Washington D.C. August 23, 2005 - Next week, if all goes according to plan, the United States will resume
six-party talks with North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russia and
host nation China on the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program.
The parties are trying to reach agreement on a set of principles
to guide negotiations that will lead to the dismantling of Pyongyang’s
nuclear program and the threat it poses of a destabilizing North
Korean nuclear weapons arsenal. This will be the fifth round of
these talks, which were initiated at the invitation of China in
2003 to address the crisis created in October 2002 when U.S. envoy
James Kelly accused the DPRK of violating the terms of the 1994
Framework Agreement that was supposed to halt that nation’s nuclear
weapons program in exchange for provision of light water reactors
to North Korea to meet its growing need for energy. Since 2002, North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT and
earlier this year claimed to have nuclear weapons, the number
of which has been placed at six by U.S. and other intelligence
sources.[1]
The fourth round of talks recessed on August 7
after nearly two weeks of meetings, a record, to provide time
for the six governments, North Korea in particular, to consider
the issues which were standing in way of agreement. Among the
motivations observers saw for North Korea to agree to these talks
was the country’s increasing need for energy to power mechanized
farming equipment and to produce fertilizer, key to addressing
the country’s worsening food shortages. The key sticking point
deadlocking the recent round of talks was North Korea’s insistence
that it be allowed to pursue a civilian nuclear energy program
under the proposed agreement, something the U.S. has branded a
deal-breaker in light of Pyongyang’s violation of the 1994 agreement,
though South Korea has gone on record as agreeing North Korea
has a right to a civilian nuclear program. Though
U.S. and other diplomats expressed encouragement based on the
length of the talks and the serious approach they saw North Korea
taking to the talks, additional complicating factors were North
Korea’s continued insistence that any agreement include a U.S.
commitment to remove its nuclear threat to North Korea, a threat
the U.S. insists is non-existent, the question of future aid for
North Korea, and Japan’s insistence that Pyongyang return abducted
Japanese nationals and turn over their abductors. [2]
These
talks illustrate a set of recurring themes and issues that run
through the efforts by the U.S. and its partners to bring North
Korea to the bargaining table and secure a binding commitment
that will effectively end the nuclear threat posed by the DPRK.
First of course is the challenge of reconciling North Korea’s
emphasis on addressing what it sees as the bilateral security
issue between itself and the U.S. with the emphasis placed by
the U.S. and its negotiating partners on multilateral talks in
which North Korea’s neighbors take much of the lead in pressing
North Korea to come to an agreement. Second is the challenge of
coordinating national positions among the U.S. and its partners,
highlighted by the apparent split between Washington and Seoul
on the legitimacy of Pyongyang’s desire for a civilian nuclear
energy program. Third is the role played by North Korea’s economic
situation in pushing that nation to the negotiating table and
any eventual agreement.
The
challenges of negotiating with North Korea are many, key among
them trying to probe the inner workings of a regime that was for
so long viewed as reclusive, paranoid and highly unpredictable,
even to its erstwhile Cold War allies, Russia and China.[3] In an effort
to shed new light on how the U.S. viewed North Korea and sought
to deal with this enigmatic country, the National Security Archive’s
Korea Project is seeking declassification of key documents going
back to the Nixon administration that provide significant new
evidence on policy deliberations within the U.S. government and
with allies, and on the policy goals regarding North Korea that
were pursued by three decades of U.S. administrations. To provide
additional background for the upcoming resumption of the 6-Power
Talks, the Archive is today posting a collection of documents
dating from the first Bush and Clinton administrations that illustrate
how the themes, issues and challenges seen in the current talks
have echoed through prior policy discussions.
Among the notable points highlighted by these documents
are:
- The
cycles of optimism and pessimism in U.S.-North Korean relations.
The first document demonstrates the optimism, albeit cautious,
that marked the view of the Bush I State Department about the
prospect for continued positive negotiations with North Korea
as the administration came to a close in 1992. By mid-1993, this
optimism would be replaced by bewilderment at North Korea’s reversion
to a hard-line regarding its nuclear program. The cycle would
continue through the low point of the 1993-94 nuclear crisis,
only to move back toward cautious optimism following the 1994
Framework Agreement and the start of peace talks. Relations would
reach another high point with the North-South Korean summit and
Secretary Albright’s trip to Pyongyang in 2000, only to collapse
again two years later with the revelations about Pyongyang’s cheating
under the 1994 agreement.
