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E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/22/08
TAGS: PREL, KISL, EAID, AF, PK, IR
SUBJ: IN BILATERAL FOCUSED ON AFGHANISTAN, GOP REVIEWS PAK/IRAN
EFFORT; A/S INDERFURTH EXPRESSES U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE TALIBAN

REFS: (A) USUN NEW YORK 2242
- (B) ISLAMABAD 5489
- (C) ISLAMABAD 5329

(U) CLASSIFIED BY KARL INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS. REASONS: 1.5 (C)(D).

1. (C) SUMMARY: A/S INDERFURTH MET PAKISTANI FOREIGN SECRETARY
AHMED TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN, JULY 22. AHMED REVIEWED THE PAK/IRAN
PEACE EFFORT, COMMENTING THAT THE INITIATIVE WOULD TAKE TIME TO
MAKE ANY PROGRESS. INDERFURTH EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR IT, NOTING
THAT PAKISTAN AND IRAN SHOULD ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
ON AFGHANISTAN. AHMED URGED THE U.S. TO SUPPORT THE GOP’S PROPOSAL
to vacate the Afghan UN seat. INDERFURTH REPLIED THAT THE U.S.
COULD NOT DO SO, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE TALIBAN WERE MOVING IN THE
WRONG DIRECTION ON SO MANY FRONTS, SUCH AS PRESSURE ON NGO’S TO
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RELOCATE AND CLOSURE OF SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS, ETC. AT THE CLOSE OF
THE MEETING, AHMED PROVIDED INDERFURTH A COPY OF HIS TALKING POINTS
(SEE PARA 10). END SUMMARY.

2. (C) ON THE MARGINS OF DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT’S VISIT TO
ISLAMABAD, SA ASSISTANT SECRETARY KARL INDERFURTH MET JULY 22 WITH
PAKISTANI FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAMSAD AHMED. DCM ALAN EASTHAM AND
MFA ADDITIONAL SECRETARY (AFGHANISTAN) IFTIKHAR MURSHED ALSO
PARTICIPATED IN THE MEETING. AHMED NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER
SHARIF WAS COMMITTED TO PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN. THIS WAS SYMBOLIZED

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BY HIS ACTIONS: FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RECENT SOUTH ASIAN PROBLEMS, SHARIF HAD EVEN SENT PAKISTANI REPRESENTATIVES LED BY MFA MINISTER OF STATE SIDDIQUE KANJU TO AFGHANISTAN TO HOLD TALKS IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH IN JUNE. THIS PAKISTANI TEAM HAD ALSO PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO NORTHERNERS HURT IN THE MAY EARTHQUAKE (IN BADAKHSHAN).

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BRIEFING ON PAK/IRAN EFFORT
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3. (C) AHMED THEN BRIEFED INDERFURTH ON THE PAKISTANI/IRANIAN JOINT AFGHANISTAN PEACE EFFORT (SEE REF C). THE INITIATIVE HAD ITS START IN EARLY MAY WITH PM SHARIF'S MEETING WITH IRANIAN PRESIDENT KHATAMI IN ALMATY DURING THE ECO SUMMIT THERE. AT SHARIF'S INVITATION, FOREIGN MINISTER KHARAZI HAD VISITED ISLAMABAD IN EARLY JUNE. THAT VISIT HAD GONE WELL AND BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED TO PROCEED WITH COORDINATED MID- AND THEN SENIOR-LEVEL VISITS TO AFGHANISTAN. VISITS TO AFGHAN SITES HAD TAKEN PLACE IN JUNE AND JULY. MURSHED AND (IRANIAN SPECIAL ENVOY ALLAHEDDIN) BORUJERDI WOULD PROBABLY MAKE A JOINT VISIT TO KANDAHAR AND MAZAR-I-SHARIF CONFIDENTIAL

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SOON. ALTHOUGH NOT DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE EFFORT, A SMALL SUCCESS MUST BE REPORTED: ON JULY 20, THE TALIBAN AND AHMAD SHAH MASOOD OF JAMIAT-I-ISLAMI HAD EACH RELEASED 300 PRISONERS TO THE OTHER SIDE. MURSHED NOTED THAT THIS RELEASE MIGHT BE A "SILVER LINING" IN AN OTHERWISE BLEAK SITUATION. (NOTE: OTHER SOURCES HAVE TOLD EMBASSY THAT THE PRISONER EXCHANGE PROBABLY INVOLVED ABOUT 140 PRISONERS TOTAL.)

