Washington D.C. October 18, 2005 - The National Security
Archive today posted a series of declassified U.S. intelligence
documents and other U.S. agency reports on Saddam Hussein's human
rights abuses, one of which is the subject of the first trial
of Saddam which begins tomorrow in Iraq. The first set of charges
concerns Saddam's responsibility, along with seven co-defendants,
for the 1982 massacre of 143 Shiites in Dujail, a town 35 miles
north of Baghdad, after an unsuccessful assassination attempt
against Saddam. Procedures for the trial are the subject of significant
controversy, as
reported by the New York Times' John Burns today.
The Archive's posting gives a preview of the evidence that the
U.S. government may be providing to the trial process.
Saddam may face up to a dozen trials for crimes alleged to have
been committed by his regime - among them the gassing of Kurds
in Halabja and the suppression of a Shiite uprising in the south.
However, in September it was reported that the Iraqi government
may waive further proceedings if Saddam is convicted in the first
trial, a conviction which could bring the death penalty. (Note
1)
During his years in power, the U.S. Intelligence Community produced
estimates and studies of Iraq's foreign and defense policies,
its military capabilities and activities, and analyses of the
regime's domestic policies and actions. Other U.S. agencies, both
before and after the termination of Saddam's rule, also produced
reports on the regime's internal activities.
The collection below contains a number of documents produced
by U.S. agencies over the last thirty years concerning the Iraqi
regime's policies and activities directed at maintaining itself
in power and eliminating or neutralizing opposition to the regime.
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1
NIO/Middle East
The Implications of the Iran-Iraq Agreement
May 1, 1975. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This State Department- CIA- Defense Intelligence Agency analysis explores the
implications of the March 1975 agreement between Iran and Iraq
on border issues. One result of the agreement was Iran halting
aid to the Kurdish forces who opposed the Iraqi regime. A key
element of the study is an examination of the impact of the agreement
on the Kurds' ability to oppose the regime
Document 2
Director of Central Intelligence
NIE 36.2-1-79, Iraq's Role in the Middle East
June 21, 1979. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
While this national intelligence estimate focuses primarily on
external affairs it also deals with topics such as the nature
of the regime and regime politics. Its principal judgments include
the observation that "Iraq's Ba'athist leaders are determined
to perpetuate themselves in power, to impose their national, socialist,
and secular philosophy on the country" and "The 40-year-old
civilian Saddam Husayn is likely to succeed the ailing President
Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr …"
Document
3
Director of Central Intelligence
SNIE 34/36.2-82, Implication of Iran's Victory Over Iraq
June 8, 1982. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This special national intelligence estimate explores both the
domestic and foreign implications of Iran's apparent (in 1982)
victory over Iraq in their then two-year old war. Included in
the estimate is an analysis of Iranian and internal challenges
to Saddam's role and the likely nature of a successor regime.
Document
4
Director of Central Intelligence
SNIE 36.2-83, Prospects for Iraq
July 19, 1983. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This estimate also explores the domestic and foreign implications
of Iraq's continued war with Iran. Two sections deal with the
domestic impacts - one focuses on economic issues, the other on
the political impact of the war. The political impact section
examines regime weaknesses and strengths, possible succession
scenarios, and opposition groups. The estimate's key judgments
included the belief that "Saddam will remain in power for
the two-year period of this Estimate, but in our judgment his
regime has become more brittle. It is more … dependent on
fear as an instrument of control …"
Document
5
Central Intelligence Agency
Iraq: Foreign Intelligence and Security Services
August 1985. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
A key factor in Saddam's ability to maintain power were the regime's
intelligence and security services. This appears to be the only
one of the CIA's "Foreign Intelligence and Security Service"
studies to be officially released. It focuses on the functions,
organization, and administrative practices of the Iraqi Intelligence
Service, Director of Military Intelligence, and the Directorate
General of Security, as well as key personalities.
Document
6
Central Intelligence Agency
Political and Personality Handbook of Iraq
January 1991. Secret
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room
In the summary to this study, it is noted that Saddam had built
a powerful, centralized political machine with only himself and
a few trusted family members and lieutenants making virtually
all policy decisions. The handbook's main body contains a section
on Saddam's Iraq which covers the country's social structure and
identity, the structure of the government, the Ba'ath Party and
the security services. Other topics examined in the handbook include
the men around Saddam, his inner and outer circles, and key military
commanders.
