Washington,
DC, March 13, 2006 - The U.S. Intelligence
Community failed to penetrate the veil of secrecy surrounding
the nuclear activities of South Africa's apartheid regime, particularly
its nuclear weapons program, according to documents obtained through
the Freedom of Information Act and archival research and posted
on the Web today by the National Security Archive at George Washington
University.
Included in the Archive posting are over thirty
documents -- many originally classified Top Secret/Codeword --
produced by interagency groups, the CIA, and the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).
The documents were obtained by Archive Senior Fellow Jeffrey T.
Richelson, while conducting research for his forthcoming book,
Spying
on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to
Iran and North Korea (W.W. Norton).
The documents show that years after South Africa claimed that
it had developed a new technique for uranium enrichment the U.S.
was uncertain as to what it entailed. In addition, the documents
show that in the 1980s the U.S. did not know the status of South
African bomb development. They also reveal a dispute between the
Director of Central Intelligence's Nonproliferation Center and
State's INR over the likelihood that South Africa's declaration
to the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the quantity
of fissile material produced constituted an honest
declaration or an act of deception. One possibility raised was
whether some of the fissile material was transferred to another
country. Since replacement of the apartheid regime by a majority
government, no evidence has emerged that South Africa's declaration
to the IAEA was deceptive.
An interagency assessment does demonstrate that the Intelligence
Community did, in 1977, correctly assess, based on its understanding
of South Africa and the regime's leadership, that while South
Africa's entrance into the nuclear weapons club could be delayed,
it could not be prevented. In 1993, President F.W. DeKlerk revealed
that South Africa had, during the 1980s, built six nuclear weapons
and was in the process of building a seventh when his government
decided to halt the program and destroy the nuclear devices.
U.S.
Intelligence and the South African Bomb
National
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 181
Edited
by Jeffrey Richelson
On December 6, 1941, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt authorized
the development and production of an atomic bomb. While U.S. and
British scientists worked in secret at Los Alamos and other sites,
they also worried that German scientists would beat them to the
finish line and present Adolf Hitler with an atomic weapon. General
Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Engineer District, was
assigned responsibility for not only building a bomb but, starting
in the fall of 1943, investigating German progress - relying not
only on a foreign intelligence section under his direct command,
but on the Office of Strategic Services and other U.S. intelligence
organizations. (Note 1)
One discovery made by a special U.S.-British team, designated
ALSOS, that followed in the wake of the Allied forces who liberated
France and then defeated Germany's military, was that Germany's
scientists had made little progress towards producing an atomic
bomb. (Note 2) But the effort provided the foundation
for the more sophisticated, longer lasting, and more vital effort
to monitor the development of the Soviet nuclear weapons program.
By the mid-1950s, the U.S. was also monitoring the efforts of
the People's Republic of China and France to join the nuclear
club.
In future decades, a multitude of potential and real foreign
nuclear weapons research and development efforts were monitored
by the U.S. Intelligence Community. A variety of intelligence
organizations have been used to collect nuclear intelligence.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted human and technical
espionage operations - including U-2 and satellite overflights
of the Soviet Union, China, Israel, and other nations. State Department
diplomats, particularly science attachés, reported on nuclear
developments in the nations where they were stationed.
The National Security Agency (NSA), and its ancestor organizations,
intercepted communications while the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) conducted various forms of overhead reconnaissance relevant
to detecting foreign nuclear weapons activities. The Strategic
Air Command also operated U-2's, and some of those missions involved
gathering the atmospheric debris resulting from nuclear tests.
In addition, the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC)
operated a variety of collection systems - ranging from ones located
under the sea to ones operating in outer space. Those systems
detected the signatures emitted from the production of nuclear
material or the testing of nuclear weapons - including acoustic
signals, seismic signals, x-rays and gamma rays, infrared signals,
and krypton-85.
