 |
Washington
D.C. July 1, 2005 - A decision to use nuclear weapons
is one of the most politically, militarily, and morally perilous
decisions that a U.S. president, or any leader of a nuclear state,
can make. Recognizing that nuclear weapons differ from any other
weapons because of their immense power and danger, President Lyndon
B. Johnson once argued that a decision to use them "would lead
us down an uncertain path of blows and counterblows whose outcome
none may know." (Note 1) Johnson, like most
U.S. presidents, sought strict controls over the weapons to minimize
the risk of accidental or unauthorized use. That the use of nuclear
weapons could precipitate a world conflagration has made leaders
of allied nations, not least those with U.S. nuclear weapons stored
on their territory, keenly interested in influencing how U.S. presidents
would use them. This is especially but not uniquely true of British
prime ministers. Since the early days of the Korean War, when the
risk of world war loomed, prime ministers have sought a voice in
any nuclear use decisions of U.S. presidents. The high priority
of the "special relationship" with the United Kingdom
made U.S. presidents responsive to British requests even though
they raised significant political difficulties. The initiatives
taken by British prime ministers and Washington's need to conciliate
the closest of allies are documented in this briefing book on the
record of U.K.-U.S. understandings on the nuclear use decision process.
Among the disclosures in the briefing book:
- the written U.S.-U.K. understandings on nuclear weapons use
from Eisenhower and Macmillan to Nixon and Heath
- the routine practice for the British to seek reaffirmations
of the agreement whenever leadership changes occurred in London
or Washington
- the strict emphasis on secrecy of the understandings to avoid
pressure for agreements from European members of NATO
- the U.S. desire for loose understandings to avoid any limitations
on "freedom of action."
- the 1965 agreement that consultations would extend to nuclear
depth charges stored in the United Kingdom on behalf of a Netherlands
anti-submarine warfare unit, although the Dutch would be kept
in the dark about the basic UK-US understanding
- the extension of the understanding to U.S. nuclear depth bombs
in Bermuda beginning in the 1970s
- parallel consultative arrangements with Canada, including more
specific understandings on use of air defense nuclear weapons
assigned to NORAD
- a related but less comprehensive understanding with the West
German government begun during the late 1960s
- NATO's 1962 Athens Guidelines requiring U.S. consultations with
the Alliance on nuclear use when time permitted it
The idea of Anglo-American nuclear weapons consultations arose
during World War II when Roosevelt and Churchill signed the Quebec
Agreement stipulating that neither London nor Washington would launch
nuclear attacks "without each others consent." This understanding
was short-lived because the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prevented
sharing of responsibility for decisions on nuclear weapons use.
Nevertheless, developments during the Cold War renewed British interest
in consultation. By the spring of 1948, the U.S. and British high
command  agreed
that the United Kingdom would serve as a base for nuclear strikes
against the Soviet Union. By March 1950, the U.S. Air Force was
beginning to deliver B-29 bombers to the British Bomber Command.
Under a covert arrangement, the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC)
would take control of the bombers in event of war. Nevertheless,
after the Korean War broke out and the U.S. Air Force began delivering
atomic bomb casings to British bases (the nuclear capsules remained
in the United States), the British Chiefs of Staff believed that
their government should have a say in how those weapons were to
be used. During the late fall of 1950 when Chinese forces moved
across the Yalu River and began fighting Western forces in North
Korea, the military crisis created apprehensions in London that
the confrontation with China could escalate into general war involving
Beijing's main ally, the Soviet Union. When President Harry Truman
stated in a press conference on 30 November that "there has
always been active consideration" of nuclear weapons use in
Korea, a worried British Prime Minister Clement Atlee flew to Washington
the next week for consultations. (Note 2)
During talks with Atlee on nuclear weapons use, Truman assured
him that he regarded the United Kingdom and the United States as
"partners in this matter"; he would not use the bomb without
consulting London unless the United States was under attack. When
Atlee asked that the statement be put in writing, Truman refused
declaring that "if a man's word wasn't any good it wasn't made
any better by writing it down." While the British pushed for
language on consultation to be included in the communiqué
of Atlee's visit, Truman and top advisers also refused. They agreed
only to language stating that the United States intended to keep
the British government "informed" of any developments
which might change the situation concerning the use of nuclear weapons.
(Note 3)
Whatever the Americans thought, the British left Washington believing
that Truman's personal commitment on consultation would remain valid
as long as he was President. Moreover, they sought a stronger understanding
on the use of U.S. nuclear-capable B-36 bombers deployed at seven
air bases on British territory (complete nuclear  weapons
were not stored at the bases until 1954). Inevitably, the British
sought a commitment that the United States would not order nuclear
strikes from those bases without their consent. The Truman administration
could not refuse and after a series of talks with the British agreed
that they could refer to a "joint decision" when explaining
policy to the House of Commons. A communiqué prepared for
the Churchill-Truman talks in January 1952 confirmed this: "the
use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision
by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in
the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time." That
language included an escape clause and Washington continued to reject
British proposals to reaffirm the personal commitment that Truman
had made to Atlee. (Note 4)
In 1958, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan sought something
more formal than a communiqué. Eisenhower agreed to that,
but he, like his predecessor and successor, never diverged from
the basic premise that consultation would depend on the "circumstances
at the time" and that "every possible step" to consult
would be taken. The United States would not agree to a veto on any
use of its nuclear forces, even those stationed in the United Kingdom,
if it deemed it necessary to launch a speedy retaliation in response
to a sudden attack. This was an element of unilateralism that U.S.
presidents always found desirable and necessary. Nevertheless, because
of the great value placed on the alliance with London, State Department
officials realized that the understandings were necessary because
of British "apprehension over possible consequences …of
independent action by the United States-either because we might
not come to its defense in time or because we might involve it in
action initiated by ourselves."
Changes in the understandings on nuclear weapons use were generally
a matter of British initiative. As nuclear deployments changed the
Prime Minister would write to the President on possible modifications
in the language. For example, when the British agreed to host U.S.
nuclear missile-launching submarines at Holy Loch, Macmillan asked
that the understanding apply to them as well. When the United States,
the British, and the Netherlands agreed that U.S. nuclear depth
bombs would be stored in the United Kingdom for use by the Dutch
navy, Prime Minister Wilson asked President Johnson for changes
in the language to reflect the latest development. U.S. presidents,
so far as it is known, always agreed to proposed revisions.
In the early 1950s, the United States applied the same understanding
to the Canadian government in light of U.S. plans to launch nuclear
strikes from air bases in that country. Moreover, under the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty, if the United States wanted to deploy nuclear weapons
on Japanese territory in a wartime emergency, it would have to make
a request to the government. Otherwise, the U.S. government had
broad freedom of action to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. (Note
5) Key allies and governments hosting U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiles,
however, sought limitations through nuclear weapon consultative
arrangements. In 1962, the U.S. and NATO allies approved the "Athens
Guidelines" that included a U.S. and a British commitment to
consult with the alliance on nuclear use decisions anywhere in the
world "if time permits." Moreover, the Johnson administration
signed a limited consultation arrangement with West Germany in the
fall of 1968.
