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COUNTRY: CHILE 8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 817 0094 75

SUBJECT: (U) Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) Expands Operations and Facilities 9. DATE OF REPORT: 15 April 1975

ISC NUMBER: 10. NO. OF PAGES: 3

DATE OF INFORMATION: 10 April 1975 11. REFERENCES: A. IR 6 817 0088 75
B. IR 6 817 0135 74; C. [REDACTED]
D. DIRM III Control No. CI750
E. DIRM b A - F

PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Santiago, Chile 12. ORIGINATOR: USDAO Santiago, Chile

EVALUATION: SOURCE A 10 April 1975 INFORMATION 2 13. PREPARED BY: CAPT J. R. SWITZER, USN, ALUSN,
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A. b 8170063; B. 6 817 0050
C. 6 817 0010; D. 6 817 0043

SUMMARY:

(C) This IR discusses the developing relationship between the several branches of the Chilean Armed Forces and the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA); relationship between members of the governing Junta and DINA; general comments about the growing personnel strength of DINA; and its new 24 floor office building currently being constructed. (NOTE: This information provides updating information to that provided in paragraph D. of reference (a).)

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Rec'd DS-4D/ 24 APR 75

1. [REDACTED] a conversation was held regarding the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) and its activities. Comments made tended to confirm information received from other sources over the past several weeks. Sources have reported that President PINOCHET has established DINA as the sole responsible agency for internal subversive matters. As such, service intelligence agencies are obliged to inform DINA immediately when subversive activities have been uncovered within their services, and turn over to DINA my detainees held. For DINA's part, however, when they have encountered subversive information about the individual services, they are only required to inform the services that an investigation is underway without turning over the actual detainees.

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17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
Classified by U. S. Defense Attaché, Santiago, Chile. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION WE - GORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON 31 Dec 2005

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:
None
Declassified by DIA with redaction per EO 12958

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D, FORM SEP 62 1396

REPLACES DA FORM 1040, 1 AUG 60, GPNV FORM 3026 (Rev 10-61), AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 62.

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2. ~~(C)~~ Additionally, the original DINA personnel manning level of 1500 persons has blossomed to approximately 2000 regular members (the great majority of which are active duty military personnel), augmented by some 2100 additional civilian personnel located throughout the country, that work on an on-call basis (most part time but some full time). The 2100 civilians (only some of which are paid for their services) constitute a subordinate unit to DINA named BRIGADA INTELIGENCIA CIUDANA (Citizens Intelligence Brigade). During operations, members of this civilian unit work in company with regular DINA operatives if arrests are to be made. Apparently President PINOCHET has given the DINA Director, Colonel Juan Manuel CONTRERAS Sepulveda, a free hand in establishing personnel requirements for DINA. An example given by source A. indicated that in late 1974, DINA tasked Navy to provide an additional 40 female/clerical personnel to their rolls. When the Navy indicated their lack of personnel assets, DINA independently contracted 40 civilian females to work for their organization, and subsequently assigned pay and housing responsibilities to the Navy. This rather high-handed measure reportedly received the approval of President PINOCHET, and the Navy has had to accept the situation (with no evident complaint being voiced by Admiral MERINO). Attempts by service intelligence agencies to check DINA's growth have been effectively countered by Colonel CONTRERAS. The Navy, in an attempt to place a responsible and loyal officer in the position of Deputy Director of DINA has found that the chosen man, Captain Rolando GARCIA LeBlanch has apparently turned his allegiance to DINA instead of the Navy. The Air Force, in an attempt to diminish the authority of DINA tried to have its previous Deputy Director, Colonel Mario JAHN Barrera removed. Colonel JAHN refused to leave his position, and in a showdown with CINC of the Air Force, retained his position as a DINA Deputy Director. The end result was that DINA now has one Director, and two Deputy Directors.

3. ~~(C)~~ The relationship between DINA and the several branches of the armed forces vary considerably. The NAVY has adopted a rather pragmatic attitude, recognizing that they have neither the monetary, material nor personnel assets to conduct the widespread anti-subversion activities that characterize DINA operations. As a result, they seldom find themselves with conflicting interests vis a vis DINA (the personnel situation discussed above representing an exception). Usually, when DINA uncovers subversive activities within the Naval community, they advise Navy Intelligence who then is kept abreast of the DINA operation. The CARABINEROS have a working relationship with DINA very similar to that of the Navy for the same reasons. However, ARMY/DINA relations have been considerably less cordial. Army Intelligence, headed by a general officer and operating with an impressive budget has been most reluctant to "knuckle under" to the wishes of DINA, headed by an Army Colonel. Army Intelligence Chief General MENA (and General POLLONI before him) is consistently irritated by the abrasive attitude of Colonel CONTRERAS, and resents the expansion of DINA operations into what are considered Army domains. He, and several other flag officers of the various services, are quite concerned about the "barbaric" tactics employed during some DINA operations. Much of the blame is attributed to poorly trained DINA agents operating under inadequate supervision. The AIR FORCE, like the Army, has strained relations with DINA. Air Force Intelligence was antagonized during the first days of 1975 when the total responsibility for anti-MIR operations was given to DINA by order of President PINOCHET (drafted by Colonel CONTRERAS). The Air Force center of anti-subversive activities located at the Air Force War Academy was disestablished and all duties previously under Air Force cognizance have been transferred to DINA. The Air Force Director of Counterintelligence, Colonel OTAIZA was

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AND DA FORM 505 1 AUGAUG 80
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was given a secondary position under the Director of Air Force Intelligence.

4. ~~(S)~~ Junta relations with DINA have changed considerably since the early days of the intelligence organizations establishment. When Colonel CONTRERAS was building DINA, he was quick to ensure that the rapport between himself and the Junta was maintained at a high level. It was during the early days that the Colonel was calling for considerable support from the various services in the form of personnel assets. But since the promulgation of Decree Law No. 521, officially establishing DINA as the national intelligence arm of the government (ref (b) refers), Colonel CONTRERAS has reported exclusively to, and received orders only from President PINOCHET. A facade of politeness is maintained with the other three members of the Junta, but their opinions and/or advice is neither sought nor desired by DINA's Director. This situation has prompted several Army officers to try and convince the President that DINA should be subject to the direction and control of a National Security Council type of authority rather than just the Presidency (ref (c) refers). To date, the President has not received these suggestions with enthusiasm. The original concept that DINA would be an intelligence body to support all of the Junta members no longer exists.

5. ~~(S)~~ When DINA was first setting-up operations, their headquarters were located in three houses on Belgrado Street in Santiago (near the intersection of Vicuña McKenna and Rancagua). Presently, however, they have been authorized funds by the President, and are building a 24 story building at the end of Belgrado Street to serve as their national headquarters. The expected completion date of this new headquarters is as yet unknown.

COMMENT: ~~(S)~~ DINA's current pattern of growth is not consistent with any form of democratic control or management of its activities. The apprehension of many senior Chilean military authorities regarding the possibility of DINA becoming a modern day Gestapo may very well be coming to fruition. DINA's autonomous authority is great, and increasing. Junta members are apparently unable to influence President PINOCHET's decisions concerning DINA activities in any way. Regarding DINA organization, policies and operations, Colonel CONTRERAS' authority is near absolute - subject only to an unlikely Presidential veto. DINA's development is a particularly disturbing phenomenon in view of the Chilean government's desire to enhance their international image. Any advantage gained by humanitarian practices can easily be offset by terror tactics (even if on a relatively small scale) on the part of poorly trained and supervised DINA operatives.

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