


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Directorate
of Intelligence

Intelligence Memorandum
Office of European Analysis
18 January 1994

CIAEUR 94-20005 M

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Talks: Off to a Turbulent Start




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
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2005

Summary

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) will open work on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty on 25 January, but members are likely to be distracted during the first round by differences over how quickly the treaty should be negotiated.



- Russia will take a moderate approach that possibly will allow it to mediate between the two camps.




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Summary of Opening CTB Positions


Scope	Timing	Verification	Sanctions	NPT Linkage	Duration, Conditions for Entry Into Force (EIF)
Russia	Might propose defining "nuclear test" as not occurring if the yield of the nuclear device is less than the high explosive yield that caused the detonation.	Wants draft treaty by 1995 NPT REVCON.	Should be limited to confirming absence of tests.	Includes in treaty. Could consider CWC model or ideas in Swedish draft.	Progress toward CTB would create favorable climate for NPT extension, but agrees no legal basis for linkage.
					Prefers unlimited duration but could accept finite duration with review. EIF after all states with peaceful nuclear capabilities ratify.

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

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
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
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Russia has traditionally supported a comprehensive test ban and probably will try to persuade the nuclear powers to conclude an accord quickly, but it does not expect to finish the treaty in 1994 and objected to including a deadline in the CTB mandate. The Russians believe that a test ban agreement would facilitate agreement to extend the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 (see box) and will seek to have a viable draft CTB treaty by the start of the NPT conference. Moreover, the Yel'tsin government probably would prefer relatively swift negotiations—to combat hardline officials who advocate resuming nuclear tests because they believe that the US is not committed to stopping the arms race.

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
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

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Duration and Entry-Into-Force

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Russia and [Redacted] also indicated they prefer a treaty of unlimited duration, although Russia probably would ultimately accept periodic review. Moreover, Moscow will seek to make an unlimited CTB contingent on Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus upholding their obligations to relinquish the nuclear weapons on their territories. [Redacted]

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Testing During Talks

[Redacted]

Although some Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy officials would like to continue limited testing to ensure stockpile safety and reliability, Moscow's official position is that it will not test unless the US or UK tests first.


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
Russia's moderate stance on negotiating speed potentially puts it in the role of mediator--a role it played during CD intercessional and last year's meetings of the five nuclear powers.

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
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
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
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
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