4. (C) CONTINUING, AHMED ADMITTED THAT THE GOP DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE PAK/IRAN JOINT EFFORT WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE LONG RUN. AFGHANISTAN WAS TOO UNPREDICTABLE A PLACE. IN ADDITION, AFGHANS TRULY LOVE TO FIGHT AND WILL NOT EASILY SIT DOWN FOR TALKS. NONETHELESS, PAKISTAN HOPES THAT THE JOINT EFFORT CAN MAKE PROGRESS AND EVENTUALLY BE LINKED TO THE UN'S "SIX-PLUS-TWO" EFFORT AND THE OIC'S EFFORTS. INDERFURTH UNDERLINED STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE PAK/IRAN EFFORT, NOTING THAT THE EFFORT SEEMED TO HAVE THE BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS OF ANY INITIATIVE UNDER WAY AT THIS TIME.
INDERFURTH ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD HELP IN ANY WAY TO PROCEED WITH A SLOVENE-PROPOSED IDEA TO HAVE AN OPEN DEBATE ON AFGHANISTAN IN

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THE UNSC. AHMED SAID IT WOULD NOT BECAUSE SUCH A MEETING "COULD
HARDEN VIEWS" AND MIGHT INTERRUPT THE PAK/IRAN EFFORT.

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PUSHING THE GOP AND IRAN TO REALLY ENGAGE

5. (C) A/S INDERFURTH THEN ASKED AHMED WHETHER THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT AND IRAN HAD REALLY HELD FRANK DISCUSSIONS? HAD THE TWO SIDES REALLY PROBED EACH OTHER’S POSITIONS? FOR EXAMPLE, HAD THE TWO DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT THEY ARE PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO DIFFERENT FACTIONS? IT WOULD HELP IF ECONOMIC ISSUES WERE ALSO DISCUSSED SINCE SOME OBSERVERS SAID IRAN WANTED THE WAR TO CONTINUE SO AS TO PREVENT PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION, WHICH IS NOT IN PAKISTAN’S INTEREST. AHMED REPLIED THAT THE TALKS HAD BEEN FRANK AND HAD BEEN SO FOR A VERY LONG TIME. HE KNEW THIS WAS THE CASE SINCE HE HAD BEEN PAKISTAN’S AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN.

| WHEN |
THE FACTIONS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. IN ANY CASE, AHMED DENIED THAT
THE GOP IS PROVIDING ANYTHING BUT "OIL AND WHEAT" TO THE TALIBAN.
IN ADDITION, HE ASSERTED THAT THE TYPE OF ASSISTANCE THAT WAS GIVEN
BY PAKISTAN TO THE TALIBAN WAS ALSO PROVIDED THE NORTHERN FACTIONS.
INDERFURTH COMMENTED THAT HE HOPED THE PAKISTANI/IRANIAN EFFORT
WOULD LEAD TO A REAL GIVE-AND-TAKE: THE "SIX-PLUS-TWO" TALKS HAD
A "SURREAL QUALITY" IN THAT THE PARTIES IN THE ROOM COULD STOP OR
AT LEAST "CALIBRATE" THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE FACTIONS. THERE WAS NO
NEED FOR AN EXPENSIVE ARMS EMBARGO IF THAT HAPPENED. AHMED
RESPONDED THAT THE GOP SUPPORTED SUCH AN EMBARGO SO AS TO CREATE A
"BINDING MECHANISM" TO HOOK ALL COUNTRIES INTO A PROCESS.
HOWEVER, IT WOULD CONSIDER A RUSSIAN IDEA FOR A "DECLARATORY ARMS
EMBARGO," IF THE UN WOULD VACATE THE AFGHAN SEAT.

