DECEPTIONED

1. **ENTIRE TEXT HIDDEN**

2. SUMMARY: COLOMBIAN VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LONDONO SAYS HE FAVORS SIMULTANEOUS, COMPREHENSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTADORA OBJECTIVES. HE VISUALIZES ONE TREATY WITH NUMEROUS SEPARATE ANNEXES. HE ALSO FAVORS EARLY TALKS BETWEEN CENTRAL AMERICANS (WITH CONTADORA IN BACKGROUND, FACILITATIVE ROLE), AND HE ADVOCATES FACT-FINDING MISSION BY CONTADORA GROUP TO HONDURAS/NICARAGUA BORDER AS "INCENTIVE" TO NICARAGUA TO STAY IN TALKS. THIS LATTER SUGGESTION IS TROUBLESOME.

3. I CALLED ON COLOMBIAN VICE FOREIGN MINISTER JULIO LONDONO PAEZDES AT COLOMBIAN EMBASSY IN TEGUCIGALPA APRIL 25, 1979, TO DISCUSS CONTADORA PROCESS FROM LOCAL PERSPECTIVE. I HAD FIRST MET LONDONO IN 1973 IN BOGOTA AT A NEGOTIATION CONCERNING EASTERN PACIFIC TWA.
MENT OF OBJECTIVES; AND INDEED IT WAS worded IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE LIABLE TO THE INTERPRETATION THAT DIFFERENT PARTS COULD BE NEGOTIATED AND IMPLEMENTED AT DIFFERENT TIMES. THIS IMPRESSION WAS STRENGTHENED BY SOME RECENT STATEMENTS (BY THE PANAMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTER AMONG OTHERS) THAT THESE OBJECTIVES COULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN ONE COMPREHENSIVE DOCUMENT.

5. LONDONO REPLIED AS FOLLOWS. FIRST, HE SAID THAT THE NEXT PROCEDURAL STEPS IN CONTADORA HAD NOT BEEN Worked OUT. HE DID SAY THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WAS STRONGLY INTERESTED IN THE PROCESS AND THAT LONDONO HIMSELF PLANNED TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR IT PERSONALLY ON HIS BEHALF. THINKING OUT LOUD, LONDONO SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY VISUALIZED ONE COMPREHENSIVE TREATY GOVERNING PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA BUT WITH SEPARATE ANNEXES ADDRESsing THE SEPARATE ISSUES. LONDONO AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE A CONTINUOUS TENSION BETWEEN THE "STEP-BY-STEP" APPROACH Favored BY NICARAGUA AND THE "SIMULTANEOUS" APPROACH Favored BY THE CORE FOUR; BUT, IN ANY EVENT, LONDONO HIMSELF Favored AND WOULD ADVOCATE THE LATTER.

6. ASSESSING THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING MOOD, LONDONO SAID HE FELT THAT THE MOMENTUM FOR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE SEIZED AND THAT IT BEHOEVED THE CORE FOUR TO MOVE QUICKLY TO NEGOTIATE WITH NICARAGUA. HE THOUGHT THE NICARAGUANS WERE UNDER PRESSURE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS BUT THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE THE CASE AFTER THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF ANNOUNCING AGREEMENT ON THE OBJECTIVES HAD WORN OFF. (I CONCEALED MY SKEPTICISM; BUT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THAT THIS BE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN CENTRAL AMERICANS WITH CONTADORA AND OTHERS ONLY PLAYING FACILITATIVE OR SUPPORTIVE ROLE. LONDONO AGREED WITH THIS.)

7. LONDONO DID RAISE ONE ITEM WHICH COULD GIVE HONDURANS SERIOUS PROBLEMS. AT ONE POINT HE SAID HE THOUGHT CONTADORA MOMENTUM COULD BE MAINTAINED IF NICARAGUA WERE GIVEN "INCENTIVE" TO STAY IN PROCESS BY, FOR EXAMPLE, ALLOWING CONTADORA GROUP TO INSPECT HONDURAS BORDER. I RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY WHAT #1050
...of 'step-by-step' approach would reject because it would address primary issue of concern to Honduras (e.g., contra) without addressing issues of concern to Nicaragua (e.g., Cuban advisors, build-up in conventional arms, FMLN rear areas, etc.). I asked if Contadora group were prepared to insist on visiting Cuban advisors and FMLN areas in Nicaragua as well. He said they were and that had been intent of his remarks in the first place. (If really so, it wasn't clear why he at first characterized idea as an 'incentive' to Nicaragua.)

S. Comment: London seemed 'sincere' in his expressions of commitment to a comprehensive, simultaneous agreement. On the other hand, his notion of an early Contadora fact-finding tour to the Honduras/Nicaragua border was troublesome and seemed a ploy beneficial to Nicaraguan interests. Negroponte is #1050.