Washington
D.C., July 13,
2007 - Throughout the 1960s
and most of the 1970s, while the U.S. government conducted its
space reconnaissance program under a veil of absolute secrecy,
officials debated whether information about the program (including
the "fact of" its existence and certain photographs)
should be disclosed to other elements of the government, public,
allies, and even the Soviet Union, according to documents obtained
through the Freedom of Information Act and archival research
and posted today by the National Security Archive.
The documents published today show that some officials argued
that even with a program as sensitive as satellite reconnaissance,
greater openness, both within and outside the government, could
help a variety of U.S. policy objectives. A certain degree of
transparency, these officials believed, would legitimize space
reconnaissance (by removing the stigma of espionage), allow
more extensive use of satellite imagery for both national security
and civilian purposes, and preserve the credibility of the classification
system. As the documents demonstrate, other officials naturally
raised objections, often citing the likely unfavorable reactions
from the Soviet Union and other nations as well as operational
security concerns.
Compiled by National Security Archive Senior Fellow Dr. Jeffrey
T. Richelson, the documents in this briefing book include National
Security Action Memoranda, national intelligence estimates,
and other sensitive internal records produced by the White House,
the CIA, the United States Intelligence Board, the National
Photographic Interpretation Center, the National Reconnaissance
Office, the Department of Defense, and the Air Force.
Electronic
Briefing Book
Secrecy
and U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance, 1958-1976
Edited by Jeffrey Richelson
In its May 2, 1946 report, "Preliminary Design for an
Experimental World Circling Spaceship," the Douglas Aircraft
Corporation examined the potential value of satellites for scientific
and military purposes. Possible military uses included missile
guidance, weapons delivery, weather reconnaissance, communications,
attack assessment, and "observation." A little less
than nine years later, on March 15, 1955, the United States
Air Force issued General Operational Requirement No. 80, which
established a high-priority requirement for an advanced reconnaissance
satellite. (Note 1)
Over the next five years, the U.S. reconnaissance satellite
program evolved in a number of ways. The Air Force program was
first designated the Advanced Reconnaissance System (also known
as 'Pied Piper'), then SENTRY. Management responsibility for
SENTRY was transferred from the Air Force to the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (ARPA), established on February 7, 1958, and
then back to the Air Force in late 1959, by which time the program
had been renamed SAMOS. That program would, for periods of time,
involve electronic readouts of imagery, physical recovery of
images in a capsule, and electronic intelligence payloads -
the latter directed primarily at Soviet and Chinese radar systems.
(Note 2)
Concerns over delays in the primary objective of SAMOS - the
development and operation of an electronic readout satellite
- led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to approve (also on February
7, 1958), a Central Intelligence Agency-led program to develop
a reconnaissance satellite that would record its images on film
and return them in a capsule. The program, which would soon
be designated CORONA, became the responsibility of the CIA's
Richard Bissell, the DCI's special assistant for planning and
development, who had also served as the chief of the U-2 program.
(Note 3)
It would not be until 1960 that U.S. efforts to exploit space
for intelligence purposes began to yield positive results. In
June of that year, a Naval Research Laboratory-designed payload,
designated Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB), was orbited
with a secret mission - to intercept the emanations of Soviet
radar systems. In August 1960, the first successful CORONA mission,
lasting one day and conducted under cover of an alleged scientific
satellite program designated DISCOVERER, yielded more imagery
of the Soviet Union than was produced in all four years of U-2
missions. The same year, President Eisenhower also approved
a program to develop a high-resolution satellite to complement
the CORONA satellites, which covered wide swaths of territory
but with insufficient resolution to allow imagery interpreters
to extract as much intelligence about facilities and weapons
as they needed. This program would be designated GAMBIT. (Note
4)
These activities were conducted in as much secrecy as was feasible,
particularly after the inauguration of John F. Kennedy. Both
Eisenhower and Kennedy were influenced by the May 1960 shoot-down
of the U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers - an event which resulted
in the termination of U-2 missions over Soviet territory. There
was concern that any acknowledgment of U.S. capabilities would
serve as a catalyst to the Soviet leadership to go beyond their
protests at assumed U.S. space espionage and take more effective
political and military measures to interfere with the American
spy satellites. Thus, each use of the GRAB satellite to intercept
Soviet radar signals had to be personally approved by President
Eisenhower, just as he had to approve U-2 missions that crossed
over Soviet territory. (Note 5)
During its first year in office, the Kennedy administration
approved the creation of the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) and the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), entities
whose existence was classified Secret and Top Secret, respectively.
