

**109. Memorandum of Conversation (U.S.)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 9, 1971,  
10:30 a.m.–12:25 p.m.

The meeting took place at Dobrynin's invitation.<sup>2</sup> He had been called back to the Soviet Union unexpectedly for consultation only 24 hours after he had submitted to me the attached note on Berlin.<sup>3</sup> He delayed his departure for 24 hours so that he could see me.<sup>4</sup>

Dobrynin began the conversation by expressing his outrage over the behavior of the Jewish Defense League.<sup>5</sup> I told him that the President was unhappy about these actions; that we were seeking indictments where that was possible; and that we would use whatever Federal resources were available to increase the protection for Soviet installations.

Dobrynin said that what rankled most in the Soviet Union was the absence of any court action. It was inconceivable in the Soviet Union that such actions could take place without connivance by the authorities. While he was taking a slightly more tolerant view of that aspect of it, he was at one with his colleagues in his inability to understand why there had been no court action of any kind.

Dobrynin added that, in a synagogue in New York, right across the street from the Soviet Mission, a loudspeaker had been set up that was blar-

ing obscene words at the Soviet Embassy every day. This was intolerable.

I repeated that we were taking the measures that were possible and expressed the personal regret of the President. I said there was no official connivance, but the overlapping of authority between Federal and State governments presented particular complications for us; however, we would seek court action wherever that was appropriate.

We then turned to substance. I told Dobrynin that I had an answer from the President to the Soviet note on Berlin—specifically, whether the President still stood by his conversation with Gromyko.<sup>6</sup> I said a lot depended, of course, on how one interpreted the President's conversation with Gromyko. In the sense that the President said that he would be well disposed towards the negotiations if they did not cut the umbilical cord between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, there was no problem. With respect to the Soviet proposal that the process be accelerated and that we review again the Soviet propositions, I said the following: I had reviewed the Soviet propositions and wanted to distinguish the formal from the substantive part. If the Soviet Union could give some content to the transit procedures and if the Soviet Union could find a way by which it could make itself responsible, together with the four allies, for access, we would, in turn, attempt to work out some approach which took cognizance of the concerns of the East German regime. I would be prepared, at the request of the President, to discuss this with him in substance, and if we could see an agreement was possible, we could then feed it into regular channels.

Dobrynin said that this was very important because Rush was clearly an obstacle to negotiations since he either didn't understand them or was too intransigent. I told him this was not an attempt to bypass Rush, but to see whether we could use our channel to speed up the procedure. I was prepared to have conversations with high German officials to find out exactly what they were prepared to settle for and then to include this in our discussions. Dobrynin said he would check this in Moscow and let me have an answer by the end of the week.

We then turned to SALT. I told Dobrynin that the President had decided the following: We were

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 4 [Pt. 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. The time of the meeting is taken from Kissinger's Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

<sup>2</sup> Kissinger and Dobrynin agreed on December 22, 1970, to meet at the Soviet Embassy on January 7, 1971; the meeting was subsequently postponed two days, presumably due to an extension of Kissinger's "working vacation" in California.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 108.

<sup>4</sup> Dobrynin called Kissinger in California at 12:05 p.m., PST, on January 7 both to report his recall to Moscow and to request a written reply to the Soviet note on Berlin. "I am a little reluctant to put it in writing," Kissinger replied, "because it depends on a number of explanations. But I wanted to make [a] very concrete proposal on how to proceed on the subject you made yesterday and another concrete proposal in another area." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File) Kissinger called Dobrynin back at 1:35 p.m. and added: "I wanted to mention one thing on a semi-personal basis. I think it would be very hard to be understood by the President if you were pulled out in light of the communication of yesterday without waiting for an answer." Dobrynin replied: "I understand and will check with Moscow." (Ibid.)

<sup>5</sup> On January 8, a bomb exploded near a Soviet cultural building in Washington, causing moderate damage. The Jewish Defense League, which had been linked to similar attacks on Soviet facilities in the United States, denied responsibility for the incident.

