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## GLOSSARY

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<th>ABBREVIATION</th>
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<th>ENGLISH</th>
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<td>DGL</td>
<td>مكتب الأمان العام</td>
<td>Office of National Security</td>
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<td>DCS</td>
<td>مكتب الأمن العام</td>
<td>Directorate General of Intelligence</td>
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<td>DMI</td>
<td>مكتب الأمن العام</td>
<td>Directorate General of Security</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>جهاز مكافحة الامن</td>
<td>Directorate of Military Intelligence</td>
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<td>مكتب الاتحاد العام</td>
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Intelligence and Security

A. General

The Iraqi intelligence and security services, as presently constituted, date from the assumption of political power by the Ba'th Party in 1968, though two of the three primary services trace their roots to the 1930s. The Iraq Intelligence Service (Jihaa al-Mukhabarat al-Iraqi—JIS), known through much of its existence as the Directorate General of Intelligence (Mudiriyyat al-Mukhabarat al-'Amma—DGI), began as the security organ of the Ba'th Party and became the predominant service in the early 1970s. The Directorate General of Security (Mudiriyyat al-'Ammal-'Amma—DGS) and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (Mudiriyyat al-Istikhbarat al-'Ashariyya—DMI) appeared in a form similar to their present organization in the reforms of the 1950s resulting from the Intelligence and Security Failings of 1948. The DGS, subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, is one of three directorates in the Ministry, along with the police directorate and the nationality directorate, which perform security functions.

Over this structure is the Office of National Security, which is the policy-level organ for supervising the activities of the intelligence and security-related organizations. Also acting as oversight, though more as a cross-check on the loyalty of senior officials and on the accuracy of security reporting, is the presidential security organ. The common mission of these organizations is the protection of the regime of President Saddam Hussein and the position of the Ba'th Party. Most key intelligence and security positions are held by persons related to the president.

1. Background and development of services

British-Indian military forces occupied southern Iraq in 1914 after the outbreak of Anglo-Turkish hostilities and from this base gradually occupied the rest of the country. A police force, organized along British-Indian lines, was established. When Great Britain's role as the dominant power in Iraq was confirmed under a League of Nations mandate approved in 1922, the Ministry of Interior was created by the British Military Administration, and the police were placed under the Ministry's jurisdiction. The mandate ended in 1932, and Iraq became an independent state. British supervision and guidance of the police and security forces, nevertheless, continued until the late 1940s when British influence in the area declined.

The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the Iraqi police was organized in 1917 with the initial objective of providing internal security for military movements. After conclusion of World War I, CID activities were modified to include political police and civil security functions. Iraqi personnel gradually increased in the CID, and by 1930 only the senior officer was British. A military counterpart to CID existed from the end of World War I until the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. This organization was nominally responsible for military intelligence collection, but its main activities were focused on providing military security and ensuring the loyalty to the regime of the armed forces.

In the aftermath of the war with Israel the Iraqi Government became aware of its shortcomings in intelligence collection and in security protection. Military intelligence was reorganized at the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The CID was removed from its position in the police establishment to become, in 1957, in accordance with the Fourth Regulation Number 8, the Directorate General of Security (DGS) under the Ministry of Interior.

The government of King Faisal II was overthrown in July 1958 by a military coup which in turn was replaced by another regime in 1963.
basic responsibility for public order rested in the Ministry of Interior which, in 1968 on the eve of the assumption of power by the Ba’th Party, was organized into three main directorates, to wit, security, nationality and police. The DGS was responsible for the detection and suppression of crimes against the state. The Directorate of Nationality, which was a part of the DGS until 1987 when it was separated and became a directorate on the level of the DGS, was charged with control of aliens, registration, naturalization, issuance of passports and exit permits.

In 1969 the Public Relations Bureau (Maktab al-’Alaqi al-Amma—PRB) first appeared. The PRB was in effect the intelligence and security organ of the Iraqi Ba’th Party, and it was formed by Saddam Husayn, then vice president. In 1970 the PRB’s name was changed to Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI); in 1984 it was changed again to Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). The PRB/DGI functioned as a power base for Saddam Husayn in his struggle for political dominance with President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr until 1979 when Husayn replaced Bakr.