- The
emphasis during the first Bush and Clinton administrations on
pursuing a multilateral approach to the North Korean problem,
both in terms of addressing the nuclear problem and the larger
issue of a peace settlement for the peninsula. This delicate and
complex balancing act created problems at home and abroad, such
as:
- The complaint voiced in one document
that Washington was being whipsawed between the calls of allies
such as South Korea and Japan for pursuing diplomatic solutions
to the North Korean problem, and domestic pressures to take a
hard line.
- The struggle to design a forum for
discussing a framework for working on a peace treaty that would
give the two Koreas the lead in reaching a peace settlement, yet
also protect the interests of the other major powers such as China
and Russia.
- The U.S. desire to preserve the ability to deal with North
Korea directly on a bilateral basis to address issues such
as missile sales or terrorism that would be free of "ROK
manipulation," as one document put it.
- Assessments
of North Korea’s leadership, its rationality and ability to survive
economically or politically also swung between optimism and pessimism.
This can be seen in:
- The double-edged sword of North Korea’s
dire economic situation, which was seen as helping to motivate
Pyongyang to come to the negotiating table, but which, if left
unchecked, could lead to disastrous consequences in the event
of a total North Korean collapse. This pitted humanitarian against
diplomatic considerations, and led the U.S. to work with South
Korea to "prevent the precipitate collapse of the DPRK, since
it would present unacceptable military risks and economic costs…"
- Assessments of North Korea’s social
and political resiliency in the face of continued economic hardship,
which one analysis attributed to the "continuing strength of their
family-centered Confucian value system," as well as to the belief
North Korea’s economic woes were grounded in millennia of imperialistic
designs upon the nation.
- The fascinating argument put forward
by Stapleton Roy, long-time State Department Asia hand, that took
issue with the image of North Korea’s leaders as illogical and
unpredictable. In assessing the historic summit meeting between
the two Korean leaders Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il in June 2000
for Albright, Roy stressed that she must realize the significant
degree of continuity in North Korean policies dating back to the
period of Kim Il Sung, policies that he said were not ideologically
rigid, but able to change in response to changing circumstances
on the Korean peninsula. Roy attributed the continued survival
of North Korea, "independent and prickly," to this adaptable foreign
policy, which he argued Kim Jong Il had helped to shape during
his father’s rule.
- Following their October 2000 meetings, Secretary Albright
described
Kim Jong Il as, "someone who is practical, decisive, and seemingly non-ideological."
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
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Document
1: Memorandum,
Kartman to Anderson, Subject: Next Steps for North Korea, July
17, 1992
Source: State Department FOIA release
This document suggests the degree of cautious optimism within
the Bush administration about the future course of U.S. efforts
to engage North Korea and reduce tensions and security threats
on the peninsula in the wake of Pyongyang’s acceptance of a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA. The memorandum summarizes a paper prepared
by a departing EAP officer on next steps for North Korea. This
paper assumes that North Korea will meet U.S. preconditions, leading
to the start of policy-level talks within months. In preparation,
the U.S. would need to discuss with Japan and South Korea an agreed
framework for talks on Korean reunification, America’s role in
this process, and how U.S.-North Korean normalization fits into
the picture. The memorandum’s author, Charles Kartman, comments
that the paper’s “assumptions, particularly regarding DPRK compliance
with its nuclear obligations, may stretch available evidence…,”
but he believed they were mostly on target.
Document
2: CIA National
Intelligence Daily, Special Analysis: The World Through Pyongyang’s
Eyes, March 18, 1993
Source: CIA FOIA release
This CIA document belies the cautious optimism expressed in the
previous document, as it seeks to explain the reversion to a hard-line
stance toward the IAEA, and the planned U.S.-South Korea military
exercise Team Spirit. As summarized in the analysis, Pyongyang’s
“counterproductive” actions are seen as driven by a combination
of historical and personal factors: the regime’s belief that in
international relations compromise equals capitulation, as well
as by Kim Il-Sung’s and his son Kim Chong-Il’s perception of foreign
pressures as personal tests of their legitimacy.
