Washington
D.C., November 4, 2006 - In late April
1999, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), led by Marine
General Anthony Zinni (ret.), conducted a series of war games
known as Desert Crossing in order to assess potential outcomes
of an invasion of Iraq aimed at unseating Saddam Hussein. The
documents posted
here today covered the initial pre-war game planning
phase from April-May 1999 through the detailed after-action
reporting of June and July 1999.
The Desert Crossing war games, which amounted to a feasibility
study for part of the main war plan for Iraq -- OPLAN 1003-98
-- tested "worst case" and "most likely"
scenarios of a post-war, post-Saddam, Iraq. The After Action
Report presented its recommendations for further planning regarding
regime change in Iraq and was an interagency production assisted
by the departments of defense and state, as well as the National
Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency, among
others.
The results of Desert Crossing, however, drew pessimistic conclusions
regarding the immediate possible outcomes of such action. Some
of these conclusions are interestingly similar to the events
which actually occurred after Saddam was overthrown. (Note
1) The report forewarned that regime change may cause regional
instability by opening the doors to "rival forces bidding
for power" which, in turn, could cause societal "fragmentation
along religious and/or ethnic lines" and antagonize "aggressive
neighbors." Further, the report illuminated worries that
secure borders and a restoration of civil order may not be enough
to stabilize Iraq if the replacement government were perceived
as weak, subservient to outside powers, or out of touch with
other regional governments. An exit strategy, the report said,
would also be complicated by differing visions for a post-Saddam
Iraq among those involved in the conflict.
The Desert Crossing report was similarly pessimistic when discussing
the nature of a new Iraqi government. If the U.S. were to establish
a transitional government, it would likely encounter difficulty,
some groups discussed, from a "period of widespread bloodshed
in which various factions seek to eliminate their enemies."
The report stressed that the creation of a democratic government
in Iraq was not feasible, but a new pluralistic Iraqi government
which included nationalist leaders might be possible, suggesting
that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force. Moreover,
the report suggested that the U.S. role be one in which it would
assist Middle Eastern governments in creating the transitional
government for Iraq.
General Zinni, who retired in 2000 shortly after the completion
of Desert Crossing, brought the report to the attention of the
public after the war. Even before the invasion, he had made
his opposition to an imminent war widely known. In a major address
at the Middle East Institute in October 2002, he disputed the
view that war was either inevitable or desirable. On the question
of establishing a new government to replace Saddam Hussein,
he said, "God help us if we think this transition will
occur easily." (Note 2)
Zinni disparaged the views of pro-war advocates who minimized
the significance of Arab opinion: "I'm not sure which planet
they live on, because it isn't the one I travel." In a
Q&A after the speech, he declared that while it was necessary
to deal with Saddam Hussein "eventually," "[t]hat
could happen in many ways" short of war. "The question
becomes how to sort out your priorities .... My personal view,
and this is just personal, is that I think this isn't No. 1.
It's maybe six or seven, and the affordability line may be drawn
around five." (Note 3)
Zinni commented in depth publicly about Desert Crossing at
UCLA in 2004 where he discussed the origins of the plan in the
wake of the Desert Fox bombing campaign in 1998:
And it struck me then that we had a plan to defeat Saddam's
army, but we didn't have a plan to rebuild Iraq. And so I
asked the different agencies of government to come together
to talk about reconstruction planning for Iraq. . . . I thought
we ought to look at political reconstruction, economic reconstruction,
security reconstruction, humanitarian need, services, and
infrastructure development. We met in Washington, DC. We called
the plan, and we gamed it out in the scenario, Desert Crossing.
(Note 4)
Zinni noted the parallels to what eventually happened after
the invasion as well as to the lack of interest elsewhere in
the U.S. government for tackling the problems of reconstruction:
The first meeting surfaced all the problems that have
exactly happened now. This was 1999. And when I took it back
and looked at it, I said, we need a plan. Not all of this
is a military responsibility. I went back to State Department,
to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Department of
Commerce and others and said, all right, how about you guys
taking part of the plan. We need a plan in addition to the
war plan for the reconstruction. Not interested. Would not
look at it. (Note 5)
So the General decided to take action himself -- "because
I was convinced nobody in Washington was going to plan for it,
and we, the military, would get stuck with it."