Major shake-ups and reorganizations of the Iraqi services took place in 1973 following the attempted coup by DGS chief Nazim Qazar and in 1983 after the dismissal of DGI chief Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti. As a check on the reporting accuracy and loyalty of members of the intelligence and security services a palace-based security organization was formed in 1983 under Husayn Kamal al-Maliki, a cousin of Saddam Husayn. In the same period a new Office of National Security was created with the mission, in principle, of coordinating the activities of the several services.

Of significance in the Iraqi services is the fact that key senior positions are occupied by tribal relatives of President Saddam Husayn who, since coming to power in 1979, has been able to prevent development of sustained domestic opposition to his regime.

2. Structure and objectives

The structure of the Iraqi intelligence and security services consists of five elements. These are the Office of National Security, the presidential security organization, Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) of the Ministry of Defense, and Directorate General of Security (DGS) of the Ministry of Interior. These are shown in Figure 1. The locations of the headquarters in Baghdad of the IIS, DMI and DGS are shown in Figure 2.

The national objectives of these organizations are basically threefold: The first objective is the security of the regime, the protection of its leaders and the perpetuation of Ba’th Party control of the instruments of political power. All five organizational elements share to varying degrees this national objective. The presidential security organization and the DGS, aided by the military elite Republican Guards, however, are the primary organizations for accomplishment of this objective. The IIS contributes to fulfillment of the objective through operations targeted at dissidents and other overseas opponents of the regime and through security activities in the Ba’th Party. The DMI contributes through domestic security operations involving the military.

The second national objective is to conduct subversive activities directed against certain Near Eastern countries. First among these is Iran, and other states include Syria, Israel, and Libya. The basic instrument for accomplishing this objective is the IIS, but the service is also assisted by the DMI. Tactics of implementation include the recruitment of nationals of these countries, giving support to dissident groups and, where necessary, assassination, kidnapping and other acts of violence.

The third national objective is the collection of positive intelligence abroad. The IIS and the DMI are the essential elements in reaching this objective, with the IIS focused on political, economic and counterintelligence operations and the DMI focused on the acquisition of military and technological information. The DGS also operates to a limited extent abroad, but primarily in connection with the protection of Iraqi installations and personnel.

In late 1988 a Supreme Committee for State Security reportedly was organized and Ali Husayn al-Maliki was appointed chief. Presumably a successor to the National Security Council which had been formed in 1974 and which consisted of the President, Minister of Interior, and the director of the DGI, DMI and DGS, the Supreme Committee was
given authority to oversee and coordinate the activities of the intelligence and security services. The continued existence of this committee, however, is in doubt though there is evidence that the Office of National Security occupies the equivalent position but with somewhat different responsibilities. With the three services more compartmented from each other than before the Iran-Iraq War and with more clearly defined lines of jurisdiction, the channels of direct reporting to the president's office have been enhanced. Accordingly, the oversight and coordination role of the Supreme Committee apparently has been replaced by an office whose purpose is to consider and recommend to the President important Interservice and national positions. While the composition of the office is not known, it is believed to be similar to the earlier National Security Council.

In addition to these changes, a presidential security organ was established in 1983 to ensure the protection of President Saddam Hussein and other senior officials. This organization, under the leadership of Hussein Kamal al-Malid, appears to be a cross-check on the loyalty of other officials and on the accuracy of the reporting of the three main intelligence and security services.

Support for the activities of the intelligence community comes largely from the other two directorates of the Ministry of Interior. The Directorate General of Police is responsible for all normal civil police matters including supervision of the customs and the physical protection of the railroads, ports and certain government installations. The Directorate General of Nationality, which was established in 1967, is concerned with the control and supervision of aliens, and matters relating to immigration, emigration and the issuance of passports.

3. Political aspects

The Public Relations Bureau (PRB), formed and initially headed by then Vice President Saddam Hussein, assumed the preeminent role in the Iraqi intelligence and security community following the takeover in 1968 of the government by the Ba'th Party. The PRB, whose name was changed to the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) in 1973
and to Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in 1984, has since its inception been a highly politicized security and information-gathering instrument of the regime. President Husayn has used the intelligence and security services, particularly the IIS, as vehicles for control of the party, the government and the Iraqi people. The people have been intimidated, political opposition groups have been penetrated, and a number of their leaders and relatives have been imprisoned or executed.