<sup>6</sup> October 22, 1970.

prepared to make an ABM agreement only, provided it was coupled with an undertaking to continue working on offensive limitations and provided it was coupled with an undertaking that there would be a freeze on new starts of offensive land-based missiles during the period of these negotiations. There might be some special provision that would have to be made for submarines, but we would have to leave this to detailed negotiations. I told Dobrynin that if he were prepared to proceed on this basis, I would be prepared to talk to him about it on behalf of the President. We could settle the basic issues in February. Prior to the resumption of the SALT talks there could be an exchange of letters or public statements between the President and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The SALT talks in Vienna could then concentrate on implementing the agreement in principle.

Dobrynin asked how I understood limitations on submarines to operate. I said I had no specific proposal to make, and I mentioned it only in case we wanted to raise it later so that he would not feel that he had been mistaken. I thought, however, that the question of equality was recognized in principle. Dobrynin said he would have an answer when he returned.

Dobrynin then raised the Middle East. He wanted to know whether the President was prepared to move that discussion into our channel also. I told him we would have to see how the Jarring negotiations went first. Secondly, we would have to then see whether the Four-Power forum might not be more appropriate. In any event, he could be sure that the President would take an interest in the negotiations and whomever he negotiated with would have Presidential backing.

Dobrynin then launched into his usual recitation of Mid-East events—how he had been misled by Sisco; how the Secretary of State had never told him the stand-still and the ceasefire were linked; how the Soviet Union could not be held responsible for a document that was handed to it after it had already been given to the Egyptians; and how, above all, the Soviet Union had never had a reply to its last note to Joe Sisco. He said if he talked to Sisco, it would be an endless series of legalistic hairsplittings that wouldn't lead anywhere. I told him that we would have to see what progress we were making on other matters before I could give him an answer.

We then turned to Vietnam. I said to Dobrynin that we had read Kosygin's interview with the Japanese newspaper with great interest.<sup>7</sup> We had noticed that Kosygin had listed the usual unacceptable Hanoi demands, but he had also indicated a Soviet willingness to engage itself in the process of a settlement. This was stated, it seemed to me, more emphatically than had been said in the past. Was I correct?

Dobrynin merely said that he noticed that sentence also. I asked whether the two statements were linked; in other words, whether the Soviet willingness to engage itself was linked to our prior acceptance of Hanoi's demands. Dobrynin then said he wanted to ask me a hypothetical question. If Hanoi dropped its demands for a coalition government, would we be prepared to discuss withdrawal separately. I said as long as the matter was hypothetical, it was very hard to form a judgment, but I could imagine that the issue of withdrawals was a lot easier to deal with than the future composition of a government in South Vietnam. Indeed, if he remembered an article I had written in 1968,<sup>8</sup> I had proposed exactly this procedure. Dobrynin asked whether I still believed that this was a possible approach. I said it certainly was a possible approach and, indeed, I had been of the view that it would be the one that would speed up matters. Dobrynin said he would report this to Moscow.

At the end of the meeting, Dobrynin gave me an art book with an inscription for my son, since he had read somewhere that my son was very interested in art.

## 110. Memorandum of Conversation (USSR)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 9, 1971.

Kissinger came to see me at our Embassy on January 9. He said he had flown in specially for one day from California on the instructions of President Nixon, who is there right now, to have

<sup>7</sup> *Asahi Shimbun* published its interview with Kosygin on January 2. For a condensed English text, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (February 2, 1971), pp. 7, 11.

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 5, Document 13.

<sup>1</sup> Source: AVP RF, f. 0129, op. 55a, p. 426, d. 1, l. 5–15. Top Secret. From Dobrynin's Journal.

a chat before my departure for Moscow and to convey some of the President's thoughts for the Soviet leadership.

*First.* Kissinger began the conversation by expressing "the President's deepest personal regret over the barbaric act, the explosion next to one of the Soviet Embassy's buildings in Washington, which he condemns in the strongest terms."

The President had asked that we be informed confidentially that he had instructed U.S. Attorney General Mitchell to personally take charge of the matter of the attacks on Soviet establishments and to prosecute the guilty parties. Mitchell will take this up right away, starting next week.

I told Kissinger we expect concrete results.

He also reported that, with the administration's tacit encouragement, the major Jewish organizations would come out with a harsh condemnation of extremist elements.