The end of the Cold War brought major changes in the U.S.'s nuclear
weapons posture overseas. Not only were many land-based weapons
withdrawn from Western Europe, the U.S. Navy withdrew its naval
nuclear weapons from foreign bases, including the depth bombs stored
in the United Kingdom and Bermuda. Moreover, in 1992, the United
States closed the U.S. naval base at Holy Loch because the long-range
Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) did not need
berthing facilities there. Nevertheless, the U.S. Air Force continues
to store nuclear weapons at Lakenheath as well as at several bases
in West Germany. (Note 6) In light of the continued
U.S. nuclear presence in Western Europe, the understandings reached
during the Cold War probably stayed in place during the 1990s, undoubtedly
modified to reflect changes in deployments and international conditions.
With all of the uncertainties about WMD, "rogue states"
armed with long-range missiles, and trans-Atlantic worries about
U.S. policy against terrorism, it is likely that the British and
the Germans have sought to preserve the understandings on nuclear
weapons use. Whether the Bush White House has been responsive on
this point remains a secret that will be disclosed some day.
Documents
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1: Atlee-Truman Agreement
Memorandum for the Record by Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State R. Gordon Arneson, "Truman-Atlee Conversations of
December 1950: Use of Atomic Weapons," 16 January 1953, Top
Secret
Source: Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Decimal
Files 1950-1954, 711.5611/1[-53, Freedom of Information Act Release
Prepared by Gordon Arneson, whose role in nuclear policy matters
stretched back to the Manhattan Project (Note 7),
this document summarized the Truman-Atlee conversations during the
latter's visit to Washington in December 1950. Arneson's description
of the meeting and the enclosures record Truman's personal commitment
to Atlee, the process by which Truman and his advisers tried to
withdraw it, and the British refusal to accept a change in the meeting
record.
Document
2A through C: Background on Consultation, 1951:
2A: Memorandum
of Conversation by John Ferguson, State Department Policy Planning
Staff, "Discussions with British regarding use of nuclear weapons,"
6 August 1951, Top Secret
2B: Memcon, "US-UK
Consultations on Atomic Warfare," 11 September 1951
2C: "Nature
of Consultations," Excerpt from Memorandum of Conversation
re: U.S.-U.K. Political Military Meeting, September 13, 1951
Source:
RG 59, Records of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military
Affairs, Subject File Special Assistant For Atomic Energy Affairs,
1950-1966, box 11, Nuclear Sharing-UK Consultation Discussions 1950-1951
(for documents A and B); Nuclear Sharing-Consultation Discussions
1952-54 (for document C)
To ease British concerns about American policy, Truman and his
advisers agreed to top level Anglo-American talks on the world situation,
especially on the circumstances that could lead to the use of atomic
weapons. These documents show the British effort to get a U.S. commitment
on consultation and the complex U.S. reactions to London's quest.
On the one hand, Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg was suspicious
that the British wanted an "implied commitment," on the
other hand, Secretary of State Dean Acheson observed that this "was
a life and death matter for the British and they … want to
know whether we are sober and responsible." The final document,
an excerpt from a memorandum of conversation between senior U.S.
and British officials conveys the Truman administration's aversion
to "any commitment limiting our sovereignty" (Paul Nitze)
while seeking harmony of views between London and Washington: "We
are just as loath … to contemplate the contingency of general
war" (H. Freeman Matthews) so that the British realized that
Washington officials were "sober and responsible."
Document
3: "Consultations Between Governments on the Possible Use
of the Atomic Bomb," Memorandum to Prime Minister [Canada]
from Under-Secretary for External Affairs A. D. P. Heeney, 8 January
1951, Top Secret
Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 17 1951,
Greg Donaghy, editor (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works and Government
Services, 1996), 1302-1303
In the summer of 1950, during the unfolding Korean crisis, the
U.S. Strategic Air Command began deploying nuclear weapons at an
air base at Goose Bay which the Air Force was leasing from Canada.
No consultative arrangements were in place, however, until shortly
after the Atlee-Truman summit in December 1950, when the U.S. State
Department told Canadian diplomats that the same loose understanding
also applied to their government. Heeney informed the Prime Minister
that the Atomic Energy Act precluded the U.S. government from making
commitments to consult any government but that the "President
will keep you informed of any developments … which
may lead to the use of the bomb." In light of U.S.-Canadian
discussions of providing the Strategic Air Command access to Canadian
bases for nuclear strike purposes in the event of war, Heeney observed
that Ottawa needed a firmer commitment. In 1952, when Churchill
negotiated language stipulating "joint decision" on the
use of nuclear forces stationed at British bases, "in light
of circumstances prevailing at the time," the Truman administration
extended the same consideration to the Canadian government. (Note
8)
Document
4A and B: Churchill and Nuclear Use
4A: Memorandum
of Conversation, Truman-Churchill Talks, "Meeting on Agenda
Items A: The Strategic Air Plans and the Use of Nuclear Weapons
(TCT D-2/7) and B. Technical Cooperation in Atomic Energy (TCT D-2/8),
7 January 1952, 5-5:45 p.m., Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Conference Files, box 15, CF 100 Truman-Churchill
Talks Wash, Jan 1952, Mins, Memcons & Communique
4B: Memorandum
for the Record by U. Alexis Johnson, 30 June 1952, with messages
between Churchill and Truman, 28 and 30 June 1952 respectively
Source: RG 59, Records of Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Politico-Military Affairs, Subject File Special Assistant for Atomic
Energy Affairs, 1950-1966, box 11, Nuclear Sharing-UK Consultation
Discussions 1950-1951
Making a visit to Washington to Washington for consultations with
President Truman on East-West relations and economic issues, Prime
Minister Churchill heard a briefing on SAC war plans and asked for
assurances that Washington would consult London on nuclear weapons
use should war break out. During a meeting on nuclear issues, Secretary
of Defense Robert Lovett asserted that nuclear weapons "would
be used sooner or later" if general war broke out. Discussion
ranged from cooperation in the nuclear weapons field to U.S. plans
for air bases in North Africa, which Churchill approved because
it meant that other countries would be Soviet targets. The Prime
Minister raised the problem of nuclear use consultation, especially
in circumstances where the United States launched a first strike:
"taking the initiative of bringing things to a point."
If British air bases were used, "consultations were necessary."
Truman approved communiqué language that called for consultation
if British bases were used and time permitted. (Note
9)
In June 1952, Prime Minister Churchill wrote Truman an urgent letter asking about rumored use of nuclear weapons to destroy dams at the Yalu River. Plainly apprehensive about such a prospect, Churchill wrote that using nuclear weapons "would be out of all proportion to Korean events and would upset the world in a way I cannot measure." U. Alexis Johnson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs, laid the report to rest-Washington
had no plans to bomb the dam or use nuclear weapons, although "Harry"
responded formally with an explanation of why he had approved the
bombing of a power plant.
Documents
5A, B, and C: The Eden Visit, March 1953
5A: Memorandum
of Conversation, "Use of United Kingdom Bases and Consultation
with the United Kingdom on the Use of Atomic Weapons," 6 March
1953, Top Secret
5B: Memorandum
for the President from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, "The
Eden Visit: Use of Atomic Weapons," 7 March 1953, Top Secret
5C: Memorandum
for Mr. Gordon Arneson from Under Secretary of State Walter B. Smith,
12 March 1953, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Decimal
Files 1950-1954, 711.5611, various dates, Freedom of Information
Act Release
With the new presidential administration in Washington in power,
Churchill and his Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden sought a reaffirmation
of the private commitment that Truman had made to Atlee in December
1950. When Eden brought up the issue with Secretary of State Dulles,
the latter refused and sent Eisenhower a lengthy background paper
explaining why refusal was possible and necessary. Eisenhower also
refused and like Dulles would only reaffirm the public commitment
made by Truman concerning the use of bases. While the Americans
wanted to maintain close relations with the British, limitations
on "freedom of action" to wage war were impermissible.
