Electronic
Briefing Book
How
Many and Where Were the Nukes?
What
the U.S. Government No Longer Wants You to Know about Nuclear
Weapons During the Cold War
Edited
by Dr. William Burr
Declassification decisions on U.S. nuclear weapons information
by federal agencies have taken a surprising turn. Security reviewers
are treating as "classified" information that has been
available in the public record for decades. For years during the
Cold War the U.S. nuclear arsenal included 1,000 Minuteman and
55 Titan II missiles; this information could easily be found in
a variety of public record sources. For reasons that are truly
perplexing, when the current reviewers open up archival documents
from the Cold War, they are redacting those and other publicly-available
numbers, even to the point of classifying parts of a public report
by the Secretary of Defense (see examples in Part
II). Excessive secrecy continues to abound in another category
of historical nuclear information: the overseas deployment of
U.S. nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Information on the deployments
that has been publicly available for many years is also being
classified by U.S. government agencies.
 |
| Members
of the U.S. Air Force's 71st Tactical Missile Squadron
check a nuclear-capable Mace MGM-13B missile on its
launcher in a steel and concrete underground hanger
at Ramstein Air Force base in Germany, 1968. The Mace's
W-28 thermonuclear warhead had an explosive yield
of 1.1 megatons. (Photo no. 112895, file 342B-ND-057-5,
Still Pictures Division, National Archives).
|
|
Government attempts to classify public-record information brings
to mind the recent controversy over the reclassification of thousands
of pages of documents at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). The controversy was sparked by doubt whether many of the
formerly open-shelf documents that the CIA and the Air Force had
withdrawn from open records at NARA had any current sensitivity
(some of the documents had been published by the State Department
years earlier). Just as questionable is the Pentagon's attempt
at virtual reclassification of the numbers of Cold War strategic
nuclear systems. During the 1960s and 1970s, Secretaries of Defense
produced public reports showing that at the height of the Cold
War, the United States had 1,054 intercontinental ballistic missiles
(1,000 Minutemen and 54 Titan IIs) and 656 submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs). This and related information has also
been available before in previously declassified documents, but
now Pentagon officials excise the same numbers when they review
documents. Although National Security Archive staffers have challenged
the practice in mandatory review appeals, the number game continues
to this day.
Another category of nuclear weapons information, the overseas
deployments of the weapons during the Cold War, also raises questions
about the standards used in declassification reviews. Since Fiscal
Year 1999, Congress has authorized the Department of Energy to
review formerly open-shelf records at NARA to locate and impound
documents containing inadvertently released secret information
about nuclear weapons. (Note 1) One of the classes
of secrets that have been at issue in DOE's review process has
been the locations of the thousands of U.S. nuclear weapons that
the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy deployed overseas during the
Cold War. While government agencies have occasionally released
information on the deployments, since the late 1990s DOE and the
Defense Department have been working together to keep the information
under wraps. As sensitive as information on the scale of the deployments
was during the period of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, it is questionable
whether all of it must remain classified. A recent massively excised
"release" of a "Draft Compendium of Nuclear Weapons
Arrangements" prepared in October 1968 by the Department
of State's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs demonstrates the
rigid approach that U.S. government agencies take to protect the
secrecy of historical nuclear deployments.
This briefing book provides examples of government declassification
decisions on questionable nuclear secrets: the numbers of strategic
weapons systems and the locations of, and policies concerning,
overseas deployments during the Cold War. While secrecy is likely
to shroud the historic overseas deployments for some time, the
hot light of publicity might halt the laughable practice of classifying
public record information on the numbers of strategic weapons.
Documents
Note:
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Part
I - Numbers
The criteria that Defense Department reviewers are using to
review documents on the U.S. strategic force posture during the
Cold War is resulting in classification of public information.
The Pentagon is now trying to keep secret numbers of strategic
weapons that have never been classified before. Since the 1960s,
if not before, Secretaries of Defense disclosed the numbers for
the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal in their annual reports. For
example, Secretaries of Defense during the 1960s and 1970s, such
as Robert McNamara, Melvin Laird, Elliot Richardson, and James
Schlesinger, published numbers of U.S. ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic
bomber forces. Despite the easy availability of these and related
numbers, and even though the Department of Defense used to recognize
their declassified status, security reviewers now treat them as
classified national security information. The justification that
Pentagon security reviewers are using to classify this information
is Section 1.4 (a) of Executive Order 12958, as amended, which
permits the classification of information on "military plans,
weapons systems, or operations." The category is elastic
enough to permit declassification reviewers to do what they are
now doing: to designate information as classifiable that no one
has ever before deemed sensitive.
Recent Pentagon declassification actions amount to an attempt
to reclassify the information without actually impounding documents.
It would be difficult to find better candidates for unjustifiable
secrecy or better evidence for the need for more realistic standards
and guidelines for the declassification of historical records.
This problem is unlikely to go away as long as there no disincentives
for improper classification of information and security reviewers
are following unrealistic guidelines.
Documents
1A and B: McNamara Report on Strategic Posture
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Draft Memorandum for the President,
"Recommended FY 1966-1970 Programs for Strategic Offensive
Forces, Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces, and Civil
Defense (U)," 3 December 1964. Top Secret
Variant
A: Declassified 1999, Source: National Archives, Record
Group 200 (Donated Collections), Robert McNamara Papers, box
44, Strategic Forces - Memos to the President - October-December
1964
Variant
B: Declassified 2006
Source: Mandatory review request to
Department of Defense
As Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara frequently sent
President Kennedy, then President Johnson "draft presidential
memoranda," or DPMs, detailing his thinking on a variety
of military policy issues, including the U.S strategic nuclear
force posture. These separate releases of the December 1964
DPM on strategic offensive and defensive forces are good examples
of the quirky aspects of the declassification process. While
both variants share some excisions, e.g. on page 12, more characteristic
are the wide divergences between the different releases---compare
the differences by looking at some of the pages, e.g. pages
1, 7, 8, 13, 19, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31, 36, 40, 43-45, 62, 63,
64, and 68. The most recent release includes many examples of
the trend to classify the numbers of strategic delivery systems;
for example, the number "200" is excised from page
1; reviewers excised the numbers of actual and projected U.S.
bombers and missiles from page 7.
