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CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8563

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ACTION SA-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 INL-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOE6-00
SRPP-00 EUR-01 FBIE-00 INLB-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
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NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-00
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P 181339Z OCT 95
PM AMBASSAD ISLAMABAD
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SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5714
INFO AMBASSAD RIYADH
AMBASSAD NEW DELHI
AMBASSAD MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMBASSAD PARIS
AMBASSAD LONDON

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LONDON FOR POL:TUELLER; PARIS FOR POL:ALLEGRONE

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/17-05
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, MOPS, PK, AF
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN AFGHAN POLICY: ANYONE BUT RABBANI/MASOOD -
EVEN THE TALIBAN

CONFIDENTIAL

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: DURING AN OCTOBER 17 CALL BY CHARGE AND POLOFF, PAC AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN QAZI HUMAYUN EXPLAINED THAT IN THE WAKE OF LAST MONTH'S SACKING OF THE PAC EMBASSY IN KABUL, GOP AFGHAN POLICY HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY DRIVEN BY INTENSE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO THE KABUL GOVERNMENT. THUS PAKISTAN NOW FINDS ITSELF IN THE UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION OF BACKING THE TALIBAN. HUMAYUN OPINED THAT IN MANY WAYS A TALIBAN GOVERNMENT IN KABUL WOULD BE EVEN WORSE THAN THE PRESENT ONE, ADDING THAT A STATE UNDER SUCH ULTRA-CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT MAKE A GOOD NEIGHBOR.

HE SAID HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR AN OPPOSITION ALLIANCE AGAINST KABUL -- "THE TALIBAN STILL THINK THEY CAN GO IT ALONE AND ARE NOT SERIOUSLY PURSUING AN ALLIANCE."

HUMAYUN PLANS "SOON" TO OPEN A "LOW KEY PRESENCE" IN JALALABAD, A STEP THAT COULD FUEL CREATION OF A PARALLEL GOVERNMENT THERE SHOULD THE BATTLE FOR KABUL REMAIN A STALEMATE. END SUMMARY

3. IN A WIDE-RANGING CONVERSATION OCTOBER 17 WITH CHARGE AND POLOFF, PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN QAZI HUMAYUN AS HUMAYUN PUT IT, THE GOP POLICY AIM HAD BEEN TO MAINTAIN TIES WITH ALL THE FACTIONS, INCLUDING RABBANI/MASOOD. AS EVIDENCE, HE CITED THE TOUR OF AFGHANISTAN THIS SUMMER BY FOREIGN MINISTER ASEEF ALI, WHICH INCLUDED A STOP IN KABUL. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 6 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED TRASHING OF THE PAC EMBASSY IN KABUL (DURING WHICH HUMAYUN WAS SEVERELY CONFIDENTIAL
4. HE EXPLAINED THAT A TALIBAN-LED GOVERNMENT IN KABUL COULD BE EVEN WORSE THAN THE PRESENT SITUATION. THINKING ALOUD, HUMAYUN MUSED THAT A TALIBAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE REPUGNANT NOT ONLY TO THE PAK GOVERNMENT (WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "MODERN AND TOLERANT"), BUT ALSO TO MOST PAKISTANIS WHO DO NOT SHARE THE TALIBAN’S "OBSCURANTIST" VIEWS, ESPECIALLY REGARDING THE ROLE OF WOMEN. HUMAYUN OPINED THAT HAVING SUCH A STATE AS A NEIGHBOR WOULD NOT BE IN PAKISTAN’S INTERESTS.

5. ASSESSING ONGOING EFFORTS IN PESHAWAR AND JALALABAD BY THE AFGHAN OPPOSITION FACTIONS TO ACHIEVE A MILITARY AND/OR POLITICAL ALLIANCE, HUMAYUN OBSERVED THAT PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING A COALITION ANY TIME SOON ARE NOT BRIGHT. HE SAID THE CURRENT TALKS ARE MORE FORM THAN SUBSTANCE AS THE TALIBAN STILL THINK THEY CAN GO IT ALONE IN DEFEATING RABBANI/MASOOD AND THUS HAVE NO INCENTIVE FOR CUTTING A DEAL WITH DOSTAM OR THE SUPREME COORDINATING COUNCIL.
**UNCLASSIFIED**

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8. ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN HERAT CITY, HE NOTED THAT THE PAK CONSUL GENERAL THERE HAS REPORTED THE CITY CALM. ECHOING SENTIMENTS VOICED ON OCTOBER 16 BY AN AMCIT WITH OVER 20 YEARS EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, HUMAYUN SAID THE TALIBAN HAD BEEN HEAVY-HANDED IN HERAT, ESPECIALLY IN CLOSING DOWN SCHOOLS AND THEN RE-OPENING THEM FOR BOYS ONLY AND IN PREVENTING WOMEN FROM WORKING IN OFFICES (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HEALTH CARE). HE IS HOPEFUL THAT THE NEW TALIBAN GOVERNOR EHSANULLAH WILL BE MORE
SENSITIVE IN DEALING WITH THE HERATIS. HE SAID THE GOVERNOR HAS ALREADY AGREED TO RECONSIDER THESE TOUGH TALIBAN MEASURES, THOUGH WITHOUT DEFINING A TIMETABLE.

9. HUMAYUN SAID THAT "IN A COUPLE OF DAYS" HE PLANS TO GO TO JALALABAD TO "OPEN A SMALL, LOW-KEY PRESENCE." HE OFFERED NO FURTHER DETAILS. MEANWHILE, PAK RELATIONS WITH KABUL TOOK A FURTHER TURN FOR THE WORSE ON OCT 17 WITH THE GOP EXPULSION OF ANOTHER BATCH OF AFGHAN DIPLOMATS, INCLUDING THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, WHO JOIN AMBASSADOR KHALILI AND SEVERAL OTHER AFGHAN DIPLOMATS WHO WERE PNG'ED ON OCT 8.

10. COMMENT: [Blank]

HOLZMAN