

The President's comments were as follows:<sup>4</sup>

"It is essential that your Government not misread the meaning of this event and that our two countries continue to work cooperatively on all the issues we have recently been discussing and continue to discuss."<sup>5</sup>

"Mr. Ambassador, you know better than anyone the efforts we have made over the past two years to make progress and in particular to give priority to a meeting between the leaders of our two countries.

"The recent decision by your leaders to postpone (a meeting) has forced us to proceed (on the issue of a meeting with the Chinese).

"This agreement (on a meeting with the Chinese leadership) changes nothing in U.S.-Soviet relations."<sup>6</sup>

"We can now take one of two routes:

"We can proceed promptly with the various subjects that have been discussed and continue to be discussed between us. We hereby reaffirm that we are prepared to do this."<sup>7</sup>

"The other path is the path of 'agonizing reappraisal' (of our relations).

"We are prepared to take either path. But we would prefer to follow our present course."<sup>8</sup>

When he had finished delivering the President's comments, Kissinger said that at this time he could not add anything to what had been said because he had to hurry back to the President, who was going to speak on radio and television soon.

However, he, Kissinger, would like to meet with me at the White House on Monday, when he returns with the President, so that we might possibly continue this discussion.

It was agreed that we would have such a meeting at the White House on Monday.<sup>9</sup>

*A. Dobrynin*

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<sup>4</sup> The text printed below has been adapted from Kissinger's talking points; several substantive discrepancies between this text and the talking points are noted below. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Materials, China—General, Jul–Oct. 1971)

<sup>5</sup> Dobrynin omitted the following sentence: "This is the spirit of the note which Colonel Kennedy has just handed you, and which I hope you will transmit promptly to Moscow."

<sup>6</sup> Kissinger evidently did not read the following two sentences from his talking points: "It is not directed at you. We are still ready for a U.S.-Soviet summit and to move ahead on our various negotiations."

<sup>7</sup> The previous sentence was not included in Kissinger's talking points.

<sup>8</sup> Kissinger evidently did not read the following sentence from his talking points: "We see no reason to take the second course."

<sup>9</sup> July 19.

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## Meeting Between Presidential Assistant Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin

JULY 19, 1971

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### 177. Telegram From Ambassador Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 17, 1971.

Urgent

The agreement reached between Peking and Washington on President Nixon's trip to Peking is unquestionably of major international significance, with potentially broad consequences for regions such as Southeast Asia and the Far East, as well as for relationships within the USSR–PRC–U.S. triangle.

The Chinese leadership has clearly demonstrated that it is even more unprincipled in its policy than Nixon himself. As practically everyone here believes, this abrupt about-face by the Chinese is based on the anti-Soviet thrust of Peking's policy, its aspiration to play a global role, and its obstinate pursuit of its nationalistic objectives above all else—objectives it places much higher than ideological considerations.

Several factors underlie Nixon's approach to relations with the PRC.

One factor that is constantly at work is his desire to exploit Soviet-Chinese differences to the maximum and to deepen and intensify them whenever possible; he is not particularly scrupulous in his choice of ways and means to accomplish this goal. It is now becoming clear that for a long period of time Nixon conducted parallel talks regarding personal meetings not only with the Soviet leaders but also with the leaders in Peking. No sooner did Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai show willingness for such a meeting and, most important, agree to announce it well in advance, than the U.S. President straightaway seized this opportunity. There is no doubt he would act the same way if

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<sup>1</sup> Source: AVP RF, f. 59a, op. 7, p. 13, d. 9, l. 81–88. Top Secret.

there were a similar turn of events with respect to his Moscow trip.

In the U.S. the President now wields so much authority—this being a trend that began after the Second World War—that he is effectively able to use all means to carry public opinion along with him, while having made a decision like this essentially on his own.

Another important factor currently influencing Nixon's behavior is his tremendous desire to be re-elected president in 1972. In this regard he is prepared to pay a high price for anything that can advance this paramount goal of his. He now views a trip to Peking or Moscow primarily in this electoral context.

There is yet one more significant factor: an agreement on a meeting with the Chinese leadership is also important to Nixon in terms of the most pressing domestic issue he now faces—finding a way out of the Vietnam War.

There are two aspects to this. In terms of public relations, an agreement now enables Nixon to greatly reduce pressure from his own public opinion for a prompt solution of the Vietnam issue and withdrawal of U.S. troops, and for a favorable response to the latest PRG proposals in Paris.<sup>2</sup> Thanks to the Chinese, Nixon has now gained a considerable respite in this regard. But alongside this public relations aspect, we know the White House now genuinely hopes that an acceptable peace settlement can be reached in Vietnam with the help of the Peking leadership. Success in this endeavor would almost certainly guarantee Nixon's re-election for a second term.

Of course, as a consequence of the agreement on Nixon's Peking trip, we should anticipate that the Americans and the Chinese will intensify their game in the international arena. The rather clear subtext is that this game will be played out primarily within the invisible U.S.–PRC–USSR triangle.

There now arises the question of our possible response.

It seems to us that also in the present circumstances one of our principal tasks should be to continue our efforts, in accordance with previously adopted directives, to counteract any U.S.–Chinese rapprochement that has an anti-Soviet basis.

Judging by the conduct of the Chinese leadership, which considers the Soviet Union to be the

number one enemy, we do not currently appear to have sizeable capabilities to directly influence the Chinese side in this respect.

In our view, such capabilities are somewhat better with respect to the U.S. side. It seems to us that we should continue to focus the aforementioned efforts on utilizing all the objective and subjective factors determining U.S. interest in development of relations with the USSR so as to check possible sliding into anti-Sovietism by the U.S. in building its relations with Peking.

Nixon's personal interest in maintaining such relations with us, which continues to be of no small importance for him in light of the 1972 presidential election campaign, is one such factor; also, the desire of the American public to avoid anything that might lead to a confrontation with the USSR, whose consequences are feared immeasurably more here than a conflict with China; and growing sentiment in the business community in favor of developing stronger ties with us, etc.

For many reasons, primarily having to do with the elections, the possibility of a "summit" conference with the Soviet leaders continues to play an essential role with Nixon—although this is now somewhat less of an immediate issue for him.