The data collected by the above-mentioned collection agencies
and other organizations was analyzed by some of those agencies
- including the CIA and AFTAC - as well as a number of other analytical
units, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) , the intelligence offices
of the Atomic Energy Commission and its successor organizations,
and Z Division of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Among the nations whose nuclear program was the subject of a
significant U.S. intelligence collection and analysis effort was
the Republic of South Africa, whose policy of apartheid had condemned
it to "pariah" status - which gave the white regime
an extra incentive to develop a weapon that might insure its survival.
Beyond trying to obtain information on policy decisions, the collection
and analysis effort focused on a number of South African facilities
and institutions - including the Atomic Energy Board, Uranium
Enrichment Corporation, the Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center,
the uranium enrichment facility (Y-Plant) at Valindaba, and the
Vastrap test site in the Kalahari Desert. South Africa's nuclear
ties with foreign countries, particularly Israel, also were monitored
and analyzed.
The documents in this briefing book, the first of four based
on research for Spying
on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to
Iran and North Korea, include national intelligence estimates
as well as CIA and INR reports and memos, along with articles
in classified periodicals. Of particular interest is the treatment
of three key elements of the South African nuclear program. One
involved its method of uranium enrichment - of separating the
weapons grade U-235 isotope from the far more abundant U-238.
The other two were South Africa's progress toward developing an
atomic bomb, and the adequacy of South Africa's 1991 declaration
to the International Atomic Energy Agency as to the amount of
uranium it had enriched. In addition, several documents deal with
an event - the September 1979 Vela incident - that many, at the
time, believed might be the result of a covert South African nuclear
test. (Note 3)
The documents, many of which were classified at the Top Secret/Codeword
level, reveal that despite U.S. collection and analysis efforts,
there was substantial uncertainty about the nature of South Africa's
novel technique for uranium enrichment and its progress toward
an atomic bomb - even after South Africa had begun producing weapons.
In addition, there was considerable debate within the Intelligence
Community in the early 1990s, particularly between the Director
of Central Intelligence's Nonproliferation Center and the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, over whether
South Africa's declaration to the IAEA was full and complete or
had understated the quantity produced - and if it had, what happened
to the fissile material it had not declared. The Intelligence
Community did correctly assess that South Africa probably could
not be dissuaded from developing an atomic bomb.
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
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Acrobat Reader to view.
Document
1: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, Nuclear Activities of Foreign Nations, Volume IV:
Asia and Africa, September 30, 1956. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
Four pages of this survey are devoted to South Africa, and note
the existence and responsibilities of the nation's Atomic Energy
Board, the absence of nuclear reactors, creation of a Nuclear
Physics Institute, and South Africa's role as "one of the
world's principal producers of uranium."
Document
2: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency "South Africa Seeks Uranium Hexafluoride Technology,"
Weekly Surveyor, May 4, 1970. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This article, published in a weekly report produced by the CIA's
Directorate of Science and Technology, reported that an executive
of the South African NuclearFuels Corporation had visited the
United States to explore of the possibility of licensing uranium
hexaflouride technology, apparently to allow South Africa to supply
uranium in a more marketable form to recipients wishing to send
it to a isotope separation facility.
Document
3: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South Africans Release Further Information on Their
Isotope Separation Process," Weekly Surveyor, October
12, 1970. Top Secret/Codeword
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This article noted that A.J.A. Roux, chairman of South Africa's
Atomic Energy Board had claimed that his nation's new isotope
separation process, the details of which the CIA had not yet determined,
was low in capital cost but required substantial power.
Document
4: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, Atomic Energy Activities in the Republic of South
Africa, March 1971. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
One of the first points made in this OSI study is that South
Africa lacked the capability to produce fissionable material and
there was no evidence that it was involved in any activity related
to the production of nuclear weapons. The report also provided
information on the National Nuclear Research Center at Pelindaba,
the Safari-1 reactor, and the organization of the South African
atomic energy effort. It also noted the tight security system
limiting information about the pilot plant being established for
uranium isotope separation.
