

A/CDS

Handwritten signature/initials

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ESO	/
FSO	

23 1965
COPY FOR:

A/C/M F.R. Miller

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ACDS	<i>Handwritten initials</i>
EA	<i>Handwritten initials</i>
PA	

RSO is CDS

Seen by ACDS.
A copy is on S3310-3.

T.S. 27-11-CDS/USA

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Ottawa, July 20, 1965

JE BESWICK
LT-COL
EA to ACDS

Dear Charles,

27 JUL 65

I refer to our numbered letter DL-365 of April 22 and your exchange of letters with Basil Robinson dated April 22-26 concerning the procedure for reaching an understanding between the Prime Minister and the President concerning "timely authorization to CINCNORAD to employ operational nuclear armed forces" (paragraph 8(b) of the proposed agreement on authorization). As you probably know, the Minister of National Defence has issued two instructions dated 16 March 1964 and 23 April 1965 to provide interim arrangements for authorizing the use of nuclear warheads on the BOMARC missiles and the CF-101B AIR2A missiles respectively. These procedures are to remain in effect until superseded by the inter-governmental agreement on authorization for the use of nuclear weapons.

2. At the 112th meeting of the PJBD at Royal Roads B.C. 7-11 June 1965, I asked "whether nuclear weapons had been or would be stockpiled at Goose Bay or Harmon for the interceptors (which we had been informed would be inactivated in FY-4/67) and the USAF member replied that no nuclear weapons were now stockpiled at Goose Bay or Harmon. As to future prospects, this question could not be answered until the studies regarding Goose Bay and Harmon had been completed and until CINCNORAD had determined his requirement for the dispersal of interceptors." We were somewhat surprised, therefore, to receive early in July an application on behalf of the USAF for an Export Permit for nuclear weapons from Goose Bay. On enquiry we were told that the USAF had in fact brought nuclear weapons into Goose Bay within the last three weeks--i.e., since the PJBD meeting at which we were told that there were no such weapons at Goose Bay or Harmon.

3. We therefore wrote to A/C/M Miller on July 15 to enquire whether any interim procedure had been worked out with the USAF to implement the provision regarding consultation and authorization of the exchange of Notes of September 28-30, 1963 on the stockpiling of nuclear weapons for U.S. interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon. If not, we suggested

Charles S.A. Ritchie, Esq.,
Ambassador,
Canadian Embassy,
Washington,

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that he might prepare a draft which we would ask to see before it was submitted to the USAF. A/C/M Miller telephoned me yesterday to say that he thought it would be much more complicated to work out a provisional authorization arrangement--especially one covering emergency situations--with the U.S.A. compared with the relatively simple interim procedures promulgated by Mr. Hellyer for the RCAF BOMARCs and VOODOOs as mentioned in paragraph 2 above. He asked about the prospects for the conclusion of the inter-governmental agreement on authorization. I told him that Basil Robinson had discussed this subject with you during your visit to Ottawa at the beginning of July. I told him that I had also discussed this subject with Harold Shullaw in Ottawa on July 6. We agreed that I would ask you to make a further effort to make progress on the understanding concerning "timely authorization" between the Prime Minister and the President and at least seek a prognosis from you concerning the prospects for reaching an agreement both in respect to substance and time.

4. In my talk with Shullaw on July 6 I told him that I did not think that we could adequately prepare for the Prime Minister to reach an understanding with the President unless we could receive in advance a copy or at least a discreetly edited paraphrase of the instructions which the President had issued to provide for "timely authorization" to CINCNORAD. I assumed that in reaching his understanding with the Prime Minister, the President would wish to be satisfied that the Prime Minister had issued similar instructions to provide for "timely authorization" to CINCNORAD. I then went on to say that I had learned that "timely authorization" on the U.S. side was provided for in a chain of three communications:

- (a) letter from the President to Secretary of Defence McNamara,
- (b) instruction from McNamara to the Chairman, JCS, and
- (c) instruction from JCS to CINCNORAD.

I asked Shullaw if he could try to get for us copies or discreet paraphrases of these three communications. I suggested that the understanding between the President and the Prime Minister might be reached either at a meeting or through correspondence by an exchange of personal letters either attaching, quoting or paraphrasing the main points of the instruction which they had each issued to provide

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for "timely authorization" to CINCNORAD. Shullaw said that he believed that Ray Barrett had made an effort to make some progress on this subject and probably had left a memorandum on the subject for him. He would in any case pursue the matter.

5. In view of the new problem of authorization which has been created by the introduction of nuclear weapons for the USAF interceptors at Goose Bay, we would be most grateful if you or one of your informed colleagues would be good enough to press the State Department to try to make some progress on this subject. You might point out that failing such progress there is no provision for emergency authorization for U.S. interceptors at Goose Bay. We would at least be grateful to have a report from you regarding the nature of the problem as you now find it and some indication of what sort of time you think might be involved in reaching an understanding on this question.

Yours sincerely,

A. R. Menzies

A.R. Menzies

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