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JUL 28 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Check List of Presidential Actions

Attached is a quickly-compiled check list of steps which the United States is obligated to take by existing arrangements in relation to allied and friendly nations where we have bases before expending nuclear weapons.

This list was put together on the basis of material which is constantly being updated and revised in the light of current high-level exchanges between heads of government and continuing base negotiations. We will revise the list to reflect such changes as they occur and will forward copies to you.

/s/ William H. Bruback

L. D. Battle  
Executive Secretary

S/S - RO

JUL 28 1961

A true copy of signed original

*W.H.*

Attachment:

Check List.

G/11: JCK: [unclear]  
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9. From bases in the Federal Republic of Germany, Morocco, Okinawa, the Philippines, Korea and the West Indies. No limitation.

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CHECK LIST OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

The following actions are required by existing agreements with friendly foreign countries before nuclear weapons may be expended in an emergency involving US treaty obligations or an attack on the U.S.

1. United Kingdom. Reach joint decision with Prime Minister by speaking personally with him before forces equipped with nuclear weapons operate from bases in the U.K. Consult with British before using nuclear weapons anywhere, if possible. Before launching Polaris nuclear weapons, take every possible step to consult with Britain and other allies.

(Murphy-Dean agreement June 7, 1958; President-Eden agreement March 9, 1953; President's letter to Prime Minister February 6, 1961; President's letter to Prime Minister March 27, 1961.)

2. France. Consult with France on the use of nuclear weapons (using direct telephone communication established for this purpose) unless attack so imminent that survival of U.S. at stake. The use of bases and installations is subject to joint decision.

3. From bases in Denmark, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, and Portugal. Unilaterally determine that use of the weapons is in accordance with NATO plans. (In the event of nuclear attack upon the United States,

CINCSAC

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CINCSAC retaliatory action is considered to be in accordance with NATO plans.)

4. From bases in Turkey. Unilaterally determine that the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area in the event of attack by an aggressive nation requires such action.

5. From bases in Spain. Unilaterally determine that evident Communist aggression threatening the security of the West requires such action.

6. From bases in Japan. Requests to deploy nuclear weapons and to initiate military combat operations must be addressed to the Japanese Government.

7. From bases in Canada. Requests to deploy nuclear weapons, or to conduct operations or overflights with them must be addressed to the Canadian Government. In a condition of Air Defense Readiness or higher declared by CINCPAC, interceptors may overfly but may expend nuclear weapons only after authorization by the President of the U.S. and the Prime Minister of Canada.

8. From bases in the Republic of China, Norway and Iceland. No special requirements appear with respect to the use of nuclear weapons from bases in these countries, but host government consent is required before the bases may be used.

9. From bases

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