*Second.* Then Kissinger proceeded to outline the President's views on the major foreign policy issues, saying that over the past two days, since arriving in California, President Nixon has devoted a great deal of time to carefully analyzing the current state of *Soviet-U.S. relations* and their possible prospects for development in the future. In this connection, President Nixon asked that the following be conveyed to the Soviet leadership.

The state of current relations between the USSR and the U.S., as Moscow undoubtedly also feels, leaves much to be desired. There is hardly any point now in arguing about who is right or who is to blame on one issue or another, which taken together have led to the current state of affairs. The main question is whether there is a prospect for improvement, and if so, what specifically can be done to improve relations.

In the President's personal view, despite the difficulties, the possibility of such an improvement does exist. The time factor, however, is beginning to play an increasingly significant role here. The presidential election campaign will take place in the United States in 1972. As the past experience of the U.S. itself shows, it is usually difficult during this period to expect any serious international negotiations, since all of the attention of any president and his administration is entirely taken up by domestic matters.

Consequently, all that realistically remains is just 1971, which essentially will be decisive in regard to whether the two countries will manage to

embark on the path of resolving major international issues by reaching the relevant agreement with each other and, thus, promote an overall improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations.

After the comprehensive review he has just conducted of the main problems currently facing the USSR and the U.S., and in an effort to take into account the legitimate interest Moscow is showing in various issues, President Nixon is now submitting specific proposals to the USSR Government on two major questions: on Berlin and on the problem of limiting strategic arms, which in his view are now at the top of the agenda of our relations. The Middle East should also be included here, of course, but that will be discussed below.

Apart from everything else, the President also took into account that the time factor plays a substantial role in these matters, and this factor, as the President realizes, is of considerable importance to both sides (Kissinger alluded to our upcoming CPSU Congress and to their election).

In specific terms, the President's thinking is basically as follows.

*Third. The Berlin Issue.* President Nixon has carefully reviewed the recent Soviet message on this question,<sup>2</sup> transmitted to him through the confidential channel.

In connection with this message, the President would like to confirm that the impression the Soviet side gained from the conversation between Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko and the President is correct.

They (the President and Kissinger) have carefully studied the progress of the latest meetings of the ambassadors of the Four Powers in Berlin and the proposals the Soviet side made at the December 10 session. They do not currently share the assessment that Rush, the U.S. Ambassador to the FRG, sent to Washington at that time, to the effect that these proposals do not add anything new. Rush was hasty. They themselves now believe the Soviet side has taken a certain step forward, although this does not yet do enough to accommodate their wishes.

President Nixon is willing, if the Soviet side agrees, to conduct in strict confidence a Soviet-U.S. exchange of views through the confidential channel between the Soviet Ambassador and Kissinger

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 108.

in order to determine realistically, without delay, and on a mutual basis whether there is a possibility of an agreement on Berlin in the near future at the talks of the four ambassadors.

The President believes that, by all indications, such a possibility does exist, but this must be verified on a mutual basis. The U.S. position, in brief, is essentially the following: regarding the main question that currently interests the USSR—a reduction of the FRG's political presence in West Berlin—the President reaffirms everything that he already told Minister A.A. Gromyko in person. Moreover, he can say that the United States will be willing to accept any position the FRG itself agrees to on this question, and they are aware that Soviet representatives are already discussing this and certain other matters directly with FRG representatives on a bilateral basis.

The U.S., along with its allies, is interested primarily in matters relating to transit and access, which, from their standpoint, are the main sources of the periodic complications. For President Nixon personally, however, the key point is that any future agreement allow him, if necessary, to contact the Soviet Government as the principal party to such an agreement “on the other side.”

To put it bluntly, the President fears that at some point a difficult situation could arise, for example, on the access routes. What is he to do then? The Soviet Union could then say: take it up with the GDR Government. It would be hard for him, however, to make a complaint or a request directly to Ulbricht, especially considering the approaching U.S. presidential campaign, when Nixon's opponents could blame him for such an agreement on Berlin.