Document
5: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South Africans to Fund Preparatory Work for Full
Scale Uranium Enrichment Plant," Weekly Surveyor,
June 11, 1973. Top Secret/Codeword
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This article provides information drawn from South African press
reporting on an announcement by Piet Koornhof, Minister of Mines,
that preparatory work would be funded toward the construction
of a uranium enrichment plant employing South Africa's secret
enrichment process. OSI's commentary on the information included
the claim that while the information did not allow the process
to be identified it, along with previous information, indicated
use of a physical process "such as jet nozzle, mass or thermal
diffusion, or some variation ..."
Document
6: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South African Uranium Isotope Enrichment Process
Probably Aerodynamic," Weekly Surveyor, February
11, 1974. Top Secret/Codeword
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This article reports on the discussions between the representative
of a U.S. firm and senior officials of largest supplier of industrial
gases in Africa - discussions relevant to South Africa's uranium
enrichment effort. OSI commentary includes further analysis and
speculation on the nature of South Africa's method for enriching
uranium.
Document
7: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South Africa Not Currently in Position to Produce
Nuclear Weapons," Weekly Surveyor, July 22, 1974.
Top Secret/Codeword
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
July 10, 1974 comments by the vice president of the Atomic Energy
Board are noted in this article, including his assertion that
South Africa had the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The
comment section of the article argues that South Africa does not
yet have that capability, and specifies some of the reasons that
OSI has reached that conclusion.
Document
8: Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum, Prospects
for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, September 4,
1974. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
As indicated by its title the memorandum, which conveyed the
judgments in a special national intelligence estimate with the
same title, focuses on the chances that a variety of nation's
would become nuclear weapons states. With respect to South Africa,
it discusses possible motivation for South Africa to develop a
nuclear capability, how likely it was to do so, as well as the
probable characteristics of any capability it did develop.
Document
9: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "Further Evidence That the South African Uranium
Enrichment Process is Probably Similar to Becker Nozzle Principle,"
Weekly Surveyor, March 24, 1975. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article indicates that the U.S. Intelligence Community had
been unable to establish, five years after South Africa had announced
that it had developed a new process for uranium enrichment, exactly
what that process entailed. The one paragraph that remains in
the heavily redacted article questions whether the process is
as novel as the South Africans claimed.
Document
10: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South African Uranium Enrichment Plant in Operation,"
Weekly Surveyor, April 21, 1975. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article comments on the claim by the South African prime
minister that the pilot uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba
(the Y-Plant) has gone into operation. The author(s) briefly discuss
the makeup of the pilot facility, whether the entire installation
is likely to be in operation, and its economic production capability.
Document
11: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "Some Aspects of South African Uranium Enrichment
Process Revealed," Weekly Surveyor, May 5, 1975.
Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
Weekly Surveyor readers are informed that South Africa
had revealed that their uranium enrichment process relied on a
high performance walled centrifuge, confirming "previous
assessments that the process is a variation on the Becker jet
nozzle process." The article also notes that details about
the process remain "closely guarded" and discusses the
requirements for it to be economically competitive with the uranium
enrichment services offered by other nations.
Document
12: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South Africa Awards Nuclear Power Project to the
French," Weekly Surveyor, June 14, 1976. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article reports on the South Africa's decision to award
a French consortium the contract for producing two power reactors.
It discusses the possible sources of enriched uranium for the
reactors, South Africa's intention to have a fuel fabrication
plant, and South African indications concerning construction of
a reprocessing facility which could be used to produce weapons
grade plutonium.
Document
13: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South African Discusses Delay in Uranium Enrichment
Operations," Weekly Surveyor, June 28, 1976. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
A conversation between a member of the South African Atomic Energy
Board and a source, resulted in this article. The board member,
it is reported, provided information on the completion of the
plant, and a safety problem that had delayed its becoming operational.
The remainder of the article discusses alternative interpretations
of the information revealed.
Document
14: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South Africa Again Rumored To Be Working on Nuclear
Weapons," Weekly Surveyor, September 13, 1976. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
The catalyst for this article is a statement by the director
of the Life Science Division of the South African AEB that "We're
going to have make an atom bomb." The comment section notes
that the statement was one of several similar statements made
by knowledgeable South Africans, but states that there was no
convincing evidence that South Africa was actually developing
nuclear weapons - and suggests such statements might be aimed
a foreign audiences.