The NRP comprised the satellite reconnaissance and aerial overflight
programs conducted by the CIA, Air Force, and Navy. For its
part, the NRO served as the institutional home for those programs,
reviewed proposals for new systems, set common security standards,
arranged for launches, and provided other services and forms
of oversight. (Note 6)
Over the next 15 years, the United States would develop and
deploy a number of satellites to produce images; intercept radar
signals, communications, missile telemetry; and detect infrared
signals that could be exploited for intelligence purposes. During
this period secrecy and security would continue to be a concern,
and would involve a number of different dimensions.
One of the problems that arose at this time was the appearance
of press disclosures concerning the U.S. satellite reconnaissance
effort - not only in 1958 but in 1976. (Documents 1a, 1b, 9,
37). An even more pressing issue was the potential international
reaction to the reconnaissance program. U.S. officials looked
for the best way to reduce the program's political vulnerability
to Soviet or other nations' objections to U.S. "spies in
the sky" overflying their territory and photographing (or
intercepting signals from) key military installations. Whether
public acknowledgment or secrecy would best protect the program
was the subject of intelligence estimates and policy memoranda
from the years before the first launch till the late 1970s (Documents
2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 15, 24, 26, 29, 37, 38).
Aside from these studies and memos, other studies
focused solely on the Soviet Union - on its awareness and understanding
of U.S. reconnaissance, its probable reaction to any public
acknowledgment of the program, and the wisdom (or lack thereof)
of disclosing certain details to Soviet officials. (Documents
12, 16, 18, 24, 25, 34).
U.S. intelligence and policy officials also had to make choices
concerning how much they should reveal about the program to
allies and how much of the product they should share with individual
governments (particularly Britain) and NATO. (Documents 19,
24, 27). At times, one or more officials raised the prospect
of releasing satellite imagery to the public at large. (Documents
20, 35).
Another set of issues concerned the security measures taken
to protect details about the programs and their product. Thus,
a Department of Defense directive (Document 13) established
policy and procedures designed to protect data about all military
space programs as a means of safeguarding the reconnaissance
programs, (See also Documents 14, 21, 36a, 36b). U.S. officials
were especially concerned with the creation, operation, and
impact of compartmented security systems - the TALENT-KEYHOLE
and BYEMAN control systems - established for shielding information
about, or produced by, reconnaissance satellites (Documents
5a, 5b, 5c, 10, 28, 37).
A final category of concerns related to internal disclosure
of the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance, or provision
of some of the product to a broader set of individuals and organizations
within the government, at the Secret or Top Secret level. (Documents
13, 29, 30, 31). In some instances, the purpose was to remove
impediments to performance of other agencies' missions. In others
it was to curb statements made by uncleared personnel about
U.S. reconnaissance efforts.
Throughout this time, proposals for greater disclosure - whether
to the American public or within the government - almost always
met significant resistance. Such reluctance, often based on
the argument that the risks of change outweighed the expected
benefits, was generally decisive in blocking more liberal disclosure
policies. So great was the resistance to disclosure that even
the "fact of" U.S. satellite reconnaissance would
not be declassified until 1978. (Note 7)
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Document
1a: Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Memorandum for Director of
Administration, DPS/DCI, "Subject: Article Appearing in
Aviation Week (23 June Issue)," June 26, 1958. Secret
Document
1b: James A. Cunningham Jr. Director of Administration DPS/DCI,
Memorandum for Special Assistant to the Director for Planning
and Development, "Subject: Evaluation of AVIATION WEEK
Article on Accelerated Pied Piper Program," June 27, 1958.
Secret
Source:
CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) II, College Park
U.S. national security officials were concerned about unauthorized
disclosures of classified information about the U.S. satellite
reconnaissance program from the program's inception. In this
exchange of memos, Richard Bissell Jr., special assistant to
Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and director
of the CORONA program, requests a report on an article in Aviation
Week - specifically the extent to which its content actually
describes aspects of the CORONA program.
In his reply, CIA Deputy Director (Administration) James A.
Cunningham reviews the history of the WS-117L project (one component
of which, DISCOVERER, served as a cover for CORONA). He discusses
the extent to which the article's description of the "Pied
Piper" program corresponds to details of the CORONA program,
and offers the reassuring conclusion that "the story is
a cleverly-written combination of a few primary facts intermingled
with a considerable amount of editorial speculation and obvious
deduction."
