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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

- William Rusher, Publisher, National Review
- Allan Ryskind, Editor, Human Events
- Stan Evans, Editor, Indianapolis News and
Chairman, ACU
- Jeffrey Bell, Editor, Battle Line
- Dan Mahoney, Chairman, NY Conservative Party
- Bill Schneider, Defense expert, Senator James
Buckley's staff
- John Fischer, American Security Council
- Randall Teague and Don Docksaid National
Officers of YAF
- Frank Shakespeare, Director, USIA
- Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

PLACE:

The Roosevelt Room, The White House

DATE & TIME:

Thursday, August 12, 1971
4:00 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

[Mr. Pat Buchanan introduced Dr. Kissinger and confirmed that Dr. Kissinger's remarks had to be entirely off the record. Nods of agreement came from members of the group.]

Question: Is the fact of the meeting's existence confidential?

Answer: (Pat Buchanan) Yes.

Question: There is an overlap between members of this group and members of the group which made a statement repudiating support for the Administration last week. The technical origin of this meeting was a request which came from Mr. Stan Evans in June. In sum, the members of this group are representative conservatives who are deeply concerned about the course of the current Administration.

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Answer: I can assure you that I know that it is exceedingly boring to listen to bureaucrats. Accordingly, I will be as brief as possible and, after making a statement, I will take questions and answer them as frankly as possible.

First of all, let me say that this Administration came to office at the end of a period of substantial collapse of foreign policy theory. A new frontier of the 60's had ended in the frustration of Vietnam, a divided country, and vicious isolationism clamored for by liberals. The conviction that there was no real danger to our nation was widespread. There was an extreme attack on general principles of authority and, in particular, on the Defense establishment -- the military. Our Administration faced a world that had changed to objective measure from the world confronted by earlier administrations. Western Europe and Japan had emerged. The Russo-Chinese split was a new characteristic of the Communist world and the military balance of power had shifted dramatically; in 1962, in the Cuban missile crisis, the Kennedy Administration took pride in the fact that he had run the risk of nuclear war. At that time, Russia had fewer than 75 ICBM's. Those ICBM's were liquid fuel missiles which required nearly 10 hours to ready for firing. They were also on open sites and, as Israel was able to do in the five-day war in 1967, we could have incapacitated the enemy with one disarming strike. Now Russia has over 1200 ICBM's and a growing submarine ballistic fleet. So the foreign situation that we faced had changed dramatically; and for the moment, I put aside domestic considerations. There were vicious attacks on the Defense establishment at home, but we first had to handle the defense problem in its international setting. When we took over, there had been no new strategic weapon developed in eight years. In the Department of Defense during that period, any weapon which could be built would not be built for two reasons. The argument was, first, that the existing weapons were adequate; and second, that in 15 years there would be a super-weapon to follow which would render obsolete the proposals then under consideration. This syndrome led to an erosion of power. This erosion of power was compounded by a domestic crisis arising from the existence of the Vietnam war. During this period, the military developed leadership in its top ranks which was well-versed in the language of systems analysis; but they were not people who could stand on their own when the going got tough. In addition, at that time, we came to face an irresponsible Congress. We also faced an intellectual establishment which has been increasingly demoralized. Not enough has been done, that is true, but the reason is that not enough could have been done. Let's look at the President's record. He personally put through

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an ABM system against violent opposition from both the Congress and the bureaucracy. As we began to deal on SALT, he continually faced the argument that our ABM development would make it more difficult to reach an agreement with the Russians, yet he pushed on. During that period, the President had the key Senators one-by-one to explain his position and push for support. Every year, the White House has pushed in Defense budget matters beyond the proposals set forth by the Defense Department itself. The serious problem in this era has been that we have not been able to run the risk of totally alienating the Congress which might, in the extreme, cut off the funding for the Vietnam war. The major mistake of this Administration has not been its defense policy but its failure to clear out members of the bureaucracy when it came to power.

Question: Which Departments?

Answer: I'm not going to mention anything particular.

Question: Ellsberg?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) Ellsberg? You think Ellsberg worked here?

Question: I was just being funny.