Interservice rivalry of the IIS and Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) played an important role in the political competition between President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Vice President Saddam Husayn in the late 1970s as the latter maneuvered to replace Bakr. With the success of this endeavor in 1979, Husayn appointed a half brother, Barzan al-Tikriti, as chief of the DGI, only to dismiss him four years later in part because Barzan was suspected by the President of building a political power base within the service and in part because he abused his position by alienating too many high personalities. During the period of his directorship, especially the first years, Barzan shared responsibility with Sa'dun Shakti, current Minister of Interior. This pattern of checking on the service chiefs reflects the President's distrust of the leadership of the IIS. He has used the presidential security organ, headed by his son-in-law, as a means of confirming the accuracy of intelligence information and the loyalty of the services' leadership. Additionally he has assigned his son, Uday, as an assistant to the IIS Director, thus providing a presidential watchdog within the service. The President has depended extensively in staffing the upper echelons of the three main services on Tikriti clan blood and in-law relatives, though he did not hesitate to dismiss Barzan and two other half brothers from their positions in 1983 and to replace them with other elements of the clan. Current rising elements in the clan include Husayn Kamal al-Majid, head of the presidential security organ, and Husan Ali al-Majid, chief of the Directorate General of Security (DGS) and reportedly also director of the military bureau of the Ba'th Party.

Political appointments and career intelligences and security officers have alternated leadership in the three main services. Present Minister of Interior Sa'dun Shakti and IIS chief Fadil al-Baraaq, for example, have lengthy careers in the intelligence and security fields.
An effort was made in 1976 and 1977 to improve DNI reporting and operational procedures with implementation of the Strategic Intelligence Work Plan, a program largely designed under Soviet guidance.

The Iraq/Soviet agreement of 1973 was meant to improve the quality and effectiveness of DGS operations. The attempted coup by DGS chief Nazim Qazaz in mid-1973, however, led to the dismissals and transfers of many officers. The purge resulted in loss of expertise and efficiency as the service was reduced in size and underwent reorganization. In 1978 then-Vice President Saddam Hussein addressed the DGS staff and urged his listeners to protect the liberties of Iraqi citizens and not inadvertently turn the people against their government through harsh treatment. The DGS nevertheless is viewed as an efficient and ruthless service whose primary mission is protection of the regime, not the rights of the people.

IIS Barzan al-Tikriti was accused of using his position for political power purposes and of withholding information. In the DGS Nazim Qazaz showed his disloyalty.

The purges in the IIS and the DGS following the ousting of Barzan and Qazaz appeared to indicate that both services contained significant seeds of opposition to the regime, though the purges may have represented more a paranoid reaction by the regime rather than a legitimate political threat. While the basic loyalty of the rank and file of the three services to the Ba’th Party is not seriously in doubt, senior IIS leaders question the loyalty of lower personnel to them and to the president. Evidence of disloyalty or infraction of regulations by personnel are dealt with harshly.

d. Morale—The pay freeze order in early 1983 affecting both staff and agent salaries is known to have created discontent within the IIS and the other intelligence and security services. Later in that year the morale of IIS personnel was affected by the dismissal of Barzan al-Tikriti and the subsequent purge of officers considered loyal to him at the expense of the president. The appointment of Saddam Husayn’s then twenty-year-old son, Uday, as a deputy director of the IIS and his role as presidential watchdog within the service is believed to have disquieted some of the staff. The selection of Fahil al-Barraq as chief in 1984 helped morale but doubts still exist over the loyalty of some lower-ranking officials.

Morale within the DGS largely has reflected the view of staff members of the chief of the service. In the wake of the dismissal and execution of Nazim Qazaz in 1978, the purge of personnel thought associated with and loyal to him, and the reduction in size of the DGS, Abd al-Khalik ‘Abd al-Aziz was appointed DGS chief.
Disciplinary measures within the intelligence and security services are strict. Actions range from arrest and execution to dismissal and isolation for political maneuvering in potential opposition to the regime. The periodic personnel purges, primarily in the IIS and the DGS, have been swift and operationally disruptive. Defectors from the services have been executed and violations of regulations and noncompliance with instructions have been dealt with by imprisonment, dismissal or transfer. Besides each service's internal disciplinary control, the palace-based security organ has functioned as a cross-check on adherence to presidential dictates in the security field.