Moreover, arguing that nuclear weapons were just another kind of
ammunition, Dulles and Eisenhower opposed the idea of special restrictions
on their use. They also worried that other allied governments would
find out and try to secure a veto on U.S. nuclear use: "there
is no point in whetting the appetite of other NATO countries in
this regard."
Document
6A and B: Macmillan's Initiative
6A: Memorandum
from British Ambassador Harold Caccia to Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles, April 30, 1958, enclosing letter from Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan to President Eisenhower, April 24, 1958, Top Secret
6B: Cable message
from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan, April 30,
1958
Source: National Archives, Records of the Department of
State, Record Group 59 (hereinafter RG 59), Records of Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Subject File Special Assistant
For Atomic Energy Affairs, 1950-1966, box 3, Nuclear Sharing-U.K.
Consultation-Discussions-April-May 1958
In the first months of 1958, the nuclear question achieved high
salience in British politics. In February Washington and London
has signed an agreement on the stationing of Thor Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) on British territory; the weapons would
be under joint control through a two-key arrangement designed to
prevent unilateral action. Moreover, public concern abounded about
the possible dangers of nuclear weapons on British territory. U.S.
nuclear deployments in the United Kingdom meant that U.S. aircraft
were taking off and landing with nuclear weapons on board. Despite
U.S. assurances of the safety of the bomb loads, the British public
was nervous. Finally, with the Soviet Union's successful launch
of Sputnik I in October 1957, the possibility of a "bolt from
the blue" nuclear missile attack became more worrisome than
ever. In this context, Prime Minister Macmillan, who had taken office
the previous year, wrote to Eisenhower about the need for coordination
on procedural matters to ensure coordination of the "decision
to launch the nuclear retaliation." Macmillan proposed that
Joint Intelligence Committee chairman Sir Patrick Dean represent
his government in any talks. Eisenhower quickly and positively responded
to Macmillan's initiative for discussions noting that the "whole
matter [had to] be done on a most secret basis." (Note
10)
Document
7: Richard Breithut, Office of Special Assistant to the Secretary
for Atomic Energy to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Robert Murphy, "British Prime Minister's Letter of
April 24, 1958 to the President, Proposing Discussions to Ensure
Agreement on Procedure for Decision to Launch Nuclear Retaliation,"
8 May 1958, Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Records of Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Politico-Military Affairs, Subject File Special Assistant For Atomic
Energy Affairs, 1950-1966, box 3, Nuclear Sharing-U.K. Consultation-Discussions-April-May
1958
Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles quickly agreed
that Robert Murphy would represent Washington in talks with Patrick
Dean. In this memorandum, Richard Breithut gave Murphy background
on the history of the consultative agreements. At the end of his
memorandum, he speculated why Macmillan had brought up the problem
of consultations: "There is undoubtedly apprehension over possible
consequences to Britain of independent action by the United States-either
because we might not come to its defense in time or because we might
involve it in action initiated by ourselves." While Breithut
observed that "we can accept no limitation upon United States
freedom of action," the high value of the alliance with London
made it essential for American and British action to "be concerted
to the fullest extent possible."
Document
8: The Murphy-Dean Agreement
Report to the President and Prime Minister, "Procedures for
the Committing to the Attack of Nuclear Retaliatory Forces in the
United Kingdom," Patrick Dean and Robert Murphy, 7 June 1958,
Top Secret, excised copy released under appeal by ISCAP
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Ann Whitman File,
Administration Series, Box 5, AEC 1958 (folder 2)
Within a month, Dean and Murphy had prepared a report that they
submitted to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan.
In 1997 the U.S. government's Interagency Security Classification
Appeals Panel (ISCAP) released an excised version of the Murphy-Dean
agreement in response to an appeal by the National Security Archive.
The agreement enshrined the understanding about "circumstances
at the time" that had been reached earlier in the decade. If
circumstances permitted a conference call between the President
and the Prime Minister, the agreement spelled out the process of
decision that would occur under two different situations: 1) strategic
warning (longer-term warning of attack) and tactical warning ("short
warning of imminent attack derived from positive radar or other
means"). Strategic warning could permit a decision to launch
a preemptive assault on Soviet nuclear forces, although whether
any warning would be certain enough to allow such a grave decision
has been a matter of debate for many years. In the event of tactical
warning, military commanders could launch forces under "positive
control" (also known as "fail safe); thus U.S. and British
bombers would fly to a "specified line" but would not
pass beyond it without receiving definite instructions.
The excisions concern the British chain of decisions as well as
references to United States nuclear weapons assigned to British
forces. This can be stated with certainty because during the 1990s,
historians Stephen Twigge and Len Scott found a final draft of the
agreement at the British National Archives and published it in a
major study of British nuclear policy. (Note 11)
Document
9: Unsigned British memorandum to Deputy Under Secretary of
State Murphy, May 11, 1959, enclosing "Addendum to Report Dated
June 7, 1958, to the President and the Prime Minister on Procedures
for the Committing to the Attack of Nuclear Retaliatory Forces in
the United Kingdom," Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Records of Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Politico-Military Affairs, Subject File Special Assistant For Atomic
Energy Affairs, 1950-1966, box 3, Nuclear Sharing-UK-Consultation
Discussions-1959
A year later, the two governments updated Murphy-Dean so it included
specific arrangements for the use of U.S. and British tactical bomber
units that would be under the direct control of NATO's top commander,
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), if war broke out. While
SACEUR General Lauris Norstad wanted to be sure that he would control
"committed forces" once a decision for war had been made,
the British wanted to preclude any possibility that SACEUR would
make unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The June 1958 agreement
specified that tactical bomber units committed to SACEUR "falls
under the basic understanding referred to in paragraph 2"-that
is, their use would require a joint decision by the President and
Prime Minister to the extent that was possible. After consultations
with Norstad, London and Washington developed procedures for using
tactical bombers that would meet NATO needs while addressing British
concerns. For example, the amendments stipulated that under conditions
of tactical warning, the decision to order to "immediate readiness"
Royal Air Force tactical bomber units assigned to SACEUR would be
a decision by the Chief of the Air Staff, not SACEUR. (Note
12)
Documents
10A and 10B:
Cables from State Department to U.S. Embassy London, July 15 and
October 27, 1960, Top Secret
Source: State Department Freedom of Information Release
Another innovation in military technology, the emergence of submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), produced a new wrinkle in Anglo-American
consultative arrangements. The first Polaris submarine, the U.S.S.