Documents
2A-C: Annual Public Reports of the Defense Department
Document
2A: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal
Year 1964 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1966),
excerpts from "Report of the Secretary of Defense"
Document
2B: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal
Year 1966 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1967),
excerpts from "Report of the Secretary of Defense"
Document
2C: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal
Year 1967 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1969),
excerpts from "Report of the Secretary of Defense"
The routine, non-classified nature of the numbers of U.S. strategic
nuclear weapons systems during the 1960s is evident in these
Pentagon reports. Secretaries of Defense believed that they
had to present such details to the interested U.S. public and
to the Soviet Union in order to demonstrate that the United
States had a "deterrent power that no aggressor could ignore."
For example, the report for FY 1967 shows the numbers of ICBMs
and SLBMs that would characterize two-thirds of the nuclear
"triad" for years to come: 1000 Minutemen, 54 Titan
IIs, and 656 SLBMs.
Document
3: Raymond L. Garthoff, U.S. Department of State Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs to Deputy Under Secretary for Political
Affairs Foy Kohler, "Subjective and Objective Strategic Balances,"
31 March 1967, Top Secret, excised copy
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National
Security Files. Spurgeon Keeny Files, box 1, ABM Deployment Decision
& McNamara Speech of 9/18/67
During the Cold War, analysts of military affairs played "numbers
games" comparing U.S. and Soviet strategic force levels
to make a case for arms control, for increases in military spending,
or for other policies. In a top secret memo based on the latest
intelligence, Raymond L. Garthoff, a State Department expert
on Soviet affairs and strategic nuclear policy, showed how hard
data could be spun to give different interpretations of the
U.S.-Soviet military balance. As Garthoff observed in his memoir,
"the strategic relationship could be depicted as very reassuring
or very dangerous, depending on how one selected the forces
to be compared." That Garthoff prepared such a report was
worrisome to senior military leaders because it showed how the
data could be accurately presented to "undermine the rather
alarmist comparisons that were used to support Defense budget
programs." (Note 2)
While Garthoff used then-sensitive numbers based on intelligence
estimates of Soviet forces and non-sensitive numbers of U.S.
delivery systems as of March 1967, security reviewers have released
more of the former than the latter. When the Lyndon B. Johnson
Library finally released this document in 2004, after a seven-year
waiting period (possibly due to delays at the Energy Department),
the redacted numbers were a surprise, but it was not yet evident
that they signaled a trend.
An appeal led to the release of a few numbers (e.g., strategic
bombers), but the Defense Department and the Energy Department
continue to withhold the numbers of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs, among
other weapon systems. This document is currently under appeal
at the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).
Using the information in the Secretary of Defense reports cited
in section 2A-C, it is possible to fill in some of the blanks
with some assurance (although the numbers may be slightly off).
For example, the excised numbers in "General Strategic
Balance", section 1, are 934 and 592 respectively. The
numbers in section 3 are 988 (934 Minutemen plus 54 Titan IIs),
592 and 1580 respectively. The excised number in section 4 is
988. The numbers in section 5 are 1054, 120, and 54 respectively.
For "Missile Launching Submarines," the key excised
numbers are 592 SLBMs and 37 submarines, with a planned fleet
of 41.
Documents
4A and B: Reclassification of Public Information from the 1970s:
Document
4A: BDM Corporation, History of Strategic Air and Ballistic
Missile Defense, 1956-[1972], Vol. II, Book 1, Draft, 21 May
1975, Top Secret Excised Copy
Document
4B: Toward A National Security Strategy of Realistic Defense:
Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Fiscal Year
1972 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, Before the
House Armed Services Committee, March 9, 1971 (Washington, D.C.,
Government Printing Office, 1971), excerpt
Recently, the Army Department declassified much of a huge history
of air and missile defense prepared by the BDM Corporation during
the mid-1970s. Included in the study are several charts depicting
U.S. strategic policy under Eisenhower, Johnson-Kennedy, and
Nixon that Pentagon reviewers excised. The charts as published
by BDM were marked "unclassified" because the compilers
of the history had taken them from Secretary of Defense Laird's
public report to Congress from March 1971. That report has been
publicly available since it was released 35 years ago. Evidently
the Pentagon reviewers did not know where BDM had gotten the
charts, but one wonders if it would have made a difference in
light of their determination to excise all numbers of strategic
weapons. The charts are currently under appeal at the Department
of Defense.
Document
5: Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979
Defense Program, March 9, 1974 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing
Office, 1971), excerpt
Other public reports by Secretaries of Defense during the 1970s
showed the declassified status of the numbers of U.S. strategic
missiles and bombers. The Schlesinger report is particularly
interesting because it included "force loadings":
the total numbers for both the Soviet Union and the United States
of nuclear bombs and missile warheads, including multiple independently-targetable
reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
Documents
6A and B: Henry Kissinger to President Ford, "Talking Points,
NSC Meeting, Monday, October 7, 1974," Top Secret
Document
6A: National Security Council FOIA release, 1999
Document
6B: Excised copy released by Gerald R. Ford Library, May
2006; Source: National Security Council Meeting File, box 1,
NSC meeting 10/7/74
Dissimilar releases of Henry Kissinger's "Talking Points"
prepared for President Ford as background for an NSC meeting
on the SALT II negotiations highlight the conflicting policies
that security reviewers have taken toward releasing or continuing
the classification of the numbers of nuclear delivery systems.
Variant A, an earlier release by the National Security Council
in 1999, illustrates the Clinton administration's openness.
As is evident from variant B, recently released by the Ford
Library, the Defense Department's security reviewers are using
the same procedures that governed the recent release of the
McNamara DPM from 1964 and the BDM history: excise all numbers
of U.S. strategic weapons systems. When the National Security
Council met that day to discuss SALT II, Kissinger read from
the "Talking Points" to keep the participants up-to-speed.
The declassified minutes of the NSC meeting, also released in
1999 and available
on the Gerald R. Ford Library Web site, reproduces the text
of parts of Kissinger's briefing paper, which he read to the
meeting participants, including virtually all of the numbers
excised from the most recent release.
Part
II- Overseas Deployments
From the 1950s through the early 1990s, the U.S. government
deployed nuclear weapons around the world, from the North Atlantic
and Western Europe to South Korea, the Philippines, and the Western
Pacific. Reflecting the East-West tensions of that period, the
Pentagon deployed nearly 13,000 nuclear weapons outside the continental
United States, with many of them (over 7,000) in NATO Europe.