Document
2: Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 100-6-58, "Implications
of Certain US Earth Satellite Programs," July 29, 1958.
Secret
Source:
CIA Historical Release Program
This estimate was written just as the U.S. was preparing to
deploy satellites for intelligence, military, and scientific
purposes. One particular concern with respect to reconnaissance
satellites was the focus of this study - the political and psychological
reaction to U.S. launchings of such satellites. The estimate
assesses likely foreign reactions (from both the Soviet Union
and other nations). Among the topics examined are the likelihood
of Soviet development and use of anti-satellite systems (ASAT),
reactions to the U.S. disclosure of its capability, and probable
reactions to alternative U.S. offers to put its satellite capability
at the disposal of the U.N.
Document
3: Richard Leghorn, "Political Action and Satellite
Reconnaissance," April 24, 1959. Unclassified
Source:
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
The R.S.L. at the end of the memo refers to Richard S. Leghorn,
one of the fathers of strategic aerial and satellite reconnaissance.
Leghorn at this time was head of the Itek Corporation - the
contractor that developed the reconnaissance camera for the
CORONA system. As did SNIE 100-6-58 (Document
2), this memo addresses the issue of the possible political
vulnerability of U.S. reconnaissance satellite programs. Leghorn
argues that the "espionage" context in which U.S.
programs were viewed - a result of the secrecy attached to the
programs - is the "worst possible" context from the
standpoint of political vulnerability and suggests the need
for an "imaginative political action program" as a
means of reducing the program's political vulnerability.
Document
4: Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 100-6-60, "Probable
Reactions to US Reconnaissance Satellite Programs," August
2, 1960. Secret
Source:
CIA Historical Release Program
The U.S. began test launches of photographic reconnaissance
satellites in early 1959, but did not successfully recover a
capsule with film until August 14, 1960. The U.S. did orbit
and obtain information from an electronic intelligence satellite,
GRAB, in June 1960. Concern over possible Soviet reactions were
so severe that GRAB's use when over Soviet territory had to
be specifically approved by President Eisenhower, even after
it was in orbit. This estimate focused on possible Soviet responses
to photographic reconnaissance and electronic intelligence missions.
It concerned the limited ability of the satellites, Soviet capabilities
for interference, and the acquisition of intelligence about
satellite operations. In contrast to Leghorn's view (Document
3), the estimate concluded that acknowledgment of the program
would compel a Soviet reaction.
Document
5a: Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, "Subject:
Plans for the Handling of Satellite Photography (CORONA),"
August 24, 1960. Top Secret
Document 5b: Dwight
D. Eisenhower, Memorandum, August 26, 1960. Top Secret
Document 5c: "Security
Indoctrination and Secrecy Agreement for Keyhole Clearance in
the Talent Control System," n.d. Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
Part of the effort to maintain secrecy concerning the CORONA
system involved the security procedures for handling the images
it produced. The first memo provides data on the TALENT Security
System, first established to protect the product of U-2 missions,
and the TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK) compartment created to safeguard
the imagery from CORONA and future imagery systems. It provides
data on the numbers of TK clearances in different organizations
and notes that the numbers could be expected to grow.
The second memo is the presidential directive establishing
the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System. It assigns to five
senior officials - the secretary of state, the secretary of
defense, the attorney general, the chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission, and the director of central intelligence - the personal
responsibility of approving TK clearances for individuals in
their organizations. It also provides direction on the establishment
of a roster of all individuals with such clearances, and the
nature of the indoctrination they should receive upon obtaining
access to TK material.
The third document is the indoctrination and secrecy agreement
individuals signed before receiving their TK clearance.
Document
6: NRO Security Newsletter, August/September 2004,
"The Retirement of BYEMAN." Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act
This NRO newsletter provides some background on the creation
and history of the BYEMAN Control System - established in 1961
to protect information about U.S. reconnaissance satellites
(in contrast to their products). Each satellite program was
assigned a secret codeword/compartment - e.g. CORONA, LANYARD.
For several decades afterwards, individuals with a "need
to know" about the system design, sensors, or capabilities
of the program's satellites and who was able to pass the necessary
background investigation would receive a clearance for that
program and be "read in" to that BYEMAN compartment.
