and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960-1998
Washington, D.C., June 1, 1999 – The relationship between the United States and the People's
Republic of China over the fifty years since the PRC was established on
October 1, 1949 has been extraordinarily complex. Several years ago the
National Security Archive initiated a project to shed more light on U.S.-China
relations. The purpose was to obtain critical documentation on key aspects
of the U.S.-Chinese relationship, with a focus on the years 1969 to the
present. Through Freedom of Information Act requests, collection
of relevant publications, and archival research, the Archive has amassed
a collection of more than 15,000 pages of previously classified documentation
on U.S.-China interaction on foreign policy issues, the U.S.-PRC military
relationship, the growing economic relationship between the two countries,
as well as documents related to the several issues that divide the countries
to this day.
In June 1999, the Archive will publish on microfiche with
a detailed, item-level printed index, these extraordinary documents, which
include policy and research studies, intelligence estimates, diplomatic
cables, and briefing materials. Titled China
and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960-1998,
this document set is part of the Archive's Special Collection Series, published
by Chadwyck-Healey Inc. (Alexandria,
Virginia and Cambridge, U.K.), and will ultimately also appear in the Chadwyck-Healey
World Wide Web publication of The Digital National Security Archive.
Among the highlights of this collection are the detailed
(and previously classified) U.S. government accounts of the infamous military
assault by the Chinese government on pro-democracy demonstrators in and
around Tiananmen Square in Beijing in June 1989. This Electronic Briefing
Book represents the first publication in any media of these documents,
which include remarkable SITREPs from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing as well
as many of the Secretary of State’s "Morning Summaries" from June 1989.
In addition to the crackdown itself, the documents also cover the student
demonstrations in late 1985 and 1986 that, in hindsight, were signs of
the events to come, the period leading up the PLA's use of force, and post-crackdown
assessments of the events and their significance.
This briefing book was prepared by Jeffrey T. Richelson, a Senior Fellow
at the Archive, and Michael L. Evans, a project associate. Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson (Ph.D., University of Rochester) is the director
of the Archive's China and the United States project and previously
directed Archive projects on intelligence, the military uses of space,
and presidential national security directives. He is the author of several
books on intelligence, including A
Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (Oxford,
1995) and The
U.S. Intelligence Community (Westview, 1999), as well as articles
in a variety of magazines and academic journals.
Michael L. Evans (M.A., George Washington University) assists with the
and the United States project, the Archive’s forthcoming Guatemala
documentation project, and has also assisted with the Archive’s U.S.
Espionage and Intelligence project.
Praise for China and the United States:
The China collection is a breathtaking record of America's long
journey toward the People's Republic of China. To "hear" the voices, for
the first time, of China's revolutionary icons, Chairman Mao Zedong and
Premier Zhou Enlai, cajoling, admonishing and debating American leaders
in private, with both sides seeking to out-charm and out-wit the other,
will stand as the greatest contribution of this document set. But for researchers
and historians, these conversations are sprinkled over a much broader landscape
of documentation that provides the larger context of Chinese-American relations
over four decades and nine administrations. For Asia hands, this collection
will likely prove the indispensable benchmark of primary source documentation
for years to come.
Patrick E. Tyler
Bureau Chief, Beijing (1993-1997)
The New York Times
Tiananmen Square, 1989: The Declassified History
The Chinese army crackdown in and around Tiananmen Square on June 4,
1989 had an enormous effect on the course of U.S.-China relations. The
deaths of democracy protesters resulted in U.S. sanctions, suspensions
of high-level contacts, and a halt in the transfer of military technology.
The controversy continues to this day, as demonstrated by the reaction
of many concerning President Clinton's decision to appear in the square
with Chinese leaders during his June 1998 trip to China.
This Electronic Briefing Book is divided into five sections, each with
links to the documents. Click on any of the links below to jump to that
1-6: Student Demonstrations in 1985-86
7-11: On the Brink
12-29: The Crackdown
30-35: The Aftermath
1999: Ten Years after Tiananmen
to the Introduction
Documents 1-6: Student Demonstrations in 1985 and 1986
The student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989 were not the
first time in the 1980s that Chinese authorities were faced with organized
demonstrations expressing dissatisfaction with their rule. In late 1985,
and again in late 1986, Beijing and Shanghai were the site of student protests.
Students carried banners with slogans such as "Law, Not Authoritarianism"
and "Long Live Democracy."
In China, a state with significant curbs on free expression, demonstrators
have often seized upon politically tolerable causes--such as anti-Japanese
sentiment or the commemoration of a popular Chinese leader--as vehicles
to gather together and express their dissatisfaction with the policies
of the Chinese government. Document 1, a U.S.
embassy cable, suggests possible meanings of a tepid anti-Japanese demonstration
in Tiananmen Square following a Sino-Japanese volleyball game on November
20, 1985. Embassy officials note that perhaps "someone wanted to stir up
trouble to embarrass the authorities," and that "the semi-holiday atmosphere
among the students at the square ... points to a lack of fear of retribution."
A subsequent cable (Document 2) reports the arrest
of 23 of the students who were suspected "ringleaders" of the November
20 demonstration. "The authorities," the cable notes, "knew whom to look
for because they had infiltrated both preparations for the demonstration
and the demonstration itself." Furthermore, "one armed police installation,
shortly before last week’s demonstration, ‘looked like it was preparing
for a war.’"
Document 3, a U.S. embassy report from late December
1985, notes that two student demonstrations had occurred in Beijing in
the last several days. These demonstrations concerned student issues, the
presence of the PLA on campus, as well as nuclear testing in Xinjiang province.
The cable comments that "we do find a bit astonishing a demonstration in
China ... on nuclear weapons testing."
The following December a new round of demonstrations, this time explicitly
calling for political reforms, sprang up in China’s cities. Document
4, a U.S. embassy cable from December 24, 1986, reports on a small
student demonstration in Beijing on the evening of December 23, 1986. The
cable cites an editorial in the People's Daily, the state news daily,
expressing sympathy with the students but making it clear that "the limits
of official toleration were being approached." Later in the cable, embassy
officials note that "political stability has always been a critical consideration
in China. There can be no doubt that the authorities will crack down, and
crack down hard, if stability seems to be being called into question."