B. Iraqi Intelligence Service

1. Functions

The Iraqi Intelligence Service (Jihaz al-Mukhabarat al-Iraqi—IIS), known until 1984 as the Directorate General of Intelligence, is the organization responsible for counterintelligence, overall political security, and foreign intelligence collection. Beginning essentially as the security arm of the Ba'th Party, under the name Public Relations Bureau, the IIS functions more in the domestic political realm than elsewhere in the intelligence community. It worked particularly closely with the Directorate General of Security (DGS) on domestic activities until 1978 when an effort was made to align the service more toward its foreign objectives while nevertheless maintaining general supervision over domestic security operations. This arrangement continues to the present. The functions assigned to the IIS are the following:

- Monitors the activities of other Iraqi national intelligence and security organizations.

- Engages in counterintelligence operations involving Ba'th Party organs.

- Gathers intelligence on opponents of the Ba'th Party government.

- Surveys and monitors the activities of Iraqi students abroad and Iraqis living in exile.

- Plans for and undertakes executive action operations against selected dissidents and other political opponents.

- Collects positive intelligence abroad.

- Conducts subversive activities against selected Near Eastern countries.

- Targets operations against foreign intelligence services.

- Maintains a special forces-type unit in Baghdad to respond to security incidents.

The IIS has personnel assigned abroad in Baghdad and at regional locations around the country.

2. Organization

The headquarters of the IIS is located in the Mansur sector of Baghdad on the west side of Damascus Street (see Figure 2 city map). The complement of the service is estimated to number about 8,000 members. The chief of the IIS since 1984 has been Fadil al-Buraq. Organizationally the service is divided into eight main departments (Figure 3). The administration department has units handling administrative affairs, personnel, finances, transportation, and general services. The information and records department contains the central files, provides records computer programming, maintains the reference library, and handles research projects involving overtly published foreign material. There are smaller similar archival units in the secret operations and counterintelligence departments. The secret operations department is responsible for operational activity abroad and is divided into seven geographic branches encompassing most countries of the world. The counterintelligence department is focused on acquiring information regarding foreign espionage in Iraq. The department is organized in geographic and functional units and it works closely with the DGS. The internal security department is essentially the security office of the service. It has units for physical and personnel security and is engaged in...
providing documentation and armaments as required by the service. The Investigations department conducts interrogations and investigations of suspects and has a judicial unit for prosecutions. A fourth unit administers the prisons under the jurisdiction of the service. There are regional offices of the IIS located in the principal cities and towns of Iraq. The service is responsible for security matters pertaining to the Ba'ath Party. Additionally, despite efforts to delineate the primary external nature of the service from the domestic responsibilities of the DGS, the IIS remains marginally involved in internal operations. The technical affairs department is engaged in supporting the technical operational requirements of the service and has units for equipment, technical penetration operations, censorship and chemicals used in operational projects.

3. Administrative practices

Preference is given in the consideration and selection of personnel for the IIS to candidates from Tikrit, from which the President and a number of
other senior officials come. An individual from the
Baghdad or al-Askar area is favored over one from
Mosul in the north. Members of ethnic groups like
the Kurds are essentially excluded from consider-
ation. While Sunni Muslims are preferred, Shi'as are
also recruited into the IIS as are a few Iraqi
Christians. Political clearance is a requirement and
nearly all candidates are Ba'ath Party members prior
to their induction into the intelligence service.
Military training and experience is a desirable
qualification, though it is not a requirement.

Newly Inducted IIS officers, including some who
have completed the military intelligence school
course, take a basic intelligence course which in-
cludes instruction in the selection and handling of
agents, security procedures, surveillance techniques,
clandestine communications, counterintelligence,
and administrative functions. In the early 1980s this
course was given at the DCI Training Institute
located in the intelligence service's Baghdad head-
quarters compound. The counterintelligence section
of the course lasted six weeks and was presented
four times each year to a class ranging from 40 to
800 students.

Certain IIS officers have been given training
abroad. In the mid-1970s groups of 30 to 40 stu-
dents underwent training in the USSR for six
months and smaller groups were trained there in
two-month courses.

To automate recordkeeping in 1989 the DCI
information and records department's computer
programming unit was planning to microfilm the
service's files and records. In 1993 the Iraqis were
negotiating to purchase a computer records system
costing US$7.7 million with a capability of handling
data on two million persons. Indications were that
the system would be used to keep track of disidents
and other opponents of the regime.
HS agent operations abroad focus on those countries where elements in opposition to the regime of Saddam Husayn congregate. Primary attention is on Iraqis living in exile who are active in dissident movements, Kurdish nationalists, members of the Iraqi Communist Party, and the overseas Assyrian community.

