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Initial Reports on Pinochet's
of State, SECRET Memorandum, "Chilean Executions,"
includes "Fact Sheet-Human Rights in Chile," November
"Fact Sheet-Human Rights in Chile," January 15, 1974
This memo, sent to the Secretary of State by Jack Kubisch,
states that summary executions in the nineteen days following
the coup totaled 320--more than three times the publicly acknowledged
figure. At the same time, Kubisch reports on new economic assistance
just authorized by the Nixon administration. The memo provides
information about the Chilean military's justification for the
continued executions. It also includes a situation report and
human rights fact sheet on Chile. An updated fact sheet showing
the situation two months later is also included.
Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Report, [Executions
in Chile since the Coup], October 27, 1973
This Intelligence Report states that between September 11,
1973 and October 10, 1973 a total of 13,500 prisoners had been
registered as detained by the Chilean armed forces. During that
same time period, an estimated 1,600 civilian deaths occurred
as a result of the coup. The report also notes that eighty civilians
were either executed on the spot or killed by firing squads
after military trials.
Intelligence Agency, SECRET Report, "Chile: Violations
of Human Rights," May 24, 1977
This secret CIA report acknowledges that Chile's National Intelligence
Directorate is behind the recent increase in torture, illegal
detentions, and unexplained "disappearances." The
report notes that the increase in gross violations of human
rights in Chile comes at a particularly bad time for the country.
Intelligence Agency, CONFIDENTIAL Report, "Directorate
of National Intelligence (DINA) Expands Operations and Facilities,"
April 15, 1975
This DIA report on Chile's Directorate of National Intelligence
(DINA) discusses the organization's structure and its relationship
with the Chilean Armed Forces and the country's governing Junta.
DINA is identified as the sole agency responsible handling internal
subversive matters. The report warns that the possibility of
DINA becoming a modern day Gestapo may be coming to fruition.
It concludes that any advantages gained by humanitarian practices
in Chile could easily be offset by DINA's terror tactics.
Support for the Pinochet Regime
of State, SENSITIVE Cable, "USG Attitude Toward Junta,"
September 13, 1973
This DOS cable sent two days after the coup states that the
"US government wishes to make clear its desire to cooperate
with the military Junta and to assist in any appropriate way."
This official welcome agreed that it was best to avoid too much
public identification between the Junta and the United States
of State, SENSITIVE Cable, "Continuation of Relations with
GOC and Request for Flares and Helmets," September 18,
This DOS cable was sent in response to a note from the Junta
regarding the continuation of relations. It stress the US government's
"strongest desire to cooperate closely with the Chilean
of State, Memorandum, "Ambassador Popper's Policy Paper,"
July 11, 1975
ARA analyst Richard Bloomfield's memo notes that "in the
eyes of the world at large, we are closely associated with this
Junta, ergo with fascists and torturers." In this memo
he makes clear his disagreement with Kissinger's position and
argues that the human rights problem in Chile should be of primary
interest to the U.S. government.
of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary's Meeting with
Foreign Minister Carvajal, September 29, 1975
This transcript records a meeting between Secretary Kissinger
and Pinochet's foreign minister, Patricio Carvajal, following
Chile's decision to cancel a visit by the United Nations Human
Rights Commission investigating human rights crimes. Kissinger
begins the meeting by disparaging his staff "who have a
vocation for the ministry" for focusing on human rights
in the briefing papers prepared for the meeting. He tells Carvajal
that condemnation of the Pinochet regime's human rights record
is "a total injustice," but that "somewhat visible"
efforts by the regime to alleviate the situation would be useful
in changing Congressional attitudes. "Our point of view
is if you do something, let us know so we can use it with Congress."
Kissinger, Carvajal, and Assistant Secretary Rogers then discuss
U.S. efforts to expedite Ex-Im Bank credits and multilateral
loans to Chile as well as cash sales of military equipment.
At the end of the meeting, Kissinger voices support for the
regime's idea to host the June 1976 OAS meeting in Santiago
as a way of increasing Pinochet's prestige and improving Chile's
of State, SECRET, "The Secretary's 8:00 a.m. Regional Staff
Meeting," December 5, 1974
At this staff meeting, Secretary Kissinger spends considerable
time discussing Congressional efforts, led by Senator Edward
Kennedy, to restrict U.S. military assistance to the Pinochet
regime. The transcript records Kissinger's vehement opposition
to such legislative initiatives, on the grounds that they are
unfair to the Chilean military government, could lead to its
collapse, and set a dangerous precedent for cutting assistance
to other unsavory governments the Ford Administration is supporting.
"Well, am I wrong that this sort of thing is likely to
finish off that government?" he demands to know. Later
he asks: "Is this government worse than the Allende government?
Is human rights more severely threatened by this government
than Allende?" According to Kissinger, "the worse
crime of this government is that it is pro-American." In
response, Assistant Secretary for Latin America, William Rogers
informs the Secretary, "in terms of freedom of association,
Allende didn't close down the opposition party. In terms of
freedom of the press, Allende didn't close down all the newspapers."
of State, SECRET Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Kissinger
and Augusto Pinochet, "U.S.-Chilean Relations," June
In this secret memorandum of conversation, Kissinger briefs
Pinochet in advance of his speech to the Organization of American
States (OAS) in Santiago in June 1976. He lets Pinochet know
that he will treat the issue of human rights in general terms
only. He stresses that his speech is not aimed at Chile but
that it is intended to appease the U.S. Congress. But, he notes,
"we have a practical problem we have to take into account,
without bringing about pressures incompatible with your dignity,
and at the same time which does not lead to U.S. laws which
will undermine our relationship."
Pinochet and the Letelier-Moffitt
Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Information Cable,
[Assassination of Orlando Letelier], October 6, 1976
Two weeks after the car bombing assassination of Orlando Letelier
this CIA field report states that its source "believes
that the Chilean government is directly involved in Letelier's
death and feels that investigation into the incident will so
Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Assessment, "Chile:
Implications of the Letelier Case," May 1978
This CIA intelligence assessment alludes to the strain placed
on U.S.-Chilean relations in light of recent findings in the
investigation of the murder of Orlando Letelier that firmly
linked the former Foreign Minister to the highest levels of
the Chilean government. CIA analysts write, "The sensational
developments have evoked speculation about President Pinochet's
Intelligence Agency, SECRET Intelligence Report, "[Deleted]
Strategy of Chilean Government with Respect to Letelier Case,
and Impact of Case on Stability of President Pinochet,"
June 23, 1978
This secret intelligence report outlines Pinochet's strategy
to cover up his regime's complicity in the Letelier assassination.
The four-point strategy would protect General Contreras from
successful prosecution in the murder, stonewall requests from
the U.S. government that would help them build a case against
Chileans involved in the terrorist act, prevent the Supreme
Court from honoring U.S. extradition requests, and convince
the Chilean people that the investigation into the Letelier
assassination is a politically motivated tool to destabilize
the Pinochet regime.
Pinochet Biographic Reports
Intelligence Agency, SECRET, "Biographic Data on Augusto
Pinochet," January 1975 (unredacted version)
Two versions of DIA's biographic profile on Pinochet - one
fully uncensored, the
other curiously redacted. Please see the Archive's
posting regarding the two different versions of
Intelligence Agency, SECRET, "Biographic Handbook [on]
Chile," November 1974
This CIA bio describes Pinochet as an intelligent, disciplined,
and professional military officer who is known for his toughness.
The document states that Pinochet is dedicated to the national
reconstruction of his country and will not tolerate any opposition
to that goal.