Washington,
DC, September 22, 2006 - The prospects of a
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the early 1990's
led China to accelerate its testing schedule and discuss differences
within the Russian government over testing, according to documents
obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and archival
research and posted on the Web today by the National Security
Archive at George Washington University. The documents illustrate
the efforts of the U.S. Intelligence Community to understand
developments at Russian and Chinese nuclear test sites--Novaya
Zemlya and Lop Nur--from 1990 to 2000.
Today's posting includes 33 documents--many originally
classified Top Secret--produced under the auspices of the Director
of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the Defense Intelligence Agency. The records were obtained by
Archive Senior Fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson while conducting
research for his recently-published book, Spying
on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany
to Iran and North Korea. (W.W. Norton).
The documents include assessments of the link between nuclear
and sub-critical tests and weapons modernization programs in
Russia and China--both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons
programs.
Of particular interest is the report of an outside review panel
appointed by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet
after detection of a seismic event in the vicinity of Novaya
Zemlya on August 16, 1997. That detection, combined with satellite
reconnaissance showing unusual activity at the test site, led
to concerns within the Intelligence Community that Russia had
conducted a nuclear test despite its pledge to abide by the
terms of the CTBT.
Electronic
Briefing Book
U.S. Intelligence on Russian and Chinese
Nuclear Testing Activities, 1990-2000
By Jeffrey Richelson
On September 24, 1996 seventy-one nations, including the five
acknowledged nuclear powers - the United States, Russia, France,
the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic of China - signed
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The signatories pledged
not to conduct any nuclear weapon or other nuclear test explosion
and to prohibit such explosion on their territory. In addition,
they agreed to refrain from "causing, encouraging, or in
any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon
test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." (Note
1) The treaty did not ban testing of warhead components
that did not result in a nuclear yield--known as zero-yield,
sub-critical, or hydrodynamic tests.
Russia had declared a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1990,
and the United States followed after tests in September 1992.
The United Kingdom ceased testing after 1991. French and Chinese
testing continued for several years, both conducting their last
tests in 1996--in time to sign and comply with the the CTBT.
(Note 2)
While French testing had become far less of concern to the
United States Intelligence Community by 1990 than it had been
in the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese nuclear activities, particularly
the activities at the Lop Nur test site, remained a significant
target of U.S. intelligence collection efforts--which employed
open sources, clandestine human sources, overhead imagery, signals
intelligence and measurement and signature intelligence. (Note
3)
Despite the Russian moratorium that began before the collapse
of the Soviet Union and continued under President Boris Yeltsin
and Russia's signature of the CTBT, the U.S. continued to closely
monitor Soviet-Russian test sites at Semipalatinsk and Novaya
Zemlya. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, only Novaya Zemlya
would remain inside Russian territory and become the sole Soviet
test site. The activities at that site during the decade--often
related to sub-critical tests, as well as occasional seismic
events in the vicinity of the test site, along with the continued
U.S. interest in Russian nuclear weapon developments, guaranteed
that U.S. spy satellites and other technical collection systems
would continue to be instructed to gather data on activities
at Novaya Zemlya. (Note 4)
Indeed, there would be suspicions and charges--first in 1996
and even more seriously in 1997--that Russia had, despite its
commitments, conducted a test at Novaya Zemlya. Thus, on August
16, 1997 a seismic signal from the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya
registered at 3.2 on the Richter scale--consistent with a very
small blast of between 0.1 and 1.0 kiloton, which might indicate
scaled-down tests of a warhead primary. Since satellite imagery
had been showing unusual levels of activity at the test site,
there were fears that Russia had tested a nuclear device. While
those fears would eventually be laid to rest by further analysis
of the data, including by an outside review group, the initial
suspicions generated considerable press reporting and intelligence
analysis. (Note 5)
The product of the collection efforts against the Russian and
Chinese test sites and related activities throughout the 1990-2000
period informed a variety of intelligence products - including
items in national intelligence products such as the National
Intelligence Daily and Senior Executive Intelligence
Brief, articles in CIA periodicals such as Science
and Weapons Review and Proliferation Digest, and
stand-alone analytical studies. The ones presented below were
obtained as the result of Freedom of Information Act requests
filed as part of the author's research for Spying
on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany
to Iran and North Korea (W.W. Norton).