We should also fully take this important factor into account: despite the U.S.–Chinese agreement on Nixon's visit to Peking, the profound objective differences that have divided the U.S. and the PRC for all these many years still remain; and the anti-China aspect of the Nixon doctrine continues to be valid. No less ballyhoo preceded Kennedy's meeting with Khrushchev,<sup>3</sup> and we all know how that turned out.

With the enormous sensational ballyhoo in the U.S. and the entire world that surrounds Nixon's upcoming visit to China, and in the heat of predictions now being made here about the rosy future of U.S.–Chinese relations, there is clearly a desire to read considerably more into the President's action than it seems to promise for the U.S. in reality.

This ballyhoo also reflects, to a certain degree, the mutual interest of the U.S. and the PRC in deliberately exaggerating and exploiting the factor of U.S.–Chinese relations in order to exert pressure on us.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 172.

<sup>3</sup> Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Vienna on June 3 and 4, 1961.

We certainly would not underestimate the major significance of the agreement the U.S. and China have reached. However, the factors we have described above are also in play here.

As for a practical response by our side to the U.S.-Chinese agreement, we would think it advisable to take the following steps:

1. We should respond briefly to Nixon's secret message to the Soviet leadership (relayed through Kissinger) regarding his agreement on the Peking visit, stating essentially that relations between the U.S. and the PRC are a matter for these two countries.<sup>4</sup> But if these relations are to be developed on an anti-Soviet foundation, at the expense of our country's interests, we will draw our own conclusions—and that applies to our relations with Nixon personally.

This response must not leave Nixon with the impression of any concern or irritation on our part. As before, it is important that we give Washington no reason to believe that we fear the possibility of his colluding with Peking and that we might make concessions to the U.S. under the influence of the "Chinese factor." Nixon should see in this response a calm determination on our part not to sacrifice our own interests under any circumstances.

2. In the diplomatic arena, we should continue our efforts to influence U.S. policy on issues of interest to us and in the areas stipulated in governmental decisions on the subject of Soviet-U.S. relations (the most recent decision issued in January of this year) and in the resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress.

In our future contacts with the Nixon administration we should continue to lay particular emphasis on resolving European issues and implementing our European political program.

We must not give the Chinese the opportunity, by intensifying their relationship with the U.S., to make it difficult to uphold our interests in Europe.

We believe that in order to achieve favorable results as quickly as possible in our current negotiations with the U.S. on issues of interest to us—primarily the West Berlin issue, which the Western powers<sup>5</sup> have tied to FRG ratification of its treaty with us—we should make full use of Nixon's familiar currying of favor (as revealed in his July 15

message to the Soviet leadership), as well as his noticeable desire to "prove" that rapprochement with Peking does not lessen his willingness to reach agreements with us on specific issues.

3. We should make use of Nixon's sense of the paramount importance of relations with us for the U.S. and for him as President, both at present and for the foreseeable future while he remains in the White House.

In order to curb the anti-Soviet element of Washington's current game with Peking, we should continue developing trends helpful to us in the economic (trade, shipping, exchange of visits) and scientific-technical areas of our relations with the U.S.

4. As regards the prospects for a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, it seems that it would best serve our interests under current circumstances if we were to leave this entire matter up in the air, while not directly ruling out such a possibility. It is advisable to continue to leave Nixon with the hope that there will be such a meeting, as a means for us to exert influence on him, while continuing to make the issue of a meeting contingent upon success or lack thereof in resolving European problems—and indeed on developments generally, including in the Washington-Peking relationship.

5. In accordance with existing directives, we should continue as part of the overall conduct of active policy vis-à-vis the U.S. and the PRC to limit the possibilities of rapprochement between these two countries on the basis of hostility towards us. We should disclose any actions taken by the U.S. and the Chinese leadership that harm the interests of the Soviet Union and other countries (Southeast Asia in particular). As in the past, one of the main aspects of this work should be to utilize all objective factors so as to exert the influence we need within the USSR-U.S.-PRC-Japan "foursome." Making use of unofficial channels and public relations opportunities, we should continue to work more actively to maintain U.S.-Chinese differences and the mutual suspicion and distrust that undoubtedly exist even now in both Washington and Peking.

In general, what we should do is continue our current policy towards the U.S., as reflected in decisions of the CC CPSU, while paying greater attention to the U.S.-Chinese flirtation in light of the most recent developments.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 176.

<sup>5</sup> Translator's note: Dobrynin used the Russian word "zapadniki."

In the final analysis presidents—with all their manipulation and swings from one extreme to the other—come and go. But our relations with the U.S., the leading country of the Western world, will remain of major importance to us.<sup>6</sup>

*A. Dobrynin*

## 178. Memorandum of Conversation (U.S.)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 19, 1971, 1 p.m.

The meeting took place at my initiative<sup>2</sup> so that I could get a feeling for Dobrynin's attitude following the announcement of the Peking Summit. Dobrynin was at his oily best and, for the first time in my experience with him, totally insecure.

I opened the conversation by telling Dobrynin that we might have a general review first. He thought it was a capital idea. Indeed, he said he had been so interested in seeing me that he had immediately left New York, where he had seen his wife off for a vacation in the Soviet Union, despite his intention to spend a day there. I said I would have been glad to reschedule the lunch. He said, "No, no, no. This is important." I then turned to recent events.

### *U.S.-Soviet Summit*

I said that I wanted to be frank with him. Perhaps in the first year of our Administration we had not always been forthcoming in improving relations with the Soviet Union, but ever since April 1970 we believe we have made an unending series of overtures. The Soviet response has been grudg-

ing and petty, especially on the Summit Meeting. They simply did not understand the President. The President thought in broad philosophical terms and had sincerely believed that his meeting with the Soviet leaders might open new vistas for cooperation around the world; instead, he found himself confronted with one evasion after another. As Dobrynin very well knew, I had urged him to have an answer by July 1st and even then it had taken till July 5th, and he had then been evasive again, saying that the meeting could take place in November and December.<sup>3</sup> This was in effect a rejection, because I had already told him that November and December were highly inconvenient. Indeed, I did not know whether Dobrynin was even saying we should fix a date.