Document
15: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South African Pilot Plant May Enrich Uranium to
More Than 20% U-235," Weekly Surveyor, November
29, 1976. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
An analysis of published photographs led to the judgment stated
in the article that the plant could produce uranium enriched to
more than 20%, but also notes that a requirement for such high-levels
of enrichment is not foreseen. The article explains what was shown
in the photographs to produce the judgment about the plant's capability,
as well as how the photos revealed a less complex arrangement
than expected - an arrangement that would have limited the level
of enrichment to less than 4% U-235.
Document
16: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, South African Uranium Enrichment Program, August
1977. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
The purpose of this heavily redacted study was "to assess
the South African enrichment program and to determine the important
characteristics of the uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba."
The conclusions section provides the agency's judgment as to the
operational status of the plant, its expected yearly production
of reactor-grade uranium, whether the plant could be used to produce
weapons-grade uranium, and the commercial prospects of the plant's
enrichment technology. The discussion section focuses on the enrichment
technology and the plant.
Document
17: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South Africa: Uranium Enrichment Technology,"
Weekly Surveyor, August 15, 1977. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article continues the reporting on the South African uranium
enrichment process - noting the late 1976 statement of an official
of that nation's Uranium Enrichment Corporation that provided
new details on the enrichment technology. The remainder of the
article notes that the official's statement is "consistent
with other recent suggestions" concerning the specifics of
the South African enrichment process.
Document
18: Director of Central Intelligence, Interagency Assessment,
South Africa: Policy Considerations Regarding a Nuclear Test,
August 18, 1977. Top Secret/Codeword
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
On August 6, 1977 a Soviet representative delivered a message
for President Jimmy Carter from Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev.
It disclosed that a Soviet reconnaissance satellite detected what
appeared to be preparations for a nuclear test at a site in the
Kalahari Desert. A U.S. reconnaissance satellite provided imagery
that confirmed that such activities were underway. The National
Intelligence Officer for Africa was asked to coordinate an interagency
study on South Africa's nuclear intentions. The resulting nine-page
Top Secret/Codeword study examined the domestic, military, and
foreign policy considerations influencing the South African regime's
decisions concerning a possible nuclear test - based both on a
technical analysis of the South African program as well as "the
Community's knowledge of the Afrikaner people and their leaders."
While the assessment held out hope that in the short-term the
South Africa could be dissuaded from testing, it was far less
optimistic about the long-term prospects.
Document
19: [Author deleted], Memorandum for: National Intelligence
Officer for Nuclear Proliferation, Subject: Review of The
Nuclear Axis, August 11, 1978. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This review of the book The Nuclear Axis is heavily
critical of the author's arguments and evidence. It also states
that a "number of statements are known or are believed to
be utterly false" including their statement on the likely
nature of the South African uranium enrichment process - which
was actually similar to the CIA's own judgment only a few years
earlier (Document 9).
Document
20: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South Africa: Military Personnel at the Valindaba
Uranium Enrichment Plant," Scientific Intelligence Weekly
Review, April 30, 1979. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article explores the implications of a the presence of military
personnel at the Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center. It notes that
the presence is unprecedented and speculates on its connection
to the production of weapons-grade uranium. According to the article
production of such uranium had been expected in connection with
two projects.
Document
21: Christine Dodson, National Security Council, Memorandum
for: Secretary of State and others, Subject: South Atlantic
Nuclear Event, October 22, 1979, w/att: Discussion Paper.
Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
On September 22, 1979 a U.S. VELA nuclear detection satellite
detected a double flash of light - somewhere in the South Atlantic
- that had been associated in over forty previous cases with a
nuclear test. To this day what actually happened has never been
conclusively determined by the U.S. Intelligence Community. While
a presidential panel would conclude that the most likely explanation
involved an object hitting the satellite rather than a nuclear
test, other groups, organizations, and individuals - including
a Director of Central Intelligence panel, the DIA, and analysts
at several nuclear laboratories would reach a different conclusion.