Document 5, an intelligence summary from U.S. Pacific
Command, reports that thousands of protesters filled Tiananmen Square on
New Year’s Day 1987, and that, "Some 24 ‘troublemakers’ reportedly were
taken away by the police for ‘education and examination.’" On January 17,
another intelligence summary (Document 6)reports
that noted reformer and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang had
resigned, apparently "a result of the recent student demonstrations."
This would not be the last time that the fate of Hu Yaobang would be
associated with student demonstrations. His death on April 15, 1989 proved
to be the catalyst that brought about the massive demonstrations in Tiananmen
Square. The demonstration that had begun as an expression of grief over
the loss of a popular political figure had, by April 26, taken on a decidedly
political character. On that day People’s Daily published an editorial
After the memorial meeting, an extremely small number of people
with ulterior purposes continued to take advantage of the young students’
feelings of grief for Comrade Hu Yaobang... This is a planned conspiracy
and a disturbance. Its essence is to, once and for all, negate the leadership
of the CPC [Chinese Communist Party] and the socialist system... All comrades
in the party and the people throughout the country must soberly recognize
the fact that our country will have no peaceful days if this disturbance
is not checked resolutely.1
Documents 7-11: On the Brink
On May 20, the Chinese leadership imposed martial law on the Beijing
Municipality and appeared to be moving toward the use of force to clear
the square.2 Nevertheless, U.S. officials
were still hoping to see the standoff between the government and the student
demonstrators resolved peacefully. While the documentary record is far
from complete, Document 7, a heavily excised summary
transcript of a May 23 meeting in Washington between President George Bush
and Wan Li, Chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People’s
Congress, indicates that the subject of the student demonstrations did
come up at their meeting. Shortly thereafter, Wan cut short his U.S. visit
and, on May 27, publicly endorsed the government’s martial law order.3
As the crowds continued to gather in Tiananmen Square in the days following
the death of Hu Yaobang, hard-liners in the party leadership prepared to
move against both the students and the more conciliatory leaders within
the party itself.4 Document
8, a State Department intelligence summary submitted to the Secretary
on the morning of June 2, notes that hard-liners "remain unable to resolve
the leadership crisis or to remove students from Tiananmen Square." The
next day’s morning intelligence summary (Document
9) reports on the first use of force on both sides--with the
police firing tear gas on crowds gathered near Tiananmen and the crowds
retaliating by stoning the police.
The next two documents report on developments at Tiananmen shortly before
the PRC employed force against the protesters. Document
10 describes the "unorganized retreat" of a first wave of lightly armed
soldiers, and notes that it might have been intended "to prove that much
stronger force will be necessary to regain control." Document
11, reporting the advance of more heavily equipped soldiers toward
the city center, concludes by noting that the fact that the troops are
helmeted and are armed with automatic weapons "suggest[s] that the force
option is real."
12-29: The Crackdown
It would not be long after the U.S. Embassy in Beijing warned that the
use of force was an option that it began reporting the PLA's attacks on
demonstrators. That reporting, as well as information obtained by other
means, is summarized in Document 12, a cable from the
U.S. embassy in Beijing. The cable notes that troops, using automatic weapons,
had advanced in tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and trucks from
several directions toward Tiananmen Square. The cable also reports that
the American Embassy believed that the 50-70 deaths reported in the foreign
media were probably much too low. It also notes that several American reporters
"were severely beaten by Chinese troops on Tiananmen Square." As events
in Beijing unfolded, the American Embassy provided a near-continuous flow
of reporting, based on the accounts of newsmen, residents, and the observations
of embassy officials.
The Secretary of State’s intelligence summary for the following morning
(Document 13) reports that "deaths from the military
assault on Tiananmen Square range from 180 to 500; thousands more have
been injured." It also describes how "thousands of civilians stood their
ground or swarmed around military vehicles. APCs were set on fire, and
demonstrators besieged troops with rocks, bottles, and Molotov cocktails."
In addition to providing information on the events of June 4, the cables
provide dramatic examples of the kinds of intelligence provided by diplomatic
reporting. Document 14, an embassy cable from June 4,
reports on confrontations between soldiers and protesters, some of which
ended in deaths, and vandalism by military personnel, who one source claimed
were breaking the windows of shops, banks, and other buildings. On the
same day, another cable from the U.S. Embassy (Document
15) reports, among other things, the statement of a Chinese-American
who had witnessed the crackdown who claimed that, "The beating to death
of a PLA soldier, who was in the first APC to enter Tiananmen Square, in
full view of the other waiting PLA troops, appeared to have sparked the
shooting that followed." In addition to these eyewitness accounts of the
crackdown, other cables (Document 16) also provide information
on PLA troop positions and casualty estimates.
One section of the Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 5th
(Document 17), titled "After the Bloodbath," focuses
on developments in Beijing. It reports that "troops continued to fire indiscriminately
at citizens in the area near Tiananmen Square." It also notes the destruction
of a large number of military vehicles, threats to execute students, and
the potential for violent resistance by students. The intelligence report
also provides details on the worldwide reaction to the massacre, noting
the unanimous condemnation of the "bloody repression" by foreign leaders,
"regardless of ideology."
After the square had been cleared Chinese Army troops continued to occupy
the city5, with continuing reports of sporadic
gunfire and interfactional fighting among PLA units. The possibility that
units of the PLA would turn on each other was raised in the June 6th edition
of the Secretary of State's Morning Summary as well as embassy cables from
June 5-6. An embassy cable from June 5 (Document 18)
reports that armored units from the PLA's 27th Army "seem poised for attack
by other PLA units," and notes that a "western military attaché"
largely blames the 27th for the June 3 massacre, and says that the 27th
"is accused of killing even the soldiers of other units when they got in
the way." The June 6 edition of the Secretary of State's Morning Summary
(Document 19) states that the 27th Army is "being
blamed for the worst atrocities against civilians during Saturday night's
attack on Tiananmen Square," and also notes that "some clashes between
military units reportedly have occurred." Document
20, an embassy cable from June 6, refers to "persistent rumours of
splits among the military and fighting among military units."