Document
7: G.B. Kistiakowsky, Memorandum for the Record, "Subject:
Notes on Meeting with the President, 9:30 a.m., September 28,
1960," September 28, 1960. Top Secret
Source:
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
This memo was written by George B. Kistiakowsky, President
Eisenhower's science adviser, and covers a number of topics
discussed at that day's meeting with the president. One topic
(#2) concerns the degree of secrecy to be attached to the development
of high-resolution satellite systems. While Eisenhower noted
that the low-resolution SAMOS satellite system had been discussed
publicly and it was logical to assume that the United States
would seek to improve the resolution of its systems, he still
believed that work on high-resolution systems should be kept
"black."
Document
8: A. J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, October
1960. Top Secret
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
This brief memo, prepared by Eisenhower's military aide, concerns
which details (the specific of its operations and its product)
about the SAMOS system should be classified and which, if any,
should be covert or "black" - that is unacknowledged
entirely.
Document
9: John M. Breit, Deputy Inspector General for Security,
"Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information (The
SAMOS Reconnaissance Satellite)," October 26, 1960. Secret
Source:
Thomas D. White Papers, Library of Congress
This memo from the Air Force deputy inspector general concerns
a paper provided to the secretary of defense by Congressman
Bill Miller, which included information (judged to be classified)
he apparently received from a Defense Department contractor
and the Air Force. The memo reports that the Air Force wants
to launch an investigation into the disclosure and whether it
bears any relation to a more extensive article published in
the journal Aviation Week.
Document
10: Chief, Special Requirements Staff/DPD/DDP, Memorandum
of Conversation, "Subject: Meeting on "Security Handling
of SAMOS Recoverable Photography, 24 October 1960, held in Dr.
Charyk's office," October 26, 1960. Top Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
This memo of conversation, written by a member of the CIA's
Deputy Directorate for Plans, focuses on the handling of photographs
obtained from SAMOS satellites (which was to return imagery
in recoverable capsules). In addition to reporting comments
on the intended open nature of SAMOS and its implications for
security, the memo notes suggestions to deceive both the American
public and the Soviet Union by falsely reporting difficulties
and failures rather than actual successes.
Document
11: Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs), Memorandum for the President, The White House, "Subject:
SAMOS II Launch," January 26, 1961. Secret
Source:
John F. Kennedy Library
This memo, from the assistant secretary of defense for public
affairs to President John F. Kennedy, may be the earliest evidence
of the Kennedy administration's plan to lower a veil of secrecy
over the entire U.S. satellite reconnaissance program - even
the previously public SAMOS program. It provides some specifics
concerning the "severe reduction" of information provided
to the public and press concerning SAMOS.
Document
12: Chief, Security Branch, DPD-DD/P, Memorandum for Acting
Chief, DPD-DD/P, "Subject: Proposal of State Department
to Reveal to Soviet Officials Intelligence Information Including
an Example of Product of CORONA," November 1, 1961. Top
Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
As indicated by the Leghorn memo (Document
4), not all individuals officially cognizant of the satellite
reconnaissance program believed strict secrecy to be the best
way to protect the program and its product. This memo, written
by the chief of the security branch of the CIA's Development
Projects Division (a component of the Deputy Directorate for
Plans) is a response to a proposal by a State Department official
to reveal certain intelligence information to Soviet officials,
including an example of CORONA imagery. The security branch
head does not specify who the official is, or the rationale
behind his suggestion. The conclusion of his memo is essentially
the product of circular reasoning: he believes that disclosure
would result in "grievous damage to our collection efforts"
based solely on an enumeration of the great lengths that had
previously been taken to keep the effort secret.
Document
13: Memorandum for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
"Subject: Exploitation Difficulties Arising from Security
Requirements," January 23, 1962. Top Secret
Source:
NRO Reading Room
Secrecy and security involved not only the issue of disclosure
to the American public or foreign governments but the extent
to which information concerning satellite reconnaissance systems
was restricted within the government. This memo, from the senior
DoD representative to the National Photographic Interpretation
Center to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, complains
about the restrictions placed by an unnamed agency (clearly
the National Reconnaissance Office) on information regarding
a new camera system for the CORONA program. That information
was off limits to organizations outside NPIC that would be involved
in interpreting the imagery produced -thus preventing those
other organizations (such as the Strategic Air Command) from
being fully prepared to exploit the images when they arrived.
In the final paragraph, the author writes: "I believe that
national security interests have already suffered materially
for the sake of a very questionable security requirement."
Document
14: Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department
of Defense Directive S-5200.13, "Security and Public Information
Policy for Military Space Programs," March 23, 1962. Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
As a means of making it more difficult for Soviet intelligence
to collect information on U.S. satellite reconnaissance programs,
the Kennedy administration decided to classify details about
all U.S. military space programs at no lower than the Secret
level on the grounds that "at night all cats are grey."