PLUGGING THE "VACANT SEAT" IDEA

6. (C) RETURNING TO THE VACANT SEAT THEME, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY
STRESSED THAT PEACE EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE ASSISTED IF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD AGREE TO VACATE THE AFGHAN UN SEAT.
SUCH AN ACTION WOULD BE FAIR AND CORRECT SINCE THE TALIBAN CONTROL
MOST OF THE COUNTRY. SUCH A STRATEGY WOULD ALSO REAP DIVIDENDS:
THE TALIBAN ARE ANGERED THAT THEY ARE NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND BLAME THE UN.

TALIBAN ARE GOING BACKWARDS

7. (C) INDERFURTH REJOINED THAT THE TALIBAN'S CHANCES OF GAINING
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INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE HAD SUFFERED A FURTHER BLACK EYE THROUGH THEIR RECENT ORDERS THAT NGO'S HAD TO RELOCATE, AND THAT GIRLS' HOME-BASED SCHOOLS HAD TO CLOSE, ETC (SEE REFS A AND B). EVEN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CULTURAL SENSITIVITIES, TALIBAN BEHAVIOR WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN SINCE MOST ISLAMIC STATES DO NOT ACT LIKE THEY DO. THE TALIBAN HAD SEEMED TO BE GOING A BIT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION EARLIER IN THE YEAR: THEY HAD PARTICIPATED IN (THE AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON-BROKERED) FACE-TO-FACE TALKS IN APRIL AND AGREED NOT TO LAUNCH ANY NEW MILITARY OFFENSIVES. THEY HAD ALSO ALLOWED SOME FOOD SHIPMENTS TO PROCEED TO HAZARAJAT. ALL OF THAT WAS POSITIVE, BUT THINGS NOW WERE DEFINITELY GOING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U.S. WAS VERY CONCERNED BY THE TALIBAN'S ACTIVITIES AS WAS THE U.S. IN SUCH A SITUATION, THERE WOULD BE NO MOVEMENT TOWARD THE VACANT SEAT, ALTHOUGH THE U.S.' OWN POLICY OF NEUTRALITY WOULD SUGGEST THAT SUCH AN APPROACH COULD BE CONSIDERED. THIS POINT, HOWEVER, BROUGHT UP THE FACT THAT EVEN IF THE U.S. CONSIDERED SUCH AN OUTCOME, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN THE AGREEMENT OF THE UN'S CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE. RUSSIA, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS STRONGLY AGAINST THE PROPOSAL.

THE TALIBAN'S NGO RELOCATION ORDER

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8. (C) The Foreign Secretary replied that Mursheed had learned something about Taliban views on the NGO issue. On cue, Mursheed recounted that he had spoken to the Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan Aziz Khan on the subject. Aziz had spoken to the Taliban on the issue, trying to get them to change their minds on forcing the NGO's to move. The Taliban had replied that the NGO's had not been ordered to leave; they had only been asked to move to the Polytechnic area (in Kabul) months ago. The NGO's, the Taliban alleged, were running schools without approval and trying to convert people to Christianity. At the end of this presentation, Ahmed allowed that the Taliban are difficult to deal with, but they should be carefully dealt with because they are easily provoked. This was the case particularly on the issue of conversion -- many other Muslim countries would not allow such activities. DCM noted that if the Taliban had a problem with a specific NGO they should confidential.

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Deal with that NGO. However, their actions have affected care, save the children, and a number of French NGO's. The Taliban have also provoked the European Commission, which has decided to suspend assistance to Kabul. The Taliban's actions could be very serious for Pakistan; the people of Kabul would be seriously affected and Pakistan could face a rush of refugees fleeing a deteriorating situation.