Meanwhile, as embassy officials continued to report on the events on
the ground, the State Department went to work assessing the political ramifications
of the crackdown. Document 21, the Secretary of State's
Morning Summary for June 7, discusses the reaction of Asian leaders to
the violence, and reports rumors "that at least some leaders may have envisioned
an outcome that would blame most atrocities on the 27th Army, relieve its
top commanders, and remove senior officials who ordered armed action against
The June 7 summary also reports that PLA troops had fired shots in the
direction of U.S. embassy apartments, an incident covered in greater detail
in Document 22, an embassy cable from June 7. It reports
that as a PLA troop convoy was passing near the embassy residence, "Heavy
automatic weapons fire ... was heard ... Emboffs [U.S. Embassy officials]
reported bullets shattered the windows of many apartments in the Jianguomenwai
An "Uneasy Calm" returned to being by June 8, according to the Secretary
of State's Morning Summary for June 9 (Document 23).
It reports on missing dissidents, police actions at universities, martial
law directives, and the first public appearance of Premier Li Peng since
the massacre. Shortly thereafter, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research published an Intelligence Brief titled "Current Situation
in China: Background and Prospects" (Document 24). The
document observes that "at the heart of the crisis in China is the power
struggle for the succession to Deng Xiaoping," and goes on to analyze the
various elements of that struggle.
The first appearance of Deng Xiaoping since the crackdown was reported
in Document 25, the Secretary of State's Morning Summary
for June 10, noting that "Deng Xiaoping’s public appearance yesterday ...
signified his endorsement of martial law and the military’s action against
the population." The Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 14 (Document
27) reports on the efforts of the Chinese leadership to demonstrate
unity and portray a return to normal government operations, even while
continuing the crackdown on the alleged leaders of the demonstrations,
reports of which were then appearing in the Chinese press. By June 21,
the Morning Summary (Document 29) was reporting that,
"More than 1,500 have been arrested ... including at least six of the 21
‘most wanted’ student leaders."
The June 14 Morning Summary and the one for the following day address
one of the many problems in U.S.-Chinese relations that resulted from the
Tiananmen crisis--the U.S. Embassy's decision to provide sanctuary for
Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi in the days following the crackdown. The June
15 Morning Summary (Document 28) notes that the treatment
of the issue in the Chinese media indicates that it represents an important
conflict of interest with the United States. Arrest warrants for Fang and
his wife had been issued by Chinese security forces on June 11 and an embassy
cable sent on that day (Document 26) reports that Chinese
radio and television announcers had read a "letter" on the air "which accused
the US government of supporting rebels and providing refuge for the ‘criminal
who created this violence.’"
Documents 30-35: The Aftermath
As the day-to-day crisis atmosphere faded, the U.S. sought to come to
a precise understanding of the events and determine how they would affect
China's future and U.S.-Chinese relations. Reports based on the accounts
of eyewitnesses (Document 30 and Document
31) represent an effort by the American Embassy in Beijing to provide
a concise description of the events that led up to the deaths at Tiananmen
Square and to "set the record straight." Document 31 is based on the eyewitness
accounts of embassy officials, western reporters and diplomats, and U.S.
students present on or near Tiananmen Square. In its introduction it notes
that while civilian casualties probably did not reach the figure of 3,000
used in some press accounts, "they surely far outnumbered official figures."
The body of the cable consists of three parts: a précis of events,
an analysis of the extent and causes of military and civilian casualties,
and a chronology of developments from 3 p.m. on June 3 to shortly after
noon on June 4. A final note states that "Sporadic killing continued at
least through Wednesday, June 6."
In the days immediately following the crackdown, U.S. and Chinese officials
were already sensitive to how recent events would impact the bilateral
relationship. On June 5, President Bush had announced the imposition of
a package of sanctions on China, to include "suspension of all government-to-government
sales and commercial exports of weapons," and the "suspension of visits
between U.S. and Chinese military leaders." Document 32,
an embassy cable sent three weeks later, notes that a military official
had lodged a formal complaint that "strongly protested recent U.S. military
sanctions," and had canceled the planned visits of U.S. military officials.
Embassy officials felt this to be a "measured response to U.S. sanctions,"
indicating that the official "did not adopt a confrontational attitude
and emphasized that both sides should take a long-term view of the military
relationship." Two days later, on June 29, the State Department prepared
"Themes," (Document 33), in support of Undersecretary
of State Lawrence Eagleburger and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft,
who were to leave the next day on a secret trip to China to meet with Deng
Xiaoping. "Themes" provided the framework for the discussions the two emissaries
would have with Deng. It focused on the global strategic benefits of the
U.S.-PRC relationship for both sides, the impact Chinese "internal affairs"
could have on the relationship (characterizing the American people as being
"shocked and repelled by much of what they have seen and read about recent
events in China"), Bush's view of the importance of the long-term relationship
between the US and PRC, and the impact that further repression could have
on US relations with China. As Scowcroft later remembered, "The purpose
of my trip ... was not negotiations--there was nothing yet to negotiate--but
an effort to keep open the lines of communication."6
By late July INR analysts continued to update the situation in China
under martial law and also had the opportunity to address the impact of
the crisis on China. Document 34, a July 26 status report
discusses developments since the crackdown. An intelligence research report
(Document 35) asks "how did China get to this point?,"
explores the impact of the crisis on China's domestic and foreign policy,
and measures the international reaction to the crackdown. Among the judgments
reached is that the situation in China would remain unsettled "at least
until Deng Xiaoping and other party elders die."
