Case Number: 200104094

DENIED IN FULL
B1, 1.5(B), 1.5(D)

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DOD-00 SRPP-00 EUR-01 FBIE-00 INLB-01 H-01 TSDE-00
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NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-00
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DRAFTED BY: SA/PAB: LOCOLDREN : RLC
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
APPEAL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
REASON(S): B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUN 2004 200104094

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: SHARON E AHMAD
DATE/CASE ID: 18 JUN 2003 200104094
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E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/11/05
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, Pins, IR, PK, AF, SA, RU
SUBJECT: A/S RAPHEL'S OCTOBER 4 MEETING WITH ASSEF ALL
ON AFGHANISTAN

REF: (A) SECDEFWASH 10052013Z, (B) ISLAMABAD 9280

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER ASSEF ALL TOLD SA A/S RAPHEL
THAT MISTAKES BY THE KABUL AUTHORITIES AND ISMAEL KHAN, NOT
ACTIONS BY PAKISTAN, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FALL OF
HERAT. HE THOUGHT THAT MASOOD WAS DESPERATE BECAUSE THE
RUSSIAN AIRBRIDGE TO KABUL HAD BEEN CUT BY THE TALIBAN AND
THAT IRAN WAS FRENZIED OVER THE FALL OF HERAT AND MIGHT "DO
SOMETHING PHYSICAL." ALL MAINTAINED THE TALIBAN DID NOT
NEED GOP SUPPORT BECAUSE OF ITS EXTENSIVE SUPPORT FROM
PASHTUNS WITHIN THE COUNTRY; HE ADMITTED THAT PAKISTAN WAS
TRYING TO COORDINATE THE OPPOSITION.

3. PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER ASSEF ALL, ALONG WITH
PAKISTANI EMBASSY PERSONNEL INCLUDING AMB. LODHI AND MILATT
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BRIG. JAVED, MET INFORMALLY TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN WITH
SOUTH ASIA A/S ROBIN RAPHEL AND SA/PAB DIRECTOR (NOTETAKER)
JUST FOLLOWING ALL'S MEETING WITH SECDEF PERRY (REF A) ON

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SAFETY OF HOSTAGES IN KASHMIR

4. BEFORE TURNING TO AFGHANISTAN, RAPHEL RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE HOSTAGES IN KASHMIR, REITERATING THAT THE GOP SHOULD CEASE RELYING ON ACCUSATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA COMPLICITY WHICH WERE NOT CREDIBLE. SHE URGED PAKISTAN TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE INDIAN AUTHORITIES ACROSS THE LINE OF CONTROL IF IT APPEARED THAT THE KIDNAPPERS WERE TRYING TO CROSS INTO PAKISTAN WITH THE HOSTAGES TO AVOID THE HOSTAGES BEING KILLED IN A CROSSFIRE. ALL STATED THAT HE DOUBTED THE KIDNAPPERS WOULD TRY TO ENTER PAKISTAN.

ACCUSATIONS OF PAKISTANI RESPONSIBILITY FOR HERAT

5. ALL DISMISSED OUT OF HAND THE ACCUSATION BY INDIA, IRAN AND MASOOD THAT PAKISTAN CONTROLLED THE TALIBAN AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FALL OF HERAT. ALL STATED THAT MISTAKES MADE BY ISMAEL KHAN AND THE KABUL AUTHORITIES WERE BEHIND THE SUDDEN FALL OF HERAT TO THE TALIBAN. KABUL HAD SENT IN PANJSHERI TAJIKS TO FIGHT THE TALIBAN WHICH WAS GREATLY RESENTED BY HERATIS. BY MAKING IT A TAJIK VS PASHTUN FIGHT, THE PASHTUNS FOUGHT ALL THE HARDER. MOREOVER, IN TRYING TO PUSH THE TALIBAN BACK TO KANDAHAR, ISMAEL KHAN CREATED AN UNSUSTAINABLE LINE OF SUPPLY WHICH

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COLLAPSED WHEN DOSTAM OPENED A FRONT NORTHEAST OF HERAT IN BAGHDIS PROVINCE. FOLLOWING ISMAEL KHAN’S FORCES ATTEMPT TO LOOT GERESHK, THE FIGHT WITH THE TALIBAN BECAME A ROUT.