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THE MFA'S TALKING POINTS

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9. (C) At the end of the meeting, Ahmed provided Inderfurth a copy of his talking points (which are contained in Para 10). In many ways, the points were clearer than his presentation, although basically as pro-Taliban in nature. For example, the points criticize the "Afghan Dialogue" meeting taking place in Bonn, asserting that the meeting will be ineffective because the Taliban
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ARE NOT REPRESENTED THERE. THEY ALSO ADVOCATE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HELP FUND SCHOOLS AND A UNIVERSITY IN TALIBAN AREAS AND FUND COUNTERNARCOTICS PROJECTS. (NOTE: THE POINTS MENTION THAT THE TALIBAN ”EDUCATION MINISTER” IS IN THE U.S. TO DISCUSS THE FUNDING OF SCHOOLS, ETC. EMBASSY WAS AWARE THAT THIS TALIBAN OFFICIAL PLANNED TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. FOR A CONFERENCE, BUT WAS NOT AWARE THAT HE PLANNED TO DISCUSS FUNDING ISSUES. END NOTE.) THE POINTS ALSO EXPLICITLY REPEAT AHMED’S COMMENT THAT PAKISTAN WOULD SUPPORT ”A DECLARATORY ARMS EMBARGO” IF THE VACANT SEAT IDEA WAS ADOPTED.

10. (SBU) AS PROVIDED BY AHMED, THE PAKISTANI SIDE’S TALKING POINTS FOR THE BILATERAL ON AFGHANISTAN FOLLOW:

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BEGIN TEXT:

-- WE EARNESTLY URGE THE U.S. TO ENGAGE ITSELF INTENSELY IN THE AFGHAN PEACE PROCESS. THIS ENTAILS CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH THE TALIBAN AND THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE. SHOULD PROGRESS BE MADE, OTHER AFGHAN ELEMENTS INCLUDING THE (AFGHAN?) EXPatriates COULD BE DRAWN INTO THE EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS.

-- MEETINGS SUCH AS THE ONE IN BONN AND ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A ”THIRD FORCE” NOT ONLY SKIRT THE GROUND REALITIES BUT ALSO COMPOUND AN ALREADY COMPLEX PROBLEM. THE TALIBAN ARE THE DOMINANT FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND DELIBERATIONS WITHOUT THEM ARE STERILE.

-- THE TALIBAN HAVE ADVANCED INTO FARYAB AND ARE SOME 30 KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE CAPITAL, MAIMANA. IN THE EVENT, DOSTAM WAS OUSTED FROM SHIBARGAN, THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT HE MIGHT JOIN WITH THE HEZB-I-WAHDAH IN A ”FORTRESS” DEFENSE OF MAZAR-I-SHARIF.

-- TENSIONS BETWEEN AND WITHIN THE COMPONENT Factions OF THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE HAVE ACCENTUATED AND THERE HAS BEEN FIGHTING AMONG ALLIANCE GROUPS LAST MONTH.

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AN OUTRIGHT MILITARY VICTORY BY ANY OF THE PARTIES IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY. A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS THE ONLY SOLUTION AND IT IS TOWARD THIS END THAT EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED.

-- SOME HEADWAY HAS BEEN MADE IN THE PAKISTAN–IRAN JOINT INITIATIVE. THE EFFORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE JULY 16 "SIX-PLUS-TWO" MEETING. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE TALIBAN HAVE PROPOSED THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS TO BE FOLLOWED BY A CEASE-FIRE. THE LISTS OF PRISONERS ARE EXPECTED TO BE READY IN A FEW DAYS AND CONVEYED BY THE MFA TO IRAN.

-- AHMAD SHAH MASOOD AND THE TALIBAN HAVE ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH AND HAVE EXCHANGED 300 PRISONERS EACH ON JULY 20 ON AN INFORMAL BASIS.