This DoD Directive notes that "[i]t is impractical to selectively
protect certain military space programs while continuing an
open launch policy for others since to do so would emphasize
sensitive projects." The document goes on to specify general
policy, the procedures to be used to protect details of U.S.
military space programs, and the responsibilities of individuals
and organizations.
Document
15: Policy paper, "National Policy on Satellite Reconnaissance,"
April 10, 1962. Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
This document, apparently produced by the CIA, deals with factors
bearing on the specific objectives and implementation of a national
satellite program. It assesses the feasibility of defending
reconnaissance satellite activities on the basis of the value
of satellite photography for civil purposes, the impact of disclosure
of the existence of a reconnaissance program, the role of surprise
and secrecy in reconnaissance, as well as the impact of the
release of satellite imagery.
Document
16: Robert Amory Jr., Deputy Director/Intelligence, Memorandum
for Director of Central Intelligence, "Subject: Soviet
Knowledge of US Reconnaissance Satellite Programs," April
11, 1962. Top Secret Codeword
Source:
CREST, NARA II
This memorandum, from the CIA's deputy director for intelligence,
examines the quality and quantity of Soviet knowledge about
U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance programs - which at the
time included several imagery programs and electronic intelligence
satellite programs either in operation or development, and the
MIDAS missile launch detection program. The author discusses
statements by Soviet officials, articles in the Soviet press
concerning U.S. programs, what the Soviets could determine from
monitoring the programs (including observing the satellite in
flight), and information available from the U.S. media. He also
tries to estimate Soviet knowledge based on the state-of-the-art
and likely Soviet responses to the U.S. program.
Document
17: John F. Kennedy, National Security Action Memorandum
156, May 26, 1962. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
In 1962, the United States was engaged in negotiations concerning
the peaceful uses of outer space - which raised the question
of defining the legitimate uses of outer space. In this memorandum,
President Kennedy ordered a review of the negotiations to ensure
they did not place any constraints on U.S. satellite reconnaissance
efforts. The committee established to fulfill this task, known
informally as the "NSAM 156 Committee" and formally
as the "Interdepartmental Committee on Space," would
meet intermittently for a number of years, often considering
the issue of how tightly restricted knowledge of U.S. reconnaissance
satellite programs should be. Its first report, "Political
and Information Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Programs,"
was delivered to Secretary of State Dean Rusk on July 1, 1962.
Among its 17 unanimous recommendations was the continuation
of tight security around the reconnaissance program.
Document
18: McGeorge Bundy, National Security Action Memorandum
No. 216, "Subject: Study of Disclosure to Russians of U.S.
Satellite Reconnaissance Capability," January 18, 1963.
Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
Notwithstanding the numerous measures taken to ensure maximum
security concerning U.S. satellite reconnaissance efforts, the
Kennedy administration also examined the alternative of disclosing
some details of U.S. programs to the Soviet Union. In this NSAM,
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, on behalf of the president,
requests a joint State-DoD-CIA study concerning the pros and
cons of alternative options related to disclosure.
Document
19: NRO, Acting Assistant Director (Special Activities),
Memorandum for Special Requirements Staff, "Subject: Accessibility
of LANYARD Take to the British," January 31, 1963, Secret
Source:
NRO Reading Room
Another aspect of the disclosure issue was whether to reveal
information to allies at the Secret level (or above). This January
1963 memo examines the issue of informing the British of the
details of a new satellite program, whose first launch was scheduled
for the following month (but would not take place till July).
Britain had been receiving imagery obtained by the first U.S.
imagery satellite, CORONA. Information about the new satellite,
designated LANYARD, and its expected high-resolution products,
was needed to allow proper exploitation of the images obtained.
It is clear from the memo that at the time Britain had not been
informed of the program's existence.
Document
20: Memorandum for the Record, "Subject: Meeting on
Further Action Under NSC Action 2454," June 26, 1963. Top
Secret (with attached Draft Memorandum, June 24, 1963)
Source:
CREST, NARA II
These two documents are responses to NSC Action 2454, which
directed that studies be conducted to determine if it would
be possible to release data, such as mapping information, to
help "legitimize" space observation and photography.
The June 24 attachment, which summarizes the CIA's view on the
subject, raises a number of objections to release. The memo
for the record summarizes the discussion that took place two
days later between representatives of the defense and state
departments, NASA, the White House Office of Science and Technology,
and several other organizations.