Besides the report of review panel established to consider the
possibility that Russia had conducted a nuclear test in August
1997 (Document 25), the briefing book includes
documents related to possible Chinese attempts to develop a
nuclear artillery shell (Document 20, Document
21), the impact of the impending Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty on Chinese testing (Document 9),
Russia's recovery of a nuclear device that had been left in
a tunnel in the Semipalatinsk test site (Document
13, Document 17), and Russian interests
in developing low-yield nuclear weapons for its Ground Forces
(Document 31, Document
32, Document 33).
Documents
Note:
The documents cited in this Electronic Briefing Book are in PDF
format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document
1: Office of Scientific & Weapons Research, CIA, "CHINA:
New Nuclear Test [Deleted]," Science and Weapons Review,
July 31, 1990. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This item from a weekly CIA publication speculates about the
possible purpose of an upcoming Chinese nuclear test.
Document
2: Director of Central Intelligence, "Russia: [Deleted]:
Nuclear Test Planned," National Intelligence Daily,
February 12, 1993. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article informed the recipients of the National Intelligence
Daily, distribution of which was restricted to about two
hundred government officials, that Russia had notified Washington
that it was planning to conduct a nuclear test in August, unless
it chose to extend its moratorium on nuclear testing (which
it eventually did). The commentary section notes the preference
of the Russian nuclear and military community to test in response
to a planned United States test in July 1993.
Document
3: Director of Central Intelligence, "China: Accelerated
Nuclear Testing Schedule," National Intelligence Daily,
February 19, 1993. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This NID article reports that China is planning to accelerate
its nuclear testing schedule and links the decision to increasing
international pressure for a comprehensive nuclear test ban
in 1996. It also comments on the relationship between the planned
tests and the types of systems being developed.
Document
4: Director of Central Intelligence, "Russia Nuclear
Test Moratorium Likely to Continue," National Intelligence
Daily, April 14, 1993. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act
This item reports an announcement by Yeltsin ecology adviser
Aleksey Yablokov that Russia would continue its nuclear moratorium--at
least until another country conducted a nuclear test. This redacted
version concludes that Yablokov's comments may have been partly
the result of his own opposition to testing; other factors remain
secret. It also offers a prediction of how Russia would respond
if the U.S. resumed nuclear testing.
Document
5: Director of Central Intelligence, "China: Prospects
for Joining Test Ban Treaty," National Intelligence
Daily, May 22, 1993. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article examines China's prospects for joining the Comprehensive
Test Ban (CTB) regime, the issue of Chinese stockpile confidence
under a CTB, and the types of experiments that China would be
able to conduct under a test ban.
Document
6: Director of Central Intelligence, "China: [Deleted]:
Response on Moratorium Noncommittal," National Intelligence
Daily, July 8, 1993
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This item notes China's reaction to the U.S. announcement of
a nuclear testing moratorium and discusses what it labels as
the "consensus" Chinese view on future testing, as
well as China's objectives in conducting future tests.
Document
7: Director of Central Intelligence, "Reaction to Chinese
Nuclear Test" and "China: More Nuclear Tests Likely,"
National Intelligence Daily, October 7, 1993. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act
The first article discusses international reactions to China's
test in early October--particularly the reactions of British,
French, Japanese, and South Korean officials. The other discusses
the prospect of China's joining of the comprehensive test ban
regime and the factors involved in China's decision.
Document
8: Office of Eurasian Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency.
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Talks: Off to a Turbulent
Start, January 18, 1994. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act
The released portions of this heavily redacted analysis by
an office in the Directorate of Intelligence focuses, inter
alia, on Russia's opening position with regard to a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, the country's past support for such a treaty,
and the prospect of Russian testing during negotiations.
Document
9: Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence
Agency, Chinese Nuclear Testing: Racing Against a Comprehensive
Test Ban, September 30, 1994. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
The introduction to this joint CIA-DIA memorandum discusses
the linkage between accelerated Chinese nuclear testing, weapons
modernization, and the looming Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Sections in the heavily-redacted remainder of the essay discuss
nuclear test activity, modernization of the nuclear force, and
the outlook.
Document
10: Director of Central Intelligence, "China: 40th
Nuclear Warhead Test at Lop Nur," National Intelligence
Daily, October 8, 1994. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act
In addition to reporting on the most recent Chinese nuclear
testing, this article estimates the number of tests China could
conduct in the upcoming year.
Document
11: Central Intelligence Agency, "China's Nuclear Test
Program Facing Delays," Proliferation Digest,
October 30, 1994. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act
This item, in a continuing CIA Directorate of Intelligence
publication, notes the delays facing the Chinese testing program
and the possible impact of those delays on China's adherence
to a CTBT regime.