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) The Ellsberg problem can happen anywhere. The real problem is the bureaucracy which must be relied upon to implement policy. Here we face constant leaks in the bureaucracy. An example recently was Senator Kennedy's reading State Department cables in an open hearing before a Congressional Subcommittee. This is part of the problem of the bureaucracy. Each year we have asked for the highest budget possible for defense. Really, one of our serious problems is that the Department of Defense requests its funds in a way which makes it very difficult for us to get the required money. The services themselves are so shell-shocked as a result of the Vietnam war that they are willing to divide the pie by thirds rather than enter into discussions about improving missions. Just this week, we had a briefing from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I can tell you gentlemen that if, following the meeting, the President had wanted to implement the recommendations of the Chiefs, it simply would not have been possible. I could not say what their recommendations were. You cannot come into a meeting and talk only about a number of "wings" without an explanation of what those "wings" involve and why they are required.

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This Administration has been under constant intellectual attack and has had no intellectual defenders. It has been the White House that has been pushing to the line on the defense budget.

Now let me turn to SALT for a moment. In the initial stages of discussions, we were nearly leaked to death. The President would not go into serious discussions with the Russians until he was fully satisfied that we had determined what was in our national interest. This took some nine months. We analyzed, weapon-by-weapon, the risks, the potential gains, the possible retaliation for breaches of the agreement, and so forth. Only after that had been done did we enter into serious SALT discussions. It is simply a joke -- a ridiculous joke -- to suggest the White House has given away anything on SALT. We are in a daily fight for our lives with Congress, with the press, and with the bureaucracy. When SALT came along, where were we? We faced a cut-off of ABM funds which meant essentially a proposal for unilateral disarmament. Second, we faced the prospect of no new strategic weapons development. Third, it was we alone who had pushed the MIRV development. Let me address the SALT discussions themselves. In the area of defensive weapons we are essentially offering an exchange in which they freeze their Moscow ABM, if we confine ourselves to several sites to protect ABM fields. We are trying to get three but recognize that two may be the most that we can get. At this stage, we have a technological superiority, and we can expand faster from two sites than from zero if they breach the agreement. What we are after is a base from which we can expand, if we have to. Regarding offensive weapons, we are asking a freeze on the development of land-based missiles. The United States is not currently building any land-based missiles. The Russians have been building land-based missiles at the rate of approximately 120 a year. On this I cannot see what we risk. We are giving up nothing in exchange for getting them to stop their deployment of land-based missiles. We have not been irresponsible, gentlemen; we are in a position now where, though we currently face Congressional threats about ABM funding, if the agreement falls through we can go back to building the ABM; and since we are not currently resuming a build-up of offensive weapons, we can still get a buildup off the ground at the earliest possible moment, if necessary. Gentlemen, let me talk out of school a minute. Here in Washington, we have dealt privately with Ambassador Dobrynin without informing the bureaucracy. Disasters seem to result when the bureaucracy becomes involved. We had been dealing with the Russians through Dobrynin and in March had rejected a proposal of the Russians. Three weeks before the agreement was to be reached, the Russians went to Gerry Smith in Helsinki with the very same proposal. Smith, who had known nothing of our negotiations, came into Washington during the psychological crisis following the Cambodia action. The press picked up this proposal as a

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dramatic new development. We had to go back to Dobrynin and get tough with him -- tell him this type of conduct simply would not work. In the bureaucracy and in 98% of press coverage, that agreement was acceptable and was praised; yet we had rejected it as inadequate. It has been the Administration, gentlemen, that has been holding the line in SALT.

Let me address the Vietnam problem for a minute. The overwhelming problem and issue in the Vietnam war today is whether, in a seven-year war in which 45,000 Americans have died, the United States can be driven out of Vietnam by public pressure resulting from the frustration of the war. Regardless of whether it was right or wrong to go into the war, we must extract ourselves slowly enough to allow the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to defend themselves. We engaged in the Laos and Cambodia operations against the advice of the bureaucracy and incurred the reaction we all know. It is essential to Presidential authority in the United States that this war be ended in a way that does not mock the commitments of the past. We could end the war any day. Thieu is the only problem. We can get out of there anytime we are willing to overthrow him. The deadline issue is irrelevant. The real question is do we end the Vietnam process, which began with the overthrow of a government, by the overthrow of another government? The answer must be no. We will not participate in an overthrow of an allied government. Today, the prospects of a negotiated settlement are good; and if they do work out, it will have been as a result of the painful months that we have endured in the recent past.