Document
21: Chief, Security Staff, OSA, Memorandum for Director
of Security, "Subject: Security of Covert Satellite Reconnaissance
Programs," August 16, 1963. Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
In this memorandum, the chief of the Security Staff of the
CIA's Office of Special Activities (at the time responsible
for CIA satellite reconnaissance activities) addresses concerns
regarding the assignment of responsibility to the Air Force
component of the NRO (Program A) for the technical direction
of several programs. Specifically, there is apprehension over
the effect this tasking will have on CIA's ability to carry
out its responsibility for program security.
Document
22: Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director (Science and Technology),
Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, "Subject:
Washington Post Article on Satellite Reconnaissance,"
December 10, 1963
Source:
CREST, NARA II
Publication of a Washington Post article on U.S. space
reconnaissance resulted in this memo from the CIA's deputy director
for science and technology to DCI John McCone. Wheelon's memo
notes that preliminary analysis of the article seems to indicate
that it contains no new information but that the agency's Office
of Security intended to conduct its own investigation to "establish
beyond question" that no new classified information was
contained in the article.
Document
23: Chief, Special Intelligence Staff, DD/I, Special Center
Notice 6-64, "Classification of TALENT and KEYHOLE Information,"
January 16, 1964. Top Secret Codeword
Source:
CREST, NARA II
As noted earlier (Documents 5a, 5b, 5c)
part of the effort to protect information about U.S. satellite
reconnaissance programs and their product was the creation of
the TALENT-KEYHOLE system. This memo defines the terms TALENT
and KEYHOLE, specifies the codewords used for specific types
of TK material, and provides guidelines for the classification
of such information. At the time the memo was declassified the
codewords for satellite ELINT (ZARF) and aerial imagery (CHESS)
had not yet been declassified.
Document
24: Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Memorandum, "Subject: Possible Disclosure
of Satellite Reconnaissance," January 21, 1964 (with attachment
from Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "The Contribution
of Satellite Photography to the Verification of Current and
Disarmament Proposals.") Classifications Unknown
Source:
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1964-1968, Volume X: National Security Policy (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002)
This memo from Alexis Johnson, chairman of the NSAM 156 committee,
to senior national security and space officials, returned to
the issue of possible disclosure of satellite reconnaissance
activities. It examines the state of allied knowledge of U.S.
programs (some of which came from U.S. briefings), the use of
the data to support NATO planning, non-bloc attitudes, Soviet
statements and awareness of U.S. programs, and the relationship
of satellite reconnaissance to U.S. disarmament proposals.
Document
25: Thomas Hughes, Intelligence Note, "Subject: Khrushchev
on Reconnaissance Satellites," June 1, 1964. Classification
Unknown
Source:
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1964-1968, Volume X: National Security Policy (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002)
This note from the director of the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research to Acting Secretary of State George
Ball followed several statements by Soviet Premier and CPSU
General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev on the subject of reconnaissance
satellites. Hughes examines and analyzes Khrushchev's comments
with respect to reconnaissance of Cuba, disarmament controls,
and the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance. He also addresses
Khrushchev's next moves.
Document
26: Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and Technology,
Memorandum for the Record, "Subject: Meeting on Disclosure
of U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance Programs and Capabilities,"
June 18, 1964. Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
On June 17, 1964, officials from the State Department, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, NASA, the White House, Department
of Defense (including the NRO director), and the CIA met to
discuss a proposal from ACDA Deputy Director Adrian Fisher for
"legitimatizing" satellite reconnaissance. This involved
creation of an international organization to be responsible
for storage and, possibly, interpretation of photography submitted
by the U.S. and USSR. This memo from CIA's Albert Wheelon, describes
his agency's concerns about such a course, and summarizes the
conclusions and recommendations that emerged from the committee.
These included publishing a RAND study, based on unclassified
sources, on the use of reconnaissance satellites to verify arms
control agreements, setting aside a proposal to approach Nikita
Khrushchev to discuss success of the U.S. program, and delaying
a planned New York Times article by Deputy Secretary
of Defense Roswell Gilpatric on satellite reconnaissance.
Document
27: Charles E. Johnson, Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, "Subject:
Satellite Reconnaissance," July 31, 1964. Top Secret
Source:
LBJ Library, Austin, Texas
This memo from Charles E. Johnson, a member of the NSC staff,
to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy was the result of
a dispute over a proposed briefing of the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) on U.S. and Soviet satellite reconnaissance programs.