The deployments of nuclear weapons reflected U.S. and NATO war
plans at the time as well as the conviction of U.S. government
officials that the deployments would demonstrate the U.S. commitment
to the security of alliance partners around the world; it was
a sign to an adversary that military action against a U.S. ally
carried the risk of escalating into nuclear warfare. As tensions
with the Soviet Union finally ended during the late 1980s and
early 1990s, however, the U.S. government withdrew thousands of
nuclear weapons from overseas bases, leaving only residual deployments
of several hundred weapons in NATO Europe (Germany, Belgium, Italy,
and the United Kingdom). (Note 3)
Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. government treated the overseas
deployments of nuclear weapons, and the arrangements surrounding
them, as highly secret; even the U.S. Congress had difficulty
getting information on them [See documents 10a-c]. What a U.S.
Senate subcommittee observed in 1970 remains pertinent today:
a "veil of secrecy hides the presence of such weapons. Nowhere
is this veil stronger than in the United States." (Note
4) That secrecy loosened up a bit after the Cold War, with
some documents on the historic deployments released at NARA, but
it has returned. Despite the wholesale changes in overseas deployments
at the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense and Department
of Energy have been taking an extremely tough position on information
concerning the Cold War deployments, treating all of the information
as secret. Even a 1999 decision by the Defense Department to release
a History
of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons July 1945 Through
September 1977, in massively excised form, has been
partly reversed. In that release, the Pentagon acknowledged that
the United Kingdom and West Germany had been nuclear deployment
sites during the Cold War. Under the current stricter standards
it has not released any information on those deployments. (Note
5)
A recent "release" of a "Draft Compendium of Nuclear
Weapons Arrangements," prepared in October 1968 by the Department
of State's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, demonstrates the
Pentagon's rigid position. After Defense Department reviewers
released the compendium in response to a mandatory review request
by the National Security Archive, they disclosed few meaningful
sentences or phrases (see Document 1). An
appeal produced no significant new information. An appeal pending
before the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP)
may lead to the release of more details.
The adverse decision on the "Compendium" shows the
inflexibility of policy on the historic deployments and related
information. Yet such intransigence stands in the face of declassification
actions during the 1990s, as well as the release of information
by at least one foreign government, which disclosed significant
details on the history of the overseas deployment of U.S. nuclear
weapons during the Cold War. While the Canadian government and,
to some extent, the U.S. State Department, have been forthcoming
in declassifying information on the Ottawa-Washington nuclear
relationship (see Documents 8a-c), the Defense
Department continues to withhold information on the particulars
of that relationship. (Note 6)
The numerous excisions in the compendium also reflect the approach
that the Department of Energy has followed in implementing the
Kyl-Lott Amendment. Sparked by allegations of Chinese nuclear
espionage during the late 1990s and DOE concerns about inadvertent
releases of nuclear weapons information at the National Archives,
Congress mandated the Department to comb through millions of pages
of material, some of which had been open to the public for years,
and sequester documents that contained sensitive nuclear weapons
information. What the reviewers have been looking for are documents
with "restricted data" (RD), which includes information
on nuclear weapons design and the production of "special
nuclear material. This information is legitimately secret; even
if the physical principles of a nuclear weapon are well known,
building a useable weapon is a complex task and the availability
of secret information on the design of nuclear weapons could accelerate
nuclear proliferation. Also in the scope of DOE's archival search
is "formerly restricted data" (FRD), which concerns
the military utilization of nuclear weapons, including information
on tests, command/control methods, and stockpiles, including overseas
deployments, current and historical. (Note 7)
Since the DOE began its review it has released twenty-one quarterly
reports on "the inadvertent release" of classified atomic
energy information. They show that among the documents that have
been returned to the vaults at NARA those with FRD significantly
outnumber those with RD. (Note 8) Of over 204
million pages of records reviewed by DOE officials so far, some
4,326 pages were in the FRD category while only 2,314 pages were
in the RD category [See Appendix A]. The detailed results of the
review remain classified but it is possible that DOE reviewers
flagged significant numbers of the pages with FRD because they
include information on the historic locations of overseas nuclear
deployments. (Note 9)
The cost of the Kyl-Lott documents review has recently become
available, thanks to the Department of Energy's Office of Classification.
(Note 10) So far, according to DOE, the review
of the 204 million pages has cost nearly $22 million. While the
average cost of the review was about 9 cents per page, the average
cost of locating the suspect information was high. The cost of
finding one of the 2,766 documents was almost $8,000, while the
cost of finding one of the withdrawn RD and FRD pages was around
$3,300.
The effort to retrieve "RD" nuclear weapons design
information is understandable (although whether adversaries would
actually have seized opportunities to find the needle in the archival
haystack is a problem worth considering). It would have been far
better, however, if DOE had undertaken its review with better
guidelines enabling it to focus on protecting truly sensitive
information instead of impounding documents that may have little
or no sensitivity. As the Federation of American Scientists' Steven
Aftergood observed during the early phase of the Kyl-Lott review,
"The problem is that Congress has said we don't want classified
information disclosed without looking at how much nonsense is
classified. They have set up a process that is inordinately expensive
and time-consuming." (Note 11) That appraisal
is as relevant now as it was in 2001.
The problem of overseas nuclear weapons deployment is not simply
a matter of FRD. U.S. government agencies have claimed that declassifying
the information will compromise war plans still in effect, but
that claim seems weak because deployments by themselves cannot
demonstrate how the military plans to use any given weapons system.
Another claim is that disclosure will harm ongoing diplomatic
relations with countries that have hosted U.S. nuclear weapons.
As noted earlier, the Canadian government has declassified documents
on its nuclear relationship with the Washington, although the
Department of Defense continues to deny information on the deployments.
Other governments, such as Japan, reluctant to disclose their
acquiescence in U.S. nuclear weapons activities during the Cold
War (see Document 15), have resisted the
declassification of anything that sheds light on the former U.S.
nuclear presence on Japanese soil and territorial waters (including
Okinawa). NATO governments, such as Turkey, have taken similar
stances.
Plainly declassifying information on the Cold War deployments
is a complex problem, but the U.S. public deserves something more
reasonable than the current blanket policy of secrecy. (Note
12) Years ago a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee argued that "there is no merit to the argument
that certain activities must be kept secret because a foreign
government demanded they … be kept secret. Such a policy
involves the Government of the United States in a web of intrigue
which is alien to American traditions." (Note
13)
Despite the massive excisions in the 1968 "Compendium",
documents 2 through 11 in this briefing book show that significant
information on the overseas nuclear deployments has been available
in State Department files at the National Archives. Some were
published earlier in 1998 and 2001 National Security Archive compilations
on U.S. nuclear history and U.S.-Japan relations which have since
become available on the Digital National Security Archive. Others
documents were located recently at NARA or released through FOIA
requests. One item was declassified by the Canadian government.