George Washington, went on its first patrol mission in November
1960 operating in the North Sea because of the relatively limited
range of SLBMs. The British, who were seeking access to Skybolt
air-launched-missiles (or as a fallback, Polaris submarines), had
agreed to provide berthing facilities for a Polaris submarine tender
at Holy Loch, Scotland. As before, they wanted to be sure that no
Polaris missile was launched from British territorial waters or
even beyond without their consent. Macmillan had raised the possibility
of a joint decision for missile launches within 100 miles of British
territory but, as Eisenhower's first message, shows he found that
impractical. While he agreed with Macmillan that the missiles "would
not be launched within your territorial waters without your consent,"
he opposed a broader form of dual control. In the end, Eisenhower
would only agree to include Polaris within the scope of the assurances
that he had made to Anthony Eden in 1953: "In the event of
an emergency, such as increased tension or the threat of war, the
U.S. will take every possible step to consult with Britain and other
allies." While Macmillan wanted the Holy Loch agreement made
public, objections by the Pentagon made that impossible; the British
had to rely on what Macmillan called a "gentleman's agreement."
(Note 13)
Document
11: Memorandum of conversation by Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Livingston Merchant, "The New U.S. Administration
and U.S. Nuclear Arrangements with the U.K.," 15 December 1960,
Secret
Source: RG 59, Decimal Files 1960-1963, 711.56341/12-1560,
Freedom of Information release
The election of John F. Kennedy raised concerns in London; would
the son of a notorious Anglophobe, Joseph Kennedy, create difficulties
in Anglo-American relations. While relations with Eisenhower had
sometimes been tense, he was fundamentally in sympathy with the
idea of a special relationship with London. The British were especially
apprehensive about preserving the agreements on nuclear use consultation,
however ambiguous, past the Eisenhower administration. Thus, a month
before Kennedy's inauguration, a senior British diplomat, Frederick
Hoyer Miller, approached his counterpart, Livingston Merchant, about
the problem of "how best to assure reaffirmation by the new
President" of the "assurances" that Eisenhower had
made to Eden and Macmillan. The British had in mind a letter to
Eisenhower mentioning the importance of briefing the president-elect
on the agreements as well as a letter to Kennedy, after his inauguration,
asking for "confirmation that they remain in force."
Document
12: Memorandum from Merchant to Secretary of State Christian
Herter, January 9, 1961, enclosing "Understandings with the
British on the Use of British Bases and Nuclear Weapons," Top
Secret, excised copy
Source: RG 59, Decimal Files 1960-1963, 711.56341/12-1560,
Freedom of Information release
The British learned that they had little to worry about when Merchant
informed Ambassador Caccia that Kennedy had agreed that the "understandings
… would continue pending a prompt exchange" with Macmillan
after his inauguration. The president-elect had no "misgivings"
about the agreements but believed that the two leaders needed to
review them. During their meeting, Merchant gave Caccia a two page
paper that summarized the understandings that had been reached during
the 1950s. This document would serve as the template for Anglo-American
understandings on nuclear weapons use into the 1970s and possibly
beyond.
Document
13: Memorandum from Merchant to Secretary of State Rusk, January
27, 1961, Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Decimal Files 1960-1963, 711.56341/1-2761,
Freedom of Information release
A few days after the inauguration, Macmillan wrote to Kennedy to
follow up the latter's suggestion that "we … communicate
… about these Understandings immediately after your Inauguration."
Declaring that the agreements form an "essential part of the
whole network of Anglo-American joint defense arrangements",
Macmillan hoped that Kennedy would accept them and "renew in
your own name the personal assurances on these matters given by
President Eisenhower and President Truman." (Note
14) As Kennedy was considering the letter, Merchant learned
from the British that Macmillan believed that a letter from Kennedy
reaffirming the agreements would be satisfactory and that the paper
that Merchant had given to Caccia earlier in the month "adequately
reflects the British understanding of these past undertakings"
except for a few points.
Document
14: Cable 3848 from State Department to United States Embassy
in London carrying message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister
Macmillan, February 7, 1961, Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Presidential and Secretary of State Official
Correspondence, 1961-1965, box 11, UK-Johnson 64-65
On February 6, 1961 Kennedy wrote Macmillan a letter expressing
his happiness to "confirm to you that these Understandings
reflect the agreements in force between our two Governments."
Kennedy transmitted the summary handed the British earlier in January
with modifications proposed by the British. One was that the arrangements
for "joint decisions" on strikes launched from bases in
the United Kingdom would not include Bomber Command aircraft equipped
with British nuclear weapons. Thus, the British sought freedom of
action as well. Another modification left open the possibility that
U.S. nuclear weapons in Britain not then assigned to NATO could
be "assigned to a NATO commander in the future." (Note
15) The easy agreement that Kennedy and Macmillan had reached
showed that the reaffirmation and modification of understandings
on nuclear weapons use had become a truly routine procedure whenever
a change of command took place in either London or Washington.
Document
15: Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs William R. Tyler to Secretary of State Rusk, "Confirmation
of existing U.S. commitments to consult with the UK before the use
of nuclear weapons," circa 9 December 1963, Secret
Source: RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1963, DEF 12 US,
Freedom of Information release
With a new president, Lyndon B. Johnson, coming to power after
President Kennedy's assassination, the matter of nuclear use consultation
with the British prime minister inevitably surfaced. Ten days before
Secretary of State Rusk was scheduled to attend a meeting of NATO
foreign ministers, Assistant Secretary Tyler predicted that British
Prime Minister Alex Douglas-Home (the Profumo scandal had forced
Macmillan's resignation) "will shortly ask the President to
confirm our existing commitments" on nuclear weapons use. Tyler
advised Rusk to reaffirm the commitments and provided him with a
memorandum (with documentary background) for President Johnson giving
background on the understandings with Churchill, Eden, and Macmillan.
Documents
16A-D: 13 Athens Guidelines
16A: Dirk Stikker,
"Annual Political Appraisal Special Report by the Secretary
General on NATO Defence Policy," 17 April 1962, NATO Secret
16B: "Joint
Meeting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers," Verbatim Record
of the meeting of the Council held on Saturday, 5th May 1962, COSMIC
Top Secret (Note 16)
16C: Statement
Made on Saturday 5 May by Secretary McNamara at the NATO Ministerial
Meeting in Athens," COSMIC Top Secret
16D: "Summary
Record of a meeting of the Council held in the Zappeion Building
in Athens on Saturday 5th May 1962 at 5 p.m., COSMIC Top Secret
Source: Copies courtesy of NATO Archives, Brussels
By May 1962, the U.S. had deployed some 5,000 nuclear weapons in
NATO Europe. Agreements with host governments, e.g., with Italy
on the deployment of Jupiter missiles, gave them a veto over use,
but the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) had effective power
to use them in an emergency. (Note 17) Nevertheless,
European members of NATO wanted more of a say in nuclear use decisions.
While the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) was, in part, designed
to give NATO members some sense of participation in decision making
on nuclear weapons, it never got off the ground. Also troubling
European members of NATO was lack of knowledge of nuclear weapons
as well as uncertainty about the durability of the U.S. nuclear
commitment to NATO. Could Western Europe count on Washington to
make nuclear forces available in a crisis? To address those concerns,
among others, NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker prepared a report
in the spring of 1962 based upon his consultations with London and
Washington. It concluded with a set of guidelines that included
U.S. assurances about the availability of U.S. and British nuclear
weapons, the provision of information on nuclear weapons to NATO
allies, and consultations with the allies about nuclear weapons
use. While consultation would not be possible if the Soviets launched
an "unmistakable" nuclear attack on Western Europe, it
would be in the event of a conventional attack or a smaller-scale
nuclear attack. The Americans and the British also declared their
intent to consult with the Council on the use of nuclear weapons
"anywhere in the world," but with the usual loophole:
"if time permits." Stikker also raised the possibility
of a "restricted group" to establish multilateral political
control over the use of nuclear weapons assigned to NATO forces,
but that proposal inspired little interest.