Now, to the China issue. I take it that no one is prone to accuse the President of excessive sentimentality, especially vis-a-vis Communists. Nor am I generally so accused. Gentlemen, we face two powerful Communist nations today. One has 1500 ICBM's; the other has none. Every crisis that has existed in the past 12 years has been initiated by the Russians. This is not to say that China is a peaceful nation. It is to say that China has been too weak to cause us serious difficulties in the past. It is essential now to get fluidity in diplomatic relations. We are seeking diplomatic maneuverability. You know that three top State Department officials in the Soviet field felt compelled to express their "consciences" to the President on our Peking initiative that the China opening jeopardized all relations with the Soviet Union. But the fact of the matter, gentlemen, is that up to July 17th Dobrynin and the Russians were insolent in their dealings with us. Since July 17th we have had their full attention. Necessity has brought us together with the Chinese, and necessity will dictate the future of our relationship. We are not hostages to the Chinese.

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They gave up something significant when they entered into this relationship with us. They gave up their revolutionary virginity. They will not cancel the visit short of our destroying a Chinese city. The principle of revolutionary purity is gone for them now; it is like a situation where a girl will sleep with you for a million dollars but not for ten dollars. We have not paid anything in this China opening and I think we will pay nothing in the future. There is a big difference between this meeting and President Eisenhower's visit to Moscow. The Moscow visit was a good will tour. Problems had been worked out previously in Summit meetings. This visit is substantive. The Chinese know that if they don't go through with this meeting in Peking, not only will they have alienated the current President, but that they will doubtless have lost an opportunity to better relations with the United States at least through the next Administration. And, gentlemen, we have not sold out our allies. The State Department has been pressing since February on the UN seating issue. We have held out as long as possible. Now the only way for us to preserve Taiwan in the United Nations is to use the dual representation formula. If one were to stick with the principal position that is to say, a Taiwan only position the result would be expulsion from the UN for Taiwan and exclusive membership for the Communists.

May I make a few general observations? The National Review had some comments on prior members of my staff. I must say that I have had staff members whose subsequent activities I have not admired. I want to be candid. I thought, and in fact think I did, deal adequately with people on my staff who disagreed with our policies. But I did overrate their sense of honor. I could not believe that they would go public with their disagreements when they left the staff. I thought they could be controlled - and they were controlled in their jobs. But I was wrong about their conduct once they left the staff. The President, you know, has many constituencies. He must be able to choose among frontal assaults, buffer zone tactics, requirements to pay a price for something he wants, and so forth. The previous administrations had moral support from the Establishment at large, from the respectable public. This Administration, gentlemen, is the loneliest administration imaginable. The intellectual Establishment turned on me, you know, only after it became clear that I wouldn't turn on the President. During the marches on Washington, for instance, we got no comments; no calls of support. During the Bay of Pigs affair, I know the administration under Kennedy received telegrams, letters, phone calls, and the like. We don't get that kind of support, and, to be quite frank, we don't hear that sort of support from conservatives. In this nation we have a great need to develop a counterweight to the liberal consensus - a counterweight other

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than in the liturgical sense of merely speaking to one another. If we don't develop that counterweight, all authority will be eroded. The attackers against the Administration increase month by month. We have had to take dramatic steps to deal with the assaults. In the Cienfuegos Affair the USSR was well on the road to developing a submarine base in Cuba. Two-thirds of the bureaucracy denied it was there. It took us over a week, and during that time I had to help analyze intelligence in the Situation Room - and that's not my job - to prove the base was being built. After we challenged the Russians on the construction, the base was substantially torn down. Then the press leaked that nothing had been there originally; and the Russians were able to resume rebuilding. This happened three times before we finally got the matter settled. I trust you will not be repeating this; but I thought that you deserved to know. We are determined to get diplomatic maneuvering power which will shake the foundation of the theory of foreign affairs which have dominated past decades. People thought that we could not get tough with the Russians -- as on the ABM, on the MIRV issue, in Cienfuegos -- and still better our relations with them. But that is where we are headed.

Before the election in 1972, it will not be possible for us aggressively to improve our Defense position. Even Senator Stennis now advocates cuts in Defense spending. That is a reflection of how serious the situation is.

Question: (Stan Evans): First just a general comment, Dr. Kissinger. You have loosely covered the areas in which conservatives have supported the Administration -- namely: ABM, the demonstrators, Cambodia, and Vietnamization. Frankly, your criticism of conservatives on that score does not seem to me to be appropriate. The question to us is distinguishing between situations in which someone agrees with your strategy and is battling to implement it as best possible from the situation in which someone has a different strategy from that which you propose. Quite frankly the latter seems to be the case for the Administration now; for exceptions to the policy which we think should prevail seem to have become the rule. The Johnson/Kennedy foreign policy theory seems to have taken over in the Nixon Administration.