Document
7: Memorandum from Philip E. Barringer, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to Colonel
Haskin et al., 8 October 1968, enclosing memorandum to Barringer
from W. J. Lehman, Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs, 8 October 1968, with draft "Compendium of Nuclear
Weapons Arrangements", Top Secret, Excised copy
Source:
Mandatory review request to Defense Department, appeal under review
at Interagency Secrecy Classification Appeals Panel
During the late 1960s, senior officials at the Office of International
Security Affairs at the Pentagon who were involved in negotiations
on overseas deployments wanted a wider perspective on previously
negotiated arrangements for nuclear weapons storage and transit
that the U.S. government had developed with other governments.
Morton Halperin, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs, remembers that the
information was so scattered about the national security bureaucracy
that senior officials could not get a full picture of the role
of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign relations. Thus, Halperin
tasked officials at the State Department and the Department
of Defense to produce a compendium that brought the scattered
details together. While some military officials objected to
putting all of the information in one document because of the
danger of a leak, Halperin insisted on it. As Philip Barringer's
cover memorandum suggested, the compendium was not necessarily
in final form. First, Barringer asked officials at the Joint
Staff and other organizations for their comments. Second, "to
maintain its usefulness, the compendium would be periodically
updated." (Note 14)
The report stayed secret for decades and, despite the recent
release, its contents remain classified. When the Defense Department
produced it in response to a mandatory review request from the
National Security Archive, it excised the text under Executive
Order 12958 exemptions (b)(5), which concerns war plans still
in effect, (b)(6), which concerns sensitive diplomatic relationships,
and (b) (3), which refers to statutory requirements, in this
case, Atomic Energy Act strictures against release of RD and
FRD.
The compendium includes 23 sections on "nuclear weapons
arrangements," but the countries with which Washington
made the arrangements are not identified. Despite the heavy
excisions, it is possible to fill in the blanks and determine
which country is the subject for many of the sections. It is
probable that the compendium is in largely alphabetical order,
and to the extent that it is, the order and length of some of
the sections help identify several key countries including Canada,
Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Various clues also
help pinpoint some of the countries. Nevertheless, as the reader
will see, identifying some of the nations with which Washington
had nuclear arrangements is very difficult. Using the numbering
provided by the Adobe Acrobat scanning system, the editor has
tried to identify the countries that are the subject of the
individual sections on "Arrangements." Some of the
sections are most difficult to identify and the editor welcomes
any suggestions on their identification.
p. 3: Afghanistan? -- This may be a reference to Afghanistan
if the following assertion is correct: the U.S. Air Force had
plans to use Kabul international airport as a "haven"
for U.S. strategic bombers during a nuclear war. (Note
15)
pp. 4-5: Australia? Antigua? Bahamas? -- This section
refers to a territory where nuclear transit, but not storage,
issues were relevant, but more specific identification is highly
difficult.
pp. 6-8: Belgium 6-8 -- If this document is organized
by the alphabetical order principle, the arrangements discussed
on page 6-8 probably concern Belgium, where the United States
has deployed nuclear bombs since 1963. That the country at issue
in these pages was the site of "strike aircraft" fits
that type of deployment. The reference to SACEUR (Supreme Allied
Commander Europe) on page 7 confirms that the country at issue
in this section is a Western European NATO member.
pp. 9-12: Bermuda? -- Ship movements are likely and
the statement about need to establish storage arrangements for
anti-submarine warfare weapons is suggestive of Bermuda, which
was the subject of Anglo-American negotiations over the basing
of nuclear depth charges during the late 1960s and the early
1970s.
pp. 13-20: Canada -- These pages have several clues
that point to Canada. The section is relatively lengthy, which
reflects the complex nuclear history of the United States and
Canada, which goes back to the early Cold War and includes a
variety of issues including overflights, storage of weapons,
and deployment of delivery vehicles [See documents
8a, b, and c for examples]. (Note 16)
Another clue, on page 14, is the reference to the diplomatic
clearance of the "annual program of [nuclear weapons] overflights
[which] is each June." Declassified documents on the U.S.-Canadian
negotiations on the SAC airborne alert program suggest that
during the 1960s Washington approached Ottawa in June each year
to begin negotiations over the overflight program for the next
fiscal year. Also telling is the discussion of consultation
arrangements beginning on page 17; arrangements for U.S.-Canadian
heads of state consultation on nuclear use decisions began in
the early months of the Korean War and developed further in
the mid-1960s. (Note 17)
pp. 21-22: Denmark -- These pages probably refer to
Denmark because of the mention of ship visits which was an issue
between the United States and the Danish government during the
1960s. The Danes wanted a commitment from the United States
that U.S. Navy ships visiting Danish ports were not nuclear
armed. In a 2 May 1967 telegram to the embassy in Copenhagen,
however, the State Department and the Pentagon jointly refused
to make such a commitment because it ran against their "neither
confirm nor deny" stance on the presence of nuclear weapons
on ships. Under the circumstances, Washington informed the embassy
that it would rather stop the visits than change the policy
[See documents 10A-B]. It is very likely
that the State telegram cited on page 22 of the compendium is
the same document, because it includes language that the "U.S.
would rather cancel the ship visits than alter the policy."
pp. 23-26: Greece -- If pages 21-22 are on Denmark and
pages 29-33 are on Italy, then it is likely that pages 23-26
discuss arrangements with Greece, where the United States deployed
nuclear weapons beginning in 1960. The editor considered the
possibility that the reference is the "Government of the
Republic of China," often used to describe Taiwan, but
the U.S. Army stored no nuclear weapons on Taiwan makes that
country a less likely candidate (for Taiwan in this report,
see pp. 64-66). In late 1960 members and staff of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy visited Greece and other countries
hosting U.S. nuclear storage sites and commented on the lax
custody arrangements, the risks of an accident when moving nuclear
weapons, and the difficult circumstances under which U.S. military
personnel guarded nuclear weapons stored only a few miles from
Soviet bloc territory: recently "two of these young men
went out of their heads, apparently because of the trying conditions."
[see document 11].
pp. 27-28: Iceland? -- These pages may refer to Iceland,
which was not a storage site, but it is likely that U.S. warships
carrying nuclear weapons transited through Reykjavik. Also,
according to a 1961 memorandum to the White House (see
document 12) the Icelandic government required its consent
before the United States could use its bases for nuclear missions.