NATO ministers approved the guidelines at the famous May 1962 Athens
meeting of the North Atlantic Council during which Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara gave a highly controversial and comprehensive
exposition of U.S. strategy and the risks of nuclear weapons use.
(Note 18) The records of this meeting include
Dean Rusk's offer of sea-based Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles for
a multilateral NATO nuclear force designed to give European members
a voice in nuclear use decisions. Washington ultimately abandoned
MLF-type solutions and interest turned to organizational solutions
to give the Europeans greater knowledge of the complexities and
dilemmas of nuclear weapons planning. By 1966, partly as a result
of the influence of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, NATO
had established the Nuclear Planning Group which became a central
locus for formulating and assessing nuclear options for a NATO-Warsaw
Pact confrontation.
Document
17: Memorandum of conversation, "Consultation on the Use
of Nuclear Weapons," December 19, 1963, Secret
Source: Source: RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1963, DEF
12 US
As Tyler had anticipated, when Rusk was in London British Foreign
Secretary Butler brought up the subject of nuclear use consultation
noting that the day before he had suggested to Douglas-Home that
the latter write to Johnson about it. Rusk recommended that Johnson
and the Prime Minister discuss the matter in more detail when they
met in February. In the meantime, "the understanding which
had existed between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan
would continue."
Document
18: Letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Douglas-Home,
February 28, 1964, enclosing "Understandings with the British
on the Use of British Nuclear Bases and Nuclear Weapons," Top
Secret
Source: RG 59, Presidential and Secretary of State Official
Correspondence, 1961-1965, box 11, UK-Johnson 64-65
The day after the Butler-Rusk meeting, Douglas-Home wrote to President
Johnson asking about the status of the understandings on nuclear
weapons use. Replying through a "back-channel, Johnson observed
that the "understandings seem reasonable to me" but he
did not want to make a formal decision until he met with the Prime
Minister in February. After Douglas-Home visited Washington, Johnson
wrote him a letter on February 28, 1964 confirming what he had told
Douglas-Home earlier, that he would reaffirm the paper on "Understandings
with the British on the Use of British Bases and Nuclear Weapons."
The paper was substantially the same as the one upheld by Kennedy
and Macmillan except that it no longer included the Thor IRBMs;
that missile's technical flaws made it easy for both London and
Washington to agree to end the deployment during 1963. (Note
19) This letter closely followed the signing of the February
1964 Anglo-American memorandum of understanding on Polaris submarine
basing at Holy Loch, which formalized the loose commitments on the
use of Polaris missiles that Eisenhower had made in 1960 and which
Kennedy and Johnson subsequently reaffirmed. (Note
20)
Document
19: Letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Harold Wilson,
December 8, 1964, Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Presidential and Secretary of State Official
Correspondence, 1961-1965, box 11, UK-Johnson 64-65
With the election of Labor Party leader Harold Wilson in late 1964,
the nuclear use understandings were quickly reaffirmed. When Wilson
wrote Johnson on December 8, the President quickly replied with
a positive response: both of them had agreed to "reaffirm together
the Understanding of our two governments."
Documents
20A through D: U.S.-Canadian Arrangements on Use of Air Defense
Nuclear Weapons
20A: Letter from
Llewellyn E. Thompson to Assistant Secretary of
Defense (International Security Affairs) John T. McNaughton, 3 June
1965, enclosing draft memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear
air defense weapons (release to and employment by Canadian NORAD
forces), and draft presidential authorization, with memorandum from
Jeffrey C. Kitchen to Ambassador Thompson, Top Secret (Draft Agreement
not attached)
Source: RG 59, Formerly Top Secret Central Foreign Policy
Files, 1964-1966, box 4, DEF 1-4 NORAD
20B: A.R. Menzies,
Department of Trade and External Affairs, to Ambassador Charles
A.Ritchie, 20 July 1965, Top Secret
20C: Memorandum
to the Prime Minister, "Authorization for NORAD Use of Nuclear
Weapons," 20 August 1965, carbon copy, with "Approved
LBP [Lester B. Pearson]."
20D: Cable from
CANFORCEHED (Canadian Forces Headquarters) to CINCNORAD, 15 September
1965
Source B, C, and D: Canadian Department of Defense Access
to Information Release, from Directorate of History & Heritage
(DHH), Raymont Collection, 73/1223 Series 1, file 314, "Nuclear
Weapons for Canadian Forces" (courtesy of John Clearwater)
During the late 1950s, with the introduction of the Genie air defense
missile (MB-1s) into the U.S. nuclear weapons inventory, Washington
and Ottawa negotiated an agreement requiring high level Canadian
approval before the U.S. Air Force could fire the weapons over Canadian
territory (although U.S. predelegation arrangements for crisis situations
effectively mooted the understanding). (Note 21)
The United States sought deployments of air defense and other weapons
on Canadian territory, an arrangement that President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Pearson negotiated in the spring of 1963. By New
Years Eve 1964, Genie and other air defense weapons were being deployed
in Canada, with Canadian air force units trained to use them. It
took some time, however, for Ottawa and Washington to reach an understanding
on how the two governments would agree to use the weapons in the
event of war. (Note 22) The 1964 election and
U.S. preoccupation with Vietnam undoubtedly delayed final decisions
over the agreement defining channels of communication, procedures
for preparatory military measures, and authorization for nuclear
weapons use by the joint U.S.-Canada North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD). By mid-1965, the Johnson administration had drafted
a specific heads-of-state level authorization to NORAD's commander-in-chief
(CINCNORAD) to "employ" U.S. and Canadian nuclear-armed
forces assigned to his command "upon declaration of Defense
Condition [DEFCON] I or Air Defense Emergency" or under "emergency
circumstances." Through "prior consultation," the
heads of state of the two countries would reach a decision to declare
DEFCON I (or Air Defense Emergency), which amounted to a decision
to begin military action. In the event of "emergency circumstances,"
however, CINCNORAD would have authority to use the weapons. This
was consistent with the predelegation procedures that U.S. presidents
since Eisenhower had approved or updated since 1956. (Note
23)
The Canadians wanted quick resolution of the issue when foreign
ministry officials learned, in July 1965, that the U.S. Air Force
had transferred nuclear weapons for U.S. interceptors at Goose Bay
despite earlier claims that Washington had no immediate plans to
deploy weapons there. Unlike earlier nuclear deployments, however,
Ottawa and Washington had not negotiated specific authorizations
for the use of the weapons at Goose Bay which led foreign ministry
officials to see a pressing need to finalize the consultation agreement.
The Canadians hoped that a U.S. embassy staffer, Harold Shullaw,
would provide information on President Johnson's authorization so
that the two governments would be playing from the same score.
On 17 September 1965 President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson
approved the consultation agreement as well as the authorization
to CINCNORAD. As the memorandum to Prime Minister Pearson indicates,
the Canadians had learned about highly secret U.S. predelegation
arrangements: "We have been aware that the President, either
officially, or on a personal and informal basis, had some time ago
made an arrangement for prior authorization, to apply in emergencies."
