

# TELEGRAM

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|   | FROM<br>AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA  | CLASSIFICATION<br><del>CONFIDENTIAL</del> |
| E.O. <del>12958</del><br>TAGS:<br>SUBJECT:<br><br>ACTION:               | 12065: GDS 3/3/88 (SHAW, DAVID G.) OR P<br>PINT, NU, HO<br>SANDINISTAS SEEKING BILATERALS WITH GOH<br><br>SECSTATE WASHDC - IMMEDIATE  |   |
| INFO:   | AMEMBASSY MANAGUA - AMEMBASSY BOGOTA<br>AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE AMEMBASSY CARACAS<br>AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR AMEMBASSY MEXICO<br>AMEMBASSY PANAMA  |   |
| DIST:<br>AMB<br>DCM<br>POL<br><del>DCM</del><br><del>DCM</del><br>CHRON | <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del> TEGUCIGALPA 1748<br><br>EXDIS <b>DECAPTIONED</b><br><del>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</del><br>1. <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del> - Entire text.<br><br>2. Minister of the Presidency Carlos Flores told PolOff March 1 that the Nicaraguans were pressing the GOH for bilateral meetings at the Armed Forces Chief of Staff level to treat <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del> border problems. Flores assumed that GRN reps would use <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del> such occasion to formalize standing proposal for joint units to patrol the border. Nicaraguan Ambassador Suarez Rivas had been in to push this line earlier in the day, and Foreign Minister D'Escoto has requested an early date to meet here with Honduran counterpart, apparently on the same topic.<br><br>3. Flores indicated that GOH's negative view of the joint-patrol proposal remained unchanged -- it was why they have been |   |

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| DRAFTED BY:<br>Amb: JDNegropona<br>POL: DCShaw: djc | DRAFTING DATE<br>3/3/82 | TEL. EXT.<br>214 | CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:<br>DCM: WCWalker |
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CLEARANCES:

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OPTIONAL FORM 153  
(Formerly FS-413)  
January 1975  
Dept. of State

50153-101

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.  
() Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify  
Date 6/1/98 Exemption \_\_\_\_\_

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avoiding this meeting ever since first proposed by the Sandinistas almost a year ago. He said he had replied to Suarez that problems affecting the two countries could not be successfully handled bilaterally but, rather, needed to be addressed in a regional context. Salvador, for example, was a complicating factor, one which affected Honduras (through the refugees) as well as Nicaragua (because of its "revolutionary sympathies" for the guerrillas). These were problems which were part of a regional context and could only be solved jointly and simultaneously.

4. Flores said these arguments were obviously not going to turn the Sandinistas aside and he feared that Nicaragua would score an excessive number of propaganda points if Honduras held out indefinitely against Managua's proposal to dialog. Eventually, Flores believed, Honduras would have to meet with the GRN if it wanted to escape being painted internationally as the stumbling block to better relations.

5. He was <sup>pessimistic</sup> ~~resistant~~ about the proposed CADC arms race declaration being a sufficient and timely counterweight to the current Sandinista diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Paz Barnica had just returned from San Jose where he had seen the PLN's Monge and Volio. He reported finding both "reserved" about the CADC, with Monge complaining about the "mechanics" of the organization and urging that no important initiative be taken by CADC until Carazo leaves

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office. Flores wound up wondering just how committed the new Costa Rican team would be to the CADC concept and, thus, how useful the latter would be in countering the Sandinistas.

6. COMMENT: Doubt as to solidity of (especially) Monge's acceptance of and willingness to use the CADC has more than once been raised by Flores, and by his boss President Suazo. (See, for example, TGU <sup>1411.</sup> ~~1411.~~) We have no way of measuring ~~the validity~~ <sup>the validity association</sup> of this perception ~~from here~~ and question whether the Honduran analysis ~~is accurate~~ <sup>is accurate</sup>. We wonder, for example, whether much of this may not come from Paz Barnica, who is an old acquaintance of Volio <sup>but who</sup> ~~may~~ be interpreting PLN reactions through his own personal filter. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

~~view from San Jose~~  
7. Meanwhile, Embassy recommends we be authorized to gently discourage Suazo from either ~~direct~~ response to Sandinista initiative or meeting at ministerial level at this time. Preferable course of action in our view would be continued development of CADC arms limitation statement along encouraging lines reported San Jose 1491, followed by CADC "plus" three in Bogota which Paz Barnica advised us evening March second ~~this~~ continues to be contemplated for sometime during this month. After such meeting and issuance of arms limitation statement, then we believe Hondurans and others would be in much better position to cope with self-serving Sandinista initiative.

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8. Foregoing conversation with Flores, combined with Embassy San Jose speculation that Carazo quite likely to accept FSLN proposal (SAN JOSE 1334) suggests urgency of refocussing CADC on strength of its own position and desirability of at least some steps to maintain CADC momentum. While recognizing reluctance of lame duck Costa Rican government to be too active during transition period, we are fearful that the very existence of CADC could unravel if individual member countries go off on uncoordinated bilateral ~~tax~~ tangents with Nicaragua between now and Monge's inauguration.

9. Would welcome Department's reactions to foregoing thoughts and advice as to how we should approach this ~~tax~~ issue with GOH.

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