The "however" on page 27 may refer to this understanding.
pp. 29-33: Italy -- The United States has deployed nuclear
weapons and delivery systems in Italy since 1956 (see
document 13). The clue that confirms that this section is
on Italy is the reference on page 30 to the 13 January 1962
"consent agreement"; the U.S. and Italian government
signed such an agreement that very day and its contents have
been declassified [see document 14]. The
most famous nuclear weapons deployment in Italy was that of
the short-lived Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
(IRBMs) during the early 1960s, which were part of the secret
trade that helped end the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Note
18)
pp. 34-38: Japan -- The United States never stored complete
nuclear weapons on Japan's main islands (Kyushu, Honshu, or
Hokkaido), but the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 included
language concerning the transit of nuclear weapons. Under the
Treaty, the United States would have to consult with the Japanese
government if Washington found it necessary to deploy ("introduce")
nuclear weapons onto, or build "bases for nuclear weapons"
on, Japanese soil. The treaty, however, did require consultations
concerning "transit of ports or airbases in Japan by United
States vessels and aircraft, regardless of their armament"
[See document 15]. In other words, Washington
would not tell Tokyo if aircraft carriers visiting Japanese
ports or U.S. bombers carrying nuclear weapons stopped at U.S.
bases for short periods of time. The discussion on pages 34-38
plainly relates to such issues and most certainly concerns Japan.
pp. 39-41: Netherlands -- Given the alphabetical principle
as well as the numerous reports on nuclear deployments in that
country, (Note 19) these pages are possibly
on the Netherlands, where the United States has deployed nuclear
weapons and delivery systems since the 1950s. The various references
to "intra-theater" are suggestive of a NATO deployment.
pp. 42-44: Norway -- Norway is possibly the subject
of these pages, because they include citation of public statements
by a government that in the "past that the Agreement does
not permit storage of nuclear weapons." During the late
1950s the Norwegian government publicly declared its opposition
to peacetime nuclear weapons deployments, although it would
accept their introduction in the event of war. The "Agreement"
may have been a 17 October 1952 aide mémoire that gave
the U.S. Air Force access to two bases, at Sola and Gardermoen,
in the event of war. (Note 20)
p. 45:?
pp. 46-49: ? This section refers to a major deployment site
where the United States and the host government exchanged diplomatic
notes authorizing storage and where the host received briefings
beginning in 1967 on numbers and types of weapons. At first
the editor thought that these pages were on the Philippines
because the pages were in the right section alphabetically and
that country was certainly a deployment site (see
documents 17A-C). Yet, this section mentions an exchange
of notes and as far as the editor knows there was no exchange
of notes with the Philippines government on nuclear weapons
storage; the arrangements were strictly informal. The possibility
that the pages concern Okinawa was set aside because that island
was under U.S. occupation through 1972 and the exchange of diplomatic
notes mentioned on page 46 would have been unnecessary. These
pages are a puzzle.
pp. 50-51: Portugal -- It is possible that these pages
refer to Portugal because of the likelihood that nuclear-armed
U.S. warships stopped in Lisbon. There appears, however, to
be no discussion of access to Portuguese bases, such as the
Azores, which appears to have been an issue (see
document 12).
p. 52: Puerto Rico -- The 1977 Department of Defense
study shows that Puerto Rico was a deployment/storage site between
1956 and 1975, making it possible that this section concerns
the Commonwealth.
pp. 53-54: ?
pp. 55-59: Republic of Korea - This section on a major
deployment site may refer to ROK, which alphabetically would
fit right before Spain. As the 1977 report showed, the U.S.
had significant nuclear deployments in South Korea. The difficulty
with this identification is that page 58 refers to "U.S.
Navy and Air Force Nuclear Weapons Storage" but the 1977
report did not identify any naval nuclear weapons among those
that were deployed. Either that report was in error or this
section concerns another country.
pp. 60-63: Spain -- These pages are very likely about
Spain, because of the reference to the off-loading of Polaris
and Poseidon missiles on page 60. Polaris and later Poseidon
submarines routinely visited Rota naval base starting in the
mid-1960s. Moreover, the 1977 Department of Defense study on
nuclear custody shows the deployment of naval nuclear weapons
to Spain, such as ASROC and Talos. U.S. "Navy Nuclear Weapons
Storage" is mentioned on page 63 of the compendium. Besides
naval nuclear weapons, Spain provided bases for SAC bombers
and the airborne alert program of the 1960s included routine
flights near the U.S. base at Palomares, Spain where KC-135
tankers refueled nuclear-armed B-52s in mid-air (until a famous
crash in 1966).
pp. 64-66: Taiwan -- These pages probably concern Taiwan,
where a deployment of nuclear weapons was closely held and known,
on the Taiwanese side, only to President Chiang Kai-Shek and
probably his son, Chiang Ching-kuo. Ships visits there would
have been probable and until 1974 the U.S. Air Force stored
nuclear bombs there for use by U.S. fighter-bombers. In addition,
during the late 1950s-early 1960s, nuclear-armed Matador missiles
were deployed on the island.
pp. 67-70: Turkey -- Another important country where
the United States has deployed nuclear weapons and delivery
systems is Turkey, which may be the subject of these pages.
Jupiter IRBMs were the most famous nuclear delivery system deployed
in Turkey, because of the secret Turkey-Cuba trade that helped
resolve the Cuban missile crisis, but the more routine deployments
included 8 in. howitzers and Honest John missiles, hence the
reference to "U.S. Army Nuclear Weapons Storage" on
page 69. The reference to "Tactical Strike Aircraft"
also corresponds to Turkey where U.S. fighter/bombers have been
deployed since the late 1950s. In the early years of the deployment,
U.S. officials were worried about the stability of the Turkish
government, especially around the time of the 1960 coup when
the "situation was so unstable that twice [SACEUR] General
Norstad almost ordered all the weapons to be evacuated."
[See document 11].
pp. 71-78: United Kingdom -- The subject of pages 71-78
can only be the United Kingdom. Like Canada, it would have taken
a number of pages to discuss the complex U.S.-U.K. nuclear relationship,
which dated back to the 1940s and early 1950s, when SAC sought
"islands" for the possibility of rapid nuclear strikes
on Soviet targets (see document 2a for information
on the early deployments). As with Canada, the text, beginning
on page 73, includes a discussion of "consultation arrangements,"
which had a long history; thus, the text refers to letters from
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, which are very likely the letters
concerning nuclear use consultation arrangements that London
and Washington affirmed during the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover,
the text on page 72 includes what may be a reference to the
negotiations with the British on storage of nuclear ASW in Bermuda.