To ensure that U.S. and Canadian emergency arrangements for nuclear
use by NORAD dovetailed, the State Department shared the language
of President Johnson's authorization with the Canadians. Thus, the
version that Pearson approved was essentially the same as Johnson's.
The presence of nuclear weapons was always a difficult matter in
Canadian politics and Ottawa was relieved to return the last Genie
warheads in 1984. The nuclear bombs that SAC deployed at Goose Bay
in 1950 had already been withdrawn in 1971. Nevertheless, later
in the decade, Ottawa and Washington negotiated an agreement allowing
emergency nuclear deployments by SAC on Canadian bases; this agreement
may remain in effect. (Note 24)
Document
21: Memorandum for the Record by J.C. Trippe, Bureau of European
Affairs, "Proposed Storage of Nuclear ASW Weapons in the U.K.
for Dutch Forces," March 23, 1965, Secret, annotated copy
Source: RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Northern
European Affairs, Records Relating to the United Kingdom, 1962-1974,
box 2, Def 12-2 Stockpiling Storage 1965
The first years of the 1960s involved a huge expansion of the U.S.
nuclear arsenal in Western Europe; by the late 1960s, Washington
had deployed over 7,000 weapons in NATO Europe. The deployments
would include W34 (Lulu) and B57 nuclear depth charges designed
for anti-submarine warfare (ASW); they and thousands of other weapons
would remain at depots in Western Europe until after the Cold War
ended. (Note 25) Early in the 1960s it had been
contemplated that ASW weapons assigned to the Netherlands's naval
forces would be stored in the United Kingdom; in time of war, the
weapons would be made available to Dutch naval air operating under
the command of the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT). Plans
for storing the weapons at a Royal Air Force Base at St. Mawgan
(Note 26) were underway but the Anglo-American
understandings did not include any arrangements for joint consultations
on the release of weapons stored on behalf of other NATO countries.
As this document shows, the British had expressed interest in including
such weapons under the scope of the consultative arrangements. One
skeptical reader of this document noted that the British wanted
more than consultation: they "want veto on their use anyway."
Documents
22A and 22B:
Letters from Wilson to Johnson, August 8, 1965, Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Presidential and Secretary of State Official
Correspondence, 1961-1965, box 11, UK-Johnson 64-65
After consultations between U.S. and British officials, in August
1965 Harold Wilson raised with President Johnson the broader implications
of storage at the Royal Air Force Base at St. Mawgan of nuclear
depth charges assigned to Dutch naval aviation. He did this in two
separate letters. The purpose of one was to update the February
1964 understanding by including more general language to take into
account the fact of British custody of U.S. ASW weapons assigned
to Dutch forces. Wilson suggested language changes and included
a version of the "Understandings" paper with the proposed
revisions. The other letter proposed that the release of the nuclear
depth bombs to the Netherlands for wartime use "would be the
subject of a joint decision taken by the President and the Prime
Minister in accordance with the terms of the understandings"
reached previously by U.S. Presidents and British Prime Ministers.
Document
23: Memorandum from Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn K. Thompson
and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
John W. Leddy to Secretary of State Rusk, "Letters from Prime
Minister Wilson on Nuclear Weapons Arrangements," 29 September
1965, Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Presidential and Secretary of State Official
Correspondence, 1961-1965, box 11, UK-Johnson 64-65
Johnson did not send replies to Wilson for several months; complex
Anglo-American negotiations on defense and the British sterling
crisis probably accounted for the delay and Johnson's gall bladder
surgery in October slowed the President's schedule. (Note
27) In any event, before Johnson replied to Wilson, a number
of issues had to be hashed out. Not only would Johnson have to approve
a SACLANT plan to disperse ASW weapon but the foreign policy bureaucracy
would have to ponder how much the Dutch should know about the arrangements
as well as arrange "low key" discussions with the British
about the issues. These memoranda show the state of play before
Secretary of State Dean Rusk discussed the Wilson letters with the
President. Senior State Department officials recommended accepting
Wilson's proposals. As for the Dutch, "the less said the better,"
but they would have to be told something "about the conditions
under which the US and the UK are entering into storage arrangements"
for the ASW weapons. Nevertheless, the Dutch should be told nothing
about the basic understanding because "we have no wish to spread
further the explicit commitment to the personal President-Prime
Minister consultation which lies at the heart of the U.S.-U.K. Memorandum
of Understanding."
Documents
24A and 24B:
Letters from President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson, 11 November
1965, with attached routing memoranda, Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Presidential and Secretary of State Official
Correspondence, 1961-1965, box 11, UK-Johnson 64-65
Johnson finally replied to Wilson's letters in November. In any
event, with the letters, Johnson stated agreement with 1) Wilson's
proposal that ASW weapons stored on behalf of the Netherlands could
not be released for use without a "joint decision" by
London and Washington, and 2) Wilson's proposed amendments to the
memorandum of understanding on nuclear use consultations.
Documents
25A through C: Arrangements with West Germany
25A: Memorandum
for the President, "Consultations with the Federal Republic
of Germany on Nuclear Weapons Release," 16 March 1968, Secret,
cross-reference copy
Source: RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1967-1969, Def 12
GerW
25B: Memorandum
from Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, "Your Luncheon Meeting with the President Today,"
24 July 1968
Source: RG 59, Executive Secretariat Agenda for the Secretary's
Luncheon Meetings with the President, box 1.
25C: Memorandum
for the President from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze and
Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, 6 September 1968
Source: RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Presidential and
Secretary of State Correspondence with Heads of State, 1961-1971,
box 9, Germany 1 of 3
As a front-line state in the Cold War, West Germany was the site
of major U.S. nuclear weapons deployments during the Cold War--bombs,
theater nuclear missiles, air defense weapons, and artillery. The
deployments were so massive that by late 1964, Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara explained in a NATO audience that the "aggregate
yield" of U.S. nuclear weapons stored on West German soil was
"more than 5,000 times the power of the atomic bomb dropped
on Hiroshima." (Note 28) For years, the United
States had complete freedom of action in any decision to use the
weapons and the West German government had become concerned about
its lack of a role in top level decisions about their use. By late
1967, Bonn proposed to the Defense Department formal arrangements
requiring its consent to any decisions involving the "selective"
or limited use of nuclear weapons based in West Germany. Most of
the documentation on this initiative remains classified or is incomplete.
One of the documents included here is a one page excerpt used for
cross-reference purposes by State Department records keepers; the
complete document remains classified in its entirety in another
file. The material that is open discloses the basic developments:
1) November 1967: West German initiative, 2) March 1968: completion
of major negotiations, and 3) September 1968: exchange of letters
between Johnson and Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger. (Note
28a) Compared to the arrangements with the British, the one
with West Germany was substantially more limited; it did not give
Bonn a say in decisions on the "general release of nuclear
weapons" or all-out war. If, however, Washington sought to
use nuclear weapons deployed on German soil "selectively",
it would be required to consult Bonn. To facilitate consultations
during a crisis, the two governments would agree to establish a
hot line.
Document
26: U.S. Mission to NATO Airgram A-003 to State Department,
"NPG --Consultations - Remarks by Ambassador Cleveland,"
7 January 1969
Source: RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1967-1969, DEF 12
NATO
The Athens Guidelines left Canadian and European members of NATO
dissatisfied with imprecision in the consultative arrangements and
in late 1968 a "Canadian-European" caucus in the Nuclear
Planning Group Permanent Representatives proposed a new mechanism
for alliance consultations on nuclear use. Responding formally to
this initiative, Ambassador to NATO Harlan Cleveland observed that
even "small mechanical issues" relating to nuclear weapons
use had to be considered at the top levels of the U.S. government:
"consultation is Presidential business." Nuclear weapons
are a "form of military power whose use is reserved to the
President by explicit legislation and repeated policy declaration."