Answer: Can you be specific?

Question (Stan Evans): A concern of mine was included in a book which I wrote in the 1960's. It attacked the notion of a stable balance of terror reflected in Phoenix thinking, and the like. I consider it a scandal to allow our population to be used as hostages in the Defense sense.

Answer: There are two aspects to this problem. The first question is: "Is it desirable to protect the population?" If the answer to this is yes, the next question must be: "Can you do it?" Of course we think it is

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desirable to protect populations; but we do not see any way to prevent a catastrophic loss to populations in a nuclear war. The first thing that we must do is to protect our retaliatory capability. Surely our populations would be defenseless if we were without retaliatory capacity. The Safeguard situation was a problem of saving what we could save. We tried for twelve sites. Every year we battle in Congress. Now we are down to fighting merely for the minimum base which would allow us subsequently to expand the system. It will take about four years to get to a full system.

Question (Stan Evans): But isn't this the Wiesner study/Phoenix mentality?

[Comment by unnamed participant: Recently Secretary Packard appeared on the Hill and spoke about our locating missile sites in low population areas and about our cessation of development of offensive weapons. He noted that the other side has shown no similar restraint.]

Answer: We have a problem of governing here. We can't fight with the bureaucracy all the time on all the issues. We have to get what we can get. We are the poor people in Washington. Originally it was thought that the SS-9 was aimed at U.S. cities; then it was found to have multiple war-heads. After analysis and weekends numbering three in the Situation Room, we came to know that the SS-9 could hit only two cities in its target belt; San Francisco and Boston. It was also easy to note that all of our Minuteman silos were in that belt. Without going into technical details, I can also tell you that the SS-9's footprint was the same as that of the Minuteman. It had about a nine-mile diameter. The conclusion was obvious. The SS-9 is targetted at our Minuteman silos. The first problem became to defend the Minuteman. We can't make adequate area-defenses without defending our retaliatory capacity. We have aggressively sought area-defenses against nuclear attack by minor nuclear powers, new nuclear powers, or the like. Certainly the population must be defended if it is possible. The fact is that we cannot get either an adequate area-defense or an adequate population defense. Yes, I know the Packard statement; super clever statement. I know the people preparing it. I don't know how good the statement was, but I can tell you that we have done all possible to improve the accuracy of our missile systems.

Question (Bill ^{Schneider} ~~Sneider~~): I know for a fact that a \$300 million program in the Air Force to improve missile accuracy, according to General Holloway, at least, had to be cancelled because of our policy that improving accuracy will not be sought.

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Answer: I have never heard anything about not improving accuracy. Al, am I right?

Answer (General Haig): Certainly there is no policy against spending money to improve missile accuracy. Just this week at a JCS briefing this very subject came up; both Laird and Packard were there, and they certainly did not say anything about a policy which excludes the improvement of accuracy as a goal. The Services simply are not presenting their cases adequately enough. They must say we need the following items for the following reasons, and list the items and the reasons. What they do now is come in and say: "Here are 50 systems with their characteristics analyzed." They assume that the President then can make a decision about implementation. In reality there may be some arbitrary policy around, but there is surely no national policy against improving missile accuracy.

Question (Bill Schneider): In the State of the World message the policy of not seeking improvement in accuracy was stated.

Answer: You keep screaming for improvement in accuracy. We like that, we need it. It is good.

Question: Defense is the key issue here. As I understand your argument, it is that we are in a situation of doing the best possible.

Dr. Kissinger: Speaking as a military expert and not as an adviser to the President, let me agree that our military difficulty in main is deterioration; and our military power has deteriorated. We have been operating under the same military philosophy for eighty years. We have not developed a single land-based missile since 1958. The increases in our budget have all been in nonstrategic areas. They have been in the pay areas. I cannot imagine today how we could finance an undertaking of the scope of World War II; and this will become more complicated by increased implementation of the all-volunteer force policy. Today the human factors are so complex. You know our staff studies have showed astronomical increases in the cost of weapon-systems here. When compared in the growth of the Russian system, it is absolutely shocking. Four months ago we sent our studies to the Pentagon for analysis, but we haven't had any response. Have we Al?