MASOOD AND IRAN DESPERATE

6. HE CLAIMED THAT MASOOD WAS DESPERATE DUE TO THE CUTTING OF THE RUSSIAN AIRBRIDGE TO KABUL THAT RESULTED FROM THE
TALIBAN'S CAPTURE OF A RUSSIAN PLANELOAD OF "32 TONS OF AMMUNITION" BOUND FOR KABUL. ACCORDING TO ALL, THE PLANE WAS THE 41ST RUSSIAN FLIGHT IN RECENT MONTHS. HE CONTINUED THAT IRAN WAS FRENZIED OVER THE FALL OF HERAT AND WAS ADVISING ALL OPPOSING FACTIONS TO ALLOY WITH RABBANI IN ORDER TO SECURE A LANDROUTE FOR PROVISIONS TO KABUL. HE OPINED THAT IRAN MIGHT "DO SOMETHING PHYSICAL" IN ADDITION TO BACKING ROUTED FORCES OF ISMAEL KHAN.

HE TOOK THE CANCELLATION OF THE IRANIAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF'S VISIT TO MALAYSIA AND SUBSEQUENT TRAVEL TO MESHED AS AN OMINOUS SIGN OF MILITARY PREPARATIONS AGAINST HERAT. HE COMMENTED THAT OBVIOUS INVOLVEMENT OF IRAN WOULD UNITE ALL AFGHANS AGAINST IRAN.

EXTENT OF GOP INVOLVEMENT WITH TALL BAN

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V. ALL DID NOT DENY THAT PAKISTAN HAD SIGNIFICANT CONTACT WITH AND GAVE SOME SUPPORT TO THE TALIBAN. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT LITTLE OUTSIDE MATERIAL SUPPORT WAS NECESSARY AS THE TALL BAN HAD WIDESPREAD SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE PASHTUN AREAS OF AFGHANISTAN. HE ASSERTED THAT MOST OF THE TALIBAN'S MONETARY SUPPORT CAME FROM KANDAHARI TRADERS WHO STAND TO LOSE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN TRADE WHEN THE LANDROUTES OUT OF AFGHANISTAN ARE CLOSED BY FIGHTING OR SUBJECT TO RUINOUS "TAXES" BY LOCAL COMMANDERS. ALL SAID IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO INFLUENCE THE TALIBAN AND THAT PAKISTAN HAD TRIED TO "BRING THE TALIBAN FROM THE 14TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY" IN HERAT WHERE THEIR FUNDAMENTALIST STREAK WAS ALREADY ALIENATING THE MORE SOPHISTICATED HERATIS. HE MAINTAINED THAT PAKISTAN HAD ALSO SPOKEN WITH THE TALIBAN IN KANDAHAR ABOUT THE CAPTURED RUSSIAN AIRCREW.
WHILE ALL PERSONALLY TOOK CREDIT FOR GETTING BETTER TREATMENT FOR THE CREW, HE SAID THAT THE TALL BAN WERE HARDHEADED WHEN IT CAME TO RELEASING THEM.

PAKISTAN TRIES TO COORDINATE THE OPPOSITION

8. ALL SAID THAT THE GOP HAS CONTACTS WITH ALL THE MAJOR OPPONENTS OF RABBANI AND MASOOD AND HAS ENCOURAGED COOPERATION AMONG THEM. WHILE INDICATING THAT MILITARY COOPERATION APPEARED SUCCESSFUL, THERE WAS LITTLE PROGRESS IN POLITICAL COOPERATION GIVEN THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FACTIONS AND THE LOOSE LEADERSHIP AND INTERNAL DIVISIONS INSIDE THE TALIBAN. HE STATED THAT THE MAIN PAKISTANI MESSAGE TO THE OPPOSITION WAS TO UNITE AGAINST THE KABUL REGIME, BUT NOT TO ATTACK KABUL AS THE HUMAN COST WOULD CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 06 STATE 243042 130233Z SIMPLY BE TOO GREAT. ALL HOPE THAT ISOLATING KABUL WOULD LEAD TO RABBANI RESIGNING AS HE PROMISED MESTIRI IN MARCH 1995. HIS REPLY TO QUERIES ABOUT MASOOD AND HIS FORCES WAS MORE EQUIVOCAL, THOUGH HE OPINED THAT FEELING AGAINST PANSHERIS IN KABUL WAS HARDENING AND THAT MASOOD COULD PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE GOVERNMENTS IF HE QUIT KABUL.

RETURN OF THE KING
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA

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Raphael

reiterated that US policy was to back the UN special mission. While we could support efforts that were aimed at furthering the UN special mission, our policy was not to endorse any factions, individual or movement in the Afghan struggle. Nor should there be any illusions about the USG providing funds outside of those channeled through the UN itself.