-- THE TALIBAN ADVANCE INTO FARYAB HAS NOT AFFECTED THE PAK/IRAN INITIATIVE. IT WILL CONTINUE. THE IRANIAN SPECIAL ENVOY BORUJERDI CONFIDENTIAL
HAS TOLD THE NORTH THAT PAKISTAN HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE FARYAB FIGHTING.

-- PAKISTAN AND IRAN WOULD WELCOME THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UN AND OIC IN THE JOINT MISSION. DISCUSSIONS ARE BEING HELD AS TO WHEN AND AT WHAT LEVEL TO INVITE THEM.

-- WE HAVE IMPRESSED UPON THE TALIBAN THAT THEY SHOULD RESUME THE STEERING COMMITTEE TALKS. ALTERNATIVELY, THEY SHOULD CONSIDER INITIATING SOME OTHER KIND OF FORMAL DIALOGUE WITH THE NORTH AS A WHOLE OR WITH ITS COMPONENT PARTS. THEY ARE CONSIDERING BOTH PROPOSALS AND WILL SHORTLY REPORT TO PAKISTAN.

-- PAKISTAN AND THE U.S. HAVE ADOPTED COMMON POSITIONS AGAINST THE PROPOSED RUSSIAN DECLARATION FOR AN ARMS EMBARGO AND A POLITICAL PROCESS. A DECLARATORY ARMS EMBARGO COULD RESULT IN ACCUSATIONS AND COUNTER-ACCUSATIONS WITHIN THE SIX-PLUS-TWO GROUP. AT ALL EVENTS, ANY MOVE ON AN ARMS EMBARGO SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY A MEETING OF EXPERTS IN NEW YORK.


-- WE AGREE TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A HIGHER-LEVEL SIX-PLUS-TWO MEETING IN THE REGION. HOWEVER, AS SUGGESTED BY BRAHIMI, WE SHOULD WAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE PAKISTANI-IRANIAN EFFORT AND PERHAPS THE MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE IN NEW YORK.

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-- AS REQUESTED BY BRAHIMI, WE HAVE TAKEN UP THE QUESTION OF THE RELOCATION OF AID AGENCIES IN KABUL WITH THE TALIBAN. THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT ONLY THE NGO'S, AND NOT THE UN OR ICRC, HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SHIFT TO THE POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE, WHICH THEY ARE WILLING TO RENOVATE. THEY CLAIM THAT THE NGO'S ARE RUNNING UNAUTHORIZED
SCHOOLS AND FEEL THAT THE UN HAS MISREPRESENTED FACTS.

-- WE HAVE ALSO ASKED THE TALIBAN TO ALLOW FURTHER SHIPMENT OF FOOD TO THE HAZARAJAT. THEY ARE CONSIDERING THIS PROPOSAL.

-- AS PER THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED DURING THE RICHARDSON VISIT TO KABUL, THE TALIBAN ARE AWAITING FUNDS TO OPEN GIRL'S SCHOOLS AND A WOMEN'S UNIVERSITY. MULLAH HAMDULLAH NOMANI, THEIR EDUCATION MINISTER IS PRESENTLY VISITING THE U.S. FOR THIS PURPOSE.

-- THE TALIBAN HAVE INFORMED US THAT THEY WILL HONOR THEIR AGREEMENT WITH THE UNDCP FOR ELIMINATING POPPY CULTIVATION. THEY DESTROYED TWO TONS OF NARCOTICS JUST PRIOR TO THE RECENT UN CONFERENCE ON NARCOTICS. THEY ARE WAITING FOR THE PROMISED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO START A CROP SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT TO COME FORWARD GENEROUSLY AND IMMEDIATELY START

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RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN. THIS
WILL SERVE AS AN INDUCEMENT TO THE AFGHAN GROUPS TO ACCELERATE THE
PEACE PROCESS.
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END TEXT.
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