Answer (General Haig): No, none yet.

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(Dr. Kissinger continued.) But also we do not have today an adequate strategic doctrine. There are issues that we ask about year after year to the military; and the answers just aren't there. But the military is so shell-shocked by its years under McNamara and in the Vietnam war that we have hesitated to brutalize them. These issues include things that are absolutely necessary, like a reassessment of the role of tactical air, and a policy for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. We have no doctrine there. But for practical reasons we must wait for the end of the Vietnam war before we can turn our attention to these strategic matters.

Question (unnamed participant): But the ultimate question here is the function of the President. You say we are declining militarily. Why doesn't the President make a direct personal appeal to the people of the nation? I am convinced that, if he did, President Nixon could chase Senator Proxmire up the road.

Answer: That question is a political question and I am not really qualified to answer in the field of politics.

Question (same unnamed participant): But isn't this the sine qua non battle?

Answer: I say again, we have done the maximum possible.

Question (same unnamed participant): You mean beyond 1972?

Answer: My personal judgment is that we have until 1975 or 1976 before we must pay a price. Today we are laying the basis to reduce the slide. We do have several more years, but that is all.

Question (Dan Mahoney): I am not much of a military expert. Perhaps I should have brought comic books in my brief case to read during this part of the discussion; but I believe that this is fundamentally a political question, and on that field I do claim some expertise. I am upset in the current intellectual and political context that the White House can see itself clear to take the minimum now on the Defense issue. I believe that the only way to turn the Establishment and the nation is with Presidential leadership. I assume that the perspective I favor is heard in White House meetings that we are not privy to, but my question is whether that is enough. Approaches such as "negotiation not confrontation," and the like, seem to me disastrous for the country. I agree with the last paragraph in William Buckley's article on the China opening. In the absence of moves forward in the Defense area and in the presence of continuing conciliatory moves, we may be robbing the nation and the public at large of its resolve and will.

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Answer: I don't want to speak on theory but I can address specific facts. Between February and June of this year we have been under incessant public pressure in one direction only . . . always in the direction to yield. Could we have rallied the forces and fought the good fight? The whole basis of Presidential authority has been in a balance. I don't know what the answer is. During the most critical period the President met with twelve conservative Senators, supporters of the Administration. At the end of the meeting one of the Senators felt obliged to state that his conscience would not allow him to support the Administration, if it did not extricate itself immediately from Vietnam. Gentlemen, we are getting no support. No one is saying "We are with you, Mr. President. We follow you." We have implemented the maximum Defense budget possible without raising taxes in a election year. Congress says that we have enough for Defense spending. I asked this question: With the China initiative, even if there is a deterioration in Sino-American relationships, won't we be in a better position then to tighten our belts and spend on Defense than we would have been in had we not made the overture? This is a question for judgment. I think the answer is yes.

Question (Dan Mahoney): But the people of the nation may not be so unsentimental. Couldn't we have gotten an invitation from the Chief of State?

Answer: Chou En-lai is the Chief of State. Mao is the Chief of the Party.

Question (Dan Mahoney): Excuse me, I stand corrected.

Question (Jeffrey Bell): Turning to SALT again, Dr. Kissinger - you indicated that we are holding out for three sites in exchange for the Russian system intact. In the area of offensive weapons, are submarines included?

Answer: This point is being negotiated; it is not clear right now. If the Soviet submarine weapons reach a certain point, we will have to use the escape clause in the agreement.

Question (Jeffrey Bell): They are cutting at our lead in submarines, though.

Answer: But we hesitate to thrust. We might use the escape clause in this area. The offensive agreement, you know, is an interim agreement, and it is open to exclude submarines.

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Question (Stan Evans): You have confirmed my belief that the Administration responds quite dramatically to immediate pressure.

Answer: On Defense?

Question (Stan Evans): No, in general.

Answer: Our basic Vietnam strategy, I can assure you, has not been affected by the media. Our basic defense strategy, similarly, has not been affected by the media. You know that in Congress the situation is simply impossible, now that Senator Russell has died. We have no Senator who can deliver votes. Senator Stennis is a decent man; but he is no fighter. Under conditions of incipient civil war in Washington we have . . .

Question (Stan Evans): If the press is a factor, and I think it should be less of a factor than it is, my conviction is that the Washington Post and New York Times do not represent American public opinion.