In the Near East, HS operational attention has concentrated on Iran, Syria, Libya and, until the death of Anwar Sadat, on Egypt. Besides being objects of normal intelligence collection, several of these countries have represented targets for Iraqi efforts to destabilize the incumbent regimes through contact with and encouragement of the respective dissident movements.

Money used in recruitment approaches has been at times excessive when judged against the information to which the agent candidate presumably had access. To tighten up in 1983 in the face of military expenses and economic stress brought on by the Iran-Iraq War, staff salaries for a time were frozen.
Information on the eventual termination of agents is lacking. Not lacking is data on the strong methods undertaken by the IIS against personnel judged to have broken the faith with the service. In one instance a former IIS operations officer

Another example, two Iraqis, perceived to be opponents of the regime, were poisoned by being forced to drink thallium. The tactic of violence is a common thread in both domestic security practices and in methods employed abroad. Without regard for host country sensitivities the IIS has not hesitated to use criminal elements to rough up opponents. Acts of violence have taken place in several Near Eastern countries and in Western and Eastern Europe. Locally assigned IIS personnel have perpetrated some of these acts, but more often the local station has provided support in funds, weapons, communications and exfiltration for terrorists and others traveling into the target country from elsewhere.

The emergence in late 1982 and growth of the palace-based security organization under Hasan Kamal al-Majid, a relative of the President, led to reports of lack of coordination between Majid's unit and the IIS. With the replacement of IIS chief Barzan al-Tikriti by Fadil al-Barzaq in 1984 this relationship presumably improved, though the basic purpose of the presidential organization is to function as a cross-check on the loyalty of members of the IIS and the other intelligence and security services. This role is underscored by the presence of the President's son, Uday, as a deputy director of IIS.

As the senior service in Iraq since the Ba'ath Party assumed power in 1963, the IIS coordinated and supervised the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Directorate General of Security (DGS) until early 1983 when the DMI was brought into closer contact with the presidential office. The IIS relationship with the DMI during much of the 1970s was embroiled in the political maneuvers between President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and then Vice President Saddam Hussein. In the late 1970s DGI Director Barzan was unpopular in the DMI due to his attempts to increase his control over military intelligence, and he is believed to have been instrumental in the replacement of the DMI chief. In early 1983 Barzan issued a general instruction to the intelligence services freezing staff
officer pay and delaying agent payments, actions which increased discontent within the services. With the appointment of Barraq as head of the IIS in 1984 it has been reported that he shares responsibility for management of the IIS with the Chief of the DMI, Mahmoud Shakir Shahnin, thus ensuring better interservice coordination. Until 1973 there was a jurisdictional problem between the DGI and the DGS. In that year a division of responsibility more clearly defined their internal security roles, with the DGI retaining primary connection with Ba'th Party security. As a former DGS chief, IIS chief Barraq is conversant with the DGS, and this should afford better relations between these services.

There is no evidence that the close liaison relationship which existed in the early 1970s between the DGI and the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) has continued in recent years. Despite President Saddam Hussein's position as chief of the IIS predecessor organization in 1972 when the 15-year Iraqi/Soviet Friendship Treaty was signed and the 1978 bilateral agreement for intelligence and security cooperation was concluded, relations between the two services cooled after the attempted coup by [DGS chief Azadun Qabar in 1973].

C. Directorate of Military Intelligence

1. Functions

The Directorate of Military Intelligence (Muctayat al-I'tikhbarat al-'Askariyya—DMI) is the organization responsible for collection of military information and for security within the military establishment. Subordinate to the Ministry of Defense since the reorganization of the Iraqi Intelligence and Security Services community in the wake of the fallings made evident by the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the DMI was brought into close contact with the presidency in early 1985. The functions assigned to the DMI are the following:

- Collects military intelligence abroad including technical research and development information and political and economic information bearing on military capabilities and intentions.
- Gathers information abroad on Iraqi political dissidents and their organizations.
- Supports operations abroad to eliminate political dissidents opposing the regime.
- Conducts counterespionage operations.
- Investigates evidence of subversion in the military forces and seeks to ensure political loyalty.
- Handles internal security investigations in the military and in those civilian activities involving the military.
- Maintains liaison with and monitors activities and contacts of foreign military attaches in Iraq.

DMI officers are assigned abroad as military attaches, they are assigned to varous communications and organization throughout the country.
2. Organization

The DMI is secondary in importance to the Iraqi Intelligence Service and is on a par with the Directorate General of Security (DGSR). The headquarters of the service is located in the Ministry of Defense complex in the Abbassia Palace area of Baghdad (see Figure 2 city map). The chief of the DMI, since 1980, is Mahmoud Shaker Shahnin.