Dobrynin in reply was almost beside himself with protestations of goodwill. On the contrary, he said, he could tell me strictly off the record that a meeting between his leaders and the President was very much on their minds. What in fact had happened was that September did not seem possible, and now November was the earliest possible date. He was certain the Soviet leaders would be willing to set another date for a Summit, but now they did not know whether our meeting with Peking made it impossible. Would we be willing to come to Moscow before going to Peking?

I replied that it did not seem to me proper to go to Moscow before having gone to Peking, that we should go in the order in which the announcements were made. He asked whether we would be prepared to announce a meeting before having been in Peking. I said that that was a distinct possibility but that I would have to check this with the President and let him know later in the day.

[I called Dobrynin at 7:00 that evening after checking with the President and told him that we would be prepared to announce a meeting in Moscow after having set the date of a meeting in Peking but before we had actually visited Peking.]<sup>4</sup>

### *Other Bilateral Issues*

Dobrynin then reviewed the international situation. He said he thought that our relationship actually was going very well. He had every confidence

<sup>6</sup> On July 19, Gromyko sent Dobrynin the following telegram: "It goes without saying, you should meet with Kissinger and listen if he has something further to report to you. Do not raise the question of the US-Chinese agreement on your own initiative. If, in the course of the conversation, you need to react in some way to what he has to say, you should proceed from those considerations, which you expressed in your telegram. In general, conduct yourself calmly." (AVP RF, f. 59a, op. 7, p. 13, d. 9, l. 90) In a separate telegram on the same day, Gromyko also instructed Dobrynin to say "nothing new" about a US-Soviet summit meeting without further instructions. (Ibid., l. 89)

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [Pt. 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 2:55 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 175.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 174.

<sup>4</sup> Brackets in the original. A transcript of the telephone conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File.

that the Berlin talks were proceeding well and that SALT too was going according to program, so it was a pity if there were any misunderstanding in our relationship. Following my request at the meeting of June 30, Dobrynin handed me some specific suggestions on the port security program which I promised him to staff.<sup>5</sup>

I also told Dobrynin that we might be able to do the foundry part of the Kama River Project separately, to the extent of \$175 million, if this were of interest in Moscow. In short, it was quite possible for us to have a useful relationship. Finally I told Dobrynin that we were prepared to proceed with the accidental war treaty with the Soviet Union separately in order to mark some progress on our relationship.

All of this was greeted by Dobrynin with the oiliest of reassurances.

#### *My Trip to China*

Dobrynin then said it would be extremely helpful to his people in Moscow if he could tell them that he had been briefed about the meeting in Peking. I said I would be glad to do so. I said we had talked essentially in general review of the situation, and of course Taiwan was very much on China's mind.

He asked me whether the Soviet Union had come up. I replied that realistically it was obvious that we could do nothing to help Communist China against the Soviet Union. In any event to us the Soviet Union was a world power, while we recognized that China was primarily significant for Asian settlements. Dobrynin asked whether Chou En-lai had indicated any worry about a Soviet attack. I said there were practically no references to the Soviet Union except an occasional vague allusion, while it seemed to me that the primary fear of Communist China was Japan.

Dobrynin brightened considerably and said that this was exactly his conviction of Chinese priorities. He asked what there really was to talk about between us and the Chinese? Were we interested in Chinese domination of Southeast Asia? He had always thought that the Soviet interests and ours were much more nearly complementary with respect to the defense of Southeast Asia. I

said that I wasn't certain that the Chinese had aggressive tendencies in Southeast Asia but that in any event we would not favor Chinese expansion beyond their borders.

#### *India and Pakistan*

Dobrynin then asked me about India and Pakistan. I replied I had heard some reports that the Soviet Union might encourage military adventures by India. Dobrynin answered that the Soviet Union was giving them political support but was strongly trying to discourage military adventures. I said my impression was that a war between India and Pakistan could not be localized to East Pakistan. He said that of course the Pakistanis consider East Pakistan an integral part of their country, just as the Soviets consider the Ukraine or we consider Alaska. I said that seemed to be my impression, and moreover the war might not be confined to the subcontinent. Dobrynin said that that was their judgment and this is why they were trying to localize it.

#### *The Two Summits*

As the meeting broke up, Dobrynin asked me again how my trip was affected by their summit decision. I said that in all candor I had always intended to go to China but if they had accepted the September summit we would have stalled a Chinese summit until much later. But that was water over the dam now. Dobrynin responded, "I wish you had given me some advance warning; it might have affected our decision." I said that that did not seem to me possible and that he understood that we could not jeopardize the secrecy of the enterprise.

Dobrynin agreed, and said he would stay here the better part of the summer to work on our relationship. I invited him to come to the West Coast at some point and I would give him a tour of a movie studio.

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<sup>5</sup> The original English text that Dobrynin gave Kissinger is printed in Document 179.

**179. Memorandum of Conversation (USSR)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 19, 1971.

I had a conversation with Kissinger over lunch at the White House at his invitation.

*First.* I intentionally did not take the initiative to raise the issue of the U.S.-Chinese agreement.

Meanwhile, Kissinger, I felt, was from the very start of the conversation impatiently waiting for me to ask many questions on precisely this issue.

Finally he himself raised the issue. To briefly summarize his remarks (the conversation lasted over two hours), the gist was as follows.

1. His main points regarding the recent U.S.-Chinese agreement: this agreement is in no way directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. In the eyes of the President, U.S.-Soviet relations continue to be more important than U.S.-Chinese relations. This is a function of reality, since in terms of military and economic strength China is still very far from the USSR and the U.S. Relations between Washington and Moscow, owing to this reality, are global in scope. Relations between Washington and Peking, though important, are nonetheless, in the final analysis, still mainly regional in nature within Asia (Southeast and Far East Asia).

As if to justify the latest agreement with the Chinese, Kissinger reiterated in detail the whole history of our negotiations on a U.S.-Soviet summit, maintaining that the decision on the President's visit to Peking was made at the very last minute, only after our latest "not altogether definite answer" had been received in early July.<sup>2</sup>

If at that time a "final affirmative reply" had come from the Soviet leadership, then, according to Kissinger, Nixon "certainly" would have gone to Moscow. The question of a trip by the President to Peking only came up, he maintained, in the course of his conversations with Chou En-lai. Before that it had not existed in practical terms at all.