(Note 21)
This document leaves the status of two important nuclear weapons
host countries up in the air--the Philippines and the Federal
Republic of Germany--which were both deployment sites in 1968.
None of the pages in the compendium seem to fit West Germany,
a major deployment site beginning in 1954 (see
document 16) or the Philippines, a deployment site until
1977 [see documents 17A-C]. (Note
22) It is difficult to guess which pages cover those two
countries; it is possible that the compendium did not cover
them, unless some of the sections are out of alphabetical order,
which cannot be ruled out.
Documents
8A-C: Canada and the United Kingdom
Document
8A: Untitled Department of State memorandum on nuclear relations
with Canada, France, and United Kingdom, 17 June 1952. Top Secret
Source: National Archives, Record Group
50, Department of State Records (hereinafter RG 59), Lot 65D478.
Records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for
Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relating to Atomic Energy
Matters, 1950-1962, box 2, 11.2.A NN France Pt. II, 1952-1953
Defense (also available in Digital National Security Archive and
published National Security Archive microfiche collection, U.S.
Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era,
1955-68, Washington, D.C., 1998)
Document
8B: Summary Record, United States-Canada Political-Military
Meeting, 19 November 1958
Source: RG 59, Department of State Decimal
Files 1955-1959, 611.42/11-1958, released in full through FOIA
appeal
Document
8C: General J. V. Allard, Chief of Defence Staff, to the [Defence]
Minister, "Nuclear ASW Weapons Storage in Canada," 10
March 1967. Top Secret
Source: Canadian Department of Defense
Access to Information Release, from Directorate of History &
Heritage (DHH), Raymont Collection, 73/1223 Series 1, file 314,
"Nuclear Weapons for Canadian Forces" (courtesy of John
Clearwater)
By the early 1950s, the United States had negotiated with the
British and the Canadians and contemplated talks with the French
to reach agreements on nuclear weapons deployments that would
"improve our posture in the event of hostilities."
To deploy nuclear weapons on French territory, the State Department
envisioned negotiations at "the highest diplomatic level,"
even though the Truman administration had taken matters in its
own hands by stockpiling weapons at SAC bases in French Morocco
without having received permission. With Ottawa and London,
the situation was more straightforward; both countries had already
agreed to the deployment of non-nuclear components as well as
the construction of storage facilities. Indeed, only weeks after
the outbreak of the Korean War the U.S. air base at Goose Bay
became the site of a highly secret temporary deployment of 11
nuclear weapons-possibly only the non-nuclear components: wiring,
high explosives, and casing minus the nuclear fuel. (Note
23)
During the years after 1950, as John Clearwater has shown in
several major studies, the United States deployed a variety
of air defense and naval nuclear weapons and delivery systems
on Canadian territory, although the deployments required complex
negotiations over time. A detailed record of a high level Canada-U.S.
defense meeting later in the decade illuminates the complex
nuclear relationship that was developing between Ottawa and
Washington, with such issues on the table as storage arrangements
for various weapons, SAC overflights, and procedures in the
event of nuclear weapons accidents during SAC flights over Canada.
In addition, the participants reviewed procedures for raising
the state of readiness for the newly created North American
Air Defense Command (NORAD). A document from a decade later
details Canada-U.S. discussions over arrangements to deploy
U.S. airborne nuclear anti-submarine warfare weapons, which
required agreement on rules of engagement and authorization
for use, among other considerations.
Document
9: L. Wainstein et al., The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command
and Control and Warning, 1945-1972, Institute for Defense Analyses
Study S-467, June 1975, Top Secret, excerpt
Source: FOIA request to Department of
Defense (also available in National Security Archive, U.S. Nuclear
History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68)
This declassified history, produced as a resource for the Defense
Department's official study, The History of the Strategic Arms
Competition (1981), was one of the first declassification releases
of information on overseas U.S. nuclear deployments during the
early Cold War. (Note 24) It includes details
on the initial deployments of weapons components to the United
Kingdom, Morocco, and aircraft carriers and the later deployment,
in 1954, of complete nuclear weapons to Morocco, the United Kingdom,
and West Germany, as well as non-nuclear deployments to Japan.
Surprisingly, the authors did not mention Canada; this may well
have been an oversight because they had complete access to classified
studies on custody/deployment issues.
Documents
10A-B: Denmark: Visits by Nuclear Armed Ships
Document
10A: U.S. Embassy Denmark cable 1245 to State Department,
"U.S. Naval Visit Approved Provided Ships Have No Nuclear
Weapons Abroad," 24 April 1967, Secret
Document
10B: State Department cable 18627 to U.S. Embassy Denmark,
"Nuclear Weapons on Visiting Ships," 3 May 1967, Secret,
excised copy
Source: RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files,
1967-1969, DEF Den-US
In the context of an escalating Vietnam War, visits by U.S.
warships were none too popular and the Danish press and public
wondered aloud whether the ships were nuclear-armed. With U.S.
ship visits scheduled for the coming months, U.S. ambassador
Katharine E. White suggested that the traditional "neither
confirm nor deny" stance was inadequate and that Washington
take Danish authorities "into our confidence" by advising
them that the ships did not carry nuclear weapons. The reply
message, prepared jointly by the Navy and the State Department,
and cited in the discussion of Denmark in document
one, informed the Ambassador that her suggestion had been
rejected because neither the Defense Department nor the State
Department wanted to break from "long practice and tradition"
of non-comment on the armaments of visiting warships: "for
overriding security reasons, partly involving precedent this
would set, US cannot be put in position of stating publicly
and unequivocally that weapons are not aboard warship, even
when that may be accurate statement." If Danish authorities
did not withdraw their request, it was better that the ship
visits did not occur if the alternative was a "major press
campaign" on nuclear weapons that could harden the government's
position.