While Cleveland took it for granted that U.S. presidents needed
flexibility on nuclear use decisions and that it was unwise to develop
rigid or uniform consultative arrangements, he saw value in incorporating
nuclear weapons use consultation into "broader crisis consultation
procedures." Indeed, he believed that NATO had a variety of
mechanisms and a wealth of experience from crisis simulation (e.g.,
High Level Exercises or HILEX) and crisis management that could
be mobilized in a crisis. That said, he broadly criticized the arrangements
proposed by the caucus because they did not "correspond to
the real world" which worked horizontally, not vertically.
If a crisis unfolded where nuclear weapons use became necessary,
he believed that proposals would "occur to all [concerned]
at the same time." Nevertheless, while advice would be welcome,
in the final analysis, the nuclear powers-the United States and
the United Kingdom--would make the final decisions: "The views
of all, and especially those to which special weight should be given
[presumably NPG members or NATO members on the front lines like
West Germany], should get to the nuclear power expeditiously."
Documents
27A and 27B:
"Weekly Activities Report," from Ronald I. Spiers, Bureau
of Politico-Military Affairs, to Secretary of State et al., 15 August
1969 and 19 September 1969, Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Executive Secretariat. Weekly Focus Reports,
box 9, Weekly Activity Report to the Under Secretary August 1969
and September 1969
With a new administration coming into power in 1969, the question
of the nuclear understanding appeared on the agenda although not
as rapidly as under Kennedy and Johnson. While the correspondence
and briefing papers remain classified, these reports document what
happened. On August 4 Wilson wrote Nixon "suggesting reaffirmation
of the traditional understanding." The matter was settled the
next month when Nixon wrote Wilson that the understandings remained
in effect.
Documents
28A through E: U.S.-West German Arrangements
28 A: Embassy
West Germany cable 15148 to State Department, 24 November 1969
28 B: State Department
cable 200554 to Embassy West Germany, 2 December 1969
28 C: Embassy
West Germany cable 15625 to State Department, 6 December 1969
28 D: Embassy
West Germany cable 714 to State Department, 23 January 1970
28 E: State Department
cable 16310 to Embassy West Germany, 3 February 1970
Source for documents 23A and C: RG 59, Subject-Numeric
Files 1967-1969, Def 12 Ger W
Source for documents 23B, D, and E: National Archives, Nixon Presidential
Materials Project, National Security Council Files (hereinafter
NSCF), boxes 682 and 683, Germany, vol. III and IV respectively
Like the arrangement with the British, the one with West Germany
was "top secret" and neither the British nor the Germans
knew that Washington had consultative understandings with both.
Washington wanted it that way. Like the arrangement with the British,
the U.S. side did not see any need to take initiative to reaffirm
the one with West Germans but was willing to do if they asked for
it. This exchange of cables (Note 29) hints at
the Nixon administration's consternation that Helmut Schmidt, the
defense minister for the new Social Democratic-Free Democratic coalition
government led by Willy Brandt, had told his British counterpart,
Dennis Healey, about the U.S.-West German understanding. Talks with
West German officials in Bonn, including Schmidt, made it plain
that the Germans regretted the disclosure to the British and agreed
that knowledge of it should be "confined to a very small circle
of top officials in each government." That the State Department
worried that the embassy was not being sufficiently secretive about
the matter comes through in the instruction in the last document
to treat information on the nuclear arrangements as NODIS ("no
distribution" except to specified officials) instead of the
somewhat less restrictive EXDIS ("exclusive distribution")
category.
Document
29: Haig to Kissinger, 2 October 1970, Top Secret
Source: NSCF, box 972, Haig Chron - Oct 1-[13], 1970 [1
of 2]
The change of government in the United Kingdom,
from Prime Minister Wilson to Prime Minister Edward Heath, in June
1970, led to the usual discussions on nuclear use consultations.
Haig's cable is slightly cryptic and the draft memorandum mentioned
by Haig, or the cable from Deputy Secretary of State John Irwin,
have not surfaced.
Document
30: State Department cable 203272 to U.S. Embassy London, "Nuclear
Consultation with the British," 15 December 1970, top secret,
excised copy
Source: NSCF, box 63, Consultations Regarding the Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Mandatory review release
By mid-December, Nixon and Heath had agreed on a consultation agreement
that incorporated six amendments by the British. Although background
documents remain classified, what prompted some of the amendments
were to bring within the scope of the understanding a deployment
of nuclear depth bombs at the U.S.-leased naval base in Bermuda.
By the 1970s, with the Lulu nuclear depth bomb had been long retired
the ASW weapon deployed in Bermuda would have been the B57 whose
explosive yield ranging from 5 to 20 kilotons. (Note
30) Details on the timing, circumstances, etc. of this deployment
are unavailable but it may have related to U.S. naval reactions
to the expansion of the Soviet SLBM fleet during the 1970s. Certainly,
the deployment was significant enough for Henry Kissinger to have
maintained several folders on the "British-US Nuclear Matter
(Bermuda Exchange)" in his office files. (Note
31) This excised document follows the structure of the 1964-1965
understandings, but document 31, released in its entirety, serves
as a key to the excised portions.
Document
31: State Department Cable 775886 to U.S. Embassy London, "Nuclear
Consultation with UK and Use of Holy Loch by FBMS (Poseidon-Equipped),"
5 May 1971, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 84, Records of Foreign Service Posts.
Embassy London, 1965-1976, box 1, 1976
Only a few months after the Heath-Nixon understanding, the deployment
of Poseidon SLBMs, more accurate than Polaris and with each missile
carrying 10 multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs),
changed the situation. U.S. plans to replace Polaris with Poseidon
at Holy Loch led to British suggestions for modification of the
basic understanding. This cable includes: 1) Nixon's letter to Heath
affirming that earlier understandings on consultations over the
use of Polaris missiles also applied to the Poseidon deployment,
2) the modified text of the basic understanding (with references
to Poseidon and ASW weapons at Bermuda), and 3) a note from Secretary
of State Rogers to the British Ambassador concerning the applicability
of earlier understandings to the Poseidon deployment.
Document
32: Memorandum of Conversation, "Nuclear Release Agreement;
Labour Government's Defense Review; UK Polaris Program; Diego Garcia;
US-Soviet Threshold Test Ban; French Presidential Elections; Middle
East; Washington Energy Conference," 26 April 1974, Secret
Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973-1977, box
7, Apr 1974 Nodis Memcons
With Heath's defeat in 1974 and the return to power of Harold Wilson
in 1974, Anglo-American relations improved after some deterioration
during the October War. During this meeting between Kissinger and
Cabinet Secretary John Hunt, the two reached a verbal agreement
on the nuclear use understandings, including the weapons in Bermuda,
with letters of agreement to follow. Confirming the close London/Washington
relationship on nuclear matters, Hunt and Kissinger agreed on British
plans to test secretly "Super Antelope," a nuclear weapon
designed for the Polaris missile, at the Nevada test site later
in the spring. (Note 32) The discussion closed
with discussions of Middle East peace negotiations and Kissinger's
amusing account of his meetings with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.