Document
12: Director of Central Intelligence, "China: Nuclear
Test [Deleted]," National Intelligence Daily,
March 7, 1995. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This NID piece notes China's need to conduct a nuclear test
to keep its testing program on schedule and the possible objectives
of the test.
Document
13: Director of Central Intelligence, "Kazakhstan:
Russians Making Progress in Recovering Nuclear Device,"
Selected Items from the National Intelligence Daily,
March 29, 1995. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This item reports on the "unprecedented" attempt
by Russia to recover a nuclear device several years after it
failed to detonate during an underground test--an effort estimated
to cost 1.5 billion rubles.
Document
14: Central Intelligence Agency, "Japan Threatens to
Reduce Grant Aid to China," Economic Intelligence Weekly,
May 25, 1995. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This section of the Weekly notes that China's recent
nuclear test may result in a cut in Japanese aid below the previous
year's amount. It cites pressure from both the Japanese prime
minister's coalition partners and the public as significant
factors in the Japanese government's consideration of an aid
cut.
Document
15: Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis, Central Intelligence
Agency. "Bearly Testing?," The Eurasia Intelligence
Weekly, June 23, 1995. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
One item in this weekly publication reports on the apparent
Russian reaction to France's decision to resume nuclear testing,
and the likely impact on Russia of a U.S. resumption of testing.
Document
16: Central Intelligence Agency, "Russian Nuclear Device
in Kazakhstan Destroyed," Proliferation Digest,
June 30, 1995. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This item mixes information derived from the Russian and Kazakhstani
media, along with classified data (redacted from the released
version), to report on the destruction of the nuclear device
that had been emplaced in a tunnel in Degelen Mountain area
of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.
Document
17: Director of Central Intelligence, "China: More
Activity at Lop Nur," National Intelligence Daily,
July 29, 1995. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article discusses the prospect of China's completing its
ambitious test schedule for 1995. In addition, the article reports
on concerns of officials at the testing base--information most
likely to have been obtained from either signals or human intelligence
or both.
Document
18: Central Intelligence Agency, "China's Requirements
for Continued Nuclear Testing," Proliferation Digest,
July 31, 1995. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article returns to the issue of China's testing schedule,
its purpose, and the impact of any delays on China's willingness
to join a CTBT regime.
Document 19: Director
of Central Intelligence, "Russia: Ministry to Support Nuclear
Test Ban," National Intelligence Daily, September
12, 1995. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article notes the acknowledgment of the Russian Ministry
of Atomic Energy of the likelihood that Russia would agree to
a comprehensive test ban and reports of conflict between the
Russian Foreign and Atomic Energy ministries.
Document
20: "China: Possible Nuclear Artillery Test,"
Proliferation Digest, September 14, 1995. Top Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This heavily redacted item reports on the nature of a test
that had been scheduled for early September and speculates on
its objectives.
Document
21: Central Intelligence Agency, "Chinese Nuclear Event
in September," Proliferation Digest, November
30, 1995. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article reports on a likely Chinese nuclear test in early
September and addresses the three probable explanations as to
its purpose. The document illustrates the uncertainties involved
in the analysis of foreign nuclear testing.
Document
22: Director of Central Intelligence, "INTERNATIONAL:
Nuclear Testing Ambiguities Arise," National Intelligence
Daily, January 5, 1996. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
U.S. monitoring of various foreign nuclear tests is evident
in this item, which notes that "Several countries recently
have been active at nuclear test sites ..." The article
also comments on the ambiguities that might arise from observations
of test site activity under a CTB regime.
Document
23: Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis, Central Intelligence
Agency. "Russians Deny Nuclear Test Took Place," The
Eurasia Intelligence Weekly, March 15, 1996. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
In reaction to press accounts claiming that Russia might have
conducted a nuclear test at Novaya Zemlya, Russian officials
issued a denial but noted that Russia's adherence to the testing
moratorium was the prerogative of the Russian president.
Document
24: Office of Weapons, Technology and Proliferation, Central
Intelligence Agency. Russia: New Warheads Without Additional
Nuclear Testing, October 24, 1996. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
Only a single paragraph remains in this heavily redacted version
of a CIA study. The released paragraph considers the possibility
that Russian nuclear engineers could be working on new designs
and whether such plans would be incorporated into new warheads
without testing.
