2. Although recent events in Eastern Europe caught most of the world by surprise, the European Community, USSR, and US are now beginning to focus on the military, economic, and political implications of a reunited and probably resurgent Germany. Overall, the prospect of a single Germany stirs concern and uncertainty through both Western and Eastern Europe. Europeans have bitter memories of Nazi Germany and are genuinely uneasy about reunification. Eastern Europeans and the Poles, in particular, fear German revanchism and see continued German membership in NATO as a guarantee of good behavior. Similarly, the French, British, and other NATO members are uneasy about the consequences of German reunification. And although the focus for NATO for 40 years centered on the military threat posed by the USSR, another tacit reason for the alliance was the maintenance of military control over a rearmed West Germany through an integrated NATO command structure. The Bonn Government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl has said that a reunified Germany would remain in NATO. According to West German Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg the protection guaranteed by NATO must be valid for all of Germany, and not only for the Western part. It is his view that Germany will continue to take part in NATO's military organization, but will also commit itself not to deploy any integrated command authorities or troops assigned to NATO on the territory of the present GDR. Under the plan, which was recently endorsed by the US Secretary of State, some Soviet Forces might be allowed to remain in what is now East Germany, at least temporarily. Publicly, Soviet officials have said that the USSR would not accept a reunified Germany in NATO. But privately, American officials say the Soviets' response has been less resolute despite the fact that the USSR wants to remain a European superpower. There is also the related view that a united Germany without NATO could give new life to the Warsaw Pact since Eastern Europe could come to view the USSR as its protector against Germany.
3. Further complicating the situation is that both East and West Germany are holding national elections this year (East Germany on 18 Mar and in West Germany in Dec 90). In both Germanys, the left (Social Democratic Parties) could well become dominant. Of course, in the east this is more probable than in the west. Should the left gain ascendancy there will be a deemphasis on defense with a concomitant increase on restructuring the economies of both states and expanding social programs. Even if Mr Kohl retains power (rated 50-50 at best) he will still need to be more sensitive to the left, especially if the two Germanies unite into a interim confederacy form of government. Indeed, Mr Kohl's best chance for political survival may be to be a hardliner on the need for a strong, united Germany that assures freedom from communism. This is the only real strategy available to him.