

DECLASSIFIED

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79. Chief, FBM to COS, Karlsruhe, "[Gehlen Organization]," 2 February 1949

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

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DISPATCH NO. [] []

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CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief of Station, Karlsruhe
FOR: []
FROM: Chief, Foreign Branch []

DATE: 2 February 1949

SUBJECT: GENERAL: []
SPECIFIC: [] []

This is a follow-up to the cable we sent you today on the above subject. []

Paragraphs 1, 2-A, 2-B, 2-C, and 2-D are self-explanatory. As regards paragraph 2-E, we want to be sure that our intention is clear, namely that the takeover on [] shall not adversely affect the operations of [] It would make no sense at all for us to scrap the labors of the last three and a half years just because we assume control of what is at best a controversial intelligence package. In this connection, we have not yet made any adjustments to take care of the vacancies on your staff made by those individuals who go over to [] We felt it would be more sensible to wait until the takeover actually became official. At that time, we can at least set up a T/O for [] and his staff so that the slots in [] will be vacated. Incidentally, we will count on you to inform us regularly on additional personnel requirements which [] may make upon us as developments occur. It seems advisable to start out with four staff officers, because the initial period will have to be one of intense exploration to find out what factually [] really is in all its manifestations.

With reference to paragraph 2-G, it seems clear that the only way for us to approach [] is to have our staff people investigate it thoroughly from the top down. At this juncture, it would make no sense to attempt to decide at what specific points in the operation staff officers should be placed, because our knowledge of what goes on is not sufficiently detailed in order to make this possible. Further, our commitment to keep the Army and Air Forces furnished with tactical information as heretofore means plainly that we will have to keep the operation at its present strength until we are absolutely sure of our ground in connection with any slicing we may feel it desirable to do. It is our thought currently that as the investigation progresses and as [] gets to the point where he will want to make specific recommendations about the future of parts of [] it will be

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ADSO

COORDINATING OFFICER []

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
RICHARD HEYND []

FORM NO. 51-29
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essential for you to appoint a unit in your own shop, headed by yourself, to pass on these recommendations, pro and con, so that they may be forwarded to Washington with your considered opinion appended thereto. This is one means of assuring that you are kept completely conversant with what the operation is doing. It also has the merit that it gives you a veto power if you feel that the [S.O.] chieftains are running away with the ball game. We all agree that it is going to be extremely difficult for [] and his staff to maintain a dispassionate view of this operation working as they will be on a day-to-day basis with its members. Many of these men are clearly intelligent, purposeful, and strong willed. They are going to be a monumental handful regardless of how things develop. Consequently, [] and his group have in a sense got to be backed up, given necessary authority, but not permitted to be put in the position of being run by [S.O.] rather than vice versa.

This operation should be a great intelligence producer. On the other hand, it will be a most delicate mechanism to administer. We are currently giving considerable thought to such ramifications as the reaction of various allied intelligence services when the word inevitably gets around that this Agency has taken over. [S.O.] The longer this can be delayed, the better, but we feel it is fanciful to assume that some German will not give the game away sooner or later. The most ticklish thing of all, obviously, is the threat of further publicity concerning the operation. [] when he was here, said that [] the writer, had learned a considerable amount about [S.O.] while in Munich. He apparently decided not to do much with the material after talking with General Clay. In any event, all we can do is keep our own lips buttoned, keep the operation away from [] and other stations, and in every possible way go as circumspectly as possible.

For the time being, [] and the undersigned will attempt to handle [S.O.] details on this end. This will leave [] free to devote their full attention to the problems of [] naturally, everything will be coordinated here, but it is recognized that it would be a grave mistake if we permitted the problems of one operation to sink those of the other. After all, there is no substitute for ones own operations carefully constructed and controlled by American hands.

Some ideas we have concerning the findings in [] investigative report will be pouched in a few days.

[]
Richard Helms

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