

TO DOB

for concurrence *Chon* 1328

R

[REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] \*  
 [REDACTED] REFUGES RUFJCS RUFHSN RUEOERA  
 [REDACTED] 2101/01 071 \*\*  
 [REDACTED] ZZR  
 [REDACTED] SEP 84  
 [REDACTED] EMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA  
 [REDACTED] SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3898  
 [REDACTED] JCS / SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
 [REDACTED] JCS / JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
 [REDACTED] EMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE 0400  
 [REDACTED] SECINSC QUARRY HEIGHTS PN IMMEDIATE

CLASS: SECRET  
 CHRG: PROG 39/27/84  
 APPR: AMB: JPNEGROPONTE  
 DRFTD: AMB: JPNEGROPONTE  
 CLEAR: NONE  
 DISTR: AME DCM PCL  
 SA IIGP OAG  
 CERCA AID TCCN

SECTION 01 OF \*

F.O. 12000: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: MASS, PINR, FAID, X, HO  
 SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.  
 Release  Excise  Deny  Declassify  
 6/6/80 Exemption

REFERENCE: TEGUCIGALPA 12002

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: EMBASSY WISHES TO REITERATE VIEW ADVANCED  
 REFTEL THAT WE MAKE EFFORT TO ISOLATE RMTG FROM OTHER  
 ISSUES OF US/HONDURAN MILITARY COOPERATION AND/OR OVER-  
 ALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. RECOMMEND AVOIDANCE OF A  
 PUNITIVE REACTION WHICH COULD PRECIPITATE UNRAVELING OF  
 MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. THERE ARE MANY AREAS OF MUTUAL  
 MILITARY COOPERATION WHICH NEED NOT BE AFFECTED IN ANY  
 WAY BY UNFORTUNATE RMTG DEVELOPMENTS. BELIEVE IT WOULD  
 BE USEFUL IF SECRETARY COULD RECEIVE GOH HIGH LEVEL  
 DELEGATION AS REQUESTED SOMETIME IN LATE OCTOBER.  
 SIMPLE FACT OF AGREEING TO MEET ITSELF COULD HAVE A  
 PALLIATIVE EFFECT AND WOULD BUY TIME NECESSARY FOR US TO  
 BRING HONDURAS AROUND TO A MORE REALISTIC APPRECIATION  
 OF JUST WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED IN OUR BI-  
 LATERAL RELATIONSHIP. END SUMMARY.

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3. THIS EMBASSY FULLY SHARES WASHINGTON AND USSOUTHCOM  
 DISAPPOINTMENT OVER REFUSAL OF HONDURANS TO TRAIN NEXT  
 SALVADORAN BATTALION AND GOH ATTEMPTS TO EXACT GREATER  
 SECURITY AND ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS FROM US AS A PRICE  
 FOR REGIONAL COLLABORATION. BUT WHILE THESE DEVELOP-  
 MENTS ARE DISAPPOINTING, AND FRUSTRATING, THEY DO NOT  
 ALTER THE FACT THAT MANY, INDEED MOST OTHER SECURITY PRO-  
 GRAMS OF COMMON INTEREST CONTINUE WITHOUT INTERRUPTION.  
 TO MENTION BUT A FEW, THERE IS THE AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION,  
 THE ARRAY OF ACTIVITIES OF JTF-BRAVO INCLUDING MILITARY  
 INTELLIGENCE FLIGHTS, THE RADAR AT CERRO LA MOLE AND OF  
 COURSE A SIGNIFICANT BILATERAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE PRO-  
 GRAM. THESE ARE ALL ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN THE MUTUAL  
 INTEREST AND TO ONE EXTENT OR ANOTHER SUPPORTIVE OF  
 BROADER REGIONAL POLICIES. FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST, NONE  
 OF THESE ACTIVITIES ARE BEING HELD HOSTAGE TO NEW ECONOMIC  
 OR SECURITY COMMITMENTS.

4. WE HAVE TRIED TO UNDERSTAND GOH RMTG PROBLEM AS

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1. ST. WE CAN HAVE SUBMITTED ENDLESS ANALYSES OF WHAT  
IS GOING ON IN THE MIGHT BE TROUBLING THEM. WHATEVER THE COM-  
PLAINT EXPLANATION, THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT ALLOW-  
ING SALVADOREANS TO CONTINUE TRAINING AT THE RMTC WAS IN  
THE "NO HARM" CATEGORY FOR THE GOH AT THIS TIME. IT  
HHH WOULD BE USEFUL AND POSSIBLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO FURTHER  
ARGUE THE POINT WITH THEM. GOH IS RESPONDING TO A COM-  
PLEXITY OF POLITICAL IMPERATIVES WHOSE INTRICACIES WE  
CAN NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND BUT WHOSE UPSHOT WE MUST ACCEPT--  
THEY, TO THEIR GREAT DISCOMFORT, MUST ACCEPT OUR  
INABILITY TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING FOR  
THE ANTI-LANDINISTAS AT THIS TIME.