The service is divided into four main departments as shown in Figure 4. The external intelligence department is responsible for overseas information collection, and it is divided into one functional and four geographic branches. The functional branch handles signal intelligence. The geographic branches are for Iran, Israel, the Arab countries and the non-Arab countries. The internal security department deals with military security and has au-
authority to investigate cases involving civilians which affect the military. These latter investigations are undertaken in coordination with the DGS, and the DMI usually takes a subordinate role. The department has offices in major Iraqi towns. These offices have direct communications with DMI headquarters in Baghdad, thus bypassing local military commanders. One of the DMI's internal duties, in fact, is to report on the local commanders. What is known as the 7th branch deals with foreign military attaches in Iraq. It is an office under the direct supervision of the DMI Director. Besides monitoring the contacts and activities of the military attaches, members of this branch try to elicit information from the attaches. Also reported to exist is a special component of the DMI for the interrogation of prisoners of war, a task which has become increasingly important during the course of the Iran-Iraq War.

The technical affairs department handles staff communications, technical support duties. The administrative department deals with personnel, logistics, finance, and other support work. In 1986 it was estimated that there were upwards to 1,000 members, not including informants, in the DMI. This figure is probably considerably higher in 1988 and is judged to approximate 3,000.

3. Administrative practices

Selection of staff personnel for the DMI is largely from the military services. Candidates are also civilians with education abroad and experience in foreign affairs. In 1988 the military intelligence school conducted two courses each year, with about fifty students in each course. Most of the students were selected from among graduates of the military college and from those recommended by military unit commanders. The training included general intelligence subjects in the operational, administrative and technical fields, plus language instruction in Hebrew and Farsi. DMI officers were scheduled to receive refresher and advanced intelligence courses every two years. Additionally, some DMI officers in 1988 received training at the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) school after completing courses at the military intelligence school.

Training has also been provided to DMI officers at facilities abroad, and foreign instructors have participated in training programs in Iraq. According to one of the four terms of an agreement in 1973 between Iraq and the Soviet Union, the Soviets agreed to provide training to Iraqi personnel engaged in security work. In 1978 a document entitled "Strategic Intelligence Work Plan" was prepared, apparently under Soviet direction, confirming the general terms of the 1973 agreement. The work plan, which was signed by the Director of the DMI, stipulated intelligence collection objectives and showed that the DMI had benefited from Soviet intelligence training. Soviet training conducted in Iran consisted of six-week courses in general tradecraft and included officers from the DGI along with the majority of DMI students. Training in the Soviet Union consisted of courses lasting from two to six months, with thirty to forty students in each course. Participants were from the DGI and the DGS in addition to the DMI. Soviet training dropped off in the 1970s as relations with Iraq became strained.

The DMI is generally reputed to be an effective organization. It underwent criticism, however, in the early period of the Iran-Iraq War for underestimating Iranian capabilities and intentions and for restricting distribution of military intelligence, denying its availability to components which had a need for it.
In early 1985 the DMI was brought into closer contact with the presidency. The chief of the DMI reports to the presidential secretary for information. This change has removed the directorate from subordination to the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), an arrangement which existed more or less continuously since emergence of the IIS' predecessor organization in the late 1960s. Until the change the chief of the DMI reported to the IIS chief who was functionally responsible for all Iraqi intelligence activity and who in the period 1978-1983 was Barzan al-Tikriti, half brother of the President.

Abroad

DMI representatives work independently of the IIS
D. Directorate General of Security

1. Functions

The Directorate General of Security (Mudiriyat al-Amm al-'Amma—DGS) is responsible for internal security, primarily in the civil sector. After the DGS became a subordinate directorate of the Ministry of Interior in 1967 its functions included immigration, nationality, residence and passport affairs. These functions were removed from the DGS in 1967 when the separate Directorate of Nationality was created. In the early 1970s there were periods of overlapping jurisdiction between the DGS and the Public Relations Bureau (PRB). DGS personnel performed much of the groundwork for PRB operations involved in domestic security activities, essentially of a political nature. An effort in 1973 to clearly delineate the jurisdiction of the two services was only partially successful. Following the attempted coup in 1973 by DGS chief Nazim Qasim the DGS was temporarily removed from subordination to the Minister of Interior and placed under the direct supervision of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. Now again subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, the DGS nevertheless is a junior service to and works in close coordination with the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The functions assigned to the DGS are the following:

- Monitors domestic opposition groups, ethnic minorities, members of former regimes, and religious elements.
- Surveys the activities and contacts of foreign diplomats and other foreigners residing in or visiting Iraq.
- Conducts counterintelligence operations against foreign intelligence services.
- Monitors and censors the communications channels including mail, telephones, telegrams, radio and telex messages.
- Assists in the protection of regime leaders.
- Monitors domestic and foreign media and broadcasts.
- Patrols points of entry to Iraq and border areas.
- Monitors the economy for evidence of illegal currency and black market activities.
- Watches Iraqis traveling abroad.
- Conducts investigations of suspects and makes arrests.

To accomplish these functions the DGS has personnel assigned to Baghdad, to regional offices around the country and to various groups traveling abroad.

2. Organization

The Ministry of Interior is divided into three directorates-general: police, security and nationality. DGS headquarters in Baghdad is located in the Sa'dan sector (see Figure 2 city map) and the chief of the directorate is 'Ali Hasan al-Majid, a cousin of Saddam Hussein. The DGS is divided into
six main departments (see Figure 5). The administrative department handles personnel, finance, logistics, and transportation. The political department has six branches which are responsible for operations involving groups considered possibly subversive. These include Communists, foreigners, dissidents, certain religious elements, members of former Iraqi regimes, Kurds, and other ethnic nationalities. There are two additional branches in this department, one for investigation and arrests and the other for information and archives. The economic department is primarily concerned with illegal activities in the fields of currency exchange, smuggling and blackmarket operations. The technical department provides assistance in electronic surveillance, telephone tap operations, communications, and photography. There are two security departments, one devoted to the Baghdad area and the other divided into regional offices for the various geographic areas and cities in Iraq. There are no available figures on the size of the DGS. An estimate of 300 members in 1989 has likely increased under the regime of Saddam Hussein and in view of the Iran-Iraq War. It is judged that there are more than 4,000 staff members, not counting many informants.

3. Administrative practices

Older DGS personnel can trace their careers to service with the Criminal Investigation Division of

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Figure 5. Directorate General of Security

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the Iraqi Police, the DGS' predecessor. Inducted into the DGS in 1937, they constituted the service's initial complement. In the late 1960s an effort was made to raise the caliber of new security officers by a more selective recruitment program drawing upon candidates with more education and better qualifications. Steps also were taken to improve the training programs. Officers were initially trained at the Iraqi Police Academy in Baghdad in a three-year course, the curriculum of which consisted of instruction in criminology, law, and weapons training. In 1973 after the signing of the Iraqi/Soviet intelligence and security agreement the Soviets and several Eastern European countries, specifically East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, became increasingly involved in the training of DGS personnel, both in courses given in the USSR and Eastern Europe and in instruction in Iraq. This instruction was considered to be good, and the DGS came to resemble many aspects of Soviet state security.

Since the second year of the Iran-Iraq War, in early 1982, when Iraqi casualties increased dramatically, a career in the security services, especially the DGS, became an attractive option for young Iraqi males of draft age seeking military deferments. In late 1983 and early 1984 acute military personnel shortages resulted from the combined effects of battlefield attrition and the quantum expansion of the ground forces. As a result there were several recruitment drives aimed at the DGS and IIS, and on more than one occasion entire battalions of police/security personnel were formed and sent to the al-Basrah front in expectation of major Iranian attacks. Some of these units sustained fairly heavy casualties, being lightly armed and poorly trained, and this reportedly has dried up some of the public zeal for security service employment.

Salaries of DGS personnel approximate the equivalent ranks in the military service. The 1980 Iraqi negotiations to buy a computer records system with a capacity to handle data on two million persons may have been intended for use by the DGS in cooperation with the IIS.

The DGS is supported in its security operations and can draw upon the assistance of the other two directorates of the Ministry of Interior, the Directorate General of Police and the Directorate General of Nationality.
The DGS relationship with the IIS and its predecessors has essentially been one of subordination since the Public Relations Bureau of the Ba'th Party assumed the role in 1969 of coordinator of intelligence and security activities. In 1973 a clearer definition of their respective roles in domestic operations was agreed upon and the PRB/DGI became less active in internal security except for matters pertaining to the Ba'th Party. After the coup attempt by DGS chief Nezam Qazaz in 1973 selected personnel were purged and control was tightened over the service which was removed from Ministry of Interior jurisdiction and temporarily placed under direct presidential supervision. Cooperation between the IIS and the DGS nevertheless has been close.