Scowcroft and Eagleburger returned to Beijing in December 1989 to brief
Chinese leaders on President Bush’s summit meeting with Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta and to "explore the possibility of developing
a ‘road map’ toward better relations."7 In
the interim, Bush--in a concession he hoped would elicit a positive response
from the Chinese government--had vetoed legislation permitting Chinese
exchange students to remain in the US until the Chinese government improved
its human rights record.8 Despite these concessions,
the Bush administration soon realized that their efforts had not borne
fruit. Scowcroft later recalled their disappointment:
After the Chinese released only a handful of dissidents ... it
became apparent that the entire, slow process was grinding to a halt--and
we had no significant steps to point to in order to justify any normalization
of our strained relations... It is my sense that one of the most dramatic
upheavals in Eastern Europe--the fall of Nicolae Ceausescu--was the main
The Chinese had watched anxiously as communist regimes fell in Eastern
Europe in the fall of 1989 but were apparently unmoved until the bloody
end of the Ceausescu regime in Romania. "When Ceausescu was toppled," Scowcroft
recalled, "I believe the Chinese leaders panicked. It had appeared to me
that they had taken great comfort from his apparent impregnability."10
China, Premier Li Peng told his American emissaries at the December meeting,
had witnessed similar eruptions during the Cultural Revolution. "Had we
not adopted the resolute measures on June 4," he added, "the present situation
in China would be even more turbulent today."11
1999: Ten Years After
In the months preceding the ten-year anniversary of the Tiananmen Square
demonstrations Chinese government and party officials have reexamined and
often revised the official version of the military crackdown. In April
1999, Zhu Muzhi, the president of the China Society for Human Rights Studies
(a government think tank) observed that, "If the way we handled the Tiananmen
crisis was incorrect, we would not have today’s prosperity. China would
be in chaos. The people would have risen and resisted the government."
He added that, "At that time, the police were poorly equipped ... They
had never witnessed such large-scale protests ... They did not have rubber
bullets then nor gas masks... The only weapons they had were their guns."12
In a slightly more conciliatory gesture during his U.S. tour, President
Zhu Rongji told reporters that, "The episode in 1989 [happened] because
they wanted democracy but they didn’t want the rule of law. That’s why
it happened." Zhu--who as mayor of Shanghai in 1989 was credited with peacefully
resolving the demonstrations there--thus became the first senior Chinese
leader to acknowledge the democratic aspirations of the demonstrators.13
1: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, A Student Demonstration of Sorts in Tiananmen Square (November
In China, a state with significant curbs on free expression, citizens
have often used "legitimate" causes to express dissent in socially acceptable
terms. One notion that often has official support is the expression of
anti-Japanese sentiment. So it was in November 1985, when anonymous flyers
appeared urging Beijing students to stage a rally at the conclusion of
a Sino-Japanese volleyball match. While nationalistic in tone, the flyer
decried the Japanese "economic invasion" of China and also those Chinese
"princes" (a clear reference to members of the Chinese Communist Party)
who have risen to power during this time of "uneven development." Although
the demonstration was apparently rather tepid, this document points to
the possibility that "someone wanted to stir up trouble and embarrass the
authorities." Embassy comments also note the curious fact that although
the flyer was "not very complimentary toward the Communist Party … the
authorities, who clearly know about the call for a demonstration in advance
… let it proceed."
2:Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash
DC, Government Arrests Student Demonstrators (November 25, 1985)
While the first document downplays the importance of the November 20
demonstration, another cable, reporting the reaction of Chinese authorities
in the subsequent five days, draws more significant lessons. In the cable,
Embassy officials report information gleaned from an unidentified source
that Chinese security forces have detained more than 100 students and arrested
23 suspected "ringleaders" involved in the demonstration. According to
the source, "The authorities knew whom to look for because they had infiltrated
both preparations for the demonstration and the demonstration itself."
The fact that the authorities had been so concerned about controlling the
demonstration, the cable concludes, "reflects the extent to which the Communist
Party has lost the initiative on campus."
3: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, More Student Demonstrations (December 23, 1985)
Demonstrations again sprang up in December 1985, and students were increasingly
bold in their expressions of dissatisfaction with various government policies.
In one of the demonstrations, at the Beijing Agricultural University, students
decried the stationing of a PLA unit on the university campus. The document
also reports another incident, that the cables authors call "astonishing,"
which involved several hundred students from the Bejing Central College
of Nationalities who were protesting the nuclear weapons testing program
in Xinjiang Province in western China.
4: From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC,
Student Demonstrations Update (December 24, 1986)
Demonstrations again occurred in late-1986, and Embassy reports were
increasingly fearful that Chinese authorities would crack down on the students
and set back the pace of political reform. The cable notes how the recent
spate of demonstrations provoked criticism from the Chinese government
who warned that the adoption of "overly energetic methods" to express views
could affect stability and interfere with societal functions. The cable
also reports the views of several different sources, whose identities remain
classified, warning about the possible repercussions for the cause of freedom
in China if the students do not proceed more cautiously. One source reportedly
told U.S. officials that "the senior leadership was fully focusing on the
demonstrations," and that "they had multiple sources of information, including
both party and government channels." Another source, in a dinner conversation
with U.S. Ambassador Winston Lord, warned that "opponents of political
liberalization in the leadership would use the protests to underline the
dangers of democracy." The document warns that if the demonstrations become
too strident, and particularly if they are staged in Beijing, "then the
entire affair could become a net liability for reform with seriously negative
policy consequences." "A severe crackdown," the cable ominously concludes,
"would be inevitible."
5: IPAC Daily Intelligence Summary 1-87, China: Student Demonstrations
(January 2, 1987)
Demonstrations continued into January 1987 when 3,000 students defied
a government ban and staged a protest in the vicinity of Tiananmen Square
in Beijing. This intelligence summary from U.S. Pacific Command notes that
24 "troublemakers" associated with the illegal protest were apparently
detained by police for "education and examination."
6: IPAC Daily Intelligence Summary 10-87, China: Hu Yaobang Resigns
(January 17, 1987)
Later that same month, on January 17, 1987, another Pacific Command
intelligence summary reported the resignation of Hu Yaobang, from his post
as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. An advocate of both
economic and political reforms, the summary notes that Hu’s resignation
"is probably the result of the recent student demonstrations." After his
death in April 1989 students gathered in Tiananmen Square to mourn the
loss of a respected leader. What began as a profound expression of sorrow,
however, would soon develop into the massive pro-democracy demonstration
that occupied Tiananmen Square in the period preceding the crackdown of
June 3-4, 1989.