DCI John McCone announced that, for security reasons, he could
not agree to the briefing. Instead, he planned to personally
brief the heads of states in October as an alternative. The
memo goes on to provide background on the dispute, discussing
public knowledge of the program, Khrushchev's remarks, the views
of the Intelligence Community concerning Soviet knowledge of
the U.S. program, and what the nations represented on the NAC
already know about the program.
Document
28: J.J. Hitchcock, CGS, DDI, Central Intelligence Agency,
Memorandum, "Subject: Background Information on Actions
Considered by the National Security Action Memorandum #156 Ad
Hoc Committee," May 2, 1966. Top Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
The memorandum, written by a member of the Deputy Director
for Intelligence's Collection Guidance Staff, describes the
origins of the NSAM 156 committee, some of the issues it examined,
and its actions and recommendations.
Document
29: U. Alexis Johnson, Memorandum, "Subject: Draft
Report on the NSAM 156 Committee on 'Political and Security
Aspects of Non-Military Applications of Satellite Earth-Sensing,'"
July 1, 1966. Top Secret (with attached Draft Report, "Political
and Security Aspects of Non-Military Applications of Satellite
Earth-Sensing")
Source:
CREST, NARA II
Attached to the cover memo by Alexis Johnson is a draft report
of the NSAM 156 committee which discusses a number of topics.
These include the continued validity of the June 30, 1962, "Report
on the Political and Informational Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance
Policy," Soviet and other nations' views on satellite reconnaissance,
the expected consequences of the acknowledgment of U.S. satellite
reconnaissance programs, NASA's proposals for an earth-sensing
satellite program, possible transfer of classified equipment
to NASA for use in such a program, and strategies for advancing
acceptance of space observation. The report concludes with several
recommendations.
Document
30: Robert H. Baraz, Department of State, Memorandum for
the Chairman, COMOR, "Subject: NSAM 156 Committee Report,"
August 8, 1966. Top Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
This memo, from a State Department representative to the NSAM
156 Committee, was addressed to the chairman of the United States
Intelligence Board's (USIB) Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
(COMOR), which was responsible for tasking U.S. national reconnaissance
systems including satellites, aircraft, and drones. The document
addressed another aspect of the security issue concerning satellite
reconnaissance - whether the "fact of" the U.S. program
could be downgraded from Sensitive Compartmented Information
to Top Secret or Secret. The author suggested that the consequence
of so many officials not cleared for access knowing of the program
could be "ill-considered public statements" that could
result in adverse foreign reactions. The author specified why
he believed providing some information about the program at
the Secret or Top Secret level could help prevent such occurrences,
and why it would not risk compromising U.S. security.
Document
31: Executive Secretary, United States Intelligence Board,
Memorandum for Holders of USIB-D-41, 12/23, August 29, 1966.
Top Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
In this memo, the executive secretary of the USIB reported
on a session of the Board that considered the question raised
in the August 8, 1966, memo mentioned above (Document
30). It reported the view of COMOR (excluding the State
Department representative) that the "fact of" U.S.
satellite reconnaissance should continue to be classified at
a level above Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) and provides COMOR's rationale. The document recounted
the individual views of the participants in the meeting, including
the author of the August 8 memo who expressed his concern that
"continuing to hold the fact of the reconnaissance program
in a special security compartment is prejudicial to the integrity
of the system."
Document
32: Comments on Joint DOD-NASA Agreement for Coordination
of the Earth Resources Survey Program, October 17, 1966. Secret
(with attachment: John S. Foster Jr., Director of Defense Research
and Engineering and Robert C. Seamans Jr., Deputy Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, September 26,
1966)
Source:
CREST, NARA II
These two documents address the issue of how to conduct NASA's
Earth Resource Survey Program without compromising details about
the U.S. space reconnaissance program. It discusses the NSAM
156 Committee on Space Reconnaissance, the role of the DCI,
and exploitation of the National Reconnaissance Program's intelligence
production. The attached September 26 paper provides a charter
for a special NASA-DOD coordination and monitoring mechanism
to permit NRP capabilities to be used for earth resources monitoring.
The October 17 memo critiqued the proposed mechanism for its
failure to take account of the DCI's responsibilities for protecting
sources and methods and creating a committee that lacked the
competence and jurisdiction to deal with issues concerning the
NRP.