Kissinger greatly lamented the serious difficulties that have existed and continue to exist "at the psychological level" in establishing between the President and the Soviet leadership the necessary personal mutual understanding and unbiased as-

essment of each other's motives. Thus far their relations have been dominated by "excessive suspicion" and lack of faith in assurances and promises made (for example, the President's assurances on the West Berlin issue), which has been harming matters considerably. It would be good to somehow "overcome this psychological barrier" together in the future.

2. The President would like our relations to continue to develop in the positive direction they have taken recently.

—He hopes the Berlin issue will be settled by the dates mentioned to us earlier, i.e., the confidential talks in Bonn involving the ambassadors of the U.S. and the USSR, together with Bahr, will conclude by the end of this month, and the quadripartite talks in Berlin—by the end of August or early September. Their latest assessment, conducted the other day at the White House, indicates that these dates are quite realistic. They are able to inform us, confidentially, of Chancellor Brandt's personal assessments just received by the President: he believes that his own negotiations with the GDR could be completed by the end of the year and expects to present a treaty with the Soviet Union for ratification at the very end of this year or beginning of next.

—The President hopes the U.S.-Soviet talks in Helsinki will succeed, since he considers them an important element in improving our relations.

—The President is prepared to continue to review significant trade deals between our two countries from a positive perspective. He is now approving, for instance, the sale to us of a foundry for the Kama River truck plant.

—He is ordering a review of all our proposals for creating more favorable conditions for maritime shipping affecting our two countries.

3. The President's proposal for a meeting with the Soviet leadership still stands, provided, of course, it suits the purposes of the Soviet side also.

If that is the case, a meeting could be held after the President's trip to Peking, while announcing the agreement reached with the Soviet Union before that trip.

An approximate time for the President's trip to Moscow could then be, as they already proposed to us before (in the second option), in April or May, 1972. There is no specific agreement yet with the

<sup>1</sup> Source: AVP RF, f. 0129, op. 55a, p. 426, d. 2, l. 60–72. Top Secret. From Dobrynin's Journal.

<sup>2</sup> Document 174.

Chinese on an exact date, although an outside date was indicated—before May 1972. If an agreement is reached with us soon for a specific date in April, they could arrange matters so that the meeting with the Chinese took place in the early months of next year.

The President would now like to ascertain the Soviet leadership's view on this issue. If the response is favorable in principle, it would be desirable then to know the most acceptable timing for a trip to Moscow by the President.

*Second.* During the conversation Kissinger volunteered some details from his conversations with Chou En-lai. As he told it, taking them all together, they boiled down to the following.

In the course of preliminary contacts between the White House and the leadership in Peking, an agreement was reached that during Kissinger's a trip to several Asian countries he would make a secret visit to Peking to have a conversation with Chou En-lai. No specific agenda for these conversations was worked out, but rather there was an understanding that each side could raise any issues.

There was no prior agreement to discuss the issue of a possible Nixon trip to Peking. This issue was not mentioned at all in preliminary contacts.

Granted, Chou En-lai now declares the initiative on this matter came from the President himself. This is true only in the sense that Nixon said in general terms at one of his public press conferences he was ready and willing to go to China. At the time even he attached no real significance to his words, since it was merely rhetoric.

The day before Kissinger's departure, the President, "not having received a final reply from Moscow," said to him words to the effect that he certainly would not mind making a trip to Peking, but he did not want to give the Chinese the impression he had any special interest in doing so. So Kissinger was instructed not to take the initiative in this matter until he had first weighed Chou En-lai's response on other issues.

But already in the second conversation the Chinese Premier himself asked why Nixon shouldn't come to Peking and talk directly with Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders. This sort of direct contact, in Chou En-lai's view, would make it possible to have a frank conversation on all the contentious issues separating the two countries, get a clearer understanding of each other's views, and look for mutually acceptable solutions.

Kissinger accepted this proposal on the President's behalf. Granted, he added, many hours had to be spent later working out the text of a coordinated communiqué on this issue. The Chinese wanted it to seem as though Nixon had approached the Government of the PRC entirely unilaterally with the request to meet, which the Chinese leaders were granting. Chou En-lai even told Kissinger he ought to understand, after all, the considerable problems they, the Chinese, have now and will have in the future "in various areas," when the world learns the Chinese leadership agreed to meet with the U.S. President. In the end, the present communiqué was worked out.

According to Kissinger, issues pertaining to relations with the Soviet Union did not come up at all during the conversations. Only once, in speaking of the peace-loving nature of the Chinese, did Chou En-lai make an ironic comment directed at the Soviet leaders, who, in his words, like to portray Mao and his followers as "atomic cannibals, out to incite a new world war." There was no other mention of the Soviet Union.

Kissinger characterized as "sheer speculation" the numerous reports by the U.S. press and U.S. commentators that Chou En-lai had spoken to him about his fears regarding a possible armed attack on China by the USSR or the threat of a Soviet pre-emptive nuclear strike.

Overall, his conversation with the Chinese Premier left him, Kissinger, with the rather strong impression that the Chinese fear Japan at present far more than they do the Soviet Union. The Chinese are nervous about the rapid growth of Japan's economic strength. They are convinced there are strong undercurrents of revanchist sentiment among the Japanese and are clearly afraid Japan might decide to become a nuclear power. Hence they simultaneously criticize the U.S. for its military alliance with Japan and hope the U.S. will restrain the Japanese within certain limits and not allow them to overstep certain bounds.

A significant portion of the conversations was taken up by discussion of the situation in Indochina, including Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The Vietnamese issue was explored in particular detail.

Kissinger declined to go into more detail on this part of his conversations in Peking. He merely proffered a cautious remark that he apparently

had a difficult conversation ahead of him with the Chinese on all these issues.

He also said he personally had not gotten as definite an impression as the leader of Australia's Labor Party had from his conversation with Chou En-lai concerning Peking's willingness to have an international conference convened on Indochina.<sup>3</sup> In Kissinger's view, Chou En-lai is rather cool toward the idea.