At the same time, the President wants to tell us that he is trying mainly to secure his flanks on the domestic front, and he asks that the Soviet leadership understand this correctly. It is therefore important to him, the President, that the Soviet Union be a kind of guarantor of the agreement reached, so that if necessary he could turn to Moscow. He, the President, does not object if the Germans discuss with each other the practical matters that are of interest to them and reach agreement on them. It is extremely desirable for him, however, to then have some four-party guarantee (in effect, what is important for the U.S. itself, in the sense outlined above, is solely the guarantee of the USSR). For example, we are now thinking about possible

four-party guarantees in the Middle East. This issue does not limit the sovereignty of the UAR and Israel in any way. The same could apply—although the situation is not completely analogous—to the issue of the GDR's sovereignty, which the U.S. does not intend to infringe on in any way.

The main thing is to find an appropriate form for such an agreement. The U.S. side does not have any compromise wording prepared yet, but they are ready to work with the Soviet side to try to find such wording (during the conversation Kissinger made a passing remark to the effect that the latest Soviet proposals of December 10 regarding transit already contained, they thought, a certain rough draft for a way—in terms of form, not substance—to somewhat circumvent the impasse over the question of the GDR, when, with the latter's consent, the USSR referred to certain possibilities; my interlocutor, however, did not elaborate on this thought any further).

Of course, during the confidential exchange of views between the two sides, he added, each side can raise any questions of interest to it in connection with the four-party talks on Berlin.

Kissinger said that according to their calculations—if the Soviet leadership agrees to the President's proposals—the aforesaid bilateral, confidential exchange of views through the Soviet Ambassador-Kissinger channel could take no more than a month. This time frame would be quite sufficient to ascertain the possibility of a compromise. The rest would then be handled within the framework of the four countries' ambassadors without any particular difficulty.

Kissinger went on to add that with the President's consent, he intended in a week to invite Bahr, whom he has personally known quite well for a long time, to visit Washington from Bonn.

In this connection it would be very important to them to receive our response, even if it is in general terms for now, during the coming week. If we agree—they could then talk with Bahr in terms of studying possible further compromises, including the question of interest to us about limiting the FRG's political presence (they “will not talk” to Bahr about the bilateral understanding reached between us).

At the four ambassadors' meetings that will resume shortly in Berlin, U.S. Ambassador Rush (as well as the entire State Department) will not know anything yet about the President's strictly

confidential proposal made to the Soviet leadership, so during the early stages the Ambassador's statements may not take account of this important aspect. They ask us to bear this in mind.

*Fourth. Strategic Arms Limitation.* Kissinger said President Nixon had carefully studied the Soviet side's position from the records of the meetings in Helsinki, including the latest Soviet proposal regarding the possibility of concluding a separate ABM agreement as an initial step.

In this connection, the President would like to propose to the Soviet Government the following compromise.

He, the President, agrees that first a separate agreement relating solely to defensive strategic arms should be concluded and signed. At the same time, he proposes that immediately thereafter the sides resume active negotiations to seek an agreement in the area of offensive strategic arms (after recording their intention to do so in the agreement concluded on defensive arms).

For the duration of these subsequent negotiations (on offensive weapons), the President proposes imposing a "freeze" ("standstill"<sup>3</sup>) on all offensive land-based types of strategic arms on both sides. For now he is leaving the question of sea-based strategic arms open: if the Soviet side deems it advisable to extend the "freeze" to them as well, President Nixon will be ready to consider that too (it would also be good to mention such an understanding in principle on a freeze in the agreement that will be concluded on defensive arms).

It is further envisaged that there be private or public agreement on the approximate desired time frame in which both sides in these subsequent negotiations will seek to achieve a concrete result either on a comprehensive accord or on individual aspects of the problem of limiting offensive strategic arms.

Accordingly, the "freeze" would also be in effect for this same, agreed period of time.

Kissinger clarified that in outlining all this on President Nixon's instructions, he is not proposing the specific time frame now, but merely the idea. If this idea is acceptable in principle to the Soviet side, then it will be possible to discuss the time frame as well.

Kissinger stressed that, in President Nixon's view, the main thing is to overcome the current impasse in the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on strategic arms. The President believes that the proposed plan affords an opportunity to overcome the impasse first in an agreement on defensive weapons—and, as he understands it, this is the gist of the latest Soviet proposal—and then to go on to seek an agreement in the area of offensive weapons in what would already be an improved political atmosphere.