Document
25: George J. Tenet, Memorandum for: [Deleted], Subject:
[Deleted] Results of Special Panel Meeting on Novaya Zemlya
Test Site, October 28, 1997. Secret. w/att: Review
of Activity and Events Related to the Russian Nuclear Test Site
on Novaya Zemlya, October 24, 1997. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
On August 16, 1997, U.S. and other nations' seismic systems
detected a seismic event in the vicinity of Russia's Novaya
Zemlya test site. Combined with satellite reconnaissance, which
indicated a high level of activity at the test site, the detection
led to suspicions, both within the U.S. Intelligence Community
and in press reports, that Russia might have conducted a nuclear
test.
DCI George Tenet appointed a panel of scientific experts from
outside the Intelligence Community to review the data. The attachment
to Tenet's letter reports their judgments.
Document
26: Jonathan Medalia, Congressional Research Service, Chinese
Nuclear Testing and Warhead Development, November 14, 1997.
Unclassified
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
Based on unclassified sources, a specialist from the Congressional
Research Service produced this assessment of Chinese nuclear
testing and warhead development. The author examines the rationales
for Chinese nuclear weapons development and nuclear force structure,
the nuclear warhead development and testing program, prospective
advances in warhead development, missile and bomber programs,
and production.
Document
27: Director of Central Intelligence, "Russia: [Deleted]
Nuclear Test Site [Deleted]," Senior Executive Intelligence
Brief, December 30, 1998. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This short item in the SEIB, which replaced the NID in the
late 1990s, reports that Russian officials had informed the
media that they had conducted non-nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya
and why they had done so. The commentary has been deleted in
its entirety.
Document
28: Director of Central Intelligence, "Russia: Trying
to Keep Nuclear Options Open [Deleted]," Senior Executive
Intelligence Brief, January 11, 1999. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This article discusses the motives behind Russia's efforts
to modernize its nuclear weapons and strategic forces, and what
some of the modernization efforts involve. It also reviews the
impact of limited resources on submarine patrols, flight training,
and mobile missile deployments.
Document
29: Director of Central Intelligence, "Russia: Mikhaylov
Pressing for Hydronuclear Experiments," "Security
Council Adopts Nuclear Weapons Plans," and "Concern
About Ability to Test," Senior Executive Intelligence
Brief, May 4, 1999. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
These articles focus, respectively, on the push by Russia's
First Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy for zero-yield nuclear
tests, the adoption by the Russian Security Council of new decrees
concerning the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and Russian
concerns about problems in the area of nuclear testing.
Document
30: Director of Central Intelligence, "Russia: Results
of Nuclear Test Program Last Year," and "Russia: Ambitious
Nuclear Test Program This Year, Senior Executive Intelligence
Brief, June 4, 1999. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act
The heavily redacted version of the first article reports the
comments of a senior atomic energy ministry official concerning
the zero-yield tests conducted at Novaya Zemlya in the last
quarter of 1998, while the second focuses on the planned tests
for 1999.
Document
31: Office of Russian and European Analysis, Central Intelligence
Agency. Russia: Developing New Nuclear Warheads at Novaya
Zemlya?, July 2, 1999. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act
In addition to examining whether Russian activities at their
test site are directed toward developing new warheads, this
report evaluates the previous year's testing activities and
the planned testing program for 1999.
Document
32: Office of Russian and European Analysis, Central Intelligence
Agency, Russia: [Deleted], June 22, 2000. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This item observes that "Recent press commentary ... suggests
that Moscow has rekindled plans to develop new warheads for
the Ground Forces." One article, it reports, claimed that
some Russian officials were advocating the creation of up to
10,000 new low-yield and super-low-yield tactical nuclear warheads
as a counter to NATO expansion.
Document
33: Office of Transnational Issues, Central Intelligence
Agency. Evidence of Russian Development of New Subkiloton
Nuclear Warheads, August 30, 2000. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This study, substantial portions of which remain after redaction,
examines the perceived need by Russian officials for "clean"
very-low-yield nuclear weapons, Soviet-era development of tailored-output
nuclear devices, the effects of high-energy X-rays, and Russian
nuclear doctrine.
Notes
1. "Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,"
p. 4. accessed September 10, 2006. Available at http://pws.ctbo.org
2. "The Nuclear Testing Tally," accessed
September 10, 2006. Available at www.armscontrol.org
3. Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying
on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany
to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006),
pp. 404- 418.
4. Ibid., pp. 421- 426.
5. Ibid., pp. 422- 426.
