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Copy No. 16

18 JUL 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Indian Post-Mortem Report

1. The subject report is forwarded for your review prior to distribution to USIB members for their information.

2. I recommend that you call attention to the report at a subsequent USIB meeting and note in particular its conclusion that the community will have to give greater priority to the nuclear proliferation problem if it expects to do better than in the Indian case. (We have not reviewed in the report the resource implications of a higher priority effort against this problem. I doubt there would be any, since the chief emphasis is on a more focused and dedicated effort by existing collection assets, chiefly in the HUMINT area.)

3. I recommend also that you indicate to USIB that, in response to the recommendation in paragraph 35 of this report, you propose to establish an ad hoc committee under the Chairman of JAEIC, with representation from DIA, NSA, CIA, AEC, and the IC Staff, to develop specific collection strategies against the nuclear proliferation target in the key nth countries. The SNIE on the issue which is currently being prepared under Mr. Stoertz's direction should, together with this report, provide a solid basis for the work of such a committee.

SIGNED

Daniel O. Graham  
Lieutenant General, USA  
D/DCI/IC

Attachment

AT

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
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In the months prior to India's 18 May nuclear test, the intelligence community failed to warn US decision makers that such a test was being planned. This failure denied the US Government the option of considering diplomatic or other initiatives to try to prevent this significant step in nuclear proliferation.

2. The intelligence community had long known that India was capable of producing and testing a nuclear device. It had also estimated as far back as 1965 that India would "in the next few years" detonate a nuclear device. Its inability to predict the actual event was due essentially to two factors: inadequate priority against an admittedly difficult target, and lack of adequate communications among these elements of the community, both collectors and producers, whose combined talents were essential to resolving the problem.



4. The proper collection strategy against the nuclear proliferation target will necessarily differ from one nth country to another. It can be determined only by integrated analysis conducted by representatives of all collection modes and by both technical and political analysts. Once determined, it must be reviewed and reinforced by continuing close communications among all concerned.

5. Most importantly, success against the nth country intelligence problem will require that the community accord it a higher priority than it has received to date.

6. Specific recommendations are provided in paragraphs 34-38.

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