Documents
3: Memorandum,
Tarnoff and Davis to Secretary of State Christopher, Subject:
North Korea: Options for Next Steps, November 6, 1993
Source: State Department FOIA release
Though heavily excised, this document provides a clear picture
of growing U.S. concerns over North Korea’s continued intransigence
about complying with its IAEA inspection safeguards commitments.
As the memorandum notes, the U.S. conditions for a third round
of U.S.-DPRK talks about the North Korean nuclear program and
suspending the upcoming Team Spirit military exercises had not
been met, as Pyongyang was rejecting the IAEA’s inspection request
and no agreement had been reached on an exchange of envoys between
South and North Korea. The continuity of the IAEA safeguards on
the North’s nuclear activities was degrading, as the surveillance
equipment was running out of power and film, increasing the possibility
that the North might be able to produce more plutonium undetected.
Compounding Washington’s problems was the fact that it was being
whipsawed by the views of allies and domestic critics, with Japan
and South Korea pressing for more diplomacy, while pundits in
the press argued for a “get tough” approach.
Document
4: Memorandum,
Gallucci to Secretary of State Christopher, in re DPRK discharge
of reactor rods from the Yongbyon reactor, ca. May 18, 1994
Source: State Department FOIA release
In this memorandum, Robert L. Gallucci, who was heading the U.S.
negotiations with the North Koreans on their nuclear program,
lays out the state of affairs regarding the most recent North
Korean actions to remove reactor rods from the Yongbyon reactor.
In essence, Gallucci believes matters have not yet reached the
point of no return in terms of maintaining some continuity of
surveillance on the North Korean reactors, but it is clear action
is needed to preserve the ability to account for the spent fuel
in the North Korean reactor. Gallucci outlines a possible course
of action in which a planned trip by Senators Nunn and Lugar to
North Korea could be used to press home to Pyongyang that the
U.S. is serious about negotiations, while the U.S. moves to publicly
state its goals and specific next steps to move toward them in
talks with North Korea.
Document
5: Cable,
SecState to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, Subject: Results
of U.S.-DPRK Talks in Geneva, August 22, 1994
Source: State Department FOIA release
In this cable, the State Department provides guidance to its
embassies on the results of the most recent round of U.S.-DPRK
talks on the North Korean nuclear program. Calling these talks
an “important step forward” in efforts to resolve this issue,
the cable outlines the elements of the proposed agreements reached
in principle so far, involving freezing the essential elements
of the North Korean nuclear program while the talks are underway,
the proposed replacement of North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors
with light-water reactor power plants, exchange of diplomatic
envoys between the two Koreas, implementation of a North-South
joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,
and U.S. willingness to provide the DPRK with assurances against
the threat or use of nuclear weapons against it. Key points remaining
to be nailed down included implementation of the IAEA safeguards
treaty, including provision for special inspections and a full
accounting of past North Korean nuclear activity, and disposition
of the spent nuclear fuel from the North Korean reactor; Summing
up, the cable notes the critical importance of sequencing these
elements of an overall agreement, comparing the final settlement
to a puzzle for which the U.S. has some, but not all, of the pieces
in place.
Document
6: State
Department Talking Points [re the Agreed Framework], ca. November
1994
Source: State Department FOIA release
These talking points, which apparently were prepared for a discussion
with Russian diplomats, summarize the main points of the Agreed
Framework reached between the U.S. and North Korea to curtail
the north’s nuclear program – which is termed not perfect but
still a major step forward in establishing a strong nonproliferation
regime on the Korean peninsula, and discusses aspects of possible
Russian involvement in implementation of the agreement, particularly
the provision of light water reactors to North Korea. The document
also notes efforts by the U.S. to consult with its allies on the
agreement, including discussions between President Clinton and
his Chinese, Japanese and Korean counterparts in Jakarta, as well
as the importance of continued rapprochement between the two Koreas
as key to the successful implementation of the agreement.
Document
7: State
Department Briefing Paper, Subject: North Korea’s Food Situation,
ca. 1996
Source: State Department FOIA release
This paper, possibly prepared for trilateral talks with Japan
and South Korea, summarizes the worsening food situation in North
Korea, which is now viewed as being nationwide and affecting not
only civilians but also military troops. The paper cites the need
for consultation with U.S. allies on any response to a international
appeal for aid, citing the need to consider the political ramifications
of any decision to provide food assistance to North Korea.