Generally, Kissinger got the impression from his conversations with Chou En-lai that although "difficult and rather lengthy bargaining" lay ahead on Southeast Asian issues, all these issues could nonetheless be resolved, particularly through a policy of neutralization of the region and non-intervention from outside following a settlement.

The most difficult problem in U.S.-Chinese relations remains Taiwan. The bone of contention is not issues related to the U.N., or other similar problems. Washington is not prepared now or in the next two to three years (which, I inferred, is what the Chinese are insisting on) to renounce its military alliance with Taiwan, though it is prepared to reaffirm the formula that the U.S. does not object to any peaceful agreement between the parties themselves, i.e., between the PRC and Taiwan.

Two further points need to be noted from what Kissinger said about his meetings in Peking with Chou En-lai.

Saying that he and Chou En-lai had spent much time discussing the Vietnam issue, Kissinger nonetheless did not go into any details in this regard and merely commented that he, Kissinger, did not develop any particularly new ("to Moscow") ideas with the Chinese Premier, and the views of the White House he expressed on the possible paths toward a settlement had already been communicated confidentially by him to the Soviet side.

Kissinger did not go on to elaborate on this remark. It is conceivable, however, that he was referring to thoughts he had communicated to us earlier (January 9) that could now form a satisfactory basis for direct negotiations between Peking and Washington.

As we know, Kissinger told us then of the following possibility: what if the U.S. commit-

ted itself to withdraw all its troops by some very specific point in time, and informed the Vietnamese of this?

—The U.S. would then not necessarily require a reciprocal withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam.

It would be important in this case, though, for the North Vietnamese to commit themselves to a cease-fire during the period of U.S. troop withdrawal, plus an additional period of time, however short, following their withdrawal.

At that time, Kissinger gave no specific dates. From his guarded comments, however, it was evident that in all of this a major role was played by considerations related to primary elections, namely, that at the decisive moment in the U.S. election campaign there should generally be a cease-fire, as well as considerations related to his own personal prestige, that a major new deterioration in the military situation in South Vietnam not occur immediately following the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Whatever happens after that would be the sole responsibility of the regime in Saigon.

Kissinger also then made comments to the effect that such a turn of events would spare them, too, the need to conduct "lengthy and essentially futile negotiations" on a political settlement in South Vietnam, since if U.S. troops were to withdraw, the entire matter would then directly concern only the Vietnamese themselves.

As we know, these "thoughts out loud" of Kissinger's were conveyed by us to the Government of the DRV. The latter showed a definite interest in them and expressed willingness to discuss them with Kissinger directly. Afterwards, there were several such secret meetings in Paris, although we (the Embassy) do not know what direction the matter took later on. In any case, the latest "7 points" of the PRG<sup>4</sup> and the "thoughts" mentioned above have certain things in common and, if it were desired, could serve as satisfactory material for continued discussion of these issues.

One should therefore not rule out the possibility that they might be discussed now in more detail between the U.S. and the Chinese and some secret compromise might be found on the basis of them. The only question is how far Peking can go in this

<sup>3</sup> Edward Gough Whitlam, then the leader of the opposition in Australia, announced this proposal after his visit to the People's Republic of China, July 3–14.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 172.

direction alone without the requisite coordination with the DRV.

Kissinger touched briefly on his personal impressions of Chou En-lai (this was their first encounter). He made quite a strong impression on him. He is “clearly undogmatic,” though not averse to hiding behind dogmatic formulae when it suits his purpose. He is very well informed about events concerning the U.S., although some specific aspects of current U.S. domestic political life are “clearly not easy for him to understand.”

At the same time, Kissinger “could not help noticing” that the thinking of Chou En-lai—and, apparently, the entire Chinese leadership—is very obviously, as Kissinger put it, about 10 years behind the times with respect to the nature and possible use of nuclear-missile strategy in international policy (Kissinger considers himself an expert in this area). Chou En-lai “was by no means able to follow everything,” and therefore required occasionally lengthy “clarifications and explanations” of details and terminology in this area that, Kissinger said, in U.S.-Soviet contacts on strategic armaments issues are immediately understood by both sides.

This backwardness and ignorance of details are evidently due to the still very great shortcomings in China’s own nuclear missile capabilities. According to Kissinger’s assertion, the Chinese would have to “become somewhat some mature” on these issues of international policy in order to actually attain the “mindset of a third superpower.” The current assessments of the Chinese on issues relating to nuclear weapons, including the problem of nuclear disarmament, come across as over-simplified, linear, and, at times, downright primitive.

Kissinger’s assessment of “Chou En-lai’s backwardness” in nuclear missile strategy is between him and his conscience; more to the point, it would seem, is the very fact that these issues were among those discussed to some extent during the conversations between Chou En-lai and Kissinger.

In conclusion, Kissinger asked whether I had any specific questions for him in connection with his trip to Peking and conversations with the Chinese Premier.

I replied I had no questions.

Kissinger—who had apparently been saving this clearly demonstrative gesture for the end of the conversation—then declared that if any questions about this come up in Moscow, he “was prepared to answer them candidly.” According to him, those

were exactly his instructions from the President, who in this way meant to underscore that he “had had no conversations, and was having none, with the Chinese that affected the Soviet Union’s interests in any way.”

Kissinger went on to say that today, on the Presidents’ instructions, Secretary of State Rogers was receiving the ambassadors of every U.S. ally in Asia, as well as the majority of those in Europe. Rogers will assure them in general terms (tailored to each individual country), that the agreement with the Chinese on Nixon’s trip to Peking in no way weakens Washington’s resolve to fulfill its commitments or treaty agreements they have with the U.S. In sum, Rogers is to carry out an operation designed to reassure allies who, under the influence of sensational coverage by the press and other mass media, may “not have an entirely correct conception” of the purpose of this step.

According to him, Rogers will not tell any of these ambassadors even one-tenth of what he, Kissinger, with the President’s authorization, has told the Soviet Ambassador about his trip to Peking. He asked therefore that we treat this information as strictly confidential.

During the conversation I expressed our fundamental attitude (in the spirit of past instructions) both toward the issue of the general development of U.S.-Chinese relations, and toward possible attempts to use this to the detriment of the Soviet Union’s interests.