7: Memorandum of Conversation, [George Bush] Meeting with Wan Li,
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and
Member of the Politburo, People’s Republic of China (May 23, 1989)
By May 20, 1989, with no peaceful resolution of the crisis in sight,
the Chinese government declared martial law in Beijing, hoping to intimidate
the protesters to clear the square. Nevertheless, U.S. officials were still
hoping to see the standoff between the government and the student demonstrators
resolved peacefully. Three days after the declaration, U.S. President George
Bush met with the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress, Wan Li, in Washington. While the documentary record is far from
complete, this document, a heavily excised summary transcript of
their conversation, indicates that the subject of the student demonstrations
did come up at their meeting. "The President," the transcript shows, "asked
how the Chairman sees the present situation playing itself out." Wan’s
reply has not yet been declassified, but he apparently commented on some
aspect of the demonstrations, prompting Bush to ask "if this was just a
handful of all those demonstrators." Shortly thereafter, Wan cut short
his U.S. visit and, on May 27, publicly endorsed the government’s martial
8: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 2, 1989, China:
On the day before the crackdown began, the Beijing city government tightened
restrictions on the foreign media reporting on the Tiananmen Square demonstration,
and the Chinese leadership was becoming increasingly frustrated with the
persistence of the student demonstrators and their refusal to clear the
square. This document, a morning intelligence summary prepared that day
by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research for Secretary
of State James A. Baker (the first of several included in this Briefing
Book), discusses these issues and also the leadership crisis facing the
Chinese government in the midst of the demonstrations. The summary notes
that students expect that the "Goddess of Democracy" statue they erected
in the square would "anger top leaders and prompt a response." "The students,"
the document continues, "may hope an overreaction by authorities will breathe
new life into their flagging movement."
Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 3, 1989, China: Police Use
Tear Gas on Crowds
The initial moves against the students suggested to many that the Chinese
leadership was still, as of the morning of June 3, committed to a relatively
peaceful resolution to the crisis. This document describes two incidents
that in retrospect may have convinced Chinese authorities that the use
of force was necessary. The document reports, according to various sources,
that "approximatley 5,000 unarmed troops … were turned back by students
and citizens as they attempted to advance on foot to Tiananmen Square."
Later in the day Beijing police fired tear gas on crowds gathered near
the Zhongnanhai leadership compound, but the report suggests that this
was an "accidental rather than a premeditated effort to escalate the level
of force beyond that used unsuccessfully earlier in the day." With respect
to the disorderly withdrawal of the military units earlier in the day,
the summary notes that "the obvious confusion of many of the soldiers suggests
they were unprepared for the outpouring of opposition their movements triggered."
10: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, SITREP No. 27: Martial Law with Chinese Characteristics (June
This cable provides fascinating eyewitness accounts of the disorganized
and confused retreat of PLA soldiers from the center of Beijing after their
advance on Tiananmen Square was halted by crowds of demonstrators on the
morning of June 3. The document describes how the soldiers were ridiculed
by Chinese citizens and scolded by elderly women who called them "bad boys"
and "a disgrace to the PLA." One U.S. official quoted in the document described
the events as "a Chinese version of Napolean’s retreat from Moscow." Embassy
officials speculate that the soldiers were to have been used to cordon
off the square while regular police units would have moved on the crowds
with clubs in an effort to clear the square. The document suggests that
the episode galvanized the demonstrators, encouraging them to resist further
attempts to move them from the square.
11: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, SITREP No. 28: Ten to Fifteen Thousand Armed Troops Stopped at
City Perimeter by Human and Bus Barricades (June 3, 1989)
The tension in Beijing had increased sharply by the late afternoon of
June 3 when ten to fifteen thousand fully equipped troops in large truck
convoys moved toward the city center. Unlike the previous units, these
troops were helmeted and armed with automatic weapons suggesting, as this
cable does, "that the force option is real." The document describes the
movement of these troops toward the vicinity of Tiananmen Square from several
different directions, noting that, "The population appears hostile to PLA
movements into the city."
12: Cable, From: Department of State, Wash DC, To: U.S. Embassy
Beijing, and All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, TFCHO1: SITREP 1, 1700
EDT (June 3, 1989)
By the evening of June 3 the crackdown had begun in Beijing, and the
State Department created a special task force in Washington, designated
by the heading "TFCH01," to coordinate information on the situation in
China. This document, the first in this series of SITREPs, updates U.S.
embassy and consular personnel around the world on the first violent clashes
with demonstrators as PLA troops "using automatic weapons advanced in tanks,
APC’s [Armored Personnel Carriers], and trucks from several directions
toward the city center." Casualties, according to the estimates of U.S.
Embassy personnel, appear high. The cable also notes that Under Secretary
of State Robert Kimmitt had called on PRC Ambassador Han Xu to express
"deep regret at the use of force."
13: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 4, 1989, China:
Troops Open Fire
The violence that occurred on the night of June 3-4 is summarized in
this State Department morning intelligence summary for June 4. "Two weeks
after martial law was declared," the report observes, "the government again
controls the symbolic center of the country." The document describes how
civilians turned out in massive numbers and fought for seven hours to prevent
the troops from advancing on the square. In the face of overwhelming numbers
of heavily armed troops, the summary notes, "thousands of civilians stood
their ground or swarmed around military vehicles. APCs were set on fire,
and demonstrators besieged troops with rocks, bottles, and Molotov cocktails."
14: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, SITREP No. 32: The Morning of June 4 (June 4, 1989)
The crackdown continued through the night, and by early morning June
4, as this cable reports, the PLA was in control Tiananmen Square. Based
on eyewitness accounts of the violence, this SITREP is the Embassy's initial
effort to provide some detail on the final PLA assault on the approximately
3,000 demonstrators who had not yet left the square. "Some 10,000 troops,"
the document says, formed a ring around the square, and "a column of about
50 APC, tanks, and trucks entered Tiananmen from the east." Demonstrators
shouted angrily, the cable states, and "PLA troops in Tiananmen opened
a barrage of rifle and machine gun fire." Another column of military vehicles
entered soon thereafter, and more gunfire ensued, "causing a large number
of casualties." The document also describes violent PLA clashes with demonstrators
on Changan Boulevard, the main thoroughfare in the Tiananmen area, and
in other parts of Beijing. Embassy officials also report conversations
with angry citizens, some "claiming that more than 10,000 people had been
killed at Tiananmen." One woman claimed to have witnessed a tank running
over 11 people. She also told Embassy officers that she had seen PLA troops
"breaking the windows of shops, banks, and other buildings."