Document
11: Memorandum of conversation, "Meeting with Three Members
and Staff of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Nuclear Test Negotiations,
MRBM Project and Report of JCAE Trip to Europe," 29 November
1960, Secret
Source: RG 59, State Department Decimal
Files 1960-1963, 397.5611-GE/12-2960
(Also available in National Security Archive, U.S. Nuclear History:
Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68)
Concern over security arrangements for U.S. nuclear weapons
then being deployed to NATO Europe led the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy (JCAE) to conduct a major investigation of custody
arrangements during 1960-1961. Shortly after committee members
and staff returned from an inspection trip they met with State
Department staffers who specialized in nuclear weapons policy
issues, including Philip Farley, the Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy. After
a discussion of NATO issues with highly skeptical committee
members, who wondered whether NATO was a "going concern
or are we handing on to a corpse," the JCAE staff presented
a report on the trip. Its purpose had been to "see as many
different custody situations as possible in as many different
locales as possible," so the group traveled east from the
United Kingdom as far as Greece and Turkey, where they were
unsettled by the lax control arrangements over U.S. nuclear
weapons deployed at NATO bases.
Document
12: Lucius D. Battle, Executive Secretary, Department of State,
to McGeorge Bundy, the White House, "Check List of Presidential
Actions," 28 July 1961, Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Department of State Decimal
Files, 1960-1963, 700.56311/7-2861 (available in National Security
Archive, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in
the Missile Era, 1955-68)
This document sheds light on the more important nuclear weapons
arrangements that Washington had with other governments, especially
concerning the uses of bases for nuclear strikes during a military
crisis.
Document
13: Letter from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Secretary
of Defense Charles E. Wilson, 12 April 1956, Top Secret
Source: Department of State Records,
Records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for
Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relating to Atomic Energy
Matters, 1950-1962, box 2, II.2.A.- NN-France 1953-1956, also
available in National Security Archive, U.S. Nuclear History:
Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68)
Through this letter, Dulles informed the Pentagon that he agreed
with plans to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons in Italy; as he noted,
Ambassador Clare Booth Luce had already received the approval
of the Italian Defense Ministry.
Document
14: U.S. Embassy Rome Despatch 525 to Department of State,
"Transmitting Documents Constituting Military Atomic Stockpile
and 'Consent' Agreements," 17 January 1962, Secret
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central
Decimal Files, 1960-1963, 611.657/1-1762
With the pending deployment of Jupiter missiles, which were
very difficult to conceal, the Italian government sought a formal
agreement with Washington on nuclear deployment arrangements.
An agreement took time to negotiate, especially when Rome insisted
that the U.S. not use nuclear weapons based in Italy until they
had secured the Italian government's consent. While the Pentagon
and the State Department wanted the United States to have freedom
of action in using nuclear weapons, they had already agreed
to a "two man rule" for Jupiter missile deployments
in Italy, ensuring that missile launches would require both
a U.S. and an Italian officer to turn a key before missile launch.
Thus, it was difficult to reject the consent proposal suggested
by the Italian Foreign Ministry; the final stockpile agreement
met Rome's political requirements. This agreement is very likely
the one mentioned in the 1968 nuclear weapons arrangements compendium
[see document 7, section on Italy]. (Note
25)
Document
15: U.S. Department of State, "Description of Consultation
Arrangements Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
with Japan," 6 June 1960, Secret
Source: RG 59, Bureau of Far Eastern
Affairs, Office of East Asian Affairs Central Files, 1947-1964,
box 24, U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (Conference
Briefing Book), (also available in Digital National Security Archive
and published microfiche collection, Japan and the United States:
Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, 1960-1976, Washington,
D.C., 1995)
The 1960 U.S.-Japan security treaty remains secret to this
day but its basic features, summarized in this briefing paper,
had important implications for the U.S. nuclear posture in Northeast
Asia. While deployments of nuclear weapons to U.S. bases in
Japan would require consultation with Japanese authorities,
ordinary military movements, such as the transfer of units and
equipment, would not. The later would include "transit
of ports or airbases in Japan by United States vessels and aircraft,
regardless of their armament." In other words, U.S. ships
or aircraft carrying nuclear weapons could use ports or bases
on Japanese territory for "transit" to other destinations.
For the most part this would mean brief ship visits or airport
landings, but in one notorious incident, the U.S. Marines interpreted
transit to permit long-term presence when they deployed, from
the mid-1950s to 1966, the USS San Joaquin County, a tank landing
ship loaded with nuclear bombs only a few hundred yards from
Japanese soil. (Note 26)
Document
16: "Understanding with the Federal Republic Concerning
the Introduction, Storage, and Use of Nuclear Weapons with Respect
to West Germany," 6 May 1955, Top Secret, cover sheet attached
Source: RG 59, Records of the Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy, Country
and Subject Files Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1950-1962,
box 2, II.2.A. NN. Germany 1954-1958 Defense (also available in
National Security Archive, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons
and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68)
Not long after the U.S. military began deploying complete nuclear
weapons in West Germany, the U.S. High Commissioner, James B.
Conant, took up the matter with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer,
seeking assurance that, once West Germany regained its sovereignty,
the United States would be able to continue storing nuclear
weapons on German territory. Adenauer quickly approved the request,
which enabled the U.S. government to take the position that
"it will continue to enjoy the right to introduce, store
and use atomic weapons in the territory of Western Germany as
long as the United States has forces there." It was not
until 1967 that German officials began actively seeking an understanding
with Washington that it would consult with Bonn on the "selective
use" of nuclear weapons stockpiled in West Germany. (Note
27)
Documents
17A-C: The Philippines and Stockpile Secrecy
Document
17A: Robert McClintock, Office of Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, to the Secretary, "Talking Points for Discussion
with Senators Fulbright and Symington re Subcommittee Hearings
on US Commitments Abroad," 25 September 1969, Top Secret
Document
17B: Robert McClintock to the Secretary and Acting Secretary,
"Meeting of Kissinger Committee on Symington Subcommittee,"
30 September 1969, Top Secret
Document
17C: Robert McClintock to Acting Secretary [Elliot Richardson],
"Presidential Decision on Categories of Information for
Symington Subcommittee to be protected by executive privilege,"
[c. 30 September 1969], Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files
1967-1969, DEF 12
In early 1969, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-MO) became chairman
of the newly-established Subcommittee on Security Agreements
and Commitments Abroad, which was a subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Active through 1974, the Symington
Subcommittee probed the extent of U.S. secret agreements with,
and commitments to, foreign governments and discovered the great
degree to which Congress had relinquished its constitutional
duties and to which the Nixon administration and its predecessors
had evaded their constitutional obligations to consult with
the legislative branch. Pulling away the shroud of secrecy required
investigators and Symington hired Roland Paul, a former Pentagon
lawyer, and Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus (who had
worked for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier in
the decade). After Paul and Pincus visited Spain, where they
uncovered nuclear deployments, they traveled to Laos and the
Philippines, where they learned much about the classified aspects
of the U.S. presence in those countries: in Laos, CIA officers
were conducting a "secret war" and in the Philippines
nuclear weapons were secretly deployed; among local officials,
only President Ferdinand Marcos was aware of the arrangement.