2. HAVING SAID THAT, QUESTION ARISES AS TO WHERE WE GO  
FROM HERE. BASICALLY, OUR REPLY WOULD BE: BUY TIME AND  
NOT FORECLOSE ANY OPTIONS. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THIS  
MEANS TO CONTINUE SOME TRAINING FOR HONDURANS AT RMTC  
HHH WITH FY-84 FUNDS AND TO SEEK TO PRESERVE FY-85 MONIES,  
IF POSSIBLE, SUBJECT TO RESOLUTION OF PENDING PROBLEMS.  
MORE IMPORTANT, WE SHOULD AVOID ANY CURTAILMENT OF OTHER  
MILITARY COOPERATION EFFORTS IN PUNITIVE REACTION TO  
RMTC DEVELOPMENTS. THE ISSUE SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ON ITS  
OWN MERITS AND NOT ALLOWED TO IMPEDE THE MANY CONSTRUC-  
TIVE ACTIVITIES WE HAVE GOING ON. AN ADDITIONAL CONSIDER-  
ATION IS THAT THE COST (OR "PENALTY" IF ONE WISHES TO USE  
THAT WORD) OF GOH NOT COOPERATING ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A  
LONG-TERM RMTC WILL BE THE LOSS OF THE OBVIOUS BENEFITS  
OF THE RMTC ITSELF. THAT IS ALREADY A SUBSTANTIAL  
PRICE TO PAY.

3. WE ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF WASHINGTON  
COULD AGREE TO RECEIVING GOH COMMISSION COMPOSED OF  
MINISTER OF PRESIDENCY, COMMANDER OF ARMED FORCES,  
ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF AND FOREIGN MINISTER AS  
PROPOSED BY GOH. AS PAZ BARNICA SAID ON SEPTEMBER 25,  
WHAT GOH WOULD LIKE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ITS  
VIEWS FOR FORTY (40) MINUTES TO SECRETARY SHULTZ. THEY  
DON'T EXPECT A CONCRETE REPLY AND IN THE PERIOD INTER-  
VENING WE CAN CERTAINLY CONDITION GOH AS TO WHAT IT CAN  
AND WHAT IT CANNOT EXPECT FROM ANY SUCH ENCOUNTER. THEY  
WOULD ALSO HOPE TO VISIT WITH NSC ADVISOR MC FARLANE.  
HHH INDEED, WHAT GOH IS PROPOSING IS VERY MUCH ALONG LINES

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OF SIMILAR VISIT BY A FUNCTIONALLY IDENTICAL DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON DECEMBER LAST YEAR.

7. WITH THE BACKGROUND OF SO MANY OFFICIAL VISITS FROM WASHINGTON IN THE PAST TWO YEARS (OUR PRESIDENT; SEVERAL CABINET AND MANY SUB-CABINET MEMBERS; ALL THE JCS AND ABOUT 20 CODEPLS) WE DON'T THINK THIS PARTICULAR REQUEST IS AN UNREASONABLE ONE. AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VERY COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WE'VE HAD IN MOST AREAS, WE COULD SEE SUCH A VISIT AS A VERY USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES WITH CONCERNED WASHINGTON AGENCIES.

8. WE UNDERSTAND AN INVITATION IS BEING DEVELOPED BY CJCS FOR GENERAL LOPEZ TO VISIT WASHINGTON DURING 11-17 NOVEMBER TIME FRAME. WE VERY MUCH WELCOME THIS PROSPECT WE WONDER IF PERHAPS RECEPTION OF HIGH-LEVEL GOH DELEGATION COULD NOT BE CALIBRATED WITH PROPOSED LOPEZ VISIT, I.E. NOVEMBER 19. IN THE MEANWHILE, WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT TO PROVIDE SOME KIND OF CONSIDERED INTERIM REACTION TO GOH TO ITS PROPOSALS AS DOCTOR SUAZO SUGGESTED TO AMBASSADOR AT BRIEF MEETING SEPTEMBER 27. EMBASSY WOULD FAVOR SUCH COURSE OF ACTION AS WAY OF DAMPENING EXPECTATIONS FOR ANY VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND AS WAY OF STEERING GOH TOWARDS A MORE REALISTIC AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH. IDEALLY, HOWEVER, SUCH AN INTERIM REACTION WOULD BE MOST USEFUL HERE IF IT COULD BE PRESENTED IN THE CONTEXT OF ACCEPTING THEIR SUGGESTION OF A HIGH-LEVEL VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

9. ONE FINAL THOUGHT FOR THOSE EXASPERATED BY WHAT HAS HAPPENED ON RMTG. ITS A QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE GLASS IS HALF EMPTY OR HALF FULL. WITH RATHER JERRY-BUILT ARRANGEMENTS, TO SAY THE LEAST, WE GOT MORE THAN FIVE THOUSAND SALVADORAN TROOPS TRAINED HERE AT A TIME WHEN THEY MOST NEEDED IT AND WHEN ALTERNATIVE TRAINING OPTIONS SEEMED SCARCE INDEED. EVEN IF OUR TALKS FOR A LONG-TERM RMTG DO NOT SUCCEED, THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL OBJECTIVES DURING THE PAST 15 MONTHS SHOULD NOT BE LIGHTLY FORGOTTEN. NEGROPONTE  
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