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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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April 20, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: ACDA/ST - Eric E. Anschutz *R. Picklin for EEA.*

SUBJECT: SIOP Expansion Studies

During our April 19 visit to SAC headquarters, General John C. Meyer described some studies underway there on the SIOP (Single Integrated Operating Plan). The purpose of these studies is to consider expanding the SIOP, which now contains only massive nuclear response options against the U.S.S.R., to include a number of more limited nuclear response options. Three examples of such limited options were briefly described: an attack on up to three sets of Soviet arctic air-bases, an attack on SS-9 ICBM launchers, and an attack on Warsaw Pact airfields in Eastern Europe. General Meyer emphasized that these examples were being studied for illustrative purposes only.

The studies are in response to the President's February 9, 1972, Foreign Policy Report, in which it is stated that:

" . . . Given the range of possible political-military situations which could conceivably confront us, our strategic policy should not be based solely on a capability of inflicting urban and industrial damage presumed to be beyond the level an adversary would accept. We must be able to respond at levels appropriate to the situation. This problem will be the subject of continuing study."

General Meyer noted that, because such limited attacks are not now included in the list of SIOP options,

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they would have to be designed upon Presidential request, target lists would have to be consulted, and couriers would have to be dispatched to instruct operating commands to execute the attack. All of this would take some time. Inclusion of limited strike options in the SIOP would permit their more careful design, and during a crisis would permit their prompt implementation.

A feature of at least some of the limited attack options being studied is that Soviet early-warning systems (and presumably command/control centers) would not be attacked. The purpose of not attacking such systems would be to allow the Soviets to distinguish the "limited" nature of the U.S. attack. In this context, however, General Meyer stated that in his opinion any U.S. attack exceeding a few missiles might not be perceived by the Soviets as limited, particularly during a crisis.

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