If the Soviet Government agrees to this proposal, it would be advisable, Kissinger said, even before our delegations resume their work in Vienna (March 15) to conduct a fundamental exchange of views between the two governments through the confidential channel and to complete it before mid-March, setting out the relevant agreement, for example, in an exchange of strictly confidential letters between the USSR and U.S. Governments, which would sum up the agreement reached. This exchange of views, confirmed in this manner, would serve as a directive to the two delegations in Vienna for the subsequent, detailed negotiations between them.

Kissinger concluded by saying that the President will await the Soviet Government's response to this specific proposal. It is important, he added, for the President to know—as soon as possible—the Soviet leadership's attitude (favorable or negative) toward the views he has expressed on two important issues: on Berlin and on strategic arms reductions. Kissinger re-emphasized that neither the State Department nor the U.S. Embassy in Moscow has been informed of these proposals by the President.

*Fifth. The Middle East.* President Nixon, Kissinger said, asked [me] to convey to the Soviet Government that he deems it advisable to resume the bilateral Soviet-U.S. dialogue on a Middle East settlement in a while.

He, the President, proceeds on the premise that the principal efforts toward this settlement must be made this year, in 1971, because next year, in 1972, the public election campaign in the U.S. will inevitably put its stamp on statements here, including those by the President himself, which—even though they will be addressed entirely to a domestic audience—may evoke a certain amount of legitimate displeasure on the part of participants in the negotiations on a settlement.

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<sup>3</sup> Translator's note: in the original Russian text, the English word "standstill" is untranslated and spelled using the Latin alphabet.

Therefore, Kissinger went on, the President is now ready to make joint efforts with the Soviet Union this year in an attempt to lay the groundwork for a settlement, by acting through the confidential channel, although this work evidently will involve a great deal of difficulty.

They plan shortly to prepare their position for resumption of talks with us, which they propose conducting first through the confidential channel between the Soviet Ambassador and Kissinger and then through the channel between the Soviet Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco. According to Kissinger, this position is currently in the development stage.

In this connection, Kissinger voiced some very preliminary thoughts about a Middle East settlement, which I will report when I arrive in Moscow.

*Sixth. Vietnam.* Kissinger said President Nixon had taken note of the Soviet Prime Minister's interview with the Japanese newspaper *Asabi* [*Shimbun*], particularly his statement that the Soviet Government was ready "to help the Americans leave Vietnam."

After specifying that he would now be speaking unofficially, Kissinger said he would like to "articulate" for the Soviet Government's information the President's current "way of thinking" regarding the problem of a Vietnam settlement, to which he and the President continue to devote a great deal of time.

The administration is still determined to retaliate against the DRV with military strikes if Hanoi, now or in the near future, launches large-scale operations against South Vietnam. But right now they would like to focus on another aspect pertaining to a settlement.

The President knows that one of the key issues to which the DRV attaches great importance is the issue of the withdrawal of U.S. troops. He and the President are currently discussing "with each other" this possibility:

—What if the U.S. were to commit to withdraw all of its troops by some absolutely specific deadline, of which they would inform the Vietnamese?

—At the same time, the Americans could refrain from demanding a reciprocal withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam, since that would be clearly unacceptable to Hanoi, which has never acknowledged the presence of its troops there.

It is important, however, that the North Vietnamese, for their part, then commit to a cease-fire for the period of the U.S. troop withdrawal plus at least some brief amount of time after the withdrawal.

Kissinger did not mention any specific deadlines. However, as far as one could make out from his deliberately vague and cautious explanations, an important factor in all this is Nixon's campaign considerations, namely that a cease-fire be observed mainly during the decisive period of the election campaign, as well as considerations involving his personal prestige, that a serious, new deterioration of the situation in South Vietnam not occur right after the troop withdrawal.

Kissinger made a rather curious remark that ultimately it will no longer be their, the Americans', concern, but that of the Vietnamese themselves if some time after the U.S. troop withdrawal they start fighting with each other again. First of all, by that time the U.S. itself will no longer be there, and second, the administration is convinced that the South Vietnamese will not be quickly defeated now: if a war does break out again between North and South Vietnam, it will be a lengthy affair, and in any case such a new war will obviously "spill over" into the period after the Nixon administration has left office, unless "the Vietnamese reach agreement earlier among themselves on a reasonable compromise."