Answer: But every Congressman and Senator reads the Post columnist more eagerly than he reads classified documents. We must deal with that fact. Wherever there has been a real challenge, as in Cienfuegos, and as in the Middle East, we have been tough. We went to the very edge of war in the Middle East. One must view the Moscow/Peking development as diplomatic counterweights of the same sort. I can assure you that the Russians do not think we are going soft.

Question (Stan Evans): The media reaction has been an orgy of congratulation, for the Administration and the media itself. Old China experts have been resuscitated, and dragged before Congress. We have seen the media distort the White House action, perhaps, but still . . .

Answer: If it hadn't been for the China initiative in the papers, you know it would have been Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers, or the Vietnam war. You must consider the alternatives in May and June of this year.

Question (Stan Evans): You don't mean that the China initiative had anything to do with Daniel Ellsberg?

Answer: No, the China trip was scheduled anyway, but the press impact had that effect.

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Question (unidentified participant): My impression is that the United States can, in the crunch, produce a majority in the United Nations at any time on any issue. We need a majority on the special-question issue for Taiwan. For the U. S. to be overpowered here to please the Chinese Communist would be a tragedy.

Answer: I fully agree with you. If the previous ambassador to the UN had been there we might be in a different situation. Ambassador Bush says he can get the majority for us. There are elements, of course, in the bureaucracy which want to sell us out. Weekly Bush gets instructions to get a majority on the special question for the Chinese issue. I fully agree with you. The justification of our policy in the China initiative would be disproved now if the Taiwanese were excluded from the UN.

Question (Bill Schneider): Looking again at our SALT posture it is obvious that we cannot push the Soviets the way Kennedy was able to push them during the Bay of Pigs period.

Answer: We will win in an area like Cuba. We did it quietly but toughly on the Cienfuegos matter. The problem here is that now there are counterpressures which prevent us from controlling Soviet activity elsewhere. In Berlin in 1962 our strategic threat was the factor in determining Soviet action in the crisis. Now we are in a different situation. Now we need a local, tactical capacity. In 1962, you know, we had the Soviets effectively in a ten-to-one missile imbalance. Now, even if we were to have 50,000 missiles to their 1500 it would be impossible to argue that the ratio had been maintained -- because such large numbers of missiles may not be fired simultaneously. So in the absolute sense our ratio advantage in ICBM's has declined and cannot be resurrected.

Question (Bill Schneider): Won't the SALT agreement, though, ratify the Soviet advances in the Defense field.

Answer: The interim agreement will stop their buildup of land-based weapons. We have excluded MIRV, so we can continue developing that system. It is in the next round where it will be crucial to deal with the disparity.

Question (John Fisher): Leaving the Congressional problems aside, do you agree with the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel that the only viable strategy is to gain and retain clear military superiority?

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Answer: Yes, I agree in general with the desirability of military superiority; but what I want to see is closer analysis of the concept of "clear military superiority." We are dealing now in new areas, and the military simply is not handling it correctly. For example, they come in and say the Russians have X number of defense fighters and we have X number of defense fighters. The issue, of course, their defense against our offense. One does not pit defense fighter planes against defense fighter planes. They are coming in with canned presentations. This makes it very tough for us to deal with military issues on a mission basis. Superiority is desirable, of course. But what we must do is overhaul our strategic theory. So far we have laid off the military. We need a major overhaul of our approach, but we have to wait until the end of the war for that.

Question (Stan Evans): I thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for being candid. I can appreciate the difficulties that the Administration faces. But I must be candid myself, and say that my prior opinion still holds ... and that opinion is that, on the whole, the Administration has a different strategic analysis from the one I support. The Packard statement on balance of terror is explainable, perhaps; but all we can do is go on what you do in the Administration.

Answer: We need pressure from the Right and we appreciate it. But you are too harsh with the Administration. Without our Administration there would have been no MIRV development, no ABM, no Army modernization.

Question (Stan Evans): I was not referring simply to defense matters.

Answer: Our defense theory was not reflected in the Packard statement. You are right; you must judge us on our actions. I recognize your group, and hope you know that we are listening. I also hope that the worse criticism that you will have of us is that we haven't moved far enough in Defense matters. I just hope you will stop yelling at us, and start yelling at our enemies. I must say to this group that I have never spoken with this degree of candor before. I must emphasize that none of these matters can appear either directly or indirectly in print. Please, you cannot discuss this with people.

Question (unidentified participant): We can talk among ourselves, can't we?

(Laughter)

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