I conducted the conversation in a relaxed, businesslike tone, to avoid giving Kissinger the impression that we were in any way troubled over their agreement on Nixon’s visit to Peking.

At the same time, I could sense that both Nixon and Kissinger themselves were now awaiting a reaction from Moscow with noticeable concern.

*Third.* Kissinger briefly touched on his impressions from his trip to India and Pakistan.

Kissinger said the White House’s alarm over the possibility of serious developments between India and Pakistan had not lessened as a result of his trip, but had perhaps even increased. Relations between these two countries continue to be very tense and the state of mind in the capitals is severely irreconcilable and narrowly nationalistic on both sides.

According to Kissinger, he was troubled by the impression he had gotten from senior Indian officials, who had intimated to him that if a military

conflict broke out on the Indian sub-continent and the overall course of events in it were unfavorable to India (an allusion, apparently, to the PRC), the Soviet Union had allegedly promised the Government of India that, upon receiving from it an appropriate written request to that effect, it, the USSR, could provide military assistance to India.

When I asked for clarification of whether the Indian leaders had actually spoken in such definite terms, Kissinger said, after some thought, that although he would have trouble quoting any of the Indian leaders directly, that was the impression he was left with from what several of them had said.

Kissinger also said the Pakistani President, in conversation with him, complained about the Indians and accused them of causing all the complications that had now arisen between India and Pakistan. According to Pakistani information, the Indians continue to seriously contemplate a military campaign in Eastern Pakistan aimed at separating it from Western Pakistan. Yahya Khan told Kissinger he was determined to defend Pakistan's integrity by force of arms, stressing that, if necessary, he would not hesitate to "ask for help from outside."

Kissinger noted the Pakistani did not directly mention China by name, but that was who he clearly had in mind.

Kissinger himself doubts the Chinese will intervene with their own troops in the event of such a conflict. However, China will "almost certainly" provide aid to Pakistan in the form of weapons and ammunition. They, the Americans, have no great doubts on this score.

Kissinger asserted that the White House agrees with the Soviet Union's policy aimed at peaceful resolution of the conflict between India and Pakistan (such is their understanding of Soviet policy) and they, for their part, "are doing the same thing."

Kissinger's comments on the Indo-Pakistani dispute should probably be regarded with some caution, since in this dispute U.S. sympathies lie with Pakistan, not India, the latter being the one, they fear, whose actions could upset the existing status quo in the region. The U.S., meanwhile, favors preserving the current balance of power on the Indian subcontinent. The Pakistanis, moreover, helped Washington organize contacts with the Chinese.

*Fourth.* During the conversation, in connection with issues raised by the Soviet delegation headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Komarov regarding equipment orders from U.S. companies (mostly for the Kama River Truck Plant), Kissinger said the U.S. side had not yet finished considering all of the issues posed.

As of today, however, they can say the White House could, in the next few days—this week even—give its approval for negotiations on our purchase of equipment for a new foundry for the Kama River Truck Plant (worth more than one hundred million dollars).

This foundry, as they are aware, elicited interest on the Soviet side.

Studying other issues related to the Soviet orders will take another 2–3 weeks. This study is supposedly still being conducted in a "sympathetic mode."

Kissinger said he had a question for us in this connection: do our organizations involved in trade think it advisable to start negotiations on the foundry right away, without waiting for a decision on other issues, or would they prefer to wait for their decision on the entire package of issues posed by the Soviet trade delegation?

They themselves could accept either option. They are leaving this matter entirely at our discretion.

Kissinger asked to be informed of our response, since based on this the White House will issue the appropriate order to the respective U.S. agencies, which are not yet aware of President Nixon's preliminary decision.<sup>5</sup>

*Fifth.* I, for my part, referring to our previous conversation on the subject, told Kissinger we deem it advisable, in parallel with continuing our efforts to conclude an intergovernmental agreement, to

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<sup>5</sup> During a telephone conversation with Dobrynin at 4:15 p.m. on July 21, Kissinger reported that David Rockefeller visited the White House the previous afternoon to discuss his recent trip to the Soviet Union. According to Rockefeller, Kosygin had expressed interest in expanding "economic collaboration" with the United States, including possibly some "joint Soviet-American economic projects." "[O]ur primary reaction to the report of David Rockefeller was quite positive," Kissinger told Dobrynin, "but we want to find out just exactly what your Prime Minister said." Rather than rely on Secretary of Commerce Stans, however, the President planned to authorize Peterson for any further talks on a "comprehensive package" with the Soviets. Kissinger, meanwhile, also mentioned the foundry for the Kama River project: "I can tell you informally we are practically ready to approve it." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File; and AVP RF, f. 0129, op. 55a, p. 426, d. 2, l. 73–74)

take some steps now toward having the U.S. abolish discriminatory restrictions on our ships.<sup>6</sup>

“For us the most appropriate way to discuss unresolved issues would be a meeting of experts from the two countries, inasmuch as these issues could be considered more concretely at the expert level. The Soviet side, meanwhile, is prepared to discuss both problems of a general, theoretical nature, as well as particular measures aimed at regulating U.S.-Soviet relations in the area of maritime shipping. If the U.S. side prefers that the discussion of practical steps take place through diplomatic channels, we would in that case like to pose the following issues:

“1. Opening the following additional ports for calls by Soviet ships:

“a) Pacific Coast—Longview, Stockton, San Diego, Tacoma (first priority), and also Sacramento, Astoria, Coos Bay;

“b) Great Lakes Region—Toledo, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee;

“c) Atlantic Coast—Burnside, Jacksonville, Mobile, Pascagoula, Piedmont, Charleston.

“The intent here is that Soviet ships would be placed on the same footing as ships [sailing under] other flags. We can tell you that the Soviet side is in principle willing to guarantee the U.S. side analogous treatment of its ships in the event they were to operate through Soviet ports.

“2. Abandoning the current practice of advance notifications of port visits, or (if the U.S. is not will agree to this) reduce the advance notification time to 7 days for all ports that are open to Soviet ships.

“3. Abolishing the procedure of submitting crew lists prior to entry into U.S. ports.

“4. Opening an office of the Far Eastern Steamship Company or ‘Sovinflot’ in San Francisco.

