. Some of those initially approached, including former DCI Robert Gates, apparently turned down the job. In a February 17, 2005 news conference, the president announced that he was nominating Ambassador John Negroponte for the position of DNI and the Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the director of the National Security Agency, as his deputy. This excerpt from the news conference transcript contains the president's remarks on his nominee as well as Negroponte's brief statement.


1. Douglas Jehl, "Top Spy's No. 2 Tells of Changes To Avoid Error," New York Times, July 29, 2005, pp. A1, A12.

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