Document
33: Memorandum, "Subject: Security and Space Reconnaissance,"
May 9, 1967. Top Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
This memo, probably written by a CIA official, argues that
there is a critical need for a review of policy and security
regulations related to satellite systems. It also notes that
many statements were being made that compromised the U.S. security
posture for space surveillance and reconnaissance - including
some made by the president of the United States and NASA. The
document notes several alternative approaches to secrecy concerning
the program. It recommends a reevaluation of reconnaissance
policy "even to the point of officially admitting that
we have successfully conducted space reconnaissance at ground
resolution of 3-10 feet" while implying that the U.S. needed
no further capability. Acknowledgment of U.S. capabilities would
allow the data to be used for NASA and other civilian purposes.
Secrecy about any greater capability would help protect the
intelligence uses of higher-resolution systems.
Document
34: Chief, European Division, OCI, Central Intelligence
Agency, Memorandum, "Subject: Soviet Sensitivity to Publicity
on Satellite Reconnaissance," April 2, 1970. Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
This memo from the chief of the European Division of the CIA's
Office of Current Intelligence returns to the subject of the
likely Soviet reaction to publicity concerning satellite reconnaissance.
It notes statements by Khrushchev and other Soviet officials,
at different times and in different places, concerning satellite
reconnaissance and the issue of public acknowledgment.
Document
35: Edward W. Proctor, Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence,
Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, "Subject:
Views on Public Release of Information on US Satellite Reconnaissance,"
April 13, 1970. Top Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
This memo for DCI Richard Helms, written by a senior Intelligence
Directorate official, rather than being directed at proposals
to alter the classification of the "fact of" satellite
reconnaissance concerns a proposal to release some KEYHOLE imagery
of Soviet and Chinese strategic missile installations "in
order to gain support for the Administration's defense programs."
The author specifies why he believes "that although some
immediate benefits to the Administration might be derived from
public release of KH photography," the costs would far
outweigh the benefits.
Document
36a: Welcoming/Keynote Comments by Maj. Gen. John E. Kulpa,
BYEMAN Security Meeting, conference on "The NRO in a Changing
Environment," May 26, 1976.
Document 36b: Presentation
[Deleted], May 26, 1976. Top Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
The remarks by Maj. Gen. John Kulpa, at the time serving as
head of Program A, the Air Force component of the NRO, along
with a representative from the CIA's Special Security Center,
focus on security challenges facing BYEMAN security officers
in the mid-1970s, including domestic and international political
developments (such as Watergate and the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks), the Freedom of Information Act, the use of NRO products
in agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, and press
disclosures.
Document
37: George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum
for the President, "Subject: Modification of the Classification
and Dissemination Controls for the Products of Reconnaissance
Satellites," June 8, 1976. Top Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
DCI George Bush transmitted this memo, drafted by DDI Edward
Proctor (see Document 35) to President
Gerald Ford. In it Bush requests that Ford declassify the "fact
of" U.S. satellite reconnaissance (without public announcement
and acknowledgment only when necessary) as well as authorize
changes in the TALENT-KEYHOLE system "that restricts access
to its products." The memo provides extensive background
for its conclusions and recommendations.
Document
38: Robert Ellsworth, Memorandum for Mr. Bush, "Subject:
Declassification of Satellite Reconnaissance, June 16, 1976.
Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA II
In this memo, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth
comments on the conflicting recommendations of a NSC committee
and the paper by Deputy Director of Intelligence Edward Proctor
(Document 37) concerning security classification
of the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance - both photographic
and signals intelligence.
Notes
1. Douglas Aircraft Corporation, Preliminary
Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship (Santa
Monica, Ca.: DAC, 1946); Headquarters, United States Air Force,
"General Operational Requirement for a Reconnaissance Satellite
Weapon System," March 15, 1955 (Revised September 26, 1958),
p. 1.
2. Jeffrey T. Richelson, America's Secret
Eyes in Space: The U.S. KEYHOLE Spy Satellite Program (New
York: Harper & Row, 1990), pp. 27-30.
3. Richard M. Bissell Jr., with Jonathan E.
Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold Warrior
(New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 135.
4. Dwayne A. Day, "Listening from Above;
The First Signals Intelligence Satellite," Spaceflight,
41, 8 (August 1999), pp. 339-346; Dwayne A. Day, "US Government
Declassifies Reconnaissance Satellites Information," Spaceflight
45, 3 (March 2003), pp. 116-117.
5. Day, "Listening from Above."
6. Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Undercover
in Outer Space: The Creation and Evolution of the NRO, 1960-1963,"
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
13, 3 (Fall 2000), pp. 301-344.
7. The decision to declassify the "fact
of" satellite reconnaissance will be the subject of a future
Electronic Briefing Book.