15: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, SITREP No. 33: June 4 Afternoon and … (June 4, 1989)
As the PLA moved to consolidate its hold on the city center in the immediate
aftermath of the crackdown, Embassy officials watched closely as tanks,
APCs, and trucks passed by the U.S. diplomatic compound, moving west toward
Tiananmen Square, reporting these movements back to the State Department.
In the space of one hour on the early morning of June 5, this cable reports,
"more than seventy tanks moving at a fast speed passed the diplomatic compound
heading toward the square." Sources also report the presence of large numbers
of burned out military vehicles scattered around the city. The document
forwards some early casualty estimates, and also reports on the release
of ten foreigners who had been detained by Chinese public security, including
several journalists. Most intriguing, however, is a report, attributed
to a Chinese-American who witnessed the Tiananmen Square violence, claiming
that, "The beating to death of a PLA soldier, who was in the first APC
to enter Tiananmen Square, in full view of the other waiting PLA soldiers,
appeared to have sparked the shooting that followed."
16: Cable, From: Department of State, Wash DC, To: U.S. Embassy
Beijing, China Task Force Situation Report No. 3 - Situation as of 1700
EDT, 6/4/89 (June 4, 1989)
As reports flowed in from the embassy in Beijing, the State Department's
China task force was busy updating other diplomatic and consular posts
around the world on the situation in Beijing. This SITREP reports the current
situation in Beijing where, "The PLA is mopping up isolated resistance,"
and notes that "casualty estimates vary from 500 to 2600 deaths, with injuries
up to 10,000." The cable also discusses the foreign reaction to the recent
events, noting especially that, "Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui called
in AIT [American Institute in Taiwan] chief David Dean in Taipei to hear
his appeal for the US to join in condemnation and consideration of sanctions."
17: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 5, 1989, China:
After the Bloodbath
By the morning of June 5 (Eastern Standard Time) the "severity of the
assault" had become clear to U.S. officials. This intelligence summary,
prepared by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
reports that, "Troops shot indiscriminately into crowds of unarmed civilians,
including women and children, often with automatic weapons… Foreign journalists
report seeing fleeing protesters shot in the back." The document notes
the large number of destroyed military vehicles littering the Beijing streets,
and reports that an undisclosed entity had "secured a university campus
where students had captured an armored personnel carrier, and issued a
warning that executions of students would begin tonight."
18: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, SITREP No. 35: June 6, 0500 Hours (June 5, 1989)
Two days after the crackdown, this report from the U.S. Embassy stated
that a western military attaché had told the U.S. military representative
that one PLA unit, the 27th Army, "was responsible for most
of the death and destruction at Tiananmen Square on June 3." The 27th,
the cable notes, was commanded by the nephew of PRC President Yang Shangkun,
a noted hardliner, and was even accused of killing "soldiers from other
units run over by the 27th APC's and tanks." The document also
indicates that a large contingent of soldiers from the 27th
had taken up position on a highway overpass, "and seem poised for attack
by other PLA units."
19: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 6, 1989, China:
Descent into Chaos
By the morning of June 6, it appeared to some in the State Department
that the situation in Beijing was teetering on the brink of political chaos
or even civil war. This Department of State morning summary describes clashes
among different PLA units, with sources claiming that in many cases the
soldiers were sympathetic with the demonstrators and often complicit in
the destruction of their own military vehicles. "At least some of the troops
still entering Beijing," the document notes, "are arriving without authorization
and are intent upon attacking the 27th Army." The document also
appears to be anticipating an intensification of the current leadership
crisis, reporting rumors that senior leader Deng Xiaoping has died or is
near death, and an attempt on the life of Premier Li Peng by one of his
own security guards in the Great Hall of the People. Moreover, Shanghai
also appeared to be heading toward some kind of violent military crackdown
as PLA troops assembled outside the city, ready to move on striking citizens
20: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, TFCH01--SITREP No. 37: June 7, 0500 Hours Local (June 6, 1989)
In this document, Embassy officials report continuing large-scale troop
movements around Beijing amid persistent but unconfirmed rumors of splits
and clashes among Chinese military units near the Nanyuan Airport. The
cable also reports the harassment of citizens by troops trying to enforce
21: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 7, 1989,
China: Tense Standoff Continues
By the time the State Department had put together this intelligence
summary for the Secretary on the morning of June 7, many of the rumors
generated in the past two days we refuted. "Despite numerous reports alleging
or predicting clashes between military units in Beijing," the summary begins,
"available evidence suggests that few—if any—significant engagements have
occurred." Reports of Deng’s death also appear to have been fabrications.
The document also mentions that Chinese troops had fired their weapons
in the direction of the U.S. diplomatic compound, shattering windows in
three of the apartments, and reports rumors that "some leaders may have
envisioned an outcome that would blame most of the atrocities on the 27th
Army, relieve its top commanders, and remove senior officials who ordered
armed action against civilians."
22: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, TFCH01--SITREP No. 38: June 7, 1900 Hours (June 7, 1989)
This intriguing cable describes a sequence of events that occurred as
a large convoy of troops from the 27th Army passed near the
Jianguomenwai diplomatic compound and U.S. embassy residences on their
way out of the city as part of a major troop rotation. In what was later
explained as a search for a sniper, the troops sprayed the compound with
automatic weapons fire. One witness, the document notes, "said the unit
was from Shenyang and that they had been on the square on the night of
June 3-4." The soldiers appeared to be aiming "at or above rooftops, but
soldiers lowered their sights (but did not fire) at any spectators who
did not cower immediately behind nearby protective cover." The cable explains
that the military had apparently chosen to replace "the much-hated 27th
Group Army unit" with the 20th in a move "apparently intended
to improve relations between the military and the residents of the city."