In this connection, Kissinger cautiously went on to suggest that such a course of events would relieve them of the need to conduct lengthy and, in effect, futile negotiations on a political settlement in South Vietnam, because if the U.S. troops pull out, that whole matter will directly involve only the Vietnamese themselves.

Kissinger's reasoning, in effect, came down to the fact that if an agreement is reached with the DRV on the military aspect (in connection with a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam), then the administration will leave the responsibility for a political settlement to the Vietnamese themselves. The U.S. will deal with this matter, like the other great powers that have an interest in this region, but no longer as "a direct party to the Vietnam conflict."

Kissinger made a point of specifying that none of what he had said was any kind of formal proposal, that it was merely "thinking out loud," something that he thought it would be useful for the Government of the Soviet Union to know, from the standpoint of possible approaches to steps for resolving the Vietnam problem.

At the same time, one could sense from Kissinger's remarks that the White House would apparently not object if we spoke with the Vietnamese about these U.S. views and then, in the same non-binding, oblique form, let them know about Hanoi's possible reaction to these feelers.<sup>4</sup>

In this connection, Kissinger let drop a general remark to the effect that he himself is ready, with the President's approval, to resume at any time his direct contacts with DRV representatives in Paris.

Kissinger inquired whether we might have information about possible changes in the position of the PRC with respect to convening a Geneva conference on the issues related to Indochina. He went on to report that they had received information from the Swiss that a fairly prominent Chinese representative had told them China was now more favorably disposed to convening such a conference and had also made clear that they would not object if this view was conveyed to Washington.

We do not know, he added, how accurate this information is. Thus far there has been no confirmation from other sources, and up to now the Swiss have not been a channel through which any signals came from Peking. It is not out of the question that in their enthusiasm the Swiss reported all of this in somewhat rosier hues.

I replied that I had no information in that regard.

*Seventh. The Far East.* Kissinger made a rather interesting statement during the conversation about their long-term assessment of developments in the Far East in terms of the USSR-U.S.-China-Japan foursome.

He stated that in their current policy they assume that Japan rather than China will play an increasingly important, even dominant, role in that region in the '70s. In the '80s, however, China "will catch up with Japan." They are especially concerned about the possible emergence of a Japanese-Chinese commonwealth or even a temporary alliance against other powers in the region. Such an alliance would then be, in effect, "hard to over-

<sup>4</sup> At the end of January, the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi, citing a conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin in "mid-January," delivered an informal American proposal to North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. According to the North Vietnamese record of the meeting, the proposal Pham received was clearly based—nearly verbatim—on Kissinger's conversation with Dobrynin on January 9 as recorded above. (Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, *Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris*, pp. 165-166)

come." They are starting to think "to themselves" about this, but so far they do not see "all that many" practical possibilities for forestalling all this in the aforementioned long-term perspective.

*Eighth. Senator Muskie's Trip to Moscow.* Kissinger said he understands the delicacy of this whole matter, but they very much hope that if the Soviet Government now has any specific new proposals regarding major international political issues or on issues bearing on the relations between the two countries, it will convey this not through Muskie but directly to the U.S. Government.

During the conversation with Kissinger he did not explicitly mention the summit meeting, although this matter was invisibly present as a subtext the whole time. As he was leaving, however, he apparently could not hold back and said that President Nixon "continues to attach a great deal of importance to his meeting with the Soviet leadership."

A. Dobrynin

#### 111. Memorandum From Presidential Assistant Kissinger to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

January 25, 1971.

SUBJECT: Soviet Note on Berlin

Attached is the Soviet note on the Berlin negotiations which the Soviets delivered to the White House on January 6, 1971<sup>2</sup> and was relayed to me in San Clemente. You will recall our discussions on this and the fact that this was one of the topics that Dobrynin and I covered in our January 9, 1971 meeting (I am sending you separately a summary and the full record of that conversation).<sup>3</sup>

I thought you would be interested in a fuller analysis of the attached note. It is a politely worded and rather plaintive charge of bad faith and it is based on the Soviet interpretation of Gromyko's conversations with you<sup>4</sup> and Secretary Rogers.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [Pt. 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 108.

<sup>3</sup> Document 109.

<sup>4</sup> October 22, 1970.

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 90 and 91.