Zinni claimed that his report had been forgotten only a few
years later, stating: "When it looked like we were going
in [to Iraq], I called back down to CENTCOM and said, 'You need
to dust off Desert Crossing.' They said, 'What's that? Never
heard of it.' So in a matter of just a few years it was gone.
The corporate memory. And in addition I was told, 'We've been
told not to do any of the planning. It would all be done in
the Pentagon.'" (Note 6)
The planning done at the Defense Department changed Zinni's
original conception in some fundamental ways. For example, Zinni
proposed a civilian occupation authority with offices in all
eighteen Iraqi provinces, whereas the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) was actually established only in Baghdad.
Even more significantly, the former CENTCOM commander noted
that his plan had called for a force of 400,000 for the invasion
-- 240,000 more than what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
approved. "We were concerned about the ability to get in
there right away, to flood the towns and villages," USA
Today quoted Zinni as saying in July 2003. "We knew
the initial problem would be security." (Note
7)
Army General Thomas "Tommy" Franks adjusted the concept
when he assumed command of CENTCOM upon Zinni's retirement.
Yet even his initial version of OPLAN 1003-98 envisioned a need
for 385,000 troops, according to the book, COBRA II,
(Note 8) -- before Rumsfeld insisted that the
number be sharply reduced.
Documents
Note:
The documents cited in this Electronic Briefing Book are in PDF
format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Desert
Crossing Pre-Wargame Intelligence Conference, April 29, 1999
Desert
Crossing After Action Report, June 28, 1999
Desert
Crossing After Action Report Briefing, July 22, 1999
Desert
Crossing Miscellaneous E-mails, May-August 1999
Joint
Intelligence Center Central, "Suggested new name for CONPLAN
DESERT RESOLVE," November 14, 1999
Links
to some of Gen. Zinni's public comments
Zinni
quoted in "I'm
Not Sure Which Planet They Live On," by Eric Boehlert,
Salon.com, October 17, 2002 [last accessed: 03 November 2006].
Leslie
Evans, "Straight
Talk from General Anthony Zinni," University of California
at Los Angeles Ronald W. Burkle Center for International Relations,
14 May 2004 [last accessed: 01 November 2006].
Thomas
Ricks, "For
Vietnam Vet Anthony Zinni, Another War on Shaky Territory,"
Washington Post, 23 December 2003, p. C01 [last accessed:
01 November 2006].
Kurt
Achin, "Post-War
Chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan Shows US Needs Better Reconstruction
Strategy, Says Former CENTCOM Commander," The Johns
Hopkins University International Reporting Project, Fall 2004
[last accessed: 01 November 2006].
CBS
News, "Gen.
Zinni: 'They've Screwed Up:' Former Top Commander Condemns Pentagon
Officials Over Iraq War," 60 Minutes, 21 May
2004 [last accessed: 01 November 2006]
Notes
1. This report was compiled prior to another
prescient study of post-invasion Iraq, the Department of State's
"Future of Iraq Project" -- see the
National Security Archive's Electronic Briefing Book No. 198.
2. Zinni quoted in "I'm
Not Sure Which Planet They Live On," by Eric Boehlert,
Salon.com, October 17, 2002 [last accessed: 03 November 2006].
3. Ibid.
4. See Leslie Evans, "Straight
Talk from General Anthony Zinni," University of California
at Los Angeles, Ronald W. Burkle Center for International Relations,
14 May 2004 [last accessed: 01 November 2006].
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Barbara Slavin and Dave Moniz, "War
in Iraq's Aftermath Hits Troops Hard," USA Today,
posted July 21, 2003 [last accessed 01 November 2006].
8. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E.
Trainor, COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and
Occupation of Iraq, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), p.
28.