Document
7
Central Intelligence Agency
Iraq: Domestic Impact of the War
January 25, 1991. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This report, by the CIA's Office of Near Eastern and Asian Analysis,
was written soon after the initiation on operation Desert Storm
in January 1991. Among the domestic impacts it considers are the
economic consequences as well as the political climate.
Document 8
Central Intelligence Agency
Iraq: Implications for Insurrection and Prospects for Saddam's
Survival
March 1991. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This analysis, also produced by the agency's Near Eastern analysis
office, focuses solely on the prospect that Saddam would survive
the aftermath of Iraq's defeat in the Persian Gulf War. It begins
by noting that Saddam "faces his most serious political challenge
in more than twenty years of power." It examines possible
outcomes to the insurrection as well as scenarios for a coup.
Document 9
Director of Central Intelligence
SNIE 36-2-91, Iraq: Saddam Husayn's Prospects for Survival
Over the Next Year
September 1991. Secret
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room
Six months after the CIA's Near Eastern analysis office completed
its assessment of Saddam's prospects for survival the entire Intelligence
Community produced a Special National Intelligence Estimate on
the same topic. In a memorandum included as a preface to the main
body of the estimate, acting director of central intelligence
Richard Kerr informed readers that "the key value of this
paper is its appraisal of the intense internal and external pressures
on the regime in Iraq."
Document
10
Director of Central Intelligence
NIE 92-7, Saddam Husayn: Likely to Hang On
June 1992. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
The title to this 1992 national intelligence estimate provided
the Intelligence Community's conclusion as to Saddam's immediate
prospects. The body of this estimate discussed how Saddam was
'tightening his grip' and 'extending his reach in the South' and
putting 'pressure on the Kurds.' It concludes with a discussion
of why Saddam's survival over the near term was judged likely.
Document
11
Central Intelligence Agency, Special Intelligence Memorandum
Humanitarian Situation in the Marshes, August 20, 1993
August 20, 1993. Top Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This special intelligence report notes that deteriorating living
conditions in Iraq's southern marshlands had prompted some Iraqi
Shiites to flee to Iran or to locations elsewhere in Iraq and
that "Baghdad continues to deny the UN and international
relief organizations access to the marshes."
Document
12
Director of Central Intelligence
NIE 93-42, Prospects for Iraq: Saddam and Beyond
December 1993. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
Among the key questions examined in this late 1993 national intelligence
estimate were the prospects for the survival of Saddam's regime,
the impact of sanctions and diplomatic isolation on Saddam's survival,
the most likely means of regime change, the characteristics and
policies of likely successors, and the prospects of political
stability after Saddam. It includes the observation that the Intelligence
Community did not "anticipate receiving significant intelligence
indications that a successful coup is imminent," since "any
group of anti-Saddam conspirators that cannot keep their plot
secret from US intelligence is not likely to keep it secret from
Saddam's security services."
Document
13
Department of State
Saddam Hussein's Iraq
September 1999. Unclassified
Source: Department of State
This heavily illustrated Department of State publication was
aimed at the American public and international audiences. It explores
the impact of sanctions, Iraqi obstruction of the oil-for-food
program, regime misuse of resources, repression of the Iraqi people,
and war crimes committed by the regime.
Document
14
Director of Central Intelligence
Putting Noncombatants at Risk: Saddam's Use of "Human
Shields"
January 2003. Unclassified
Source: Central Intelligence Agency
This unclassified Intelligence Community study examines Saddam's
use of both foreigners and Iraqis as human shields. Specific topics
include the manipulation of Iraqi and foreign volunteers, and
placing Iraqi civilians and civilian facilities at risk.
Document
15
U.S. Agency for International Development
Iraq's Legacy of Terror: MASS GRAVES
January 2004. Unclassified
Source: Agency for International Development
In the aftermath of the end of Saddam's regime mass graves were
uncovered at numerous sites in Iraq. This Agency for International
Development publication shows the location of the graves, which
British Prime Minister Tony Blair estimated contained the bodies
of as many as 400,000 Iraqis, and discusses the history involved
as well as including stories of the survivors.
Note
1. Ellen Knickmeyer, "Iraq May Forgo Multiple
Trials is Hussein Is Convicted in First," Washington
Post, September 5, 2005, p. A25; Sebastian Allison, "Saddam
to be tried in 1982 massacre," Washington Times, September
5, 2005, p. A15.