This paper was prepared at a time when it was assumed that VELA
had detected a nuclear event - and the limitations of U.S. knowledge
about the South African program permitted the belief that South
Africa was the most likely culprit. The paper explores the nonproliferation
stakes involved, the impact public disclosure would have on foreign
policy efforts in Africa, the pros and cons of approaching the
South African government, the effect on various nuclear negotiations
with South Africa, informing the Soviet Union, possible U.N. sanctions,
and the implications for public perceptions of the ability to
verify a comprehensive test ban treaty.
Document
22: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, The South African Peaceful Nuclear Program: Its Dependence
Upon Foreign Assistance, November 1979. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
Although the focus of this intelligence assessment is the non-military
component of South Africa's nuclear program, it also provides
information on the background and operations of the Pelindaba
and Valindaba facilities.
Document
23: Director of Central Intelligence, Interagency Intelligence
Assessment, The 22 September 1979 Event, December 1979.
Classification Not Available
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request by Natural Resources Defense
Council
This study begins, as was requested by the National Security
Council, with the assumption that the September 22, 1979 VELA
event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that
the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted
the Defense Intelligence Agency's suggestion that the Soviet Union
might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of
its treaty commitments. But the majority of the study is concerned
with three possibilities to explain the incident - a secret test
by South Africa, a secret test by Israel, and secret test by South
Africa and Israel.
Document
24: Director of Central Intelligence, South Africa: Defense
Strategy In An Increasingly Hostile World, January 1980.
Classification Not Available
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request by Natural Resources Defense
Council
This national intelligence product identifies South Africa's
strategies - clandestine and overt - with regard to its nuclear
weapons program. It also explores the options of maintaining the
existing program levels, cutting back the program, and the political-military
usefulness of the nuclear weapons program.
Document
25: National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence
Agency, "South Africa - Israel: Status of Relations,"
Africa Review, June 8, 1981. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
One section of this article focuses on Israel-South African nuclear
ties, noting that since Pretoria's sale of ten tons of uranium
to Israel in 1963, speculation concerning Israeli-South African
cooperation in the production of nuclear weapons had been "rife,"
and the Vela incident in September 1979 increased the speculation.
Document
26: Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South
Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and
Military Cooperation, March 30, 1983. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
New information, almost certainly from a human source, was the
basis for this report. The source, according to the report, expanded
and confirmed U.S. knowledge about South Africa's nuclear weapons
effort - although it is clear that the knowledge is largely historical.
The secret study notes that South African scientists had been
tasked to develop fission as well as thermonuclear designs, but
also is clear that the U.S. had no direct intelligence concerning
developments in the South Africa weapons program subsequent to
the August 1977 Kalahari incident. The report, in addition to
commenting on South African-Israeli cooperation in the nuclear
field, also commented on the sparseness of the information available.
Document
27: Central Intelligence Agency, Trends in South Africa's
Nuclear Security Policies and Programs, October 5, 1984.
Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This study, apparently based in part on communications intelligence,
stated the belief of agency analysts that South Africa had already
stockpiled the components for several test devices or first-generation
nuclear weapons and estimated the quantity of highly enriched
uranium that could be produced each year for additional devices.
It also observed that it was "reasonable to assume that R&D
has continued." Topics covered in the study include South
Africa's search for security, its nuclear explosives capability,
considerations regarding nuclear testing, its nuclear test capabilities,
and alternative delivery systems.
Document
28: Randall Fort, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to
[Deleted], September 18, 1991. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
F.W. DeKlerk's assumption of the South African presidency would
lead to a reversal of the nation's domestic and nuclear policies.
In July 1991, de Klerk signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
required a declaration of the country's holdings of fissile material.
This memo from the head of the State Department's intelligence
bureau, addressed the question of whether Pretoria intended to
fully declare its stock of highly enriched uranium - giving INR's
conclusion about South Africa's intentions as well as enumerating
reasons why it might choose to cooperate.
