1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR J. STAPLETON ROY, REASON, 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. DURING A 45-MINUTE MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 9, 2003, THE INI LEADERSHIP WANTS CLOSE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH INTERPET, BUT TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS, BOTH SIDES MUST SHOW MUTUAL RESPECT, A POSITIVE ATTITUDE AND KEEP OPEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION. HE STRONGLY CRITICIZED
PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S EAST TIMOR POLICY, SAYING THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NEVER HAVE MADE SUCH A SUDDEN DECISION AFFECTING INDONESIA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS. REFERRING TO THE HISTORY OF EAST TIMOR, SPEAKING AS AN OLD "COLD WARRIOR," SAID THE UNITED STATES AND INDONESIA STOOD TOGETHER IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM. NOW WE SHOULD EMBRACE EACH OTHER AS OLD FRIENDS. LIKE OTHERS, EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF AUSTRALIA TOWARD INDONESIA. I TOLD THE GENERAL THAT A STRONG, STABLE AND UNITED INDONESIA IS IMPORTANT TO BOTH THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA IN OUR STRATEGIC VIEW OF THE EAST ASIA REGION. END SUMMARY.

3. (C)

THE UNITED STATES VALUES ITS RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA AND DOES NOT WANT EAST TIMOR TO FURTHER DAMAGE TIES BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. TO AVOID THIS, IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE UNSPONSORED INTERFET OPERATION IN EAST TIMOR GO SMOOTHLY.

4. (C) SAID THAT FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, INDONESIA WANTS TO BE A RESPECTABLE MEMBER OF WORLD SOCIETY WITH GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., AUSTRALIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES. DESPITE COMPLAINTS ABOUT AUSTRALIA AND UNAMET, OVER THE LONG TERM JAKARTA MUST SEEK MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION. TNI ALSO NEEDS TO BE INTERNATIONALLY ENGAGED, HE SAID. "TNI LEADERS FROM WIRANTO ALL THE WAY DOWN TO MG KIKI SYAHNAKRI (IN DILI) WANT GOOD RELATIONS AND COOPERATION WITH INTERFET." TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS, BOTH SIDES MUST SHOW MUTUAL RESPECT, A POSITIVE ATTITUDE AND KEEP OPEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION, HE SAID.

5. (C) SAID PRESIDENT HABIBIE MUST EXPLAIN HIS DECISION ON EAST TIMOR TO THE MPR. CITING INDONESIA'S LONG HISTORY IN EAST TIMOR, HE CHARGED THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE SUCH A SUDDEN DECISION AFFECTING INDONESIA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS WHILE THE MPR WAS STILL CONSIDERING THE ISSUE OF WIDERRANGING AUTONOMY FOR EAST TIMOR.
HE HAD SENT A STRONGLY WORDED LETTER TO PRESIDENT
HABIBIE OUTLINING THESE OBJECTIONS. WHILE IN PRINCIPLE THE
MPR COULD REJECT THE RESULTS OF THE POPULAR
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CONSULTATION, AGREED THAT SUCH A MOVE
WOULD PUT INDONESIA IN CONFRONTATION WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY - SINCE THE UN AND MANY
COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY RECOGNIZED THE CONSULTATION AS AN ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

6. (C) I SAID THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW WEEKS HAVE BEEN
TERribly DAMAGING TO TNI'S REPUTATION, WHILE STRESSING
THAT THE METHODS USED BY TNI AND THE MILITIAS WERE
TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

7. (C) REITERATED THAT, DESPITE THE STRONG PERSONAL TIES
BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE MILITIAS, TNI MUST BE VERY CLEAR
AND CONSISTENT IN COOPERATION WITH INTERFET. AT THE SAME
TIME, INTERFET SHOULD TRY TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION,
ALTHOUGH IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO BRIDGE THE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE OPPOSING Factions. "ON THE FIELD, IT'S A
DIFFICULT JOB BECAUSE EITHER SIDE CAN BE EASILY PROVOKED
TO ACT VIOLENTLY," HE SAID. HE AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR
ALL PARTIES TO AVOID PROVOCATION AND MAKE PROMPT
EFFORTS TO RECONCILE ANY INCIDENTS SO THEY DON'T GET OUT
OF HAND.

7. (C) DESCRIBED INDONESIA'S TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY AS PRECAUTIONARY. DESPITE THE BANK BALI

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   NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 FM-00
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SCANDAL AND THE EAST TIMOR PROBLEM, PRESIDENT HABIBIE AND THE GOLKAR ORGANIZATION ARE STILL STRONG. "LET'S SEE WHAT HAPPENS IN THE MPR AND WHETHER OUR LEADERS WILL SHOW 'HATI NURANI' (PURE HEART) TO SATISFY THE PEOPLE'S ASPIRATIONS, OR IF SELFISH INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS WILL PREVAIL." IF OUR LEADERS ARE WISE, THEY WILL REACH AN ACCOMMODATION BEFORE THE MPR, HE SAID.

8. (C) NOTING THAT AT A TIME WHEN INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION WAS FOCUSED ON EAST TIMOR, WE ALSO NEEDED TO PAY ATTENTION TO INDONESIAN SENSITIVITIES. IN THIS CONTEXT, I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS SOME WAY TO SHOW RESPECT AND SYMPATHY FOR THE VETERANS AND FOR THE FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO HAD DIED IN EAST TIMOR. RESPONSES TO THEM WERE VARIED. SOME RESPONDED POSITIVELY BUT SAID HE WOULD NEED TO CONSULT WITH OTHERS ON WHAT MIGHT BE DONE. HE SAID THE VETERANS ARE VERY SAD AND DISAPPOINTED ABOUT EVENTS IN EAST TIMOR. HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE GOVERNMENT POLICY IN AN ATTEMPT "TO CALM DOWN THESE STRONG EMOTIONS."

SUITECH SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE BEST TO WAIT FOR A SUITABLE MOMENT TO EXPRESS SYMPATHY, WHICH WOULD BEST BE DONE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS. PROMISED TO PURSUE THE ISSUE.

9. (C) SAID WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THE STARTING POINT IN EAST TIMOR. BOTH THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA HAD STRONGLY SUPPORTED INDONESIA AGAINST THE COMMUNIST

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10. (C) FINALLY, LIKE OTHERS WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH RECENTLY, EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT AUSTRALIA'S INTENTIONS TOWARD INDONESIA, ALTHOUGH HE SHOWED NO OUTWARD SIGNS OF EMOTION OR HOSTILITY IN HIS COMMENTS. I EXPLAINED TO THAT EAST TIMOR HAS BECOME A MAJOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE IN AUSTRALIA. IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE EAST TIMOR PROBLEM BE SOLVED BECAUSE IT IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO OVERALL RELATIONS BETWEEN CANBERRA AND JAKARTA. BUT THERE IS NO BASIS TO BELIEVE THAT AUSTRALIA IS INTERESTED IN SEEING THE BREAK-UP OF INDONESIA. INSTABILITY IN INDONESIA WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR AUSTRALIA, WHEREAS A STRONG, STABLE AND UNITED INDONESIA IS IMPORTANT TO BOTH THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA IN OUR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF THE ENTIRE EAST ASIA REGION.

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