Document
8: State
Department Briefing Paper, Subject: Four Party Proposal Briefing,
ca. April 1996
Source:
State Department FOIA release
This briefing paper underscores the difficult balancing act
the U.S. was attempting in working to arrange Four Power talks
involving North Korea, South Korea, China and the U.S. on a possible
peace agreement for the peninsula. The overriding principle for
the talks is that it was for the Korean people to determine the
future of the peninsula, so the two Koreas had to take the lead
in negotiating any permanent peace treaty. Still, the U.S. and
China have interests in the matter, so the talks were being organized
to provide maximum flexibility for accommodating and expressing
the views of the four parties as they discuss how to initiate
a process that can lead to a final settlement.
Document
9: Cable,
Department of State to Moscow, Subject: Informing Russia of New
US-ROK Peace Plan, April 11, 1996
Source: State Department FOIA release
This cable provides U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Thomas Pickering
with talking points for briefing the Russian government on a new
U.S.-South Korean peace plan – the Four Power Talks discussed
in the previous document - for the peninsula, which was to be
announced by President Clinton and South Korean President Kim
Young Sam during Clinton’s upcoming visit to South Korea. This
plan is presented as the result of close consultations between
Washington and Seoul, and to impress upon North Korea the seriousness
of the proposal, the U.S. and South Korea planned to brief the
DPRK before the public announcement. In the same vein, the U.S.
was hoping Russia would use its diplomatic representatives in
Pyongyang to convey the seriousness of the proposal.
Document
10: State
Department Talking Points [in re North Korean economic situation
and food aid], ca. May 1996
Source: State Department FOIA release
This paper, apparently prepared for trilateral talks with South
Korea and Japan, lays out the points of consensus among the three
governments regarding the situation in North Korea. Essentially,
while North Korea remained in a steep decline economically, the
regime under Kim Il Sung’s son, Kim Jong Il, remains in control.
The paper outlines the evidence for deepening economic ills in
North Korea, and outlines the key points surrounding the question
of further food assistance to the country. Important questions
here involved the balancing of humanitarian concerns with other
policy goals, and how to relate food aid to the four party process.
In any event, the U.S. saw the burden of any new aid falling primarily
on South Korea, Japan and China.
Document
11: State
Department Briefing Paper, Subject: US-Japan-Korea Trilaterals,
ca. May 1996
Source: State Department FOIA release
This paper discusses the mixed record of success in U.S. policy
goals for Korea. On the plus side, good progress was being made
on the Agreed Framework, with the canning of spent fuel underway
at Nyongbyon under IAEA supervision. On the other hand, efforts
to foster a meaningful North-South dialogue seemed stalled, as
Pyongyang continued to resist official talks with Seoul. The record
for bilateral U.S.-DPRK talks was also mixed. Meanwhile, serious
challenges still faced the establishment of the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO), including securing adequate
international financing, though South Korean participation in
KEDO delegations had served to reduce Seoul’s concerns about being
left out of the arrangement. Despite continued problems on specific
points, the U.S. assessed North Korean cooperation as “good” so
far.
Document
12: Key Issue
Paper for Secretary of State-designate Madeleine Albright, Subject:
Korean Peninsula Issues, December 1996
Source:
State Department FOIA release
This paper, prepared to brief Madeleine Albright after her nomination
as Secretary of State in Bill Clinton’s second term, provides
a concise summation of U.S. policy goals and concerns on the peninsula,
as well as pressing near-term issues. Significant points that
emerge from this document include the statement that the U.S.
and South Korea had “cooperated to prevent the precipitate collapse
of the DPRK, since it would present unacceptable military risks
and economic costs,” as well as the acknowledgement that strains
had arisen between Washington and Seoul over North Korea policy,
fostered by general resentment in South Korea of any
U.S. interaction with North Korea and specifically in the wake
of the September 18 incident in which North Korean infiltrators
were discovered entering South Korea from a submarine, leading
to firefights and a search that extended into November. Despite
these South Korean concerns, the U.S. had continued to move ahead
in bilateral discussions with Pyongyang on a variety of issues
free of “ROK manipulation,” if not resistance, including preparations
to open liaison offices in their capitals, recovery of the remains
of U.S. soldiers who died north of the DMZ during the Korean War,
and negotiations on DPRK missile development and exports.