The incident has provoked speculation that the shootings may have been
staged as a response to the package of sanctions against China announced
by President Bush in June 5, or the decision to grant refuge to dissident
Fang Lizhi, an outspoken critic of the Chinese regime, in the U.S. Embassy
23: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 9, 1989, China:
Five days after the violence, this intelligence summary indicates that,
"Numerous arrests can be expected," and that the military appears poised
to take over the university campuses. The document suggests that Chinese
leaders have initiated a defensive campaign combining mass arrests and
detentions with vehement denials that there were heavy civilian casualties
during the military crackdown, "focusing instead on attacks and atrocities
against the police and soldiers." With regard to the brewing leadership
crisis, the report cites a "reliable source" who says that "Zhao [Ziyang]
is still in Beijing and in the custody of the hard-liners."
24: Department of State Intelligence Brief, "Current Situation
in China: Background and Prospects" (Ca. June 10, 1989)
One week after the bloody crackdown of June 3-4, State Department’s
Bureau of Intelligence and Research issued this brief, explaining the current
situation within the context of the Chinese leadership crisis that had
been broiling for two years and especially "the power struggle for the
succession to Deng Xiaoping." The document suggests that only Communist
Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang "seemed to understand the depth of public grievances
and the urgent need to address them in some realistic fashion," and that
hard-liners in the leadership saw the crackdown as an opportunity to undermine
his leadership and restore a more authoritarian government. Thus Deng split
with Zhao, his protégé, and "gave carte blanche to Yang Shangkun
and Li Peng to enforce martial law and quash the demonstrations." Commenting
on prospects for future political reforms, the document asserts that, "There
is probably little residual faith that the government can be counted on
to move forward on demands for political freedoms, an open and accurate
press, and an end to official corruption."
25: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 10, 1989, China:
Mixed Signals on Purge
On June 9, Deng Xiaoping made his first public appearance since May
16, expressing his support for the military measures imposed on the demonstrations.
This document explores the meaning of his speech, and also reports that
Chinese authorities continue to round up suspected "counterrevolutionaries"
and search for evidence to use against those responsible for the turmoil.
The authors comment that although most Chinese leaders blame a small number
of instigators for stirring up the population, "that ‘tiny group’ is likely
to include thousands of bureaucrats, intellectuals, students, and labor
26: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, SITREP No. 49, June 12, 0500 Local (June 11, 1989)
As it became apparent that the U.S. Embassy had no intention of handing
over dissident Fang Lizhi, who had taken refuge their on the night of June
5, the Chinese government, in the words of this cable, "stepped up its
anti-US rhetoric." Chinese authorities had issued an arrest warrant for
Fang and his wife, Li Shuxian, the day before, charging them with "crimes
of counter-propaganda and instigation before and during the recent turmoil."
The U.S. Embassy was accused of harboring the "criminal who created this
violence," and was warned of the potentially harmful consequences for U.S.-China
27: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 14, 1989, China:
Back to Business, But Crackdown Continues
Ten days after the crackdown Chinese leaders appeared to be trying to
portray a return to business as usual in Beijing, despite the continuing
widespread arrests of students and political activists suspected as instigators
of the Tiananmen demonstrations. This document describes the sudden public
emergence of many top Chinese officials—including some associated with
ousted party chief Zhao Ziyang—in an apparent show of support for the military
crackdown. The report also comments that "Beijing’s efforts to sell the
official version of recent events and win bureaucratic compliance with
the new hardline regime conflict with US attempts to limit repression and
honor Fang Lizhi’s request for protection."
28: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 15, 1989, China:
Accusation over Fang Lizhi
Policy makers in Washington were clearly concerned as the Fang Lizhi
episode threatened to further disrupt Sino-American relationship beyond
its current strains. This morning intelligence summary leads of with a
discussion of Chinese media reports about the affair, noting that "the
article takes care to limit blame to 'certain US personages,' 'a handful
of people in the United States,' 'some US media, particularly the Voice
of America,' and the 'US Embassy in Beijing.'" The document also reports
on fears in Hong Kong over how the colony will be governed after returning
to mainland Chinese rule in 1997. "Locals are worried that Beijing could
in the future limit civil rights in Hong Kong by declaring martial law
or a state of emergency."
29: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 21, 1989, China:
Washington policy makers also kept close tabs on the continuing crackdown
and arrest of persons associated with the demonstrations. This intelligence
report leads off with a discussion of recent arrests and executions, noting
that, "More than 1,500 have been arrested … including at least six of the
21 'Most Wanted' student leaders." The document also anticipates a Communist
Party Central Committee plenum that will ratify the removal of party secretary
Zhao Ziyang, and name a new leader.
30: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, Eyewitness Account of June 4 PLA Tank Crushing 11 Students and
Related Early Morning Events in Tiananmen Square (June 22, 1989)
This extraordinary document provides the detailed account of a source
who witnessed firsthand the violence at Tiananmen Square on the night of
June 3-4. The source indicated that the students had believed that the
soldiers would be firing rubber bullets and that "he had a sickening feeling
when he noticed the bullets striking sparks off the pavement near his feet."
His and other eyewitness descriptions represent an effort by diplomatic
reporters to gather evidence about the crackdown and get the story straight.
Most impressive in the account is the source’s graphic description of a
PLA tank crushing 11 students under its wheels on the morning of June 4.
Comments at the end of the document indicate that the source’s version
dovetails with the comments of other sources, concluding that, "We find
his account of that episode credible. His accounts of other incidents are
worth recording as other evidence becomes available."
31: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, What Happened on the Night of June 3/4? (June 22, 1989)
This document, as its authors state in the outset, "attempts to set
the record straight" about the events of the night of June 3-4. Contrary
to earlier reports in the western media, the cable asserts that many if
not most of the deaths associated with the crackdown occurred on Changan
Avenue and other streets surrounding the square, rather than on Tiananmen
Square itself. The document calls the notion that the military could have
suffered more casualties than civilians "inconceivable," but holds that
"civilian deaths probably did not reach the figure of 3,000 used in some
press reports," but believes that the figure put forward by the Chinese
Red Cross of 2,600 military and civilian deaths with 7,000 wounded to be
"not an unreasonable estimate." The cable concludes with a detailed, hour-by-hour
chronology of the events of the night of June 3-4.