“5. Opening regular passenger service between Leningrad and New York.

“6. It would also be desirable to settle with the Federal Maritime Commission the issue of certificates of ability to pay for Soviet ships entering U.S. ports and waters and passing through the Panama Canal (in connection with the U.S. regulations, ad-

opted at the end of 1970, aimed at preventing pollution of territorial, inland and other waters under U.S. control by oil and petroleum products from ships as a result of accidents or other causes). It would be possible to conduct separate negotiations on this issue (between the Ministry of the Merchant Marine and the Federal Maritime Commission).”

Kissinger said President Nixon in principle is favorably inclined toward easing conditions for merchant shipping between the USSR and the U.S., and is willing to reach an agreement to this effect on the basis of reciprocity with the Soviet side.

Meanwhile, a specific response to all of the Soviet proposals may be forthcoming in a while, after the competent U.S. agencies have studied them.

*A. Dobrynin*

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**180. Telegram From Ambassador Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 22, 1971.

Very Urgent

In connection with the announcement that Nixon’s visit to Peking has been agreed to, I would like to present some thoughts given recent discussions with Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers on this subject and reactions to the announcement within American political circles.

As the dust settles over the sensation caused here by Nixon’s announcement that an agreement has been reached with the Chinese leadership on his visit to Peking, aspects of the agreement are coming to light that could cause a certain amount of difficulty for the White House in the future.

This primarily relates to the fact that no specific date has been set for the visit, while the last possible time for it to take place has been postponed to May of next year, which encompasses a lengthy ten-month period from now.

1. The lack of a specific date for the visit to Peking is undoubtedly a minus for the Americans.

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<sup>6</sup> The text printed below is similar but not identical to the original English translation that Dobrynin gave Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [Pt. 2])

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<sup>1</sup> Source: AVP RF, f. 59a, op. 7, p. 13, d. 9, l. 91–98. Top Secret.

All our information indicates that there was a disagreement between Kissinger and Chou En-lai when they discussed the date for Nixon's arrival. The American side clearly tried to set an earlier date for the visit, closer to the present, while the Chinese side sought to put off Nixon's arrival in Peking until well into next year.

Senate Republican Leader Scott told us that when Nixon himself was briefing Congressional leaders on the talks with Chou En-lai, he said he had instructed Kissinger to propose to the Chinese Premier that the Peking meeting be held prior to the U.S. primary elections, that is before March. While not ruling out such a possibility in principle, Chou En-lai refused to incorporate this date in the joint public statement and insisted on using the timeframe of before May 1972.

It is also revealing that in his most recent conversation with us,<sup>2</sup> Kissinger, when referring to Nixon's prior attempt to arrange a meeting with the Soviet leaders, was in favor of holding such a meeting in the April–May timeframe. He observed casually that this would allow him to put pressure on the Chinese for an earlier date for Nixon's visit to Peking, sometime at the end of this year or the beginning of the next.

In brief, all the evidence points to the Chinese not accepting an early meeting with Nixon. The Americans had to give in and be content for now with the broad wording of before May 1972, i.e. a period of almost an entire year.

2. The reasons are quite clear why Nixon would like to go to Peking earlier and why the Chinese would like to put the visit off until later.

Scheduling the visit later, say in the spring of 1972, could be attractive for Nixon in one way—namely proximity to the election campaign and the impact such a sensational trip would have on it. In all other respects, a lengthy gap of many months between the announcement and the visit itself would put the Americans in a disadvantageous position, since the unwritten “obligation” would fall principally on them to take no actions, especially in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, that could spoil the atmosphere for the Peking meeting. Otherwise the meeting might not take place.

Besides possible general assurances, the Chinese do not have to assume specific obligations

like this, since in contrast to the Americans they are not directly involved in military operations in Southeast Asia, for example.

In a nutshell, Washington's policy is now limited, for the sake of the meeting, to the bounds of fairly “good behavior” in South-East Asia, the UN, and on other important issues for the entire period leading up to the meeting.

Moreover, the White House is bound by certain domestic commitments, in particular, its promise to continue the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The sooner the Peking meeting takes place, the greater will be the “position of strength” (so favored by the President and Kissinger) from which they can enter into talks with the Chinese. The longer the date of the meeting is put off, the fewer American troops will remain in Vietnam and the less grounds there will be for counting on a position of strength.

Thus it is clear that the longer the period of time before the meeting, the less advantageous it will be for the White House.

3. Judging by our observations, the latter factor is already beginning to arouse serious concern in Washington.

There is a certain amount of dissatisfaction, particularly in the Pentagon, that the U.S. will now be required to exercise restraint in Indochina, to desist from launching major offensive operations, and to refrain from massive bombing of the southern areas of the DRV that has been the practice up to now, and so forth, so as not to weaken the President's hand with the Chinese and give the latter grounds for charging Nixon with upsetting the atmosphere in advance of the meeting.

At the same time, they are asking themselves a not insignificant question here about what should be done if the North Vietnamese and forces of the South Vietnamese PRG were to launch major offensive operations of their own in Indochina during this period. How would plans for the Peking meeting be affected by massive American retaliatory strikes from the air, sea, and perhaps on land, which might be unavoidable in this case to save Saigon from a major defeat?

There are secret fears among the Americans that the South Vietnamese generals could pursue a “risky,” or to be more precise, provocative course of action that would also put the U.S. in a difficult situation with respect to the U.S.-China meeting.

Granted, in this case the White House itself is counting on the fact that on their part the Chinese

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<sup>2</sup> July 19.

will persuade the DRV and the South Vietnamese PRG to also exercise restraint during this period. But the Americans are not totally clear about this. There are apprehensions here that Peking can influence the Vietnamese only up to a certain point and no further, and this could have its own risky implications for current White House expectations regarding Nixon's trip to China.

On the whole, a situation is developing that can hardly be described as a reasonably complete understanding between the Chinese and the Americans.

We have reported that Nixon himself as much as admitted in a private conversation with Senator Scott that he is unsure how his visit to Peking might shape up.