E. Key personalities

Sa'dun Shakir Mahmud al-Tikriti

Minister of Interior since 1979, Sa'dun Shakir was chief of the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) from 1973 to 1977. During 1977 he was Minister of State. Since 1977 he has been a member of the Regional Command, the Ba'th Party's ruling body, and has also been a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, Iraq's highest executive and legislative body.

Shakir has been involved in Ba'th Party security activities for over two decades. In the early 1970s he succeeded Saddam Hussein as chief of the party's security organ, the Public Relations Bureau, the predecessor of the DGI.

He was born in 1939, is a law school graduate and is tribally related to the President, in whose confidence and political inner circle he has been since the mid-1960s.

Fadil al-Barraq Husayn al-Tikriti

Fadil al-Barraq has been chief of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) since January 1984. Early in his intelligence and security career he worked in the DGI's predecessor organisation, the Public Relations Bureau of the Ba'th Party. He is a former chief of the Directorate General of Security.

Born in about 1946, Barraq attended Iraq's military college but was expelled for political activity. Nevertheless after the coup in 1968 he was given a military commission and was appointed aide-de-camp to President Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr. In 1969 he was assigned as assistant military attaché to Moscow where he learned Russian and did advanced academic work in history, earning a doctorate. He has written several books and articles on internal security problems.

Barraq is a friend of Minister of Interior Sa'dun Shakir and is related to Saddam Hussein.

Muhmmad Shakir Shahin

Major General Muhammad Shakir Shahin has been chief of the Directorate of Military Intelligence.
since mid-1983. In late 1983 he was on a four-man committee which temporarily directed the Directorate General of Intelligence until the appointment of Fadil al-Baraq.

Shahin is a Shi’a participant in the revolution of July 1958 which led to the assumption of power by the Ba’th Party. He is a leading member of the party. He is a professional military officer and a graduate of the French military staff college. One of the more successful field commanders of the Iraq-Iran War, he has a reputation for being intelligent, industrious and an efficient manager. He is said to be close to Minister of Defense ‘Adnani Khayyamah.

Ali Hassan al-Majid

Prior to his appointment in early 1984 as chief of the Directorate General of Security, Majid served as chief of the secretariat of the Ba’th Party Regional Command and as a member of the party’s military bureau.

A cousin of Saddam Husayn and a friend since childhood of Minister of Defense Khayyamah, Majid was a noncommissioned officer before the coup of 1968 and is reported to have been a member of the Iraqi Communist Party in his youth. One of his two wives is the daughter of former President al-Bakr.

In 1980 Majid’s name first appeared when he was identified as president of the Iraq/USA friendship society and later that year when he led a Ba’th Party delegation to the People’s Republic of China. In 1982, as a senior official in the Directorate General of Intelligence, he chaired sessions of an interservice security committee.

Uday Saddam Husayn

In September 1983 Uday Saddam Husayn was appointed by his father as deputy chief of the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI), then under Barzan al-Tikriti. Shortly thereafter Barzan was removed from his position and replaced by Hisham Salah al-Fakhrit. Uday then functioned as assistant to General Pakhi, reporting to his father on progress within the DGI in purging Barzan’s adherents. In December 1983 Uday was made coordinator within the DGI of the various intelligence services.

Born in 1964, Uday is the oldest son of the President and was a first year engineering student at the University of Baghdad in 1983, and he divided his time between his studies and work at the DGI. Prior to entering the university he is said to have joined the Ba’th Party. He visited the United States in mid-1982 with the title of Counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is described as spoiled and troublesome.

Husayn Kamal al-Majid

Husayn Kamel al-Majid, a cousin of Saddam Husayn and member of the presidential guard, was appointed head of the palace-based presidential security organ when it was set up in 1983. In the fall of 1988 he married the President’s eldest daughter. The marriage was a factor in the dismissal of Barzan al-Tikriti from the position of chief of the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI), Majid’s presidential guards participated in surrounding DGI headquarters and in Barzan’s arrest.

Born in 1955, Majid is viewed as one of the President’s two watchdogs, along with Saddam’s son Uday, over the Iraqi intelligence and security services.

Research for this survey was essentially completed in May 1985.