Document
29: INR/SPA to INR/SPA Files, Subject: South Africa's
Options to Conceal Highly Enriched Uranium, March 3, 1992.
Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This memo notes that a recent CIA assessment that apparently
questioned the completeness of South Africa's statement concerning
the amount of highly enriched uranium that it had produced. INR,
as spelled out in the memo, was less inclined to be suspicious
and more willing to postpone judgment - noting that South Africa
reportedly kept poor operating records and that more information
was being received, but that INR could not yet reach a definitive
judgment.
Document
30a: INR/SPA to DCI/NPC, Subject: PAWG Draft Paper on
South Africa's Nuclear Inventory, August 26, 1992. Secret
Document 30b: INR/SPA
to DCI/NPC, Subject: Comments on PAWG Draft, August 28,
1992. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
These memos represent a continuation of continued debate (see
Document 29) between INR and the Nonproliferation Center over
the South Africa's compliance with its disclosure commitments
under the NPT. The State Department's intelligence office - in
response to a draft paper produced by a NPC working group - asserts
that the information was unambiguous as to whether the DeKlerk
regime had made an honest declaration, and that it was premature
to reach a firm conclusion. The later document was submitted as
a dissenting footnote to the working group draft.
Document
31: INR/SPA to DCI/NPC, Subject: INR Footnote to NPC Paper
on South Africa, September 18, 1992. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
In this memo to NPC, INR protests the elimination of some portions
of the footnote (Document 30b) it submitted to the working group
draft, resulting in a version that failed to spell out in full
the argument that the evidence was subject to differing interpretations
and treated the issue of the range of possible levels of highly
enriched uranium production less fully than INR would have preferred.
Document
32: INR/SPA - Gary Dietrich to INR - Douglas Mulholland, Subject:
[Deleted], December 7, 1992. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This memo, from the chief of INR's Office of Strategic and Proliferation
Affairs to INR chief Douglas P. Mulholland, again notes the intelligence
concerning South African compliance with NPT disclosure requirements
was inconclusive. It appears the memo may have been written in
response to a CIA report concerning the Vela incident. INR notes
two factors that suggest that, if a nuclear device was tested
at the time of the incident, South Africa was not the country
responsible.
Document
33: INR, Underground Nuclear Facilities, December
9, 1992. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This paper is also related to the controversy over South African
compliance with NPT disclosure requirements - as it examines the
possibility that undeclared highly enriched uranium was being
concealed in an underground facility. INR judges the likelihood
to be remote while considering it more likely that such undeclared
material, if it existed, would have been transferred to a foreign
country.
Document
34: INR, South Africa: Nuclear Case Closed?, December
19, 1993. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
On March 24, 1993, South African President F.W. deKlerk appeared
before his nation's parliament to officially acknowledge that
not only had South Africa sought to build an atomic bomb, but
that it had succeeded and had built six devices and was working
on a seventh, which were dismantled and destroyed before the country's
accession to the NPT. This report examined a number of topics
concerning the South African program: the dismantlement or decommissioning
of nuclear facilities, the continued controversy over the inventory
declaration, and the possibility that enriched uranium was transferred
abroad.
Notes
1. For an account of Groves' intelligence operation
see Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie
R. Groves, The Manhattan Project's Indispensable Man (South
Royalton, Vt.: Steerforth Books, 2002), pp. 253-312; Jeffrey T.
Richelson, Spying
on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to
Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), pp.
17-61.
2. Book-length accounts of the ALSOS mission,
written by the unit's commander and its scientific director, respectively
are: Boris T. Pash, The ALSOS Mission (New York: Charter,
1969), and Samuel Goudsmit, ALSOS (Los Angeles, Ca.:
Tomash, 1983).
3. U.S. intelligence performance with regard
to the South African nuclear weapons program and the VELA incident
are the covered in. Richelson, Spying
on the Bomb, ch. 6, 7, 9.