The delay in Nixon's visit to Peking appears to be evidence of yet another not insignificant factor, namely that the Chinese and the Americans have not yet carved out an approach to resolving the main problems between them such as the Vietnam War, Laos, Cambodia and, more importantly, Taiwan. If their viewpoints on these issues were close already at this stage, neither side would stop to think things over for long and the meeting would take place quite quickly. All of these issues are still rife with unforeseen stumbling blocks for them.

However, to all appearances the two sides have already begun their search for solutions to these problems and for compromises. In any case, Kissinger has brought together the relevant "team of experts" in the White House under his leadership to prepare for the visit. Even ABM specialists familiar with Chinese work in this area have joined the "team," in case this issue is discussed with the Chinese.

However, the primary focus of attention is on preparing for the Vietnam issue, and for South-East Asia as a whole, since this is a matter of high priority for Nixon. He is evidently hoping that the Chinese will help him escape from this quagmire "with his dignity intact," which can secure him a victory in the elections.

In fact, this is the main reason why Nixon is ready to run the aforementioned political risk associated with the circumstances of his trip to Peking. He is prepared to pay a certain price in return, by meeting the Chinese halfway on issues of interest to them. In short, he is clearly counting on the possibility of making a deal with the Chinese.

Of course, the above analysis is not intended to detract from the significance of the very fact that the Americans and the Chinese have reached agreement on Nixon visiting Peking for talks with the Chinese leadership. This agreement is indisputable evidence of a major improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations and will have an impact on the overall international situation.

At the same time it is no small matter that Nixon, apparently in a hurry to reap domestic political benefits and to publicize the fact that an agreement has been reached with the Chinese on the meeting, still does not have the necessary guarantees from the Chinese as to the success of the whole undertaking. This can in turn lead to considerable complications in the future (which would be a good idea to foster wherever possible) that will inevitably have an impact on other aspects of Nixon's foreign policy and on his domestic positions.

Setting aside for the moment the loss the Chinese have suffered within the international Communist and workers' movement, they currently enjoy a more favorable position than do the Americans. As noted earlier, they are evidently under no obligations with regard to the "pre-visit atmosphere," while the Americans are in effect bound by the need to "conduct themselves" with restraint in Asian affairs, especially in the Indochina War.

The "revolutionaries" in Peking are certainly not indifferent to the tone of their Washington partner's conduct during this period, especially after so many years of Chinese diatribes directed at Washington. The Chinese will hardly be pleased if for some reason the Americans resume intensive bombing in Indochina and otherwise continue to obliterate Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians, or if more and more American atrocities are uncovered in South Vietnam. The Peking leadership cannot help but be offended by the assurances that the White House is now lavishing on its allies and—what must be particularly distasteful to the Chinese—on the rightist Sato government in Japan and on Chiang Kai-shek.

Issues such as these, especially when they become widely known to the public, will of course make it harder for the Chinese leaders to prepare for a "cordial meeting" with the U.S. President in Peking. A lot of unforeseen developments can happen over the course of the long, almost ten-month period.

In conclusion, I would note that certain objective opportunities exist that we can usefully exploit to take our own appropriate countermeasures in the period leading up to the U.S.-Chinese meeting in Peking.

It is not a matter of issuing a government statement criticizing the U.S. and the PRC for their agreement to meet. That would hardly be a sensible approach for obvious reasons. However, utilizing various channels, we should consistently, though not obtrusively, draw the attention of world public opinion to issues and facts that cast the motives and the actions of the two governments in a far from positive light. At the same time we should gradually highlight everything that continues to stand between the U.S. and the PRC and hinders their rapprochement, particularly those issues that are antagonistic to us.

*A. Dobrynin*

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## Meeting Between Presidential Assistant Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin

JULY 27, 1971

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### 181. Memorandum of Conversation (USSR)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 27, 1971.

I met with Kissinger at the White House. He said that among the aspects of limiting strategic offensive arms now being discussed by the two delegations in Helsinki, there is also the issue of reducing the risk of unintentional, accidental nuclear war. This issue has already been examined in considerable detail. Hence, by making some additional effort now, it would not be very difficult, in the view of the U.S. side, to conclude a separate agreement on this issue in the near future. Such an

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<sup>1</sup> Source: AVP RF, f. 0129, op. 55a, p. 426, d. 2, l. 75–76. Top Secret. From Dobrynin's Journal. No American record of the meeting has been found. Kissinger, however, also called Dobrynin at 10:28 a.m. to discuss several issues, including the proposal for a separate "accidental war" agreement. A transcript of the telephone conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File.

agreement could then be signed in Washington or Moscow. This could be done, for instance, by the heads of the two delegations now negotiating in Helsinki.

Either of these options is acceptable to the U.S. Government, and they are willing to discuss other possible proposals on this matter that the Soviet side may have regarding the place of signing as well as the individuals who would be authorized to do it.

Kissinger qualified his comment by saying that of course this proposal of theirs ought not in any way affect the existing agreement of May 20, 1971 between the two governments, which should continue to be the basis for the current work of our two delegations at the Helsinki talks.

I said the Soviet delegation had already stated in Vienna and Helsinki that reducing the risk of nuclear war is a significant issue in its own right, and therefore concluding a separate accord on this issue is also conceivable, after the requisite preparatory work is completed and an appropriate text is agreed upon.

Kissinger, however, came back to the issue he had raised, saying it is important for them that on this matter—namely the possibility of concluding such a separate accord soon, and not continuing to discuss the subject generally—an appropriate decision at a high level be made now by their side and ours. Then this mutually agreed decision would be reflected in respective additional instructions to both delegations.

Speaking unofficially but frankly, he added, the White House approaches this issue now from the perspective that under the present circumstances (an allusion to recent developments in U.S.-Chinese relations), it would be useful—if, of course, this accords with the Soviet position—to move ahead in resolving the above-mentioned issue. This would be another unmistakable positive step in U.S.-Soviet relations and would at the same time be useful in dispelling "various speculations" about these relations.

The U.S. proposal on concluding a separate agreement soon on reducing the risk of nuclear war has its pluses and minuses both from a military and a political standpoint. This entire issue as currently framed by the White House is taking on a somewhat different complexion, beyond the original framework of the set of issues being discussed at the SALT talks. It is now taking on its own quite