

MEMORANDUM

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

IT HAS SEEN.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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TOP SECRET

July 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Additional Studies of the U. S. Strategic Posture

As a result of NSC consideration of the NSSM-3 Review of the U. S. Strategic Posture, I recommend that two follow-on studies be conducted as follows:

1. U. S. Strategic Capabilities.

This study will examine our strategic capabilities and force requirements under circumstances other than "massive retaliation." Also, the study will consider measures of war outcome other than the number of people killed on both sides.

The objective will be to develop measures which are appropriate for the kinds of situations which the President might actually face in a crisis -- specifically it should examine more discriminating options than the present SIOP.

The study will also examine the command and control requirements for both limited and all-out nuclear exchanges.

A draft NSSM is at Tab A.

Approve *HK*

Disapprove _____

2. The Relationship of Strategic and Theater Forces in NATO.

This study will examine the contribution which our strategic and tactical nuclear forces can make to the deterrence of attacks on NATO and to coping with attacks if deterrence fails.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

2

The study will also examine under what circumstances and how we might employ strategic and tactical nuclear forces in the event of a crisis or war involving NATO.

Further, the study will examine the command and control requirements for NATO nuclear options.

A draft NSSM is at Tab B.

Approve



Disapprove _____

Enclosures

- Tab A - Draft NSSM on
U.S. Strategic Capabilities
- Tab B - Draft NSSM on
Relationship of Strategic and
Theater Forces in NATO

By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

2300

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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June 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. *YLF*

SUBJECT: Additional Studies on U.S. Strategic and Tactical
Nuclear Postures

As a result of the NSC Review of NSSM-3, and in response to your requests, I have prepared NSSMs which direct studies of:

- U.S. Strategic Capabilities, *NSSM-64 7/8/69*
- The Relationship of Strategic and Theater Forces in NATO. *NSSM-65 7/8/69*

The purpose of the first study is to obtain analyses of less than all-out nuclear conflicts and of measures of war outcomes other than numbers of people killed.

The objective is to extend our doctrine of strategic sufficiency to recognize the kinds of threats and situations which the President might actually face and to insure that we have the command and control necessary to give the President a full range of strategic nuclear options.

The purpose of the second study is to analyze in depth the contribution of strategic forces and tactical nuclear forces to deterring and coping with conventional and tactical nuclear wars, uses of tactical and strategic military weapons to improve war outcomes, and command and control requirements for a full range of NATO nuclear options.

Rather than rely on an interagency steering group, I think it would be best this time to assign the studies to the Secretary of Defense and to use the NSC Review Group to obtain comments and criticisms from other agencies.

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By KW NARA, Date 7-17-03

I plan on working personally with the study group to insure that questions of concern to you and the President get properly addressed.

Mort Halperin and Hal Sonnenfeldt concur in the enclosed NSSMs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the enclosed memorandum for the President, and, if he approves, that you sign the enclosed NSSMs.

Enclosures --

- Tab A -- Memo for the President
- Tab B -- NSSMs

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