Document
13: Core
Paper for Secretary of State-designate Madeleine Albright, Subject:
Korean Peninsula Issues, December 18, 1996
Source: State Department FOIA release
This paper, also prepared to brief Secretary of State-designate
Albright, provides a one-page overview of U.S. policy regarding
the Korean peninsula. While recapitulating much of what was included
in the longer Issue Paper, noted above, it also provides a neat
summary of the potential pitfalls facing the U.S. in pursuing
its multilateral and bilateral diplomatic objectives. These included
possible provocative actions by North Korea or internal problems,
such as the deepening food shortage; persistent funding problems
for KEDO; and potential Congressional interference, based on doubts
about KEDO’s effectiveness and concerns about South Korea being
neglected in the U.S.-DPRK talks.
Document
14: Department
of State INR Paper, Subject: DPRK Nuclear Status, December 20,
1996
Source: State Department FOIA release
This INR memorandum addresses the range of problems plaguing
implementation of the Agreed Framework. Noting U.S. assessments
that Pyongyang might already have enough plutonium to build one
or two nuclear weapons, the paper underscores how failing to implement
the Framework agreement will undermine the IAEA’s ability to provide
a historical audit of the North’s nuclear activities in the past
or prevent the production of more plutonium in the future. Key
to curtailing the North’s ability to reprocess spent fuel into
plutonium was the ongoing canning of the spent fuel, a process
that had run aground on the decision by South Korea to suspend
the light water reactor project, which led the DPRK to shut down
the canning operation in November 1996 in an effort to force Seoul
to reconsider its decision.
Document
15: Department
of State INR Paper, Subject: North Korea – Food Shortage and Political
Stability, December 20, 1996
Source: State Department FOIA release
This INR report updates the situation regarding the food shortage
in North Korea, and restates the conclusion that despite the deepening
hardship, there were no clear signs of emerging domestic unrest
in North Korea. Rather than blaming the North Korean government,
its ideology and economic system for this problem, North Koreans
continue to view it as the result of millennia-old imperialistic
designs upon their country. In the final analysis, “The continuing
strength of their family-centered Confucian value system gives
this society profound resilience.”
Document
16: Memorandum,
Roy to Secretary of State Albright, Subject: Pyongyang at the
Summit, June 16, 2000
Source: State Department FOIA release
In this memorandum, Stapleton Roy attempts to provide Secretary
of State Albright with some historical perspective on the historic
North-South summit in Pyongyang. His basic argument is that while
there was much that was new in the summit, “Pyongyang is carrying
out policies that have been much discussed in the leadership and,
in some cases, were formulated and partially deployed years ago.
What appears to be a new, more lively North Korean approach is
really a return to familiar patterns, temporarily suspended after
the death of Kim Il Sung. … The North Koreans have survived, independent
and prickly, among their larger neighbors precisely because they
have not had an ideologically rigid foreign policy. On the contrary,
the policy has reacted to changing circumstances in and around
the peninsula. Kim Jong Il was a party to that policy for many
years, indeed, he helped shape it” The rest of the memorandum
provides Roy’s evidence for this argument, citing events
going back to the 1980s.
Document
17: Memorandum,
Stanley Roth to Secretary of State Albright, Subject: Your Visit
to Pyongyang, DPRK, October 19, 2000
Source: State Department FOIA release
This memorandum lays out for her approval the scenario for Secretary
of State Albright’s historic trip to Pyongyang in October 2000.
As Roth indicates, the DPRK planned to “roll out the red carpet”
for Albright, and would cooperate fully to make the visit a success.
Key to the show of cordiality was Kim Jong Il’s imprimatur on
the visit, though this also brought a degree of uncertainty into
the plans, as the schedule could change unexpectedly as the result
of his whims. Looking to the recent visit of South Korean President
Kim Dae Jung to Pyongyang for guidance, Roth argues that this
“element of unpredictability” meant that Albright needed to remain
very flexible and open to extending her visit to two days in order
to reap the maximum benefit from the discussions with the North
Korean leader. Roth also noted the hope that the trip might provide
the occasion for serious discussions on bilateral issues between
the U.S. and North Korea, including missiles and terrorism.