32: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, TFCH01: SITREP No. 65, June 27, 1700 Local (June 27, 1989)
This Embassy cable sent three weeks after President Bush announced a
package of sanctions against the PRC, informs that a Chinese military official
had lodged a formal complaint with the U.S. defense attaché that
"strongly protested recent U.S. military sanctions." The document notes
that, in response to the military sanctions, the official had canceled
the planned visits of U.S. military officials and the discontinuation of
exchanges of military personnel and the suspension of visits with the U.S.
defense attaché. Embassy officials felt this to be a "measured response
to U.S. sanctions," indicating that the official "did not adopt a confrontational
attitude and emphasized that both sides should take a long-term view of
the military relationship."
33: State Department document entitled "Themes" (June 29, 1989)
On June 30, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary
of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger embarked on a secret mission to Beijing
that, according to Scowcroft, was meant to "keep open the lines of communication"
between the U.S. and China. This extraordinary document is a list of themes
prepared for their meetings with Chinese leaders. The document shows that
the administration stressed his personal interest in the maintenance of
good relations, and the interest of both countries in continuing strategic
cooperation. The Bush administration wanted to make clear that a harsh
crackdown a dissidents would make the broader relationship more difficult
to manage in the U.S. Although the way in which the PRC deals with those
of its citizens involved in the recent demonstrations is "an internal affair,"
the document stresses that how American people view and react to that behavior
is also "an internal affair." Emphasizing the importance of the long-term
relationship, the document notes that the president "wants to manage short-term
events in a way that will best assure a healthy relationship over time."
(Document provided by Jim Mann)
34: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Status
Report on Situation in China as of July 26, 1989"
Nearly two months after the crackdown of June 3-4 martial law still
prevailed in Beijing with, according to this brief status report, "between
100,000 and 200,000 troops" remaining in the area. This document provides
a broad sketch of the bleak situation in China, covering martial law, arrests
and executions, the leadership crisis, the mood of the Beijing population,
the faltering economy, and China's foreign relations. "Rivalries within
the Politburo," the report suggests, "are likely to heighten as the economy
worsens and Deng and other party elders sicken or die."
35: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "China:
Aftermath of the Crisis" (July 27, 1989)
This document, an intelligence research report, asks: "How did China
get to this point?" The report explores in detail the impact of the crisis
on China's domestic and foreign policy, and measures the international
reaction to the crackdown. The report also provides brief biographic sketches
of China's new leaders including Jiang Zemin, Song Ping, Li Ruihuan, and
Ding Guangen. Among the judgments reached is that the situation in China
would "remain unsettled at least until Deng Xiaoping and other party elders
1 ."It Is Necessary to Take a Clear-Cut Stand
Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) editorial,
April 26, 1989, Reprinted in Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan and
Marc Lambert. Beijing Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict, The
Basic Documents. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990), pp. 206-208.
2 .The order, issued by Li Peng, Premier of the
State Council, on May 20 stated that, "In view of the serious turmoil in
Beijing Municipality ... the State Council has decided to enforce martial
law ... so as to check the turmoil with a firm hand...", Beijing Spring,
pp. 315-316; On May 24, executive vice chairman Yang Shangkun spoke to
the Central Military Commission: "Although martial law has been declared,
some of the martial law tasks have in fact not been carried out... We can
no longer retreat and must launch an offensive... If any troops do not
obey orders, I will punish those responsible according to the military
law.", "Main Points of Yang Shangkun’s Speech at Emergency Enlarged Meeting
of the Central Military Commission," Ming pao (Enlightenment) (Hong
Kong), May 29, 1989, Reprinted in Beijing Spring, pp. 320-327.
3 .Beijing Spring, p. 401.
4 .On April 25, senior party leader Deng Xiaoping
stated that, "Comrade Yaobang was weak and retreated; he did not truly
carry through the campaign against bourgeois liberalization... He was weak
in the face of bourgeois liberalization... Now the posthumous evaluation
is too high."
South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 31, 1989,
Beijing Spring, p. 204-205; Zhao Ziyang, one of Hu’s
protégés, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (and effectively
only second to Deng Xiaoping) was also receiving harsh criticism from senior
leaders. On May 24, President Yang Shangkun noted that, "Zhao’s attitude
was the same as Hu Yaobang’s... The current events are related to the failure
to thoroughly carry out the struggle against bourgeois liberalization and
the failure to oppose spiritual pollution." Beijing Spring, p. 325.
5 .On June 6, State Council Spokesman Yuan Mu,
appeared on television to speak about the "shocking counterrevolutionary
rebellion." He stated that "We have achieved the initial--or shall we say
first step--victory in crushing the rebellion. The rebellion has not been
completely quelled, however... I wish to make it clear that we should not
have mercy for those who planned the riots and those behind-the-scenes
organizers of the riots, because the contradictions between them and us
are of an antagonistic nature." Source: Beijing Television Service, June
6, 1989, Reprinted in Beijing Spring, pp. 363-376.
6 .Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft, A World
Transformed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 110; At the meeting
Deng reportedly told Scowcroft that "China will persist in punishing those
instigators of the rebellion and its behind-the-scenes boss in accordance
with Chinese laws. China will by no means waver in its resolution of this
kind. Otherwise how can the PRC continue to exist?" A World Transformed,
7 .A World Transformed, p. 174.
8 .The Chinese, for their part, had lifted martial
law, gave vague assurances on missile sales, accredited a Voice of America
correspondent, and had released a small number of detainees.
9 .A World Transformed, pp. 178-179.
10 .A World Transformed, p. 179.
11. A World Transformed, p. 175.
12 ."China’s Growth ‘Justified Tiananmen Crackdown,’"
The Straits Times (Singapore), April 11, 1999, p. 19.
13 ."Students wanted democracy: Zhu," South
China Morning Post, April 15, 1999, p. 1.