Notes
1. Speech by Lyndon Johnson at Detroit, 7 September
1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States,
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, II (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1965), 1051.
2. Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning
Armageddon: Britain, the United States, and the Command of Western
Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers,
2000), 30-36. This is the most authoritative account of British
nuclear policy and Anglo-American nuclear relations in the first
decades of the Cold War.
3. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1950, Vol. VII (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1976), 1261-1262, 1462-1464; United Kingdom Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, Documents on British Policy Overseas,
Series II, Vol. IV (London, HMSO, 1991), 255, 310-311.
4. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Vol. IV
(London, HMSO, 1991), 311; Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon,
26-27.
5. For the arrangement with Japan, see Lucius D.
Battle to McGeorge Bundy, "Check List of Presidential Actions,"
28 July 1961, at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/NC/nuchis.html#usnhdp.
The 1969 U.S.-Japan treaty reverting Okinawa to Japanese control
included a secret agreement requiring the United States to consult
the Japanese government if it wanted to base nuclear weapons on
the island in an emergency. For more information on the Okinawa
issue, see National Security Archive briefing book, Robert Wampler,
ed., "Nuclear Weapons and Okinawa," at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/japan/okinawa/okinawa.htm.
For a fascinating account of the Kissinger-Waikaizumi backchannel
talks on the Okinawa treaty see Waikaizumi Kei, The Best Course
Available : A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa
Reversion Negotiations (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
2002).
6. For the present situation, see Natural Resources
Defense Council report prepared by Hans M. Kristensen, U.S.
Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force
Levels, and War Planning, at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf>.
7. For the Truman Library's oral history interview
with Arneson, see http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/arneson.htm.
8. For an authoritative account of the U.S. nuclear
presence in Canada during the Cold War, see John Clearwater, U.S.
Nuclear Weapons in Canada (Toronto, Dundurn Group, 1999). The
consultative arrangements are discussed on page 18.
9. For the Churchill-Truman meetings, see Klaus
Larres, Churchill's Cold War (New Haven: Yale, 2002), 155-173.
For the communiqué language see document 1.
10. Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon,
109-116. .
11. Ibid., pp. 326-333.
12. Ibid., 118-119, for more details on British
concerns.
13. Ibid., 119-122.
14. Macmillan to Kennedy, January 26, 1961, see
document 13; also published in U.S. Department
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,
Vol. XIII (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1994),
1030.
15. Kennedy's letter mentions three modifications
but only two are footnoted in the text; the third may have been
a minor stylistic change.
16. The NATO "COSMIC Top Secret" documents
reproduced here bear a series of annual year stamps because NATO
security regulations required an annual mustering of highly classified
documents; records managers had to stamp the documents to show that
they had accounted for them. E-mail from Anne-Marie Smith, NATO
Archives, 15 June 2005.
17. For SACEUR's control, see Marc Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace, The Making of the European Settlement,
1945-1953 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 169-170.
For the agreements with Italy on Jupiter IRBMs, see Ray L. Thurston
to B.E.L. Timmons, 16 October 1958, and Rome Embassy Despatch 1168,
2 April 1959, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 1955-1959, 711.56365/10-1558
and 4-259 respectively.
18. For background on the Athens Guidelines,
see Twigge and Scott, Planning Armaggedon, 174-180. For
an account of McNamara's presentation and the NATO reaction, see
Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 108-110.
19. Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in
the United States Air Force, 1945-1960 (Washington, D.C.: Office
of Air Force History, 1990), 232-233.
20. For details on the Holy Loch memorandum of
understanding, see Charlie Witham, University of the West of England,
Bristol, "Leverage, Leaks and Liabilities: Holy Loch and the
'Special' Anglo-American Nuclear Relationship, 1960-1965,"
presentation at annual meeting of the Society for Historians of
American Foreign Relations, College Park, Md, June 24, 2005.
21. For the agreement on air defense missiles,
see "Checklist of Presidential Actions," at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/NC/nuchis.html#usnhdp.
For further details on the loose agreement over the Genies, see
Clearwater, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Canada, 20-32 and 52-59.
22. For the agreement by the Pearson government
and the first deployments, see Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear
Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada's Cold War Arsenal (Toronto:
Dundurn Press, 1998), 27-54. For accounts of the negotiations, see
Greg Donaghy, Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States
1963-1968 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 2002), 101-103, and John Clearwater, U.S. Nuclear Weapons
in Canada, 24-40.
23. For declassified U.S. documents on predelegation,
see
< https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/predelegation2/predel2.htm>.
24. Clearwater, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Canada,
90, 154; Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons, 216.
25. For details on the W34 and B57 weapons, see
Stephen Schwartz et al., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences
of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Washington, D.C., Brookings
Institution, 1998), 88-89, and Clearwater, U.S. Nuclear Weapons
in Canada, 210-211.
26. For storage of the nuclear depth bombs at
St. Mawgan, see Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin, Nuclear
Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons 1990: A Complete Inventory,
Neptune Papers No. 5, Greenpeace International, 1990, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/nep5text.htm.
Also on the ASW weapons and the U.S.-British-Netherlands, nuclear
connection, see Robert S. Norris, Andrew Burrows, and Richard W.
Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 5: British, French,
and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 85 and
Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military
Power in Britain (London: Michael Joseph, 1984), 93.
27. For background on U.S.-UK issues during this
period, see Sylvia Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam
War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 118-132.
28. For details on the deployments, see, Robert
S. Norris, William Arkin, and William Burr, "Where They Were,"
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 55 (November-December
1999) 26-35; "Secretary McNamara's Remarks to NATO Ministerial
Meeting, December 15-17, Paris," Airgram CA-6436, 23 December
1964, in William Burr, editor, U.S. Nuclear History: Arms and
Politics in the Missile Age, 1955-1968 (Alexandria, VA: Proquest/National
Security Archive, 1998).
28a. It recently came to the attention of the
editor that the State Department’s historical series, Foreign
Relations of the United States, included a significant document
on the selective release issue. An excised version of a memorandum
to President Johnson from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary
of Defense Clark Clifford, dated 16 March 1968, “Consultations
with the Federal Republic of Germany on Nuclear Weapons Release,”
[Document 25A above] discloses the basic features
of a consultative arrangement that State and Defense thought were
appropriate for a recommendation to West German officials. See FRUS,
1964-1968, Vol. XIII (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office,
1995), 679-680 ( 3 January 2007).
29. The cable from the State Department, number
196674, that initiated the exchange has not yet surfaced: apparently,
it raised questions about Schmidt's "indiscretion" with
the British.
30. For deployments of nuclear-capable U.S. ASW
forces in Bermuda, see Handler and Arkin, "Nuclear Warships
and Naval Nuclear Weapons 1990: A Complete Inventory," at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/nep5text.htm.
31. See the reference to these files in the finding
aid for the Henry Kissinger Office files, box 63, at
http://nixon.archives.gov/find/textual/presidential/nsc/kissinger/country_files_europe.pdf.
32. For Super Antelope, or Chevaline, and its
history, see John Baylis and Kristan Stoddard, "Britain and
the Chevaline Project: The Hidden Nuclear Program," Journal
of Strategic Studies 25 (Summer 2003): 124-155.
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