

Robert S. McNamara/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

32. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

Washington, June 1, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Reconnaissance Satellites. Secret.

SUBJECT

Khrushchev on Reconnaissance Satellites

Twice in two weeks Khrushchev has raised the subject of satellite reconnaissance in conversations with Americans—*Draw Pearson* and *Senator Benton*. The Soviet Premier probably has two things in mind. First and most immediate, to maximize pressure on the US to cease overflights of Cuba; second, over time to gain acceptance for the idea that satellite reconnaissance obviates the need for extensive disarmament controls.

Cuban Overflights. In both the *Pearson* and *Benton* conversations Khrushchev raised the subject of satellite reconnaissance in the context of threatening to shoot down a U-2. As Khrushchev described them, the flights were not only increasingly dangerous but unnecessary, a point similar to *Castro's* May Day argument that the U-2 flights were unnecessary because the US had reconnaissance satellites.

Argument Against Disarmament Controls. Although the current emphasis is on Cuba, the idea that satellites obviate the need for disarmament controls appears to have been in Khrushchev's mind longer. On July 8, 1963 Khrushchev raised the subject in a conversation with Belgian Foreign Minister *Spaak*, arguing that satellites made aerial inspection unnecessary for a European arms control system. Since then the argument has been taken up by lower-ranking Soviet officials, for example by *Viktor Karpov* of the Soviet Embassy here.

Legitimacy of Satellite Reconnaissance. Like Khrushchev's May 1960 suggestion in Paris that he would not have objected to US use of a satellite instead of a U-2, Khrushchev's statements to *Spaak*, *Pearson*, and *Benton* all suggest that Moscow is seeking to legitimize satellite reconnaissance.

The degree of Soviet acceptance to date of satellite reconnaissance should not be overstressed, however. For example, in the UN Outer Space Committee the Soviets have been willing to forego discussion of the subject but they have not made explicit statements accepting the practice. Moreover, the Soviet media have not published Khrushchev's remarks, *Adzhubel's* boast in Helsinki last September about Soviet pictures of New York and *Castro's* May Day statement. Moscow is also apparently reluctant to suggest to the home audience that the Soviet Union is vulnerable to American surveillance.

Next Moves. Khrushchev's semi-public references to reconnaissance satellites could reflect his intention to pursue more formal discussions in this field. He could formally put to the US the proposition on Cuba he has put informally to *Pearson* and *Benton*. More broadly, he could seek to inject new momentum into old disarmament debates by formally proposing use of satellites instead of traditional forms of inspection.

For the moment, however, we would expect Khrushchev to continue his semi-public remarks to foreigners: they avoid formally accepting US satellite programs as legitimate while showing Khrushchev as seeking a way out of a crisis over Cuba. At the same time they permit him to make threats about the Cuban overflights without putting them formally on the record. He may be calculating that he can with his present tactics maneuver the US into a position where it must choose between three relatively awkward alternative responses: (1) it could remain silent and appear adamant in face of his "reasonable" suggestion; (2) it could agree with his arguments and stop the U-2s; or (3) it could counter his simple proposition with a complex technical, and possibly revealing, argument about the limitations of satellite photography.

If Khrushchev finds that his tactics backfire—i.e. that the US welcomes his acceptance of the legitimacy of

satellite photography but continues flying the U-2s--it would become more likely that he would make a formal, high-level approach to us to get us to substitute satellites for U-2s.

33. Letter From the Director of the White House Office of Emergency Planning (McDermott) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, June 17, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-2 US. No classification marking. An attached June 26 note from Marion A. Baldwin (S/S-G) to William E. Knepper (S) requested approval of an attached draft letter from G. Griffith Johnson to McDermott, as a reply to McDermott's letter to the Secretary. A "yes" is handwritten in the margin of Baldwin's note.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I recently submitted to The President a report about the progress that has been made on the Supply-Requirements Study for Nuclear War and Reconstruction that is currently being carried out by the Office of Emergency Planning in cooperation with a number of Federal agencies, including the Department of State./2/ On June 4, 1964, the Honorable Walter Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President, wrote me that "The President has asked to be kept advised periodically of your progress," and added that "Because of the obvious need for nuclear war objectives to provide guidance for stockpile policy, the participating Federal agencies should give high priority to this work." A copy of Mr. Jenkins' memorandum is enclosed./3/

/2/The progress report has not been found. Regarding what apparently is the final report, see footnote 4, Document 44.

/3/Attached but not printed.

The Department of State, under guidance issued by the Office of Emergency Planning, is contributing to this study through the development of estimates covering the supply of and requirements for various major resources following a nuclear attack on the United States. The study was explained at a special meeting of the Interdepartmental Emergency Planning Committee on October 1, 1963./4/ Since that date, all departments and agencies having either resource or claimant responsibilities for specific materials, products, or services during emergency periods have been conducting detailed evaluations in their assigned areas.

/4/Not further identified.

The results of the study will be invaluable in our planning for the postattack recovery of the nation, and will provide the basis for setting nuclear war stockpile objectives. Our present stockpile objectives are based on supply-requirements studies reflecting the needs of a conventional war. We are currently being urged, both by members of the Congress and representatives of industry, to develop stockpile objectives which will meet the needs of nuclear war and reconstruction.

I would appreciate your informing the individuals in your agency that are engaged in this study of its importance and of the necessity for ensuring that no unjustifiable delays prevent its completion as soon as possible. In this connection, I would also appreciate having you bring a copy of Mr. Jenkins' memorandum to their attention.

Sincerely,

Ed

34. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

No. 1391/84