As these documents suggest, the Nixon administration, worried
that the deployment in the Philippines would leak and disrupt
presidential elections there, determined to keep them secret
by rejecting the Symington Subcommittee's requests for information.
Thus, top Nixon administration officials, including national
security adviser Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird, and Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, agreed
that in any hearings, government witnesses would refuse to testify
on nuclear deployments by invoking executive privilege. The
administration argued that the information was top secret and
that the Subcommittee was not the proper venue for discussion
of nuclear deployments. That hard-line stance ultimately collapsed
when the White House acceded to Senator Fulbright's insistence
that the Subcommittee receive a briefing on the deployments.
On 27 May 1970, Ronald I. Spiers, director of the Department's
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, delivered a top secret
briefing although the Bureau, not the Subcommittee, retained
control of the transcript. The Symington Subcommittee later
observed that the administration's initial refusal to share
information "is obviously absurd, is used to cover up questionable
policy, is unconstitutional, and is against the best interests
of the United States." (Note 28)
Notes
1.George Lardner Jr., "DOE Puts Declassification
in Reverse," The Washington Post, May 19, 2001,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/05/wp051901.html.
2. Raymond L. Garthoff, A Journey Through
the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence (Washington,
D.C., Brookings Institution, 2001), 203-204.
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2005-annual-report.pdf.
3. For the current situation, see Natural Resources
Defense Council report prepared by Hans M. Kristensen, U.S.
Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force
Levels, and War Planning at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf>.
4. Hearings before the Subcommittee on United
States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments
Abroad, 91st Congress, Volume II (Washington, DC, Government
Printing Office, 1971), 2431.
5. For the 1978 Pentagon release and an effort
to interpret the excised portions, see Robert S. Norris, William
Arkin, and William Burr, "Where They Were," The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55 (November-December 1999):
26-35, and "How Much Did Japan Know," ibid. 56 (Jan.-Feb.
2000), 11-13, 78-79.
6. For detailed studies of the U.S.-Canada nuclear
relationship, largely based on declassified Canadian documents,
see John M. Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold
History of Canada's Cold War Arsenal (Toronto: Dundurn Press,
1998), and U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Canada (Toronto: Dundurn
Group, 1999).
7. For the Department of Energy's public reports
on its Kyl-Lott review, see http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/.
For the differences between Restricted Data [RD] and Formerly
Restricted Data [FRD], see a Department of Energy pamphlet reproduced
on the Web page of the Federation of American Scientists at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/doe/sakwd.htm
8.For the Department of Energy's public reports
on its Kyl-Lott review, see http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/.
For a general discussion of the differences between Restricted
Data [RD] and Formerly Restricted Data [FRD], see a Department
of Energy pamphlet reproduced on the Web page of the Federation
of American Scientists at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/doe/sakwd.htm.
For an argument for greater transparency of nuclear weapons information,
but also for protecting weapons design secrets, see Annette Schaper,
Looking for a Demarcation Between Nuclear Transparency and Nuclear
Secrecy, PRIF Report No. 68, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
(Germany), 10-16, at http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/PRIF-68.pdf
9. The whole series of reports by the U.S. Department
of Energy's Office of Classification may be found on the Federation
of American Scientists Web site at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/index.html.
10. Information provided by Mr. Kenneth Stein,
Office of Classification, Department of Energy in e-mail, 8 August
2006. Mr. James Wendt, Office of Document Reviews, provided an
annual breakdown for the expenditures: FY 99: 1.992M; FY 00: 3.582
M; FY 01: 3.653M; FY 02: 3.852M; FY 03: 3.072M; FY 04: 2.482M;
FY 05: 1.761M; FY 06: 1.313M; Total: 21.707M. E-mail, 10 August
2006.
11. Lardner, "DOE Puts Declassification
in Reverse," The Washington Post, May 19, 2001.
12. For an argument in favor of declassifying
most information on nuclear deployments, past and present, see
Schaper, Looking for a Demarcation Between Nuclear Transparency
and Nuclear Secrecy, 10-16, at
http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/PRIF-68.pdf
13. United States Security Agreements and
Commitments Abroad, 2431.
14. Communication from Morton Halperin, 27 March
2006.
15. Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001), 114.
16. Again, see the Clearwater studies cited
in endnote 3.
17. For background on the consultative arrangements
with Canada, see National
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 159, "'Consultation
is Presidential Business': Secret Understandings on the Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1974," documents 3 and 20A-D.
18. Thanks to Leopoldo Nuti (University of Rome)--who
has a major book in progress on the history of U.S. nuclear weapons
in Italy--for the citation to the January 13, 1962, agreement.
19. See the Kristensen report cited in endnote
3.
20. For discussion of the air bases agreement
and Norway's posture on nuclear weapons during the late 1950s,
see Rolf Tammes, The United States and Norway in the High
North (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1991), at pages 72-74 and 160-65,
respectively.
21. For details on the history of the consultative
arrangements, see "`Consultation is Presidential Business':
Secret Understandings on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1974,"
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 159, at
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB159/index.htm.
22. For documentation on the removal of the
weapons from the Philippines, see declassified documents published
by the Nautilus Institute, at http://www.nautilus.org/archives/library/security/foia/taiwphil.html.
23. John Clearwater, U.S. Nuclear Weapons
in Canada, 125-126.
24. This report was an important source for
Norris et al., "Where They Were" [see note 5].
25. Leopoldo Nuti's forthcoming study provides
a thorough account of the negotiations.
26. Hans Kristensen, Japan Under the US Nuclear
Umbrella, at www.nauitlus.org.
27. See documents 25A-B in National Security
Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 159, "'Consultation
is Presidential Business': Secret Understandings on the Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1974,"at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB159/index.htm.
28. For Fulbright, the Symington Subcommittee,
Paul, and Pincus, see Randall Bennett Woods, Fulbright: A
Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
305-307, 506-511, and 525-527, as well as James C. Olson, Stuart
Symington: A Life (Columbia: University of Missouri Press,
2003), 392-398. For Fulbright's success in getting an executive
session on the deployments, see "Administration Trap Feared
by Doves on Foreign Relations Committee," The Washington
Post, 23 July 1970. For the quotation from the Symington
Subcommittee, see United States Security Agreements and Commitments
Abroad, 2427.
