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Dear John:

You will recall that we have been working for some time on an agreement with Canada up-dating consultation and authorization procedures for the use of nuclear weapons by NORAD. Our staffs have collaborated on the enclosed draft memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, recommending that the President approve the proposed agreement and sign two authorizations pertaining to it. When this is done, final steps can be taken to bring the agreement into effect.

This will confirm that the Department of State concurs in the enclosed draft memorandum, and in having it go forward as soon as may be convenient.

Sincerely,

/s/ Llewellyn Thompson

Llewellyn E. Thompson
Acting

The Honorable
John T. McNaughton,
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
(International Security Affairs).

G/PM:SGeorge:fm
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S/S *[Signature]*
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DRAFT/27May65

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Nuclear air defense weapons (release to and employment by
Canadian NORAD forces)


In National Security Action Memorandum No. 287 of March 14, 1964,
the President approved certain guidelines for the development of detailed
NORAD nuclear weapons employment procedures, including release of weapons
by CINCONAD to Canadian NORAD forces for certain operations in situations
of surprise attack or upon declaration of Defense Condition 1 or Air
Defense Emergency. The President requested that following Canadian
coordination the substance of those procedures be submitted to him,
along with the related proposed arrangements for intergovernmental
consultation.

Subsequently the Canadian Government approached us to negotiate an
agreement not only covering the matter of intergovernmental consultation,
but also establishing intergovernmental agreement on the conditions
which would govern the operational use of nuclear weapons by NORAD forces.
The draft of such an agreement, including certain interpretive under-
standings, appears at Tab A. This draft is acceptable to the Canadians
and, on our side, has been cleared in the Departments of State and
Defense. It was negotiated in the light of the guidance contained in
NSAM 287 with respect to the release and employment of nuclear weapons.
The relevant provisions in this regard appear in paragraphs 7 and 8 of
the draft.

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
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The NORAD nuclear weapons employment procedures are still under coordination in Canada. We understand that the Canadians now regard these as implementing arrangements for the draft intergovernmental agreement at Tab A. They therefore believe, and we agree, that the final coordination should follow rather than precede this intergovernmental agreement on substantive principles.

In my memorandum of February 1, 1964 to you, I indicated that at the appropriate time I would submit for the President's approval certain formal documentation needed in connection with this problem. This documentation is provided at Tabs B and C, in the form of two related authorizations to CINCONAD and CINCORAD. The use of two authorizations is desirable in order to keep within U.S. channels those aspects which Canadian officers in the NORAD chain do not need to see. These authorizations would discharge our commitments in paragraphs 7(b) and 8(b) of the draft agreement. They would also provide a formal basis for the NORAD nuclear weapons employment procedures. They have been prepared on the basis of the guidelines provided in NSAM 287, except that the concept of "emergency circumstances" has been employed in place of "surprise attack situations." In the draft agreement to which the authorizations are now related, "emergency circumstances" are defined in paragraph 8(e) to encompass surprise attack in force and other specified circumstances warranting the presumption of great danger to national security. In addition, the concept of "emergency circumstances" is confined to conditions under which prior consultation is not practicable.

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
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I recommend that the President (1) approve the draft agreement at Tab A, and (2) sign the authorizations at Tabs B and C. I further recommend that the two authorizations be held by your staff until the governmental agreement is concluded with the Canadians, and that it then be dated and forwarded to me for appropriate action through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Coordination of the detailed NORAD nuclear weapons employment procedures by Canada can be expected shortly after conclusion of the agreement. The substance of these detailed procedures, which the President initially wished to review, is now incorporated in the intergovernmental agreement. I therefore believe that when the agreement has been signed, the procedures themselves could be reviewed for conformity with the agreement by appropriate levels in State and Defense, without making further claim on the President's time.

This memorandum is concurred in by the Department of State.

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
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
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AUTHORIZATION FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR DEFENSE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN
FORCES UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CINCNORAD

The establishment of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), which placed air defense forces of the United States and Canada under the operational control of a single commander, CINCNORAD, recognized that the air defense of the United States and Canada must be considered as a single problem and that it was essential to have in existence in peacetime an organization, including the weapons, facilities, and command structure, which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defense plan approved in advance by national military authorities.

An agreement was concluded on August 16, 1963 with the Canadian Government providing for the nuclear support of certain Canadian forces, including Canadian air defense forces under the operational control of CINCNORAD. A further agreement has been concluded today between the two Governments concerning inter alia the conditions governing the use of nuclear weapons by both the Canadian and United States forces under the operational control of CINCNORAD. In furtherance of these agreements, and acting on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I hereby authorize the Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command (CINCNORAD) to employ nuclear armed United States and Canadian forces under his operational control.

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- (a) upon declaration of Defense Condition I or Air Defense Emergency; or
- (b) in the emergency circumstances described in paragraph 8(e) of the agreement concluded today.

The use of such forces will be in accordance with approved NORAD rules of interception and engagement and nuclear weapons employment procedures.

It is understood that the declaration of Defense Condition I or Air Defense Emergency by CINCNORAD is subject to prior consultation except under the emergency circumstances referred to in subparagraph (b) above.

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Authority *NM 957000*
By *MLZ* NARA Date *4/28/87*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY
G/PM

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MEMORANDUM

TO : G - Ambassador Thompson
FROM : G/PM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen *JK*
SUBJECT: Agreement with ~~Canada~~ on NORAD Procedures

June 1, 1965

As far as the basic agreement itself is concerned, we have been prepared for some time to exchange notes with the Canadians agreeing upon comprehensive consultation and authorization procedures for the use of nuclear weapons by NORAD (Tab B). However, paragraph 8 (c) of the agreed procedures stipulates that the President and the Prime Minister will "provide for the timely authorization to CINCNORAD to employ operationally nuclear armed forces", and we concluded after consulting the White House staff that it would be advisable to work out the details of this "timely authorization" before rather than after the exchange of notes. *However the Presidentially approved authorizations would be shown informally to the*

We have therefore been working with DOD/ISA and White House staff on a draft memorandum to McGeorge Bundy explaining the matter. The memorandum recommends that the President approve the draft agreement and sign two authorizations, the said authorizations to be held by the White House until analogous Canadian action has been taken and the exchange of notes has taken place. The memorandum has been fully staffed within the Department and I see no problem in going forward with it.

A letter to John McNaughton has been prepared for your signature, to indicate the Department's formal concurrence in the draft memorandum which is attached.

Recommendation: That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Clearance:
EUR- Mr. D *RLD*

G/PM: SGeorge: fm
6/1/65

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Canadians to enable them to complete internal "coordination" of their own procedures. *JK*

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