Document
18: Secretary
of State Albright-Kim Jong-Il Meeting: Quotations from Madeleine
Albright, Madam Secretary
(Miramax Books, 2003)
Source: Madeleine
Albright, Madam Secretary
(Miramax Books, 2003)
The memoranda of conversation recording the meetings between
Secretary Albright and Kim Jong-Il during her October 2000 visit
to North Korea have not yet been declassified. However, the quotations
provided in Secretary Albright’s memoir where she discusses her
visit are clearly taken from these memoranda, and are here provided
as additional information and context for understanding the nature
and results of their meetings.
Document
19a through 19h: Press
Briefings and Remarks by Secretary of State Albright during her
October 2000 Visit to North Korea
Source: Department
of State website
Document
19a: Remarks to Rangnang Kindergarten and World Food Program
Distribution Site, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, October
23, 2000
Document
19b: Toast
at Dinner Hosted by Chairman Kim Jong Il, Pyongyang, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, October
23, 2000
Document
19c: Toast at Lunch Hosted by Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, Pyongyang,
Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, October
24, 2000
Document
19d: Press Briefing by Richard Boucher at Koryo Hotel, Pyongyang,
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October
24, 2000
Document
19e: Press Conference, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, October
24, 2000
Document
19f: Toast at Dinner hosted by the Secretary, Pyongyang, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, October
24, 2000
Document
19g: Press Availability after Trilateral Meeting, Seoul, South
Korea, October
25, 2000
Document
19h: Press Briefing on plane en route to Washington, D.C. from
Seoul, Republic of
Korea, October
26, 2000
To provide additional context and information about Secretary Albright’s visit
to Pyongyang, the text of her remarks and press briefings given
during the trip, taken from the State Department’s archived website
materials from the Clinton administration.
Document
20: State
Department Paper, Talking Point for S/Ivanov Telephone Call, Tuesday
10/29/00 [document incorrectly dates telephone call in August],
ca October 23, 2000
Source: State Department FOIA release
This document provides a checklist of points Secretary of State
Albright wanted to make when briefing Russian Foreign Minister
Ivanov on her recent trip to Pyongyang, among other subjects.
Interesting observations include Albright’s assessment of Kim
Jong Il as “someone who is practical, decisive, and seemingly
non-ideological.” Albright also planned to express U.S. gratitude
to Russian President Vladimir Putin for his help in relaying to
Washington Kim Jong Il’s proposal for exchanging satellite launches
for long range missile restraint, which is part of the ongoing
U.S.-DPRK dialogue on missile technology.
Notes
[1] For background on the North Korean nuclear weapons
program, including estimates of its possible stockpile of weapons,
see CRS Issue Brief for Congress: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons
Program, updated May 6, 2005, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/
IB91141.pdf, as well as National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book No. 87, North Korea and Nuclear Weapons:
The Declassified Record, edited by Robert A. Wampler, available
at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/.
[2] See for example Burt Herman, “N. Korea Talks May
End Without Agreement,” Washington Post, August 3, 2005; Burt
Herman, “U.S., N. Korea Differ on Nuclear Activities,” Washington
Post, August 5, 2005; Edward Cody, “North Korea Talks Adjourn
Without Agreement,” Washington Post, August 7, 2005; Edward Cody,
“N. Korean Demand Torpedoed Arms Talk,” Washington Post, August
8, 2005; Ji-Soo Kim (AP), “North Korea Still Facing Food Shortages,”
Washington Post, August 9, 2005; and Ji-Soo Kim (AP), “S. Korea:
Peaceful Nukes in North Are OK,” Washington Post, August 11, 2005.
[3] The literature on this topic includes Chuck Downs,
Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy (The
AEI Press, 1999); Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North
Korean Negotiating Behavior (USIP Press, 1999); and Leon V.
Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea
(Princeton University Press, 1998). Important first-hand accounts
of dealing with North Korea include that provided in former secretary
of state Madeleine Albright’s memoirs, Madam Secretary
(Miramax Books, 2003), and the extensive account of the negotiations
leading to the 1994 Framework Agreement found in Joel S. Wit,
Daniel B. Poneman and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The
First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Brookings Institution Press,
2004). A fascinating window on how frustrating Pyongyang could
be to its communist allies is provided in the documentation being
collected by Korea Initiative, headed by Dr. Kathryn Weathersby,
at the Cold War International History Project, housed at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars; see for example “Newly
Available Evidence Offers Insights into North Korea’s Thinking,
Actions “, by Dana Steinberg, Wilson Center staff